National Highways Authority Of ... vs Rajarama Adyanthaya
2022 Latest Caselaw 8865 Kant

                            1



     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JUNE 2022

                         PRESENT

         THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE

                           AND

           THE HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE J.M. KHAZI

              M.F.A. NO.5376 OF 2021 (AA)

BETWEEN:

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT
DOOR NO.3-29, BETHEL
THARETHOTA, NEAR PUMPWELL
(NH-66), MANGALORE 575005
REP. BY ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR.
                                          ... APPELLANT
(BY MR. PADMANABHA HOLLA S, ADV.,)

AND:

1.     RAJARAMA ADYANTHAYA
       MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN
       S/O KITTANNA ADYANTHAYA
       PADUMANE HOUSE, TALAPADY VILLAGE
       MANGALORE 575022
       DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT.

2.     THE ARBITRATOR AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
       D.K DISTRICT
       MANGALORE 575001.

                                          ... RESPONDENTS
                           ---
                                2




      THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.37(1)(C) OF THE ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD
DT:12.11.2020 PASSED IN A.S.NO.02/2020 ON THE FILE OF THE
IV ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DAKSHINA
KANNDA,    MANGALURU,      DISMISSING     THE   ARBITRATION
APPLICATION FILED U/S.34(2) OF THE A AND C ACT, 1996 BY
PLAINTIFF.

     THIS M.F.A. COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

                             JUDGMENT

Mr.Padmanabha Holla S., learned counsel for the

appellant.

This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for

short) has been filed against the judgment dated 12.11.2020

by which objection preferred by the appellant under Section

34 of the Act has been dismissed.

2. Facts giving rise to the filing of the appeal briefly

stated are that the appellant is a statutory authority

constituted under Section 3 of the National Highways

Authority of India Act, 1988. The respondent No.1 was the

owner of wet land measuring 921 square meters of

Sy.No.132/2C situated at Talapady Village, Mangalore. The

said land was acquired by the National Highway Authority for

widening of N.H.66. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an

award and awarded a sum of Rs.9,06,280/- as compensation

to the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 thereupon

filed an application seeking enhancement of compensation

before the Arbitrator who, by an award dated 25.06.2019,

enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.28,24,268/-.

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a petition under

Section 34 of the Act on 02.01.2020 before the Trial Court

along with an application seeking condonation of delay.

Section 34(3) of the Act provides that an application for

setting aside of an award may not be made after three

months have elapsed from the date on which the party

making that application had received the arbitral award.

The proviso further empowers the Court to condone the delay

of a further period of 30 days but not thereafter. The said

provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and it

has been held that the time lines prescribed therein are

mandatory and the Court has no power to condone the delay

beyond the period of 30 days after the limitation of 90 days

of filing the appeal expires. In the instant case, the

appellant, after the expiry of 120 days which expired on

25.10.2019, filed objection under Section 34 of the Act, on

02.01.2020. The Trial Court, by the impugned judgment,

has rejected the aforesaid objection. In the aforesaid factual

background, this appeal has been filed.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant

at length. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme

Court in 'SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED Vs.

UNION OF INDIA' (2019) 2 SCC 455, it is evident that the

Court has no power to condone the delay beyond the period

of 120 days to entertain any objection to the arbitral award

under Section 34 of the Act.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted

that the appellant has not produced any material before the

Trial Court in respect of the averments that the copy of the

award was received by it on 05.09.2019. The aforesaid fact

has also been recorded by the Trial Court in paragraph 11 of

the judgment. In the absence of any proof with regard to

service of copy of the award on 05.09.2019, the objection

preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act, was

clearly barred by limitation and the Court had no power to

condone the delay. The impugned order, therefore, does not

require any interference in this appeal.

In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Sd/-

JUDGE

RV