[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
P. Venkatamuni vs State Of Karnataka on 7 April, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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NC: 2026:KHC:19341
CRL.P No. 5248 of 2026
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 5248 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1. P. VENKATAMUNI
S/O P.MUNIKRISHNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
R/O. NO.54, VALEPURA,
DINNE NEAR GREEN GARDEN SCHOOL, WHITE
BENGALURU CITY - 560 67
AND ALSO AT
NO.510, DINNURU MAIN ROAD
NEAR AMBEDKAR STATUE
KADUGODI PLANTATION
KADUGODI, BENGALURU - 560 067.
Digitally
signed by 2. DEVAMMA @ INDIRA DEVI P.,
SANJEEVINI J W/O. VENKATAMUNI.P
KARISHETTY
Location: AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
High Court of R/O. NO.120,
Karnataka
SRINIVAS MANDIR ROAD,
NEAR NAVABHARATA PUBLICATION
BALEPET, MAIN ROAD,
BENGALURU SOUTH, CHICKPET,
BENGALURU - 560 053.
3. DEEPA P.,
D/O P. VENKATAMUNI
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
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CRL.P No. 5248 of 2026
HC-KAR
R/O.NO.184
BALEPET MAIN ROAD,
NEAR NAVABHARATHA PUBLICATION
BALEPET BENGALURU SOUTH, CHICKPET,
BENGALURU - 560 053.
4. DIVYA P. V.,
D/O P.VENKATAMUNI
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
R/O. NO.184,
NAVABHARATHA PUBLICATIONS
BALEPET MAIN ROAD,
BENGALURU SOUTH, CHICKPET,
BENGALURU - 560 053.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ANAND R.V., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY WHITEFIELD POLICE STATION
BENGALURU CITY - 560 062
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
OFFICE ATTACHED TO
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU.
2. SMT. XXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI CHANNAPPA ERAPPA, HCGP FOR R-1;
SMT.SRINITHA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
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CRL.P No. 5248 of 2026
HC-KAR
THIS CRL.P FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.98/2026 REGISTERED
BY WHITEFIELD P.S., BENGALURU CITY, SAME IS PENDING
BEFORE THE ACJM, BENGALURU RURAL, FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S 69, 115(2), 351(3) R/W 3(5) OF BNS, 2023.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners - accused Nos.1 to 4 are at the doors of
this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime
No.98/2026, pending before the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate (ACJM), Bengaluru Rural, for the offences under
Sections 69, 115(2), 351(3) r/w. 3(5) of the BNS, 2023.
2. Heard Sri Anand R.V., learned counsel for petitioners,
Sri Channappa Erappa, learned High Court Government Pleader
for respondent No.1 and Smt. Srinitha B.V., learned counsel for
respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
The complainant gets married to one Suresh M., in the
year 1998 and the marriage ends up in divorce in the year
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2011. In the year 2019, complainant develops relationship
with one Venkatamuni, the petitioner, who is said to have
promised to marry the complainant and they remain in live-in
relationship for 3 years. Later, on certain discord, the
relationship between the two breaks. The allegations against
petitioner No.1 are that, the petitioner for 6 years had sexual
relation on the promise of marriage and the petitioner has
breached the promise of marriage and against petitioner Nos.2
to 4, the allegation is for the offences of criminal intimidation
and assault.
4. Learned counsel for petitioners and respondent No.2
would submit that the complainant and the petitioner have now
settled their dispute among themselves and the complainant is
not wanting to pursue the complaint. The submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties cannot be accepted on the score
that the impugned crime cannot be closed by recording
settlement, in the light of the fact that the offence being
punishable under Section 69 of the BNS. Therefore, this Court
deems it fit to consider the petition on its merit.
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5. Learned counsel for petitioners would vehemently
contend that the relationship between accused No.1 and the
complainant was for more than 6 years and never on promise
of marriage. The relationship between petitioner No.1 and the
complainant was consensual. The complainant is already
married and having children from her first marriage, which
ends in divorce. Therefore, there is no warrant of permission
for making investigation even in the case at hand. The
complainant has not stopped at by drawing only petitioner -
accused No.1 with whom she had relationship into the web of
crime but, the members of the family of accused No.1 have
also been dragged. Therefore, he submits that the impugned
crime is abuse of the process of the law.
