Jharkhand High Court
Amit Oraon vs State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... on 4 September, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 14 of 2025
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1. Amit Oraon, aged about 34 years, Son of Sri Hit Narayan
Oraon, Resident of at House No. 185, Village Nigani, P.O.
& P.S. Nigani, District - Lohardaga, Jharkhand.
2. Ajay Das, aged about 33 years, Son of Sunil Das, Resident
of Village Lokania, P.O.-Pabia, P.S. Narayanpur, District-
Jamtara, Jharkhand ... ... Appellants
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary,
Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project
Building, Dhurwa, Р.О. Dhurwa, P.S.-Jagarnathpur,
District - Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Personnel, Administrative
Reforms & Rajbhasha Department, Government of
Jharkhand, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa,
P.O. - Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District - Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
3. Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission through its
Secretary, having office at Chai Bagan Namkum, P.O. &
P.S. Namkum, District Ranchi.
4. Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Staff Selection
Commission through its Secretary, having office at Chai
Bagan Namkum, P.O. & P.S. Namkum, District - Ranchi.
... ... Respondents
With
L.P.A. No. 59 of 2025
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1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary,
Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and,
Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at
Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District
Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and
Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, having
office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa,
Town and District-Ranchi.
... ... Respondent nos. 1 & 2/ Appellants
Versus
1. Shyamal Rathaur, son of Sri Ramesh Kumar, resident of
Ujjwal Bihar, near SBP School, P.O. Mahilong, P.S.
Tatisilway, District Ranchi.
2. Jawed Ansari, aged about 24 years, son of Md. Rajomat
Ansari, resident of Bargari, P.O.- Bargari, P.S.- Mandar,
District- Ranchi.
3. Arvind Vishwakarma, aged about 37 years, son of Sri
Nand Kishor Vishwakarma, resident of Bariatu Road,
1
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near S.D.A. Mission Hospital, Garigaon, P.O.- RMCH,
P.S.- Sadar, District- Ranchi.
... ... Petitioner/ Respondents
4. Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, through its
Secretary, having office at Chaibagan, Kalinagar, P.O. &
P.S.- Namkum, Town and District- Ranchi.
5. The Examinations Controller, Jharkhand Staff Selection
Commission, having office at Chaibagan, Kalinagar, P.O.
& P.S.- Namkum, Town and District Ranchi.
... ...Respondent nos. 3 & 4/ Performa Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellants : Mr. Amritansh Vats, Advocate
[in L.P.A. No. 14 of 2025]
: Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II
[in L.P.A. No. 59 of 2025]
For the State : Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. SC-I
: Mr. Ranjan Kumar, A.C. to Sr. SC-I
For the JSSC : Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate
: Mr. Prince Kumar, Advocate
: Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, Advocate
: Mr. Jay Prakash, Advocate
For the Pvt. Resp. : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
: Ms. Akanksha Priya, Advocate
: Mr. Karamjit S. Chhabra, Advocate
: Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate
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C.A.V. on 08.08.2025 Pronounced on 04/09/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. In both the appeals since similar issues are involved,
as such, listed together and taken up together with the
consent of learned counsel for the parties.
Prayer made in L.P.A. No.14 of 2025
2. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters
Patent is directed against the order dated 04.10.2024 passed
by learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 5635 of 2021,
whereby and where under the learned Single Judge has
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refused to interfere with impugned notice dated 01.11.2021
whereby and where under, several advertisements for
appointment in different posts, bearing Advertisement No.
04 of 2018 and 05 of 2018 have been cancelled. Further, the
learned Single Judge has also refused to interfere with the
Memo No. 821, dated 05.02.2021 whereby and whereunder
a decision has been taken to cancel all those advertisements
where appointment letters have not been issued.
Prayer made in L.P.A. No.59 of 2025
3. The instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters
Patent is directed against the order dated 04.10.2024 passed
by learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1856 of 2021,
whereby and where under while allowing the writ petition
filed by the writ petitioner, the learned Single Judge has
quashed the State Government's resolution contained in
Memo No. 821 dated 05.02.2021 whereby the State
Government had taken a decision to rescind its earlier
notification issued vide Memo No. 3854 dated 01.06.2018
and also to cancel all such advertisements which were issued
under the provisions of Notification No. 3854 dated
01.06.2018 under which appointment process were
incomplete.
4. The factual matrix of both cases are being dealt with
separately since in one of the orders which is the subject
matter of L.P.A. No.59 of 2025, the cancellation of
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advertisement No.3/2018 has been quashed and set aside
with a direction to the respondents to proceed in accordance
with law by recommending the names of the successful
candidates to the State respondent who shall proceed further
by issuing appointment letters to the successful candidates
including these petitioners strictly in accordance with law.
5. While in L.P.A. No.14 of 2025, which has been filed
by the candidates, the writ petition has been dismissed by
holding therein that the recruitment process is in the initial
stage.
6. Since two different views on the same issue have
been taken and, as such, the factual aspect of both these
appeals is being referred herein separately.
7. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made
in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated,
read as under :-
The case of the writ petitioners/appellants is that the
respondent-JSSC has floated an advertisement for filling up
of the post of Excise Constable being Advertisement No. 04
of 2018 and another advertisement was floated being
advertisement No. 05 of 2018 for appointment on the post of
Special Branch Constable (Close Cadre).
8. The appellants, being eligible candidates in terms of
the advertisements, have filled-up the application forms and
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pursuant thereto, Admit Cards were issued to the appellants
for appearing in the said examinations. Pursuant thereto,
the appellants have appeared in the said examinations.
9. Pursuant to the said examinations, answer keys were
also published by the respondent-JSSC for both the
examinations. Thereafter, the appellants were waiting for the
publication of final results and recommendations but the
respondents were sitting tight over it even after lapse of three
years of time from the date of the examinations.
10. The appellants and the other similarly situated
candidates have made several representations before the
respondents for publication of final results, but the result
was not published.
11. Thereafter, suddenly through notice dated
01.11.2021 published in the website of the respondent
JSSC, whereby and whereunder, a decision has been taken
by the respondent no. 4 cancelling both the examinations
pursuant to Advertisement No. 04/2018 and 05/2018
including several other advertisements.
12. In the said notice dated 01.11.2021 it has been
mentioned that all the advertisements have been cancelled
except where the appointment letters have been issued to
candidates.
13. It is the further case of the writ
petitioners/appellants that surprisingly from the same
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advertisement and examination process where appointment
has been given to several candidates, their appointment has
not been disturbed whereas several candidates who are
waiting for their appointment/final result, their appointment
has been declared as null and void.
14. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties,
has refused to interfere with the impugned notice, against
which the present appeal has been filed.
15. It is the case of the writ petitioners that
Advertisement No. 03/2018 was issued by Jharkhand Staff
Selection Commission for appointment on the post of Vehicle
Driver (Heavy Motor Vehicle) and Vehicle Driver (Light Motor
Vehicle). The qualification for appointment was 10th (Matric)
pass with driving license.
16. Since the petitioners were eligible for appointment on
the post of Vehicle Driver (Light Motor Vehicle), they applied
for appointment in the prescribed format as prescribed by
the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission.
17. The applications of the petitioners were found to be
in order and hence, the admit cards were issued to them.
18. The petitioners appeared in the written test, which
was scheduled on 20.1.2019. The writ petitioners were
declared successful in the written test and were called for
medical test.
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19. The petitioners appeared on the date, time and venue
for medical test and on being found medically fit, the
petitioners were called for driving test vide notice dated
14.09.2019. As per the direction contained in Notice dated
14.9.2019, all the petitioners appeared on the time, date and
venue for driving test.
20. It is the case of the writ petitioners that when
everything was at final stage, the respondent no.1 has issued
the impugned Resolution contained in Memo No. 821 dated
05.02.2021, whereby, in Clause 4 (Kha), it is provided that
all advertisements, in which, appointment letters have not
been issued and are covered by Resolution No. 3854 dated
01.06.2018 and Resolution No.8468 dated 20.11.2018 stand
canceled.
21. After issuance of aforesaid resolution, the writ
petitioners approached this Court by filing writ petition being
W.P.(S) No.1856 of 2021 challenging Clause 4 (Kha) of the
resolution as contained in Memo No. 821 dated 05.02.2021.
22. The respondents appeared before the learned writ
court and filed counter affidavit.
23. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties,
has allowed the writ petition by quashing Annexures-9
(Resolution dated 05.02.2021) & 10 (Information dated
01.11.2021).
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24. So far as Advertisement No.03/2018 is concerned,
the learned Single Judge has observed that the entire
process of appointment was on the verge of completion, the
Respondent JSSC is directed to proceed in accordance with
law by recommending the names of the successful
candidates to the State Respondent who shall proceed
further by issuing appointment letters to the successful
candidates including these petitioners strictly in accordance
with law.
25. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the
learned Single Judge, the State has filed the instant appeal.
26. It is evident from the factual aspect that the occasion
to approach this court on behalf of the petitioners who are
the candidates participated in the process of selection in
terms of advertisement No.3/2018, subject matter of LPA No.
59 of 2025 and advertisement No.4 & 5 of 2018, subject
matter of LPA No. 14 of 2025, having not been appointed,
even, as per the writ petitioners, the process of recruitment
was at the verge of completion. But the advertisements,
being Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 have
been cancelled by the State by virtue of issuance of fresh
advertisement.
27. The ground has been taken before the learned Single
Judge that once the process of selection has begun and it
has been allowed to proceed and at very advanced stage, as
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such, at that juncture, cancellation of the advertisements
cannot be said to be proper.
28. The ground has been taken that while cancelling the
Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018, the State
has taken the ground of observing the direction passed by
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Satyajit Kumar & Others
v. State of Jharkhand & Others [(2022) 18 SCC 284] as
per the cause title of the litigation upholding the view taken
in the case of Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand and
Others [W.P.(C) No.1387 of 2017 and Analogous matters]
by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
29. The State has taken the ground that the
advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 have rightly
been cancelled since restrictions have been imposed for not
accepting the application of the candidates outside the State
of the Jharkhand.
