Karnataka High Court
Smt Gouramma Alias Gangamma W/O ... vs The Deputy Commissioner Haveri on 29 July, 2024
Author: Krishna S.Dixit
Bench: Krishna S.Dixit
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WA No.100101 of 2024
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 2024
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT APPEAL NO.100101 OF 2024 (KLR-RES)
BETWEEN:
SMT. GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA
W/O. TIPPERUDRAPPA MEDLERI
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. JALINAGAR, NEAR PARK,
DAVANAGERE, DIST. DAVANAGERE.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. LAXMAN T. MANTAGANI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
by JAGADISH T
R HAVERI,
Location: High DISTRICT. HAVERI 581110.
Court of
Karnataka
Dharwad Bench
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
HAVERI SUB DIVISION 581110,
DISTRICT. HAVERI.
3. SHIVAJEPPA
S/O PAMPANNA BHOSLE
AGE. 75 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
4. CHANDRAPPA
S/O PAMPANNA BHOSLE
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WA No.100101 of 2024
AGE. 77 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
5. SAHADEVAPPA
S/O SHIDLINGAPPA TOTAD
AGE. 68 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
6. RAMAPPA
S/O SHIDLINGAPPA TOTAD
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
7. HANUMANTAPPA
S/O MAHADEVAPPA TOTAD
AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. V.S. KALASURMATH, HCGP FOR R1 & R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO, SET-ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED
BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DTD.23/01/2024 IN
W.P.NO.67352/2011 (KLR-RES) IN ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION
BY UPHOLDING THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER DTD.22/11/2004 VIDE ANNEXURE-L TO THE WRIT
PETITION AND ORDER PASSED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DTD.17/03/2011 VIDE ANNEXURE-M TO THE WRIT PETITION.
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WA No.100101 of 2024
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS
DAY, KRISHNA S.DIXIT, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE KRISHNA S.DIXIT)
This intra-court appeal seeks to call in question a
learned Single Judge's order dated 23.01.2024 whereby
private respondents' W.P. No.67352/2011 (KLR-RES)
having been favoured, the orders of Assistant Commissioner
and Deputy Commissioner for resumption of land under the
provisions of Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978
(for short, 'the 1978 Act'), have been quashed and, as a
consequence, appellant's application filed for resumption
has been dismissed.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-
grantee vehemently argues that the rejection of the earlier
applications for resumption having not been made on merits
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do not come in the way of making a fresh claim for
resumption, as observed by the Deputy Commissioner and
Assistant Commissioner in their resumption orders; learned
Single Judge in holding to the contra has grossly erred in
law; the question of dealing in making resumption
application would pale into insignificance in view of
Karnataka Act No.30 of 2023 whereby the 1978 Act has
been amended, to the effect that there shall be no
limitation of time to invoke the provisions of the 1978 Act.
Counsel submits that, this aspect having been lost sight of,
there is error apparent on the face of the impugned order of
the learned Single Judge. Learned Government Advocate
also maintained the same stand.
3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we
decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:
(a) The subject land does not answer the definition of
'granted land' in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act
cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was
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not on account of social status of the grantee. The said
grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958.
The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale
Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a
part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide
registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly,
the resumption application filed earlier was rejected
vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the
same also came to be turned down vide order
27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption
orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in
W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000,
remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That
is how the subsequent application came to be moved;
that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even
appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003.
(b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is
ununderstandable as to how persons claiming under
the original grantee could move another application
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afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner
could not have allowed the said application vide order
dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the
Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against
the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records
reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale
Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for
resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the
meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained
since it was a "hereditary land" falling within the
precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act,
1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty-
two years spanning between alienation and the filing
of resumption application. There is absolutely no
explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on
record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits
into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi vs State Of Karnataka1, that tardy and
belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning
(2020) 14 SCC 232
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has animated the impugned judgment, rightly and
therefore, the same cannot be faltered.
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the
appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the
provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding
clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section
and therefore, the concept of "limitation and delay"
has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as
under:
"(c) notwithstanding anything conained in any
law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the
provisions of this Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all
cases pending before all the competent authorities and
all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this
section."
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time,
the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for
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moving application for the resumption of granted land
after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing
legal position. Such duplication happened even in
English legislative history, hardly needs to be
mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of
limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c)
and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do
not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the
most, they are declaratory of what the statute has
been all through, so far as the limitation period is
concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no
limitation period earlier and there is no limitation
period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of
factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of "limitation period"
at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time
between alienation of granted land and the filing of
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claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in
para 8 of the decision lend support to this view:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to
terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any
interested person to make an application for having
the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the
Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within
which such an application can be made. Neither does
it prescribe the period within which suo motu action
may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal
Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. &
Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case
of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A.
No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated
a settled position in law that whether Statute provided
for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute
must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held
that action whether on an application of the parties, or
suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.
This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in
the Kosi River which make agricultural operations
impossible. An application for restoration was made
after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that
background that this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for restoration
of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after
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an unreasonably long period and was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments
of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs.
Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law
Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka,
2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G.
Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B
holding that there is no limitation provided by Section
5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be
made at any time, are overruled. ....."
(Emphasis is ours)
Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the
above case has not been altered by the subject
amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have
taken place about the observations of the Apex Court
in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the
Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to
the contention that the said amendment intends to
invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the
country which it did after considering all aspects of the
matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the
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Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti,
it would have employed a different terminology. We
repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing
the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas
"laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors.
Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and
laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227
of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay & laches'
that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that
obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex
Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan2 make out
this point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on
many occasions. However, they have their distinct
characters and distinct elements. One can say that
delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence
are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus
to a species by name acquiescence. However, there
may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not
(2022) 2 SCC 25 at para 20, 21 & 22
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laches. These principles are common law principles,
and perhaps one could identify that these principles
find place in various statutes which restrict the period
of limitation and create nonconsideration of
condonation in certain circumstances.... The underlying
principle governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an
important issue to be taken note of by the court.
Laches.
21. The word "laches" is derived from the French
language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus
involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing
a claim involving an equitable relief while causing
prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part
of a party to do an act which law requires while
asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way
of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of
the delay and the nature of acts done during the
interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence
on the part of the party approaching the court apart
from the change in position in the interregnum.
Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of
Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its
doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a
right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a
particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is
not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."
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(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment
has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and
that, matter is pending consideration. We make it
clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its
validity is another. We do not want to say even a word
about the validity, that is being examined by the
learned Single Judge before whom the matter is
pending. We have only placed our interpretation on
the amended provisions of the Act and nothing
beyond.
(i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to
observe that, legislative process is not simple and
easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care,
caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If
language is not properly employed what is said is not
what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant,
what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A
linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of
legislation. More is not necessary to specify.
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In the above circumstances, this appeal is liable to be
and accordingly, dismissed, costs having been made easy.
The Registry to send a copy of this judgment to
Respondent Nos.3 to 7 by speed post immediately.
Sd/-
(KRISHNA S.DIXIT)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL)
JUDGE
KMS, CT:VP