6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 - complainant
would submit that he would leave the decision to the Court as
the complainant is not interested in pursuing the matter.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The
relationship between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 -
complainant is a matter of record. The complaint itself
indicates that both were in a live-in relationship for over 6
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years, all are consensual acts and later, the relationship breaks.
As the impugned crime has triggered from the complaint, I
deem it appropriate to quote the complaint. It reads as
follows:
"ರವ ೆ ಾಂಕ: 02.02.2026
ಸ ಇ ೆಕ ರವ ೆ
ೈ ೕ ೕ ಾ ೆ,
!ೆಂಗಳ$ರು.
ಇಂದ
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
'ಾನ)*ೇ,
+ಷಯ : ./ೕ. 0. ೆಂಕಟಮು3 ಎಂಬುವವರು ನನ6ನು6 ಮದು ೆ
'ಾ78ೊಳ:;<ೆ=ೕ ೆಂದು 6 ವಷ> ನನ6 ?ೊ<ೆ ಸಹAೕವನ
'ಾ7 ಮದು ೆ 'ಾ78ೊಳ;Bೇ Cೕಸ 'ಾ7ರುವ ಬ ೆD
ದೂರು.
ಈ FೕಲHಂಡ +ಷಯ8ೆH ಸಂಬಂJKದಂ<ೆ ./ೕಮL. XXXX ಆದ ಾನು FೕಲHಂಡ
+Oಾಸದ P ಾಸ ಾQರು<ೆ=ೕ ೆ Rಾಗೂ Sೈಲ 8ೆಲಸ 'ಾ78ೊಂಡು Aೕವನ
ನTೆಸುL=ರು<ೆ=ೕ ೆ. 1998 ರ P ./ೕ. ಸು*ೇU.ಎಂ ಎಂಬುವವರ ?ೊ<ೆ ಮದು ೆ ಆQದುV 2011
ರ P +WೆXೕದನ ಪTೆ ರು<ೆ=ೕ ೆ. +WೆZೕದನ ಪTೆದ ನಂತರ 2018 ರ ವ*ೆಗೂ ಾನು ಮRಾಲ\]
^ೇಔ , ಕುರುಬರಹ`; ?ೆ.K. ನಗರದ P ನನ6 Aೕವನ ಒಂbcಾQ ನ7ಸುL=ರು<ೆ=ೕ ೆ. 2019
ರ P ./ೕ. 0. ೆಂಕಟಮು3 ಎಂಬುವವರು ನನ6ನು6 ಮದು ೆ 'ಾ78ೊಳ:;<ೆ=ೕ ೆಂದು ಎಂದು
Rೇ` ನನ6ನು6 ಮRಾಲ\] ^ೇಔ , ಕುರುಬರಹ`; ?ೆ.K. ನಗರ ಂದ ಕುಂdೇನ ಅಗ/Rಾರ,
8ಾಡು ೋ7 ೆ ಕ*ೆತಂದು 3 ವಷ> ಇBೇ +Oಾಸದ P ಾಸ+ರು<ೆ=ೕ ೆ. ಈ ಮೂರು ವಷ>ವf
ನನ6ನು6 ಮದು ೆ 'ಾ78ೊಳ:;<ೆ=ೕ ೆಂದು Rೇ` ನನ6 ?ೊ<ೆ ಸಹAೕವನ ನTೆKರು<ಾ=*ೆ. Rಾಗೂ
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ಾಸ+ರು<ೆ=ೕ ೆ. ಾOೇಪfರ ೆ6 ೆ ಬಂದ 2 ವಷ>ಗಳ: ಸುಖ ಾQ ನನ6 ?ೊ<ೆ
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ಸಹAೕವನದ P ಇದುV 1 ವಷ> ಂದ ನನ6 Fೕ^ೆ ಅ ೇಕ !ಾ ಅ^ೆP 'ಾ7 ನನ6ನು6 ಒTೆದು,
ಎiೊ ೕ jಾ ನನ6ನು6 ಮ ೆkಂದ Rೊರ ೆ Rಾlರು<ಾ=*ೆ. ಾನು ನಮm ಅಮmನ ಮ ೆ ೆ
RೊರSಾಗ ನನ6ನು6 ಅ Pಂದ ಏ'ಾjK ಮ<ೆ=ೕ ಾOೇಪfರ ೆ6 ೆ ಕ*ೆತಂದು ನನ ೆ lರುಕುಳ
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./ೕಮL Bೇವಮm ಮತು= ಅವರ ಮಕHOಾದ ./ೕಮL. ೕ ಾ ಮತು= ./ೕಮL. ಾ) ರವರು
ಮ ೆಯ ಹL=ರ ಕ*ೆತಂದು ನನ6 Fೕ^ೆ Bೈoಕ ಹ^ೆP 'ಾ7ರು<ಾ=*ೆ. ಾನು ಏ ಾದರೂ
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8ೊ^ೆ !ೆದ 8ೆ Rಾlರು<ಾ=*ೆ.