30. The ground has been taken that there cannot be any
such restriction which is in the teeth of Article 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India.
31. Moreover, the identical issues putting restriction
upon acceptance of the application of the candidates for the
post of (1) Lower Division Clerks (Collectorate Cadre, District
Level Posts), (2) Panchayat Secretary (District Level Posts),
(3) Lower Divisional Clerks- State Level Posts and (4) State
Stenographer- State Level Posts in terms of the application
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invited in advertisement Nos.1/2017 and 2/2017 have been
quashed and set aside.
32. However, in the said judgment, the issue of selection
process to the said posts has been directed to be concluded,
which is by taking into consideration the fact that the
advertisement so issued for these posts are having
restrictions in acceptance of application, restricting it to only
the locals of the State of Jharkhand on the basis of the
residential certificate of the State of Jharkhand.
33. The learned Single Judge while disposing the writ
petition being W.P.(S) No. 1856 of 2021 with W.P.(S) No.
5068 of 2021 has given the reason that a blanket decision
cannot be taken to cancel all the appointments process
where appointment letter was not issued, that too only in the
garb of any order of the Hon'ble Apex Court which does not
appear to be fair on the part of the State and further reason
has been assigned that the process of recruitment pertaining
to Advertisement No.3/2018, since was at the verge of
completion, and as such, cancellation of the advertisement
cannot be said to be just and proper and accordingly the
order cancelling the said advertisement has been quashed
and set aside with the direction to issue appointment letters,
which is the subject matter of the appeal.
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Argument on behalf of State in both the appeals:
34. Learned counsel for the State appellant in L.P.A.
No.59 of 2025 has submitted that the order passed by the
learned Single Judge suffers from an error, reason being that
the said judgment has been passed without taking into
consideration the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India by virtue of which there cannot be any
restriction in acceptance of the candidature of the
candidates outside the State.
35. Learned Single Judge has passed judgment only on
the ground that the recruitment process was at the verge of
completion but merely because the recruitment process was
at the verge of completion, that does not create indefeasible
right to claim appointment.
36. Learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the
fact that initially the State had committed error in issuance
of advertisement restricting acceptance of application
confining it to district wise candidates so far as the case of
Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand and Others
(Supra) and Satyajit Kumar & Others v. State of
Jharkhand & Others (Supra) is concerned, but when the
said issues have been decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide
judgment dated 02.08.2022 and following the same, if the
error which has been committed in the Advertisement
No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018, subject matter of L.P.A.
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No.59 of 2025 and L.P.A. No.14 of 2025, has been tried to
be corrected by floating a new advertisement inviting
applications from the candidates not restricting only to the
State of Jharkhand in order to follow the mandate of the
Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Soni Kumari v.
The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and Satyajit
Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra)
as also the intent of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India, the learned Single Judge has considered it to be an
error on the part of the State by giving a finding that merely
on the basis of an order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court,
the decision so taken by the State cannot be said to be just
and proper. But, while making such observation, the learned
Single Judge has not appreciated the principle of binding
effect of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as
it binds under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
37. It has been contended that after the mandate in the
case of Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand and
Others (Supra) and Satyajit Kumar & Others v. State of
Jharkhand & Others (Supra), the earlier decision taken
restricting the acceptance of application of one or the other
candidates district wise has been recalled for the purpose of
following the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of Indian as also the judgment rendered by
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Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Soni Kumari v. The State
of Jharkhand and Others (Supra).
38. It has also been contended that even in the case of
Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand and Others
(Supra), the reference of issuance of advertisement
pertaining to the post of Panchayat Secretary and
Stenographer has also been considered, subject matter of
Advertisement No. 1/2017 and 2/2017. The Hon'ble Apex
Court has passed an order by way of a direction to the State
to prepare the service wise merit list followed by allocation of
district for the post in the district cadre.
39. It has also been observed that there shall not be any
impediment in proceeding further with the
recruitment/appointment pursuant to the aforesaid
Advertisement No.1/2017 and 2/2017.
40. The State has proceeded due to the reason that in the
Advertisement No.1/2017 and 2/2017 there was no
restriction upon the candidates not to make application if
the candidates are residents of outside the State of
Jharkhand for consideration of their candidature under
unreserved category while in the Advertisement No.3/2018,
4/2018 and 5/2018 such restrictions are there, hence, the
same has been recalled with a direction to come out with the
fresh advertisement and accordingly, fresh advertisement
has also been issued.
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41. Learned State counsel has further submitted by
referring to the order dated 04.10.2024 passed in connection
with W.P.(S) No. 5635 of 2021 wherein the conflicting view
has been expressed by not interfering with the decision so
taken by the State of cancelling the Advertisement
No.4/2018 and 5/2018 although on the ground that the
recruitment process is on the initial stage.
42. The learned State counsel, therefore, has submitted
that if the issue has been decided by the learned Single
Judge, based upon the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India as also the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Soni Kumari v.
The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and Satyajit
Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra)
then merely on the ground of stage of recruitment process,
there should not have been two conflicting views.
43. Learned State counsel has relied upon the judgment
rendered in the case of State of Assam and Others v.
Arabinda Rabha and Others reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine 523.
Submission made by learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/writ petitioners in L.P.A. No.59 of 2025
44. Per contra, Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent/writ petitioners, has taken the
following grounds in defending the impugned judgment:-
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(i) It has been contended that the judgments rendered in
the case of Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand
and Others (Supra) and Satyajit Kumar & Others v.
State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra) are having no
concern with the advertisement which is the subject
matter of the present lis.
(ii) It has been contended that the Advertisement
No.3/2018 was not travelled to the Hon'ble Apex Court
and merely on account of the fact that the judgment
has come with respect to filling up of the post of
teachers, subject matter of Soni Kumari v. The State
of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and Satyajit
Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others
(Supra), the same cannot be made applicable in the
facts and circumstances of the present case.
(iii) Learned counsel has submitted that due to the
aforesaid reason, the learned Single Judge has made
an observation that in the garb of the order passed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court cancelling the advertisement
already issued being Advertisement No.3/2018 cannot
be said to be just and proper that too when the
recruitment process has reached to the advanced stage.
(iv) It has been contended that since there is no laches or
fault lies on the part of the writ petitioner, as such,
following the principle of legitimate expectation, the
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order passed by the learned Single Judge needs no
interference.
(v) Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment
rendered in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak & Ots. v.
Rajasthan High Court and Ors., [(2025) 2 SCC 1].
Submission made by learned counsel for the appellants
45. Mr. Amritansh Vats, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants in L.P.A. No.14 of 2025, has taken the
following grounds:-
(i) It has been submitted that the issue in the instant
appeal is identical to the issues as under L.P.A. No.59
of 2025, hence, all the arguments which have been
advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the
respondents/writ petitioners in L.P.A. No.59 of 2025
are being adopted.
(ii) It has been contended in addition thereto that merely
because the recruitment process was at initial stage,
the learned Single Judge should not have taken the
conflicting views, rather, the order in the present writ
petition ought to have been passed by following the
principle of the decision having been taken on the
pretext of the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
But, the learned Single Judge has taken totally
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different view merely on the ground that the process of
recruitment was at initial stage.
(iii) It has been contended that irrespective of the stage of
recruitment process, if the consideration is being made
on the legal issues, then the order could have been
passed on parity, as has been passed, subject matter of
L.P.A. No.59 of 2025.
Response of the State counsel
46. Leaned State counsel, responding to the aforesaid
argument, has submitted that the view which has been
taken by the learned Single Judge in the present case
although has been taken on the ground of recruitment
process in the initial stage but the intent of Article 14 and 16
of the Constitution of India ought to have been taken into
consideration as also the impact of the judgment passed by
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Soni Kumari v. The State
of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and Satyajit Kumar &
Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra).
47. It has been contended that the learned Single Judge,
even if not considered the said judgment but fact remains
that merely because the candidates have participated in the
recruitment process and if the advertisement in connection
with the present appeal also bars the acceptance of
candidature from outside the State, and if in such
circumstances the Advertisement No.4/2018 and 5/2018
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have been cancelled by issuing fresh advertisement, then
this finding should have been recorded in the impugned
judgment.
48. Learned State counsel, therefore, has submitted that
so far as the order passed in the present writ petition is
concerned, the same requires no interference in view of the
above.
Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission (JSSC).
49. Mr. Sanjay Piprawall, learned counsel appearing for
the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission (JSSC), has
submitted that the order passed in W.P.(C) No.1856 of 2021,
subject matter of L.P.A. No.59 of 2025, is not just and proper
since the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India, initially has not been followed as also the direction
passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Soni Kumari v. The State
of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and Satyajit Kumar &
Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra).
50. He has submitted that since the Commission is to act
upon on the basis of the decision taken and in pursuance
thereto the Commission has acted, hence, he has nothing
more to say.
Analysis
51. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and gone through the pleading made in the memo of appeals
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(both) as also the impugned judgements, subject matter of
both the appeals.
52. This court, having heard the parties, is of the view
that following questions require consideration:-
(i) Whether the restrictions can be imposed for not
accepting the application from the candidates outside
the State so far as it relates to the filling up of the
unreserved category of post?
(ii) Whether the State, if had issued the advertisement
contrary to mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, restricting it to the candidates of
the State of Jharkhand only, based upon the residential
certificate, and if in such circumstances, the same has
been cancelled by issuing the fresh notification asking
application from the candidates outside the State, will
it be said to be improper?
(iii) Whether the advertisement number either
Advertisement No.3/2018 or 4/2018 or 5/2018 which
are not the subject matter of the Soni Kumari v. The
State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and Satyajit
Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others
(Supra), and even if in such circumstances the State
has followed the mandate of the judgment in the case
of Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand and
Others (Supra) and Satyajit Kumar & Others v.
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State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra), will it be
considered to be improper exercise of the State?
53. Since all the issues are interlinked and, as such, are
being taken up together for its consideration, but before
consideration, the brief admitted facts of the Soni Kumari
v. The State of Jharkhand and Others needs to be
referred herein: -
One advertisement was issued to fill up the post of
teachers (district level posts) for 13 non-scheduled area. The
condition has been provided therein that candidates of the
particular districts will only be eligible to make application
for the particular district, meaning thereby, a candidate
belonging to district 'A' will not be allowed to participate in
the process of selection of district 'B', which is by virtue of
order dated 14.07.2016.
54. Another notice had been issued to fill up the post of
Class-III and Class-IV for 11 non-scheduled districts. The
condition precedent therein was that the candidates will only
be said to be eligible who will be the local residents of the
State of Jharkhand.
55. The selection process commenced and the
appointment letters have also been issued. At that juncture,
matter travels to this Court titled Soni Kumari v. The State
of Jharkhand and Others (Supra).
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56. The matter had been referred to the Full Bench of
this Court and vide judgment dated 21.09.2020 wherein the
order has been passed by quashing and setting aside both
the notices restricting the candidature of the outsiders living
outside the district coming under the schedule area and so
far as the restriction imposed for the district falling under
the non-schedule area, the candidature was to be accepted
on the basis of the residency certificate of the State of
Jharkhand.
57. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is
being referred hereunder as:-
"61. Such is not the case in the present writ applications in
hand. The local residents of the scheduled districts have been
appointed only in the month of July, 2019 and they are
working since then. Their appointments are fresh
appointments and indeed, in teeth of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. Such appointments cannot be protected
in law. Indeed, it has been pointed out through Annexure-7 to
the lead writ application that the State Government had been
contemplating to impose such unreasonable and
unconstitutional restrictions for all the districts in the State.
We cannot be a mute spectator to such illegal actions of the
State Government and any such attempt by the State
Government has to be stalled at its very inception. Such
appointments, ignoring the rights of more meritorious
candidates, only on the basis of residence, were absolutely
illegal and unconstitutional from its very inception and have
to be quashed.
62. In the result, the appointments of the Trained Graduate
Teachers made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 21/2016
published on 28.12.2016 as modified by Advertisement dated
4.2.2017, as contained in Annexures-4 and 4/1 of the lead
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writ application, in the scheduled districts relating to the local
residents of those districts only, are hereby, quashed. Even
those appointees, if any, who may not be a party in these writ
applications, shall be treated to be represented in
representative capacity by the respondents and the intervener
respondents, in view of orders dated 21.02.2019, 24.04.2019
and 18.09.2019 passed by this Court.
64. Accordingly, we hereby, direct that all the 8423 posts of
Trained Graduate Teacher in the Government Secondary
Schools in the scheduled districts of the State of Jharkhand,
as detailed in the Notification No. 5938 and Order No. 5939
dated 14.7.2016, as contained in Annexures-6 and 6/1 of the
lead writ application, be advertised afresh and fresh selection
process be undertaken in accordance with law.
65. We hereby, clarify that all those candidates who were
eligible to apply in response to the Advertisement No.
21/2016, as contained in Annexures-4 and 4/1 of the lead
writ application, shall be entitled to apply in the fresh
selection process, irrespective of any barrier, if any, as to their
age.
66. We also propose to make it abundantly clear that by the
ad-interim order dated 18.9.2019 passed by this Court in
these writ applications, the selection process was never stayed
by the Court in the non-scheduled districts, though, as
informed to us, it had erroneously been taken by the State
Government like that. There was no stay for appointments on
any post in the non-scheduled districts, or for that matter
there was no stay for the appointments even in the scheduled
districts, rather, only the operation of the Notification No.
5938 dated 14.7.2016 was stayed by this Court. In other
words, the appointments could be continued to be made even
in the scheduled districts, ignoring the aforesaid notification.
67. In the result, all these writ applications succeed and are
accordingly, allowed with the directions and observations as
above. The pending interlocutory applications also stand
disposed of."
58. It needs to refer herein that there is purpose for
referring this judgment, since, the State appellant has taken
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
the ground that on the basis of the mandate of the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Satyajit
Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand & Others
(Supra), the decision has been taken to cancel the
Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018.
59. Therefore, in order to come to the conclusion that the
decision of the State is proper or not, the reference of the
judgments is necessary to be referred herein.
60. It is further evident from one of the orders passed in
Soni Kumari (Supra) in miscellaneous application wherein
the reference of Advertisement No.1/2017 and 2/2017 has
been made.
61. The occasion to file such application was that the
result of the process of recruitment was not being published.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to pass the order
that instead of fresh/de novo recruitment process by setting
aside the appointments already made in the Scheduled
Districts/Areas, the State shall revise the merit list based on
the already published cut-off obtained by the last selected
candidates in each TGT subject against the respective
categories with respect to entire State and respective
candidates belonging to the non-Scheduled Areas and
Scheduled Areas (districts) shall be adjusted accordingly on
the basis of individual merit of the candidates, for ready
reference, the order dated 02.08.2022 passed by Hon'ble
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
Apex Court in the case of Satyajit Kumar & Others v.
State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra) is being referred
hereunder as:-
"111. However, at the same time, the directions issued by the
High Court in the impugned judgment and order [Soni
Kumari v. State of Jharkhand, 2020 SCC OnLine Jhar 797]
while setting aside all the appointments made pursuant to the
Notification/Order dated 14-7-2016 and Advertisement No.
21 of 2016 dated 28-12-2016 as modified on 4-12-2017 and
to go in for fresh/de novo recruitment process for the
Scheduled Areas/Districts is hereby modified. It is now
directed that instead of fresh/de novo recruitment process by
setting aside the appointments already made in the Scheduled
Districts/Areas, the State shall revise the merit list based on
the already published cut-off obtained by the last selected
candidates in each TGT subject against the respective
categories with respect to entire State and respective
candidates belonging to the non-Scheduled Areas and
Scheduled Areas (districts) shall be adjusted accordingly on
the basis of individual merit of the candidates.
112. The present directions are issued considering the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and more
particularly considering the fact that there are already vacant
posts of teachers in the State (in both Scheduled and non-
Scheduled Areas). We are of the view that if the appointments
already made are set aside and fresh/de novo recruitment
process for such posts is initiated, a number of schools in the
Scheduled Areas shall be without any teacher which may
ultimately affect larger public interest and education of
children in the Scheduled Areas concerned."
62. The appellant State, in the backdrop of the aforesaid
direction, has come out with the resolution dated
01.06.2018 to recall the earlier notice issued for filling up of
the post of Class-III and Class-IV for all scheduled or non-
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
scheduled area. The advertisements have been published in
pursuance to the same.
63. The State appellant, when had taken such decision,
at the same time, the Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and
5/2018 had also been notified inviting applications to fill up
the following posts:-
Advertisement No.3/2018 1. H.M.V. Vehicle Driver
(General Category)
2. L.M.V. Vehicle Driver
(General Category)
Advertisement No.4/2018 1. Excise Constable
Advertisement No.5/2018 1. Special Branch Constable
(Close Cadre)
64. The said advertisements, i.e., Advertisement
No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018, are available in paper book
which we have perused and found under the eligibility
criteria, as referred in the aforesaid advertisements, that the
candidature of such candidates only will be accepted who is
the resident of State of Jharkhand having with the residency
certificate.
65. The ground has been taken on behalf of the State
that in order to avoid the multiplicity of procedures which
has been crept up on issuance of the advertisement to fill up
the post, the decision has been taken to recall the
Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 for the
reason that there cannot be any restriction in the acceptance
of candidature basing upon the residency certificate of the
State of Jharkhand.
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
66. But by the time the aforesaid advertisements were
cancelled, the recruitment process was in progress and the
candidates who have participated in the process of selection
being aggrieved with the decision of cancellation of
Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 have
approached to this court by filing writ petitions on the
grounds, as referred hereinabove.
67. This Court is to consider, in the light of the aforesaid
background, as to whether the decisions so taken by the
State is unjust.
68. This Court is further to consider the judgment
passed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the
State has taken decision to follow the mandate of Article 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India, as also the judgment
passed in the case of Soni Kumari v. The State of
Jharkhand (Supra)/Satyajit Kumar & Others v. State of
Jharkhand & Others (Supra).
69. This Court is of the considered view that the issue of
recruitment to fill up the post of public employment is strictly
to be governed under the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
70. The same has primarily been considered by Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Satyajit Kumar & Others v.
State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra).
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
71. Even prior to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Satyajit Kumar & Others v.
State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra), in catena of
judgments the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that any
recruitment if it is in the teeth of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, the same cannot get the constitutional
validity.
72. It needs to refer herein, at this juncture, that the
question of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India has
also been taken into consideration by this Court while
dealing with the rule formulated by way of Niyojan Neeti
(Employment Policy) wherein the following conditions have
been stipulated, restricting the acceptance of the
candidature:-
^^2->kj[k.M deZpkjh p;u vk;ksx ijh{kk ¼Lukrd Lrj½ lapkyu fu;ekoyh] 2015
¼;Fkk la'kksf/kr] 2016½ ds fu;e&5&ik=rk@vgRrkZ dk fu/kkZj.k dh dafMdk&¼ii½
esa fuEukafdr izko/kku gSa %&
^^vH;fFkZ;ksa dks vk;ksx esa vkosnu izkIr gksus dh vafre frfFk rd okafNr 'kS{kf.kd
;ksX;rkizkIr djuk vko';d gkxk**;
dks fuEuor~ izfrLFkkfir fd;k tkrk gS %&
^^U;wure 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk %& ^^vH;fFkZ;ksa dks vk;ksx esa vkosnu izkIr gksus dh
vafre frfFk rd Lukrd vFkok led{k mRrh.kZ gksuk vfuok;Z gksxkA
mDr vfuok;Z ;ksX;rk ds vfrfjDr vH;fFkZ;ksa dks eSfVªd@10oha d{kk ,oa
baVjehfM,V@10+2 d{kk >kj[k.M jkT; esa vofLFkr ekU;rk izkIr 'kS{kf.kd laLFkku
ls mRrh.kZ gksuk vfuok;Z gksxk rFkk vH;FkhZ dks LFkkuh; jhfr&fjokt] Hkk"kk ,oa
ifjos'k dk Kku gksuk vfuok;Z gksxkA
ijUrq ;g fd >kj[k.M jkT; dh vkj{k.k uhfr ls vkPNkfnr vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ekeys
esa >kj[k.M jkT; esa vofLFkr ekU;rk izkIr 'kS{kf.kd laLFkku ls eSfVªd@10oha
d{kk rFkk baVjehfM,V@10+2 d{kk mRrh.kZ gksus laca/kh izko/kku f'kfFky jgsxkA**
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
^^7->kj[k.M deZpkjh p;u vk;ksx ijh{kk ¼Lukrd Lrj½ lapkyu fu;ekoyh] 2015
¼;Fkk la'kksf/kr] 2016½ ds fu;e&10 esa fuEukafdr izko/kku gSa %&
^^i=&2&fgUnh@vaxzsth@mnwZ@laFkkyh@[email protected]¼eq.Mk½@gks@[kfM+;k@d¡q
Mq[k mjkao½@dqjekyh@[kksjBk@ukxiqjh@iapijxfu;k@mfM+;kA
foHkkxh; ladYi la[;k 5726 fnukad 05-07-2016 ds n~okjk >kj[k.M deZpkjh
p;u vk;ksx ijh{kk ¼Lukrd Lrj½ fu;ekoyh] 2016 ds fu;e&10 eq[; ijh{kk ds
i=&2 esa vafdr Hkk"kkvksa esa laLd`r Hkk'kk dks lfEEfyr fd;k x;k gS **;
dks fuEuor~ izfrLFkkfir fd;k tkrk gS %&
^^i=&2& fpfUgr {ks=h;@tutkrh; Hkk'kk
fpfUgr 12 ¼ckjg½ {ks=h;@tutkrh; Hkk'kk& mnwZ@laFkkyh@caxyk@
eq.Mkjh¼eq.Mk½@gks@[kfM+;k@dq¡Mq[k¼mjkao½@dqjekyh@[kksjBk@ukxiqjh@
iapijxfu;k@ mfM+;k esa ls fdlh ,d Hkk"kk dh ijh{kk fodYi ds vk/kkj ij
vH;FkhZ ns ldsx
a As **
73. This Court, while dealing with the mandate of Article
14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, has come up with the
conclusive finding in the case of Ramesh Hansda and Anr.
Vs The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary,
Government of Jharkhand and Ors. W.P. (C) No. 3894 of
2021 that there cannot be any restrictions in acceptance of
the application in order to deprive the participation in the
recruitment process, the relevant paragraphs need to be
referred herein which read hereunder as:-
"49.In these circumstances, the question arises that what led
the State Government to exercise the power under Section 12
of the Act, 2008 to deprive a class of candidate from
participating in the process of selection to fill up the vacancies
in Group C posts in different departments of the State of
Jharkhand, and to carveout different class by making class
amongst class and can it be said to be object and spirit of the
Act,2008.
50.This Court, after perusing the record has found therefrom
that there is no discussion, as the argument has been placed
on behalf of State of Jharkhand,
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
narrating the object necessitating the State Government to
make such amendment depriving a class of candidates from
participating in the process of selection or putting a class of
candidates in detrimental situation by deleting Hindi/English
from the syllabus of Paper-2, as such it appears to this Court
that such amendment has been brought by the State of
Jharkhand in exercise of power conferred under Section 12 of
the Act, 2008 is having no nexus with the object, which is
mandatory requirement for legislating the
Act/Rules/Regulations.
51.It is relevant to refer herein that the authority, who is
legislating the subordinate legislation, is required to consider
its object by applying active mind, considering the purpose for
which the subordinate legislation is being enacted.
Though, the same has been tried to be explained by the
respondents, by way of filing affidavit or advancing argument
orally, but such argument, either mentioned in the affidavit or
submitted orally before this Court, cannot be considered to be
part of consideration for the purpose for which the
subordinate legislation has been enacted rather the same is
required to be reflected from the record itself.
Therefore, raising such argument in defence is not acceptable
and accordingly, the same is hereby rejected.
52.Further, this Court has found that the object and intent of
the Act, 2008 is not to deprive a class of candidates from
participating in the process of selection for consideration of
their candidatures, rather, object is to conduct Combined
Competitive Examination for filling up the Group C posts in
different departments of the State of Jharkhand.
53.Argument has been advanced on behalf of respondents-
State of Jharkhand that one of the provisions, as contained in
the Act, 2008,is to fix the eligibility for recruitment and
therefore, the amendment has been carved out by depriving a
section of society and hence the same being under the
eligibility clause, the power conferred to the State Government
under Section 12 of the Act, 2008 has correctly been invoked.
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54.This Court is not in agreement with such submission
reason being that eligibility does not mean to deprive a class
of candidate from participating in the process of selection
rather eligibility means to fix the eligibility of one or the other
candidates by way of
taking a policy decision but certainly not to deprive a class of
students on the basis of obtaining the educational
qualification from a particular State/territory otherwise the
same will lead to regionalism which will be against the spirit
of the Constitution of India, as under Part II of the
Constitution, which recognizes only one Indian citizenship
and when there is one citizenship why there will be category
against the same class merely on the ground of obtaining the
educational qualification, either Matriculation/10thand
Intermediate/10+2 or Graduate level certificate.
In that view of the matter, the same will lead to discrimination
and arbitrariness on the part of the State which ultimately be
in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
55.The eligibility connotes the minimum criteria for selection
that may be laid down by the executive authority/legislature.
It is not in dispute that under the Act, 2008 eligibility for
recruitment was also the object of the Act to be determined by
making a rule in view of provision of Section 12 of the Act,
2008 and that is the reason Rules, 2015 (amended Rules,
2016) has been made, which only contains the eligibility i.e.,
the
minimum criteria for selection, as would appear from the
provisions of Rule 5 thereof, but in the impugned provision
under the amended Rules, 2021 as under Rule 2, it has been
inserted that apart from the minimum eligibility criteria a
candidate is required to pass Matriculation/10th and
Intermediate/10+2 examination from the recognized
institutions situated within the State of Jharkhand.
Inserting of such educational qualification cannot be
considered to be 'eligibility criteria' rather eligibility criteria
within the meaning eligibility come under the fold of
qualification since the same is additional norms laid down by
the rule making authority.
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
Difference in between the 'eligibility' and 'qualification'
has been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgment rendered in Dr. Preeti Srivastava & Ors Vs. State
of M.P. & Ors. [(1999) 7 SCC 120], wherein at paragraph 39
the same has been explained as under:
"39.The respondents have emphasised the observation that
admission has to be made by those who are in control of the
colleges. But, the question is, on what basis? Admissions must
be made on a basis which is consistent with the standards laid
down by a statute or regulation framed by the Central
Government in the exercise of its powers under Entry 66 List I.
At times, in some of the judgments, the words "eligibility" and
"qualification" have been used
interchangeably, and in some cases a distinction has
been made between the two words --"eligibility"
connoting the minimum criteria for selection that may be
laid down by the University Act or any Central statute,
while "qualifications" connoting the additional norms laid
down by the colleges or by the State. In every case the
minimum standards as laid down by the Central statute
or under it, have to be complied with by the State while
making admissions. It may, in addition, lay down other
additional norms for admission or regulate admissions in
the exercise of itspowers under Entry 25 List III in a
manner not inconsistent with or in a manner which does
not dilute the criteria so laid down."
Similar view has been taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in
the judgment rendered in State of Gujrat & Ors vrs. Arvind
Kumar Tiwari & Anr. [(2012) 9 SCC 545],wherein at
paragraph 9 it has been held asunder:
"9.The eligibility for the post may at times be
misunderstood to mean qualification. In fact, eligibility
connotes the minimum criteria for selection, that may be
laid down by the executive authority/legislature by way
of any statute or rules, while the term "qualification",
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
may connote any additional norms laid down by the
authorities. However, before a candidate is considered
for a post or even for admission to the institution, he must
fulfil the eligibility criteria. (VidePreeti Srivastavav.State
of M.P.[(1999) 7 SCC 120 : AIR 1999 SC 2894] )"
56.Herein, it has been argued that the insertion of additional
qualification, as has been insertedherein, cannot be
construed to be eligibility rather the same is in addition to the
eligibility criteria, which is evident
from the phrase'in addition to the eligibility criteria' by which
the candidate is required to pass Matriculation/10thand
Intermediate/10+2 examination from the recognized
institutions situated within the State of Jharkhand.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that what has been argued
on behalf of State of Jharkhand, that the eligibility for the
purpose of recruitment will come under the scope of Section
12of the Act, 2008,is not sustainable.
57.Herein, the rule has been framed, by amending Rule 5 of
Rules, 2015 by way of substitution of Rule 2 in Rules, 2021,
inserting the phrase 'in addition to the eligibility criteria' by
which the candidate is required to pass
Matriculation/10thand Intermediate/10+2 examination from
the recognized institutions situated within the State of
Jharkhand. Since the additional qualification is not coming
under the fold of eligibility and as such the same is outside
the scope of Section 12 and, therefore, the provision which
has been inserted to that effect cannot be construed to come
under the scope of Section 12 of the Act, 2008.
58.This Court, on the basis of discussions made herein above,
is of the view that Section 12 of the Act,
2008 does not confer power upon the State to deprive a class
of candidate from participating in the process of selection,
since the same will not come under the foldof implementing
the provisions of the Act, 2008.
59. This Court, in the entirety of facts and discussions as also
judicial pronouncements, is of the considered view that the
impugned rules, as contained under Rules, 2021 are
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
discriminatory on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India not based upon intelligible differentia
rather are unreasonable, and as such the Rule 2 and Rule 7
of the Rules, 2021 are held to be invalid, as the same are
in teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India."
