Wednesday, 13, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

M/S. Janardhana Enterprises vs M/S. Fine Serve Hospitality
2024 Latest Caselaw 22589 Kant

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 22589 Kant
Judgement Date : 5 September, 2024

Karnataka High Court

M/S. Janardhana Enterprises vs M/S. Fine Serve Hospitality on 5 September, 2024

                                           -1-
                                                    NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB
                                                        MFA No. 668 of 2019




                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                       DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2024

                                        PRESENT
                         THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
                                           AND
                       THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
                 MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 668 OF 2019 (AA)
                BETWEEN:

                M/S. JANARDHANA ENTERPRISES,
                A REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP FIRM
                HAVING ITS OFFICE AT "VEDASRI",
                OPPOSITE TO SUBHAMANGALA KALYANA MANTAPA,
                60 FEET ROAD, 2ND STAGE, VINOBHA NAGAR,
                SHIVAMOGGA - 577 201.
                (REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER &
                 AUTHORIZED PERSON MR. M.S. MURALIDHARA ARAS)
                                                                ...APPELLANT
                (BY SRI. ASHOK HANDE, ADVOCATE)

                AND:


Digitally       M/S. FINE SERVE HOSPITALITY
signed by K S   SERVICES INDIA PVT. LTD.,
RENUKAMBA       A PVT. LTD. COMPANY INCORPORATED
Location:       UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF COMPANIES
High Court of   ACT, 1956, HAVING ITS REGISTERED
Karnataka
                OFFICE AT NO. 528, 2ND MAIN,
                2ND CROSS, 2ND PHASE, 5TH STAGE,
                BEML LAYOUT, RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR,
                BANGALORE - 560 098.
                (REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
                MR. SHASHIDHARA PADUVARY)
                                                              ...RESPONDENT
                (BY SRI.PRAVEEN HEGDE, ADVOCATE (ABSENT))

                     THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1)(b) OF
                ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 PRAYING TO SET
                ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
                SESSIONS JUDGE, CHITRADURGA, IN A.S.NO.3/2017 DATED
                                  -2-
                                             NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB
                                              MFA No. 668 of 2019




30.11.2018   ANNEXURE-A,  IN   ALLOWING   THE   PETITION/
APPLICATION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT UNDER S.9 OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, WITH SUCH OTHER
INCIDENTAL RELIED AS DEEM FIT AND PROPER UNDER THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, TO SECURE THE ENDS OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

     THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:


CORAM:     HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
           AND
           HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T


                         ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL)

This appeal is preferred challenging the judgment and

award dated 30.11.2018 in A.S.No.3/2017, passed by the

Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chitradurga. By the

impugned judgment and order, the learned District Judge has

allowed the application filed by the present respondent under

Section-9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for

short '1996 Act') and directed the appellant to pay a sum of

Rs.81,56,124/- as arrears of rent, to be paid within a period of

thirty days.

2. The appellant was the respondent and the

respondent was the petitioner in A.S.No.3/2017 before the

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chitradurga. For the

purpose of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their

ranking before the District Judge.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

On 07.02.2011, Karnataka State Road Transport

Corporation (for short 'KSRTC') entered into a contract titled as

'Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT)' with the petitioner

M/s.Hospitality Services India Private Limited. As per the said

contract, the petitioner had to construct hotel and lodge in

Survey No.79/1 on NH-4 at Metikurki, Hiriyur, Chitradurga

District, Karnataka and operate the same by paying certain

rents to KSRTC. Clause-16 of the said agreement permitted the

petitioner to sub-let the property. In compliance with the said

agreement, the petitioner constructed a hotel and lodge named

as KSRTC - 'Atithya Midway Plaza'.

4. On 20.04.2015, the petitioner entered into two sub-

lease agreements with the respondent to run the KSRTC -

Atithya Midway Plaza and a lodge on payment of certain rents.

The respondent filed O.S.No.97/2015 against the petitioner

before the Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Hiriyur for permanent

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

injunction not to dispossess it without adopting due process of

law. Pending that suit, the petitioner filed A.A. No.3/2017

before the Principal District And Sessions Judge, Chitradurga,

under Section - 9 of the Act 1996, seeking an order to the

respondent for payment of all the arrears of rent forthwith,

payment of future rents, furnishing of proof of remittance of tax

deducted at source, etc. As per Rule 10(d) of High Court of

Karnataka Arbitration (Proceedings before the Courts) Rules,

2001 the said case ought to have been registered as an

Arbitration Application (AA) but the Trial Court has erroneously

classified it as an Arbitration Suit (AS). For the sake of

convenience it shall be referred to as classified by the Trial

Court.