ಆದV ಂದ ಾನು ತಮm P 8ೇ`8ೊಳ:;ವfBೇ ೆಂದ*ೆ ನನ6 ಮ ೆಯ Bೈನಂ ನ
ಸಲಕರ ೆಗಳ: ಮತು= ನನ6 ಒಡ ೆ, ಾನು rೕb ಎL=ರುವ ಹಣ ಮತು= !ೆ`; jಾ'ಾನು ಇBೇ
ಾOೇಪfರ ೆ6 ಮ ೆಯ Pರುವf ಂದ ಾನು ಅದನು6 ಪTೆದು8ೊಳ;ಲು ./ೕ. 0. ೆಂಕಟಮು3
ರವರ Cದಲ ೇ RೆಂಡL ./ೕಮL Bೇವಮm ಮತು= ಅವರ ಮಕHOಾದ ./ೕಮL. ೕ ಾ ಮತು=
./ೕಮL, ಾ) ರವರುಗಳ: ಅ7ಪ7ಸುL=ರು<ಾ=*ೆ Rಾಗೂ ಅವರುಗಳ: ಇBೇ ಮ ೆಯ P
ಪ/ಸು=ತ ಾಸ+ರು<ಾ=*ೆ Rಾಗೂ ನನ6ನು6 ಈ ಮ ೆಯ ಬರಲು tಡುL=ಲP. ಆದV ಂದ ನನ ೆ
Fೕ^ಾHgKದ ಇವರುಗ`ಂದ ನನ ೆ ಾ/ಣ Rಾg ಇರುವfದ ಂದ ನನ ೆ ತumಂದ ರv ೆ
ಒದQK8ೊಟು ಇವರುಗಳ Fೕ^ೆ 8ಾನೂನು ೕL ಕ/ಮ ಜರುQK ನನ ೆ ಾ)ಯ
8ೊ7ಸ!ೇ8ಾQ ತಮm P ಕಳಕ`ಯ ಾ/ಥ> ೆ."
A perusal at the complaint would indicate that the acts
between petitioner No.1 and the complainant are all consensual
and it cannot become an offence under Section 69 of the BNS
or Section 64 of the BNS. Jurisprudence is replete with the
judgments of the Apex Court on the issue. Therefore, I deem it
appropriate to quote two of the judgments of the Apex Court on
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the issue in the lis. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA1 the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
28. We find that the present case is not a case
where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for
physical pleasures and then vanished. The
relationship continued for a period of three long
years, which is a considerable period of time. They
remained close and emotionally involved. In such
cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the
course of a functioning relationship cannot be
retrospectively branded as instances of offence of
rape merely because the relationship failed to
culminate in marriage.
29. This Court has, on numerous occasions,
taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed
or broken relationships are given the colour of
criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest
kind, must be invoked only in cases where there
exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence
of free consent. To convert every sour relationship
into an offence of rape not only trivialises the
seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the
accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such
instances transcend the realm of mere personal
discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery
in this regard is a matter of profound concern and
calls for condemnation.
30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5
SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us
(Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a
relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in
the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a
consensual relationship between the parties at the initial
stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said
relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant
portion is extracted as under:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528
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"20. In our view, taking the allegations in
the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the
crucial ingredients of the offence under Section
376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and
the complainant's statement under Section
164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of
marriage was extended at the outset of their
relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the
prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it
cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged
in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on
account of any assurance of marriage from the
appellant. The relationship between the parties was
cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break
up of a relationship between a consenting couple
cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings.
What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour
of criminality when the said relationship does not
fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both
parties are now married to someone else and have
moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our
view, the continuation of the prosecution in the
present case would amount to a gross abuse of the
process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be
served by continuing the prosecution."
(underlining by us)
31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in
which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage
holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore,
not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her
partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the
assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a
lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such
circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very
foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather
than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent
may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise
of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no
genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman.
The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where
trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the
protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a
mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time,
the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible
evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated
allegations or moral conjecture.
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... .... ...
33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that,
during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or
allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding
the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was
only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for
payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present
criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore,
the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between
12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged
only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last
alleged act of sexual intimacy.
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific
allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or
compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel,
nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or
inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her
presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that
emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition,
visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also
borne out from the record that whenever the appellant
brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2
herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the
contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical
relationship between the parties was premised upon any
assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit
and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision
of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when
a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual
relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and
without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship
was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of
marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man
cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC.
The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year
2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant
were residing in different towns. The complainant is
an educated woman and there was no pressure
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whatsoever upon her which could have prevented
her from filing a police complaint against the
accused if she felt that the sexual relations were
under duress or were being established under a
false assurance of marriage. On many occasions,
she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the
appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the
intention of the appellant was to cheat her right
from the inception of the relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact
that it was mostly the complainant who used to
travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting.
Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship
between the complainant and the appellant was
consensual without the existence of any element of
deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the
complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-
2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a
consensual relationship with the appellant since
2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she
had proposed that they should marry and live
together, the appellant physically abused her and
beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in
this allegation then the FIR should have been
registered immediately after this incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge
of the complainant that the appellant was getting
married to another woman, in an attempt to stop
his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the
One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that
she was equally guilty as the appellant and
therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
xxx
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is
not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has
wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The
Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can
agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her
love and passion for the accused."
(underlining by us)
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the
High Court observed that although it was contended on
behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him
and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such
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categorical statement was made by him in the memo of
application and that the plea of consent was merely
inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High
Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ)
505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had
stated that unless there was a specific defence of a
consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however,
fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in
question itself reveals that the relationship between
the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as
respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he
expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore,
respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated
individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant
and entered into physical intimacy on her own
volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the
relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was
subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances,
even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it
is manifest that the relationship between the parties
was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an
express statement to that effect in the memo of
application, as emphasised in the impugned order,
cannot be held against the appellant when the same
can be otherwise clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision
of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following
observations were made:
"29. It must also be clear that for a promise
to be a false promise to amount to misconception
of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must
have been made from the very beginning with an
intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to
have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is
established that such consent was given under a
misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated
and not a valid consent. In this regard we may
refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC
675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held
as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
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"21. Consent may be express or implied,
coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through
deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied
by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex and in
a case like this, the court must very carefully
examine whether the accused had actually wanted
to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and
had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit
of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and consequences
of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where
the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse
on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently. An accused can be convicted for rape
only if the court reaches a conclusion that the
intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he
had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The 'failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of
fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance'.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
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situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the
court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her."
(underlining by us)"
7.1. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL
v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA2 the Apex Court has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
8. Having heard both sides in this case and after
carefully considering the material on record, the following
attributes come to the fore:
(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true
and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not
appear from the record that the consent of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against
her will and merely on an assurance to marry. The
Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself
admits that they interacted frequently and fell in
love. The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in
a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had
done so without her consent, however she not only
sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but
continued to visit him in lodges on two separate
occasions. The narrative of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate
with her conduct.
(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent
no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also
cannot be said to have been obtained under a
misconception of fact. There is no material to
substantiate "inducement or
misrepresentation" on the part of the Appellant
to secure consent for sexual relations without
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230
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having any intention of fulfilling said promise.