74. Herein also what is being contended on behalf of the
learned counsel appearing for the appellants/writ
petitioners, if will be accepted, then the right which was there
for consideration of candidature of the candidates residing
outside the State of Jharkhand, or even residing in the state
of Jharkhand but having no residential certificate, had been
deprived from participating in the process of selection, and
thereby they have been put to jeopardize due to non-
observance of the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
75. The recruitment process, if has been initiated
contrary to the mandate of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, then irrespective of the stage of the
recruitment process, the same has to go if the issue has been
raised before the court of law or if the State has decided to
rectify the illegality committed in the inception.
76. The State if has proceeded in that direction, it is not
available for the court of law to come out with the finding
that such decision taken by the State is unjust and
improper.
77. This court, in order to have the view regarding the
difference in between the Advertisement No.1 & 2/2017 and
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Advertisement No.3/2018 has compared both of them in
order to come to the conclusion for the purpose of
appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the learned
counsel for respondents/writ petitioners that they have been
subjected to discrimination since the candidates who have
participated in terms of the Advertisement No.1 & 2/2017
have been selected and appointed, but that treatment has
not been given to the candidates who have participated in
terms of Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018.
78. We, in course thereof, have found that in the
Advertisement No.1 & 2/2017 the condition has been
stipulated that the applications are to be invited from the
citizen of India, for ready reference the same is being referred
here in:-
Condition stipulated in Condition stipulated in
Advertisement No.1/2017 Advertisement No.2/2017
3. (i) पंचायत सचचव के पद की संसूचचत 3. (i) काचमिक, प्रशासचनक सुधाि तर्था
रिक्तिय ं के चवरूद्ध एक अभ्यर्थी चकसी एक िािभाषा चवभाग झािखण्ड की अचधसूचना
चिले की रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध ही आवेदन दे सं० 5938 चदनांक 14.07.2016 के
सकते हैं। प्रावधानानुसाि साहेबगंि, पाकुड़, दु मका,
(ii) काचमिक, प्रशासचनक सुधाि तर्था लातेहाि, िॉची, ल हिदगा, पूवी चसंहभूम
िािभाषा चवभाग झािखण्ड की अचधसूचना औि सिायकेला-खिसाव ं के अधीन
सं0 5938 चदनांक 14.07.2016 के चनम्नवगीय चलचपक (समाहिणालय संवगि)
प्रावधानानुसाि साहेबगंि, पाकुड़, दु मका, तर्था पंचायत सचचव की संसूचचत रिक्तिय ं
िामताड़ा, लातेहाि, िााँची, खूंटी, गुमला, के चवरूद्ध संबंचधत चिले के स्थानीय
ल हिदगा, चसमडे गा, पूवी चसंहभूम, पचिमी चनवासी ही आवेदन दे ने के पात्र ह ग
ं े।
चसंहभूम औि सिायकेला-खिसावााँ के अधीन अर्थाित् साहेबगंि चिले के स्थानीय चनवासी
चनम्नवगीय चलचपक (समाहिणालय संवगि) अभ्यर्थी ही साहेबगंि चिले के रिक्ति के
तर्था पंचायत सचचव की संसूचचत रिक्तिय ं के चवरूद्ध आवेदन दे सकते हैं।
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
चवरूद्ध संबंचधत चिले के स्थानीय चनवासी ही
आवेदन दे ने के पात्र ह ग
ं े। अर्थाित् गुमला (B) उपयुिि उप कंचडका (i) में अंचकत
चिले के स्थानीय चनवासी अभ्यर्थी ही गुमला चिल ं क छ ड़ कि अन्य चिले की रिक्ति
चिले के रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध आवेदन दे सकते के चवरूद्ध चवविचणका की पात्रता सम्बंधी
हैं। शतों यर्था शैक्षचणक य ग्यता, आयु सीमा
(iii) उपयुिि कंचडका (ii) में अंचकत चिल ं आचद के अध्यधीन तर्था सम्बंचधत आिचक्षत
क छ ड़ कि अन्य चिले की रिक्ति के वगि की रिक्ति के आल क में झािखण्ड
चवरूद्ध चवविचणका की पात्रता सम्बंधी शतों िाज्य के स्थानीय चनवासी आवेदन दे ने के
यर्था शैक्षचणक य ग्यता, आयु सीमा आचद के पात्र हग
ं े। चूंचक बैंकलॉग रिक्तिय ं
अध्यधीन भाित का क ई भी नागरिक आिचक्षत वगों से सन्दचभित हैं अतएव
आवेदन दे ने के पात्र ह ग
ं े, पिन्तु एक अभ्यर्थी बैकलॉग रिक्तिय ं के चवरूद्ध दू सिे िाज्य ं
के द्वािा पंचायत सचचव की एक से अचधक के चनवासी आवेदन दे ने के पात्र नहीं ह ग
ं े।
चिले की रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध आवेदन नहीं (ii) चनम्नवगीय चलचपक (समाहिणालय
चदया िा सकता है। सम्वगि) की रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध उपयुिि उप
(iv) िाज्य स्तिीय सम्वगों के पद ं यर्था चनम्न कंचडका (i) में वचणित अचधसूचचत चिल ं क
वगीय चलचपक (क षागाि चलचपकीय सम्वगि), छ ड़कि अन्य चिल ं के रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध
चनम्न वगीय चलचपक वाचणज्य कि चवभाग तर्था झािखण्ड िाज्य के स्थानीय चनवासी
खाद्य सावििचनक चवतिण एवं उपभ िा आवेदन पत्र समचपित कि सकते हैं तर्था
मामले चवभाग, आशुचलचपक खादय चिल ं का चवकल्प अचधमानता क्रम में
सावििचनक चवतिण एवं उपभ िा मामले उनके द्वािा चदया िाएगा चिसकी सुचवधा
चवभाग के िाज्य स्तिीय सम्वगों के रिि पद ऑनलाईन आवेदन पत्र में उपलब्ध िहेगी।
के चवरूद्ध भाित का क ई भी नागरिक उपयुिि उप कंचडका (i) के प्रावधान ं के
पात्रता संबंधी अन्य शतों के अध्यधीन अध्यधीन पंचायत सचचव की चकसी एक ही
आवेदन दे ने के पात्र ह ग
ं े। इनमें वैसे अभ्यर्थी चिले की रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध आवेदन चदया
भी सक्तिचलत ह सकते हैं चिन् न
ं े इस िा सकता है।
चवविचणका के माध्यम से संसूचचत चनम्नवगीय
चलचपक (समाहिणालय संवगि) के अन्तगित
चकसी चिले के रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध आवेदन
चदया ह । ऐसे अभ्यचर्थिय ं के संदभि में
अचधमानता क्रम में पद का चवकल्प आवेदन
पत्र में उपलब्ध ह गा।
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
79. We, after going through the Advertisement
No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018, have found, as under
Clause No.3, that the acceptance of candidature has been
confined only to the local residents of the State of Jharkhand
having with the residency certificate, for the purpose of
appreciation, the conditions as mentioned in Advertisement
No.1/2017 and 3/2018 are being referred in the tabular
chart:-
Condition stipulated in Condition stipulated in
Advertisement No.1/2017 Advertisement No.3/2018
3. (i) पंचायत सचचव के पद की संसूचचत 3. पात्रतााः -
रिक्तिय ं के चवरूद्ध एक अभ्यर्थी चकसी एक क) उपयुिि कंचडका-2 में वचणित पद ं पि
चिले की रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध ही आवेदन दे झारखण्ड राज्य के स्थानीय ननवासी
सकते हैं। अभ्यर्थी ही आवेदन दे ने के पात्र हैं। अताः
(ii) काचमिक, प्रशासचनक सुधाि तर्था चवविचणका के परिचशष्ट-III पि चदये गये
िािभाषा चवभाग झािखण्ड की अचधसूचना प्रपत्र में आवेदन पत्र समचपित किने की
सं0 5938 चदनांक 14.07.2016 के चतचर्थ तक आिचक्षत एवं अनािचक्षत द न
ं ं
प्रावधानानुसाि साहेबगंि, पाकुड़, दु मका, क चट के अभ्यचर्थिय ं क स्थानीय चनवासी
िामताड़ा, लातेहाि, िााँची, खूंटी, गुमला, प्रमाण पत्र धारित किना अचनवायि है।
ल हिदगा, चसमडे गा, पूवी चसंहभूम, पचिमी
चसंहभूम औि सिायकेला-खिसावााँ के अधीन
चनम्नवगीय चलचपक (समाहिणालय संवगि)
तर्था पंचायत सचचव की संसूचचत रिक्तिय ं के
चवरूद्ध संबंचधत चिले के स्थानीय चनवासी ही
आवेदन दे ने के पात्र ह ग
ं े। अर्थाित् गुमला
चिले के स्थानीय चनवासी अभ्यर्थी ही गुमला
चिले के रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध आवेदन दे सकते
हैं।
(iii) उपयुिि कंचडका (ii) में अंचकत चिल ं
क छ ड़ कि अन्य चिले की रिक्ति के
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
चवरूद्ध चवविचणका की पात्रता सम्बंधी शतों
यर्था शैक्षचणक य ग्यता, आयु सीमा आचद के
अध्यधीन भारत का कोई भी नागररक
आवेदन दे ने के पात्र होोंगे, पिन्तु एक
अभ्यर्थी के द्वािा पंचायत सचचव की एक से
अचधक चिले की रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध आवेदन
नहीं चदया िा सकता है।
(iv) िाज्य स्तिीय सम्वगों के पद ं यर्था चनम्न
वगीय चलचपक (क षागाि चलचपकीय सम्वगि),
चनम्न वगीय चलचपक वाचणज्य कि चवभाग तर्था
खाद्य सावििचनक चवतिण एवं उपभ िा
मामले चवभाग, आशुचलचपक खादय
सावििचनक चवतिण एवं उपभ िा मामले
चवभाग के िाज्य स्तिीय सम्वगों के रिि पद
के चवरूद्ध भारत का कोई भी नागररक
पात्रता सोंबोंधी अन्य शतों के अध्यधीन
आवेदन दे ने के पात्र होोंगे। इनमें वैसे
अभ्यर्थी भी सक्तिचलत ह सकते हैं चिन् न
ं े
इस चवविचणका के माध्यम से संसूचचत
चनम्नवगीय चलचपक (समाहिणालय संवगि) के
अन्तगित चकसी चिले के रिक्ति के चवरूद्ध
आवेदन चदया ह । ऐसे अभ्यचर्थिय ं के संदभि
में अचधमानता क्रम में पद का चवकल्प
आवेदन पत्र में उपलब्ध ह गा।
80. This Court, in view of the aforesaid distinction in
these two advertisements, is of the view that the
appointments so made of the candidates who have
participated in terms of Advertisement No.1 & 2/2017,
which is on the basis of the direction passed by Hon'ble Apex
Court Soni Kumari v. The State of Jharkhand
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(Supra)/Satyajit Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand
& Others (Supra), as referred hereinabove, has got no
equality with the case of the candidates who have
participated either in terms of Advertisement No.3/2018 or
4/2018 or 5/2018, since, in Advertisement No.3/2018,
4/2018 and 5/2018, the applications have been invited only
from the local residents of Jharkhand having with the
residential certificate.