5. The respondent contested the said petition denying

the arrears of rent and other allegations made against it. The

respondent contended that it has complied with all the terms

and conditions of the sub-lease agreement. It was further

contended that the application filed in O.S. No.97/2015 by the

petitioner, was rejected by the said court and on the ground

that no case is made out to grant relief under Section-9 of the

Act 1996. It was also contended that such application is filed

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

without invoking the arbitration clause and seeking

appointment of an Arbitrator and on that ground also, the

petition is not maintainable.

6. Learned District Judge on hearing the parties, by

the impugned judgment and order held that as per the records

produced before him the arrears of rents were not paid. So far

as the maintainability of the petition, it was held that when

there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, filing of a

petition before the High Court for appointment of an Arbitrator

amounts to initiation of arbitration proceedings. The said

judgment in challenged before this Court in the above appeal

on the following grounds:

i) That the dispute was not arbitrable.

ii) The impugned order is violative of Rule - 9(2) and

(4) of High Court of Karnataka Arbitration (Proceedings

Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 (for short 'Rules 2001').

iii) CMP No.185/2017 filed by the petitioner was

dismissed at its behest. Therefore, arbitration under

Section-9 of Act 1996 cannot be invoked.

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

7. On 23.06.2021, this Court on hearing the parties

allowed the appeal on the on the following grounds:

i) CMP 185/2001 was dismissed on respondents own

submission that in view of judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Himangni Enterprises Vs.

Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia1 and judgment of this Court

in the case of M/s.Paton Constructions Private Limited

Vs. M/s. Lorven Projects Limited and Another2, the

matter is not arbitrable.

ii) Since the arbitration proceedings are not initiated,

the impugned order is violative of Rule-9(4) of the

aforesaid Rules 2001 and Section-9(2) of the Act 1996

and the orders have to be automatically vacated.

8. The petitioner filed R.P. No.617/2022 seeking

review of the judgment of this court dated 23.06.2021 on the

ground that the order suffers from error apparent on the face

of record. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by the judgment

dated 17.11.2023, allowed the Review Petition No.617/2022 on

the following grounds:

2017 (10) SCC 706

ILR 2017 KAR 3016

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

i) The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case of Himangni Enterprises' referred to supra, was

over-ruled by the later judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Vidya Drolia and others vs. Durga

Trading Corporation3 .

ii) Before the Hon'ble District Judge even before

30.11.2018, on 08.01.2017 itself, the petitioner had

issued notice to the respondent seeking appointment of

an Arbitrator. Thus, the arbitration proceedings had

commenced.

iii) The above said two facts was unnoticed by this

Court while passing the judgment dated 23.06.2021 and

the same amounts to error apparent on the face of the

records.

9. During the course of the arguments, the learned

counsel for the appellant Sri.Ashok Hande, fairly conceded that

he does not press the ground that the dispute was not

arbitrable. In view of the subsequent developments of law

namely, the judgment of Seven Judges Bench of the Hon'ble

2021 (2) SCC 1

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

Supreme Court in the case of Interplay between Arbitration

Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 &

Stamp Act, 1899, in Re. But he submits that the lease

agreements which contained the arbitration clause were

insufficiently stamped. Therefore, the learned District Judge

was in error on acting on such agreements. He further

submitted that due to such insufficiency of stamps the

agreement becomes invalid and Section-8 of the Act 1996 bars

referring such agreement to arbitration thereby the application

under Section-9 of Act 1996 was also untenable. He further

contended that Section-9 of Act 1996 can be invoked only if

arbitration proceedings are initiated. While filing the

proceedings before the District Judge, the proceedings were not

initiated. Though CMP 185/2017 was initiated.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted

that though the petitioner filed second application in CMP

No.378/2022 under Section-11(6) of the Act 1996 withdrew

that, therefore no interim relief could be granted exercising

powers under Section - 9 of the Act 1996. In support of his

(2024) 6 SCC 1

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

contention, he relied on the judgment of this Court in

M/s.Paton Constructions' case referred to supra.

ANALYSIS

11. The impugned judgment is purportedly passed

exercising the powers under Section-9(1)(ii) of Act 1996, which

reads as follows:

9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.--

[(1)] A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a court--

(i) xxx

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:--

(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or

- 10 -

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;

(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.