Investigation has also revealed that
the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022
which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had
obtained from her ex-husband. During this
time, the parties were already in a relationship
and the alleged incident had already taken
place. It is inconceivable that the Complainant
had engaged in a physical relationship with the
Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while
she was already married to someone else. Even
otherwise, such promise to begin with was
illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant.
(c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of
injury to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to
attract an offence under section 506 IPC. It is
improbable that there was any threat caused to
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the
Appellant when all along the relationship was
cordial, and it was only when the Appellant
graduated and left for his hometown to
Ahmednagar, the Complainant/Respondent no.
2 became agitated. We also cannot ignore the
conduct of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
in visiting the native village of the Appellant
without any intimation, which is also
unacceptable and reflects the agitated and
unnerved state of mind of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same
reason, the criminal prosecution against the
Appellant herein is probably with an underlying
motive and disgruntled state of mind.
(d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman
being married before and having a child of four
years, would continue to be deceived by the
Appellant or maintain a prolonged association
or physical relationship with an individual who
has sexually assaulted and exploited her.
9. In our considered view, this is also not a
case where there was a false promise to marry to
begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or
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partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for
invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such
conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the
identity of an individual accused of such a heinous
offence. This Court has time and again warned
against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed
it a folly3 to treat each breach of promise to marry as
a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence
under section 376 IPC."
The Apex Court in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL,
observes that where the complainant is already married, the
allegation of physical intimacy induced by promise of marriage
stands on infirm grounds, for a promise which is ex-facie
unenforceable, cannot in those circumstances, be elevated into
a foundation of imputing criminality.
8. What would remain are the offences under Sections
115(2), 351(3) r/w. 3(5) of the BNS. Respondent No.2 except
stating that petitioner Nos.2 to 4, who are the wife and children
of petitioner No.1 have assaulted her and have given a life
threat, has not indicated any specific overt acts performed by
them. The ingredients of the offence under Section 115(2) of
the BNS is in Sections 115(1) of the BNS and the ingredients of
the offence under Section 351(3) of the BNS is in Section
351(1) of the BNS. They read as follows:
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"115. Voluntarily causing hurt.--(1) Whoever does
any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt
to any person, or with the knowledge that he is
likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and
does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said
"voluntarily to cause hurt".
(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by
sub-section (1) of section 122 voluntarily causes hurt,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both."
"351. Criminal intimidation.--(1) Whoever
threatens another by any means, with any injury to
his person, reputation or property, or to the person
or reputation of any one in whom that person is
interested, with intent to cause alarm to that
person, or to cause that person to do any act which
he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any
act which that person is legally entitled to do, as
the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,
commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of
any deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.
Illustration.
A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is
guilty of criminal intimidation.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both.
(3) Whoever commits the offence of criminal
intimidation by threatening to cause death or
grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any
property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable
with death or imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
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description for a term which may extend to seven
years, or with fine, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
A perusal at the complaint would not indicate any of the
ingredients of Section 115(1) or Section 351(1) of the BNS.
The provisions indicate that whoever threatens another with
any injury to his person, reputation or property with intent to
cause alarm to that person is said to have criminally intimated
the victim. In the case at hand, the complainant has neither
produced any wound certificate or produce any evidence on
record, except making omnibus statements, nothing is on
record to prove the allegations against the petitioners. It is
apposite to notice the postulates laid down by the Apex Court
in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL3 wherein
it is held as follows:
".... .... ....
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335
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extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
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there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In the afore-quoted judgment, the Apex Court permits
quashing at the stage of crime / investigation, where the
allegations even if taken at face value, do not constitute an
offence and if the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fides and the continuation of proceedings would
amount to abuse of the process of the criminal law. Therefore,
permitting further investigation to continue against the
petitioners would become an abuse of the process of the law
and therefore, the crime registered against the petitioners is
required to be obliterated.
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9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The criminal petition is allowed.
b. The impugned crime in Crime No.98/2026, pending
before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM),
Bengaluru, stand quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
nvj
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 169