81. This Court therefore, is of the view that the grounds
which have been raised on the issue of the hostile
discrimination with the case of the respondent/writ
petitioner vis-à-vis the candidates of Advertisement No.1 &
2/2017, is not having any basis, rather, we are of the view
that no equality can be claimed from the candidates who
have been appointed in terms of Advertisement No.1 &
2/2017.
82. Law is well settled that there cannot be any
discrimination said to be hostile, otherwise the same will be
in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But the
classification if based upon the reasonable classification,
then certainly Article 14 will not attract, but if the
classification is unreasonable, then certainly the Article 14
will be applicable, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar [AIR 1952 SC
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
75] wherein it has been held that differentia between the
basis of classification and the object of the things are two
different things. It is important that there must be nexus
between the basis of classification with the object of the Act.
83. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors Vs. Shri
Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors [AIR 1958 SC 538], the
Hon'ble Apex Court, taking into consideration catena of
judgments rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court, has held that
Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In
order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification
two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought
to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification
may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or
according to objects or occupations or the like. What is
necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis
of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of
this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only
by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.
Paragraph 11 of the said judgment is quoted as under:
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
"11. ...
(a). That a law may be constitutional even though it
relates to a single individual if, on account of some
special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and
not applicable to others, that single individual may be
treated as a class by himself;
(b). That there is always a presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon
him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear
transgression of the constitutional principles;
(c). That it must be presumed that the legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the need of its
own people, that its laws are directed to problems made
manifest by experience and that its discriminations are
based on adequate grounds;
(d). That the legislature is free to recognise degrees of
harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases
where the need is deemed to be the clearest;
(e). That in order to sustain the presumption of
constitutionality the court may take into consideration
matters of common knowledge, matters of common
report, the history of the times and may assume every
state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time
of legislation; and
(f). That while good faith and knowledge of the existing
conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed,
if there is nothing on the face of the law or the
surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the
court on which the classification may reasonably be
regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality
cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that
there must be some undisclosed and un-known reasons
for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to
hostile or discriminating legislation...."
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
84. The aforesaid principle can further be found in RE
The Special Courts Bill, 1978, which contains that:
➢ The basic principle of Article 14 is that the persons in
similar circumstances shall be treated similarly both in
privileges conferred and liability imposed.
➢ The State shall have the power to determine with regard
to the process of classification, which should be
regarded as a class for the purpose of legislation and in
relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.
➢ The classification does not mean arbitrary application
of law to certain person instead it means segregation in
classes which had a systematic relation, usually found
common property and characteristics.
➢ The law can make and set apart the classes according
to the needs and exigencies of the society and suggested
by experience. It can even recognize 'degrees of evil' but
the classification should never be arbitrary, or artificial.
85. A mere assumption that the authority which has
been conferred with the discretion by law, would act
arbitrarily in exercising such law, would not be
determinative of the constitutionality of law.
Discretionary power does not necessarily mean
discriminatory power. Inequality in the application of law
may not question the constitutionality of such law.
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A practical evaluation of operation of law in
particular circumstances is necessary. A rule of procedure
laid down by law derived as much within the purview of
Article 14 as in the rule of substantive law.
86. In R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors [(1981) 4
SCC 675], the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Article 14
forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable
classification.
87. In V. Markendeya & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors [(1989) 3 SCC 191], the Hon'ble Apex Court
has held that where two classes of employees perform
identical or similar duties and carrying out the same
functions with the same measure of responsibility having
same academic qualifications, they would be entitled to
equal pay. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action
would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
and the court will strike down the discrimination and grant
relief to the aggrieved employees. But before such relief is
granted the court must consider and analyse the rationale
behind the State action in prescribing two different scales of
pay. If on an analysis of the relevant rules, orders, nature of
duties, functions, measure of responsibility, and educational
qualifications required for the relevant posts, the court finds
that the classification made by the State in giving different
treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on
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rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be
achieved, the classification must be upheld. Principle of
equal pay for equal work is applicable among equals, it
cannot be applied to unequal. Relief to an aggrieved person
seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for equal work
can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the court
that invidious discrimination is practised by the State in
prescribing two different scales for the two classes of
employees without there being any reasonable classification
for the same.
88. It is, thus, evident that Article 14 prohibits
discriminatory legislation against an individual or against a
class of individual but it does not prohibit reasonable
classification. Reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in D.S. Nakara
& Ors. v. Union of India [(1983) 1 SCC 305], wherein at
paragraph 11, it has been held as under:-
"11.The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14
forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however,
to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions
must be fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be founded
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from those that are left out of
the group; and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in
question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar
[AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279, 296 : 1959 SCJ 147] ). The
classification may be founded on differential basis according to
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that
there ought to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between the
basis of classification and object of the statute under
consideration. It is equally well settled by the decisions of this
Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a
substantive law but also by a law of procedure."
89. In the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali
Sarkar (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that to pass
the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes those that are grouped together from
others; and (2) that differentia must have a rationale relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Thus, the
differentia which is the basis of the classification and the
object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is
that there must be a nexus between them. The test must be
reasonable and not the arbitrary and irrational.
90. It is, thus, evident from the judgments rendered by
Hon'ble Apex Court referred hereinabove that Article 14
granting the fundamental right to equality to every citizen in
the country which provides equality to all the people
irrespective of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place or
birth, residence or any of them.
91. There are two aspects under Article 14 i.e., 'equality
before the law' and 'equal protection of the laws' and to test
the constitutionality in order to know the reasonable
classification under which it was tested whether there was a
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reasonable classification in the legislation. There is no
absolute bar in making classification but classification must
be based upon the rationality; meaning thereby there must
be classification based upon the intelligible differentia.
92. It needs to refer herein that it cannot be denied that
the object of recruitment to any service or post is to appoint
most suitable person who answers the demands of the
requirement of the job. In the case of public employment it
is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favouritism and
introduce the uniformity of standards in the matter of public
employment, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgment rendered in Union of India & Ors Vs. N.
Hargopal & Ors [(1987) 3 SCC 308] wherein dealing with
principle to be followed in the matter of filling up of the public
posts, it has been held that the main object of recruitment is
to choose the suitable person so that the condition of merit
be allowed to be prevailed for the better functioning of the
public administration.
93. Article 14 provides that there must be a reasonable
classification but there cannot be an unreasonable
classification.
94. Here, in the instant case, the classification has been
made out by classifying one group of candidates who are
resident of district/State of Jharkhand and another group
who reside outside the State of Jharkhand.
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95. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that
such difference is based upon unreasonable classification,
since, there cannot be any discrimination on the ground of
residence of a candidate.
96. There is no dispute that Article 16 of the Constitution
of India entails provision to make out special policy to
provide benefit to the candidates belonging to backward
class i.e., Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes etc. Such
provision, carved out under Article 16 of the Constitution, is
being followed by the State to obtain the Constitutional
bounty to benefit such section of society who have been
found not at par with the other section of the society, in that
circumstance such classification cannot be said to be
unreasonable since the same is based upon the rationality
i.e., to bring such section of society at par with the other
section of society so that they may come in the mainstream
of the society and thereby society may develop as a whole.
97. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present cases,
which we are dealing with separately by considering the two
different orders passed by the learned Single Judge on the
same legal issues.
98. The State has taken decision by cancelling the
Advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 by issuance
of the order dated 01.11.2021. The fresh advertisements
have also been said to be issued.
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99. The case of the respondent/writ petitioner so far as
it relates to Advertisement No.3/2018 is concerned, the
recruitment process has been said to reach to the advanced
stage, while the recruitment process pertaining to
Advertisement No. 4/2018 and Advertisement No. 5/2018
has been considered to be in the initial stage as would appear
from the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.
100. This Court first needs to deal with the issue that
irrespective of the stage of the recruitment process, if there
is any illegality and the recruitment processes are being
allowed to proceed contrary to the constitutional mandate,
the same principle is to be followed, and not only on the basis
of the fact that in one recruitment process, since the process
has reached to the advanced stage, the illegality regarding
the flagrant violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India cannot be ignored.
101. This Court is of the view that irrespective of the stage,
if any illegality is there, contrary to the principle laid down
under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the
entire recruitment process is to go.
102. The same can also be nullified if the recruitment
process have also been concluded as the fact of Soni Kumari
v. The State of Jharkhand (Supra) is concerned wherein
the Full Bench of this Court while quashing the decision of
the State restricting the acceptance of candidature, has
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quashed such decision and the entire appointment have also
been cancelled.
103. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in exercise of
power conferred under Article 142 of Constitution of India
has saved the said appointment, for ready reference, the
same is being referred herein:-
"111. ... ... ... It is now directed that instead
of fresh/de novo recruitment process by setting aside the
appointments already made in the Scheduled Districts/Areas,
the State shall revise the merit list based on the already
published cut-off obtained by the last selected candidates in
each TGT subject against the respective categories with
respect to entire State and respective candidates belonging to
the non-Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Areas (districts)
shall be adjusted accordingly on the basis of individual merit
of the candidates."
104. Here, the stage of saving the appointment has not
come, since, as per the admitted case, based upon the
factual aspect as discussed hereinabove, the recruitment
process was going on at that time the recruitment process
has been cancelled.
105. The argument which has been raised that the learned
Single Judge has passed the order in respect of
Advertisement No.3/2018 by considering that the
recruitment process has reached to the advanced stage
which is based upon the principle of legitimate expectation
and to strengthen the argument the learned counsel for the
respondent/writ petitioner in L.P.A. No.59 of 2025 has relied
2025:JHHC:26862-DB
upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Tej Prakash Pathak & Others v. Rajasthan High
Court and Others, [(2025) 2 SCC 1], particularly
paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 thereof. For ready reference, the
said paragraphs are being quoted hereunder as:-
"24. The principle of fairness in action requires that public
authorities be held accountable for their representations.
Good administration requires public authorities to act in a
predictable manner and honour the promises made or
practices established unless there is good reason not to do so.
25. Candidates participating in a recruitment process have
legitimate expectation that the process of selection will be fair
and non-arbitrary. The basis of doctrine of legitimate
expectation in public law is founded on the principles of
fairness and non-arbitrariness in government dealings with
individuals. It recognises that a public authority's promise or
past conduct will give rise to a legitimate expectation. This
doctrine is premised on the notion that public authorities,
while performing their public duties, ought to honour their
promises or past practices. The legitimacy of an expectation
can be inferred if it is rooted in law, custom, or established
procedure.
26. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not
impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay
down a policy or withdraw it. The public authority has the
discretion to exercise the full range of choices available within
its executive power. The public authority often has to take into
consideration diverse factors, concerns, and interests before
arriving at a particular policy decision. The courts are
generally cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of
public authorities which denies legitimate expectation
provided such a decision is taken in the larger public interest.
Thus, public interest serves as a limitation on the application
of the doctrine of legitimate expectation."
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106. We have considered the said judgment and found
from the paragraph 24 which has been relied upon on behalf
of the respondent/writ petitioner that the question of the
principle of fairness in action has been taken into
consideration wherein at paragraph-25, it has been referred
that the candidates participating in the recruitment process
have a legitimate expectation, while in para 26, it has been
observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not
impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay
down a policy or withdraw it. The courts are generally
cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of public
authorities which denies legitimate expectation provided
such a decision is taken in the larger public interest.
107. In paragraph 62, it has been laid down that there can
therefore be no doubt that where there are no rules or the
rules are silent on the subject, administrative instructions
may be issued to supplement and fill in the gaps in the rules.
In that event administrative instructions would govern the
field provided they are not ultra vires the provisions of the
rules or the statute or the Constitution. But where the rules
expressly or impliedly cover the field, the recruiting body
would have to abide by the rules.
108. The conclusion has been arrived at as has been
referred in paragraph 65, it has been held therein which is
relevant for the present case, that the recruiting bodies,
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subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate
procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical
end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-
discriminatory/non-arbitrary and has a rational nexus to
the object sought to be achieved.
109. It has been laid down at paragraph 65.5 that extant
Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting
body both in terms of procedure and eligibility. For ready
reference, paragraph 65 is being referred hereunder as:-
"65.1. Recruitment process commences from the issuance of
the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling
up of vacancies;
65.2. Eligibility criteria for being placed in the select list,
notified at the commencement of the recruitment process,
cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process
unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement,
which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if
such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the
advertisement, the change would have to meet the
requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the
test of non-arbitrariness;
65.3. ... ... ...
65.4. Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may
devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment
process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted
is transparent, non-discriminatory/non-arbitrary and has a
rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved;
65.5. Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the
recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility.
However, where the rules are non-existent, or silent,
administrative instructions may fill in the gaps;
65.6. Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to
appointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide
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reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if
vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot
arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of
consideration in the select list."
110. The backdrop of the aforesaid judgment is that the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak &
Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, [(2013) 4
SCC 540] while accepting the solitary principle that once the
recruitment process commences, the State or its
instrumentalities cannot tinker with the "rules of the game"
insofar as the prescription of eligibility criteria is concerned,
wander whether that should apply also to the procedure for
selection. In that context, doubting the correctness of the
Coordinate Bench decision in K. Manjusree v. State of
Andhra Pradesh and Another [(2008) 3 SCC 512], for not
having noticed an earlier decision in State of Haryana v.
Subash Chander Marwaha and Others [(1974) 3 SCC
220], vide order dated 20th March, 2013 passed in Tej
Prakash Pathak & Others v. Rajasthan High Court and
Others (Supra), it was directed that the matter be placed
before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger
Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the subject.
The context for the reference was "Whether such a principle
should be applied in the context of the "rules of the game"
stipulating the procedure for selection more particularly when
the change sought is to impose a more rigorous scrutiny for
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selection requires an authoritative pronouncement of a larger
Bench of this Court".
111. In the light of the aforesaid reference, the proposition
has been laid down, as referred hereinabove.
112. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ
petitioner has tried to make out a case that by virtue of
cancellation of advertisement the rules of game in the midst
of the recruitment process have been changed by cancelling
the advertisement No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 and
coming out with the fresh advertisement.
113. What is the concept of rule of game that has been
considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered
in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak & Others v. Rajasthan
High Court and Others (Supra) to deal with the situation
where the State sought to alter (i) the eligibility criteria of the
candidates seeking employment, or (ii) the method and
manner of making the selection of the suitable candidates.
114. Here, it is not the case of the respondents/writ
petitioners of changing the eligibility criteria of the candidate
seeking employment or method and manner of making the
selection of the suitable candidates, rather, here the case is
the illegality crept up since inception in notifying the
advertisement by restricting the application to be accepted
of the candidates only for the local resident of the State of
Jharkhand based upon the residency certificate.
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115. Therefore, here the case is neither of eligibility
criteria or the method and manner of making the selection
of the suitable candidates, rather, it is the case where the
mandate of Article 14 and 16 has been decided to be
followed, which was not there in the Advertisement
No.3/2018 by putting restrictions upon the candidature of
the candidates from the outside the State or even inside the
State barring them due to want of residency certificate.
116. Therefore, this Court is of the view that on the fact of
the present case the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Tej Prakash Pathak & Others v.
Rajasthan High Court and Others (Supra) is not applicable
in true sense. But this Court, after considering the
discussion so made in the said judgment as under paragraph
24, which speaks about the principle of fairness and in
paragraph 62 the recruitment process is to proceed as per
the provision of rules or the statute or the Constitution.
117. The state has proceeded to fill up the vacancies by
following the mandate of Constitution as under Article 14
and 16 thereof.
118. The consideration is also to be made herein is
whether merely because the respondents/writ petitioners
had participated in the process of selection, irrespective of
the stage of the recruitment process, can it be said that any
right has been accrued, said to be vested/accrued?
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119. Rights are "vested" when right to enjoyment, present
or prospective, has become property of some particular
person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of
future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute
"vested rights." "Vested right" has been defined by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank v.
Chakrawarti Singh [(2014) 13 SCC 583] at paragraph 11,
12 and 13, which read hereunder as:--
11. The word "vested" is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: "Vested.--fixed;
accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character
or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not
contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition
precedent. Rights are "vested" when right to enjoyment,
present or prospective, has become property of some
particular person or persons as present interest; mere
expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in
property founded on anticipated continuance of existing
laws, does not constitute "vested rights".
12. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International
Edition) at p. 1397, "vested" is defined as law held by a
tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by
law as a permanent right; vested interest.
13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any
contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent
of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from
contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued
or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy
decision/scheme could be changed.
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120. The accrued right so far in the case of public
employment is concerned, is only to be said to be available if
the appointment letters have been issued.
121. But here the admitted case is that the appointment
letters have not been issued and as such it is not a case
where the accrued or vested rights have been created in
favour of the one or the other respondents/writ petitioners.
122. Therefore, no indefeasible right is there merely on
account of the fact that the recruitment process has
proceeded. Further, the law is well settled that merely
because the candidates were successful in the exams they
do not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed on the
vacant post. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shankarsan
Dash Vs. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 47], has held that:
6. "It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies
are notified for appointment and adequate number of
candidates are found fit, the successful candidates
acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which
cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the
notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified
candidates to apply for recruitment and on their
selection, they do not acquire any right to the post.
Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the
State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the
vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has
the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The
decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken
bonafide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies
or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to
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respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as
reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination
can be permitted. This correct position has been
consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find
any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana
V. Subash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla V.
State of Haryana, or Jatinder Kumar V.State of Punjab".
123. One of the arguments is also of the applicability of
the principle of legitimate expectation, but even no
advantage can be given on the aforesaid principle by taking
into consideration the fact that in the service jurisprudence,
the principle of legitimate expectation is not applicable.
124. In the case of Tej Prakash Pathak & Others v.
Rajasthan High Court and Others (Supra) as referred
herein above, the aforesaid issue has been taken into
consideration as under paragraphs 25 and 26.
125. It is evident from paragraph 25 wherein it has been
observed that if the candidates have participated in the
recruitment process, have the legitimate expectation that the
process of selection be fair and non-arbitrary.
126. The basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation in
public law is founded on the principles of fairness and non-
arbitrariness in Government dealings with individuals.
127. From paragraph 26, it would be evident that the
Hon'ble Apex Court has considered that the doctrine of
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legitimate expectation does not impede or hinder the power
of the public authorities to lay down a policy or withdraw it.
128. This court, in view of the reading of paragraph 25 and
26, is of the view that legitimate expectation is only to be
taken into consideration in order to follow the process of
selection to be fair and non-arbitrary, and if the process is
not fair and suffer from vice of arbitrariness, then the State
is competent enough to take decision, and in that
circumstances, as has been held in para 26, the courts are
to be cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of
public authorities, which denies legitimate expectation
provided such a decision is taken in the larger public
interest. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed in para
26 that the public interests serve as a limitation on the
application of the document of legitimate expectation.
129. This Court, in view of the aforesaid observation of the
Hon'ble Apex Court, is of the view based upon the factual
aspect that here restricting the candidates outside the
periphery of the State of Jharkhand and even inside the
periphery of the Jharkhand due to want of the residency
certificate cannot be turned to fair selection process and
suffer with the vice of arbitrariness.
130. Arbitrariness has been defined that if the decision
has been taken by the State, contrary to the constitutional
mandate, in not allowing to participate in the process of
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selection, even though the constitution put restriction upon
the same by carving out under Part III of the Constitution,
under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, that there
cannot be any discrimination in the public employment on
the basis of caste, creed, and place.
131. This Court, therefore is of the view that if the
restrictions have been imposed in acceptance of the
application of the candidature of candidates outside the
periphery of the State of Jharkhand and even inside the
State of Jharkhand, the same being in the teeth of Article 16
of the Constitution of India, hence, such decision would hit
the principle as available under Article 14 of the Constitution
of India, being arbitrary.
132. Herein also similar is the situation, hence, the
principle of legitimate expectation will not be applicable, in
the facts and circumstances, as per the discussion made
hereinabove.
133. This court, having discussed the issues, has gone
across the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge so
far as the subject matter of L.P.A. No.59 of 2025 is
concerned, and found that the directions have been passed
upon the respondents by quashing the impugned resolution
dated 05.02.2021 and notice dated 01.11.2021 to proceed in
accordance with law by recommending the names of the
successful candidates to the State respondent who shall
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proceed further by issuing appointment letters to the
successful candidates including these petitioners strictly in
accordance with law, mainly on the ground that since the
process of appointment with regard to Advertisement
No.03/2018 was on the verge of completion and the
petitioners were finally sent for medical test.
134. But, as has been discussed hereinabove, that the
stages of recruitment process cannot be a bearing in
questioning the decision of the State, if the decision has been
taken to follow the mandate of the Constitution of India.
135. Further, if the State has taken recourse to rectify the
illegality committed so as to multiply the multiplicity of
proceeding as has been occurred in the case of Soni Kumari
v. The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and
Satyajit Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand &
Others (Supra), then it cannot be termed to be the mala fide
exercise of the State, rather it is considered to be the bona
fide approach in order to maintain fairness, transparency
and to avoid the vice of arbitrariness.
136. The learned single judge has given a finding that
merely on the garb of judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court,
no such decision is to be taken, but we all with due respect
to the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge are of
the considered view that if the mandate has been given by
the Hon'ble Apex Court it is not the fact which is to be
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considered to be important, rather it is the ratio to be taken
into consideration and if any ratio has been laid down then
it is having binding precedence in view of the Article 14 of
the Constitution of India, reference in this regard be made to
the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Ors., (2008) 10
SCC 1, wherein at paragraphs-84, 86 & 88 it has been held
as under:
"84. In State of Bihar vs. Kalika Kuer, the Court
elaborately considered the principle of per incuriam
and held that the earlier judgment by a larger Bench
cannot be ignored by invoking the principle of per
incuriam and the only course open to the coordinate
or smaller Bench is to make a request for reference to
the larger Bench.
86. In Central Board of Dwaoodi Bohra Community
vs. State of Maharashtra, the Constitution Bench
interpreted Article 141, referred to various earlier
judgments including Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs.
Mumbai Shramik Sangha and Pradip Chandra Parija
vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and held that "the law
laid down in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger
strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser
or co-equal strength and it would be inappropriate if
a Division Bench of two Judges starts overruling the
decisions of Division Benches of three Judges. The
Court further held that such a practice would be
detrimental not only to the rule of discipline and the
doctrine of binding precedents but it will also lead to
inconsistency in decisions on the point of law;
consistency and certainty in the development of law
and its contemporary status - both would be
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immediate casualty (Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community case, SCC p. 682, paras 12 & 10).
88. In U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh vs. Daya
Ram Saroj, the Court noted that by ignoring the
earlier decision of a coordinate Bench, a Division
Bench of the High Court directed that part-time tube-
well operators should be treated as permanent
employees with same service conditions as far as
possible and observed:
"26. Judicial discipline is self-discipline. It is an
inbuilt mechanism in the system itself. Judicial
discipline demands that when the decision of a
coordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought
to the notice of the Bench, it is to be respected and is
binding, subject of course, to the right to take a
different view or to doubt the correctness of the
decision and the permissible course then open is to
refer the question or the case to a larger Bench. This
is the minimum discipline and decorum to be
maintained by judicial fraternity."
137. This Court, in view of the above, is of the view that
the reasoning which has been assigned by the learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment cannot be said to be
upheld.
138. We will fail in our duty if the argument with respect
to relaxing 4(kha) as referred in Resolution dated 05.02.2021
which has emphatically been relied upon by the learned
counsel appearing for the appellants/respondents/writ
petitioners that if 4(kha) has been relaxed, meaning thereby,
the decision ought to have been taken on the basis of
Advertisement No.3/2018.
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139. This Court, in order to appreciate the said argument,
needs to refer herein the contents of 4(ka) and 4(kha) of the
Resolution dated 05.02.2021 which is being referred herein:
"4. माननीय झािखण्ड उच्च न्यायालय के उि न्यायादे श के आल क में
सम्यक् चवचाि पिान्त िाज्य सिकाि के द्वािा चनणि य चलया गया है चकाः -
(क) िाज्य के गैि अनुसूचचत चिल ं के चिला स्ति के समूह 'ख'
अिािपचत्रत, समूह 'ग' एवं समूह 'घ' पद ं पि चनयुक्तिय ं में संबंचधत
चिले के स्थानीय चनवाचसय ं क एवं िाज्यस्तिीय समूह 'ख'
अिािपचत्रत, समूह 'ग' एवं समूह 'घ' के पद ं पि चनयुक्तिय ं में
झािखण्ड िाज्य के स्थानीय चनवाचसय ं क प्रार्थचमकता दे ने संबंधी
काचमिक, प्रशासचनक सुधाि तर्था िािभाषा चवभाग की संकल्प सं0-
3854, चदनां क-01.06.2018 (संकल्प सं0-8468, चदनां क-
20.11.2018 द्वािा यर्थासंश चधत) क तत्काल प्रभाव से आहरित
चकया िाता है ।
(ख) इस संकल्प के चनगित ह ने की चतचर्थ से पूवि समूह 'ख' अिािपचत्रत,
समूह 'ग' एवं समूह 'घ' के पद ं पि चनयुक्ति हे तु वैसी प्रचतय चगता
पिीक्षाओं से संबंचधत सभी चवज्ञापनं, ि काचमिक चवभागीय संकल्प
संख्या-3854, चदनां क-01.06.2018 (संकल्प सं०-8468,
चदनां क-20.11.2018 द्वािा यर्थासं श चधत) से आच्छाचदं त हैं तर्था
चिनमें अबतक चनयुक्ति पत्र चनगित नहीं चकए गए हैं , उनमें चनयुक्ति
की प्रचक्रया अपूणि मानते हुए उन सभी चवज्ञापन ं क चनिस्त चकया
िाता है । इन मामल ं में अब नए चसिे से (ab-initio) चवज्ञापन
प्रकाचशत किने की कािि वाई की िाएं गी।"
140. Subsequent thereto, the Resolution dated
19.01.2022 has been issued wherein the 4(kha) has been
relaxed.
141. Learned counsel for the State appellant has argued
that the writ petitioner has only challenged part of the
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Resolution dated 05.02.2021 particularly, 4(kha) without
challenging 4(ka).
142. The 4(kha) is the consequence of 4(ka) and if the
content of 4(ka) has not been challenged wherein the earlier
decision taken for recall of the Resolution dated 05.02.2021,
then in absence of the challenge the content of 4(ka), the
same will be operative.
143. This Court, is of the view that what has been
contended by learned counsel appearing for the State is
correct, since, 4(kha) decision is consequence of 4(ka) and as
would be evident from the pleading made in the writ petition
that there is no prayer to quash the 4(ka), rather, the prayer
only is to quash 4(kha).
144. Further, so far as the contention raised on behalf of
the respondents/writ petitioners with respect to relaxing
4(kha) is concerned, even accepting that the content of
4(kha) has been relaxed, even then the recruitment process
which has been initiated in terms of Advertisement
No.3/2018, 4/2018 and 5/2018 cannot be allowed to be
concluded in view of the mandate of Article 16 of the
Constitution of India.
145. Accordingly, the judgment dated 04.10.2024 passed
in W.P.(S) No.1856 of 2021, subject matter of L.P.A. No.59 of
2025, is hereby quashed and set aside.
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146. L.P.A. No.59 of 2025 stands allowed.
Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed.
147. So far as order/judgment dated 04.10.2024 passed
in W.P.(S) No.5635 of 2021, subject matter of L.P.A. No.14 of
2025, is concerned, therein the only difference has been
carved out based upon the stage of recruitment process.
However, the writ petition has been dismissed but we intend
to say that the reasoning which has been given by the
learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, cannot be
merely on the basis of the stage of recruitment process,
rather, the reasoning would have that the State has rectified
the illegality committed based upon the judgment passed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Satyajit Kumar & Others v.
State of Jharkhand & Others (Supra) following the ratio
laid down therein in order to follow the mandate of Article 16
of the Constitution of India.
148. So far as the outcome of the order/judgment dated
04.10.2024 is concerned, we are of the view that the same
requires no interference.
149. Accordingly, the L.P.A. No.14 of 2025 is hereby
dismissed.
150. Both the appeals stand disposed of. Pending
interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.
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151. The concerned authorities/ State are hereby directed
to conclude the entire selection process of the fresh
advertisement which has already been floated by the
authority concerned after cancellation of advertisement in
question, strictly in accordance with law by maintaining
fairness and transparency within the period of four months
from the date of receipt of the copy of the order.
152. The State respondents are further directed to adhere
to the time limit, since the fresh advertisement is of the year
2021 and since then four years have already elapsed.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
A.F.R.
Birendra/