(2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine."

12. A reading of the above provisions show that though

such petition can be filed even before the Arbitral proceedings

Section-9(2) of Act 1996, mandatorily arbitral proceedings shall

commence within a period of 90 days from the date of such

interim order.

- 11 -

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

13. In exercise of the powers under Section-82 of the

Act 1996, this Court has framed the Rules 2001. Rule-9(4) of

said Rules, is relevant for the purpose of this case, reads as

follows:

"9. Application for interim measure, etc -

(1) xxx (2) xxx (3) xxx (4) In the case of an application for interim measure made before initiating arbitral proceedings, if the arbitral proceedings are not initiated within three months from the date of the presentation of the Application under Section 9, any interim order granted shall stand vacated without any specific order being passed by the Court to that effect.

14. Reading of the above Rules shows that if the

arbitration proceedings are not initiated within three months

from the date of presentation of application under Section-9 of

Act 1996, any interim order granted shall stand vacated

without any specific order being passed in that regard. In the

present case, the arbitration application was filed on

01.03.2017, admittedly at that point of time the petitioner had

not filed any petition under Section-11 of the Act 1996 for

- 12 -

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

appointment of an arbitrator. The records produced before this

court show that though the petitioner filed CMP No.185/2017

before this Court under Section - 11 of the Act 1996, the

petitioner withdrew that application on 09.08.2018 as not

maintainable. Subsequent to that, the petitioner filed another

petition CMP No.378/2022 and that was also withdrawn on

10.11.2022 with liberty to commence appropriate proceedings,

after issuing fresh notice.

15. Respondent has not placed anything before this

Court to show that subsequently any proceeding was initiated.

Whereas the appellant contend that no such proceedings were

initiated. The impugned order is passed in the year 2018. In

view of Section-9(2) of Act 1996 and Rule9(4) of Rules 2001, in

the absence of initiation of the arbitration proceedings the

impugned interim order has no legs to stand.

16. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of

M/s.Paton Constructions' case referred to supra has held that

if arbitral proceedings in respect of the dispute are not

commenced within the period stated in Section-9(2) of Act

- 13 -

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

1996 and Rule-9(4) of Rules 2001, the order under Section 9

stands vacated automatically.

17. Further, from a reading of Section-9(2) it can be

gathered that the exercise of the powers to grant interim

measure is akin to Order-39 Rule-1 and 2 of CPC and great

caution has to be exercised for that. It was not the contention

of the petitioner that the respondent is likely to flee away or

there are no means to recover the amount, if at all arbitration

award is passed against the respondent for the alleged sum.

The respondent had contended that it had paid the arrears of

rent. In the guise of exercising the power under Section -

9(1)(ii)(b) of Act 1996 i.e., securing the amount of dispute of

arbitration, the Court under Section-9(1) of the Act 1996,

cannot sit as an arbitrator and decide the dispute.

18. The reading of the records of this case shows that

learned District Judge instead of exercising the powers under

Section-9(1)(ii)(b) of the Act 1996, has virtually passed the

arbitration award which is the jurisdiction of the Arbitral

Tribunal. On that count also, the impugned order is liable to be

set-aside.

- 14 -

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

19. The contention of the appellant's counsel that the

agreements containing the arbitration clause was insufficiently

stamped therefore, the arbitration clause could not have been

invoked by the Tribunal, cannot be countenanced, in view of

the Seven Judges bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court referred to supra. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court while considering the interplay of the Stamp Act

and Arbitration Act with reference to Sections-8 and 11 of the

Act 1996, has held that though insufficiently or inadequately

stamped agreements are inadmissible in evidence, in view of

Section - 35 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899, such agreements

are not rendered void or void ab-initio or unenforceable. It was

held that non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable

defect and any objection in that regard must be examined by

the Arbitral Tribunal and that falls within the ambit of the

Arbitral Tribunal. However, on the other grounds discussed

above the impugned order is liable to be set-aside. Hence, the

following:

ORDER

i) The appeal is allowed.

- 15 -

NC: 2024:KHC:36492-DB

ii) The impugned judgment and order passed in

A.S.No.3/2017, dated 30.11.2018, passed by the

Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chitradurga is

hereby set-aside.

iii) The petition in A.S. No.3/2017 is hereby dismissed

with costs.

Sd/-

(K.S.MUDAGAL) JUDGE

Sd/-

(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE

JJ

CT: BHK

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : Smt. Nirmala Devi Bam Memorial International Moot Court Competition

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter