Barun Prasad Singh vs Central Bnak Of India Through Its ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 7210 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Barun Prasad Singh vs Central Bnak Of India Through Its ... on 27 November, 2025

Author: Deepak Roshan

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                                       2025:JHHC:35388


      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                    W.P. (S) No. 934 of 2019
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Barun Prasad Singh, aged about 65 years, son of Late Muneshwar Prasad Singh, resident of Mohalla- Gangajal, Ward No. 16, P.Ο. and P.S. Saharsa, District Saharsa, Bihar.

....Petitioner

Versus

1. Central Bnak of India through its Chairman-cum- Managing Director having its registered office at Chandramukhi, Nariman Point, Mumbai, Maharastra.

2. General Manager, H.R.D., Central Bank of India, office at 17th Floor Chandramukhi, Nariman Point, Mumbai, Maharastra.

3. Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India, having office at 2nd Floor, Block-B, Maurya Complex, Dakbunglow Road, Patna, Bihar.

4. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India, having office at 2nd floor, Krishna Arcade, H.B. Road, Dipatoli, Booty More, Ranchi.

5. Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of India, Regional Office, Jatinchand Road, Lalpur Chowk, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Lalpur, District Ranchi.

6. Branch Manager, Central Bank of India TELCO Town Branch, having its office at Red Carpet Service Station, Jamshedpur, P.O. and P.S. Telco, District East Singhbhum. ....Respondent

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Adv For the Respondent : Mr. P.A.S.Pati, Adv

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C.A.V. ON: 30.10.2025 PRONOUNCED ON:27/11/2025

Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the

petitioner for the following reliefs;

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(A) For quashing of the letter dated 08.09.2007 as contained in ref. no. RO/HRD/07-08/843 (Annexure-3), issued under the signature of the Assistant General Manager to the Branch Office, Telco Town, central Bank of India, whereby and whereunder application dated 27.06.2007 has not been considered under the Central Bank of India (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995 and treated it as application for premature retirement;

(B) For quashing of letter dated 20.09.2007 (Annexure-4), issued under the signature of Senior Manager, Central Bank of India, Telco Branch, whereby the petitioner has been informed that his application for voluntary retirement has been returned by the Regional Office as he has not completed 55 years of age or has not completed 30 years of service;

(C) For a direction upon the respondents to forthwith fix the pension of the petitioner since 21.07.2008 when the petitioner's resignation has been accepted, release arrears of pension with all consequential benefits with statutory interest pursuant to Regulations 14 and 29 of the Central Bank of India (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995.

3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings are that

the Petitioner had joined the services of Respondent Bank on

30.12.1978 as Agriculture Assistant. Subsequently, he was

promoted on the post of Manager, MMG-II in August, 1997. Since

the year 1999, the Petitioner was suffering from Hypertrophic

Apical Cardiomyopathy disease.

While posted at TELCO Town Branch, the Petitioner

submitted an application dated 27.06.2007 seeking VRS on

medical grounds. In response to the application dated 27.06.2007,

the Bank vide letter dated 08.09.2007 informed the Petitioner that

since VRS scheme was not in vogue at that time, the application

was treated as that for "premature retirement" as per clause 19.7

of Officer Service Regulation. However, he was found ineligible for

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'premature retirement' as per clause 19.7 of Officer Service

Regulations and was asked to resume his duties immediately.

4. The fact further reveals that the Petitioner due to his

health aliments tendered resignation vide letter dated 24.11.2007.

Pursuant thereto, he was informed by letter dated 12.07.2008 that

his resignation has been accepted under Regulation 20.2 of the

Officer Service Regulations with immediate effect.

5. It further transpires from record that the Petitioner had

earlier approached the High Court of judicature at Patna in

C.W.J.C. No. 1700/2016 which was dismissed on the ground of

lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Petitioner thereafter, filed one

writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 7299/2016 which was dismissed

vide order dated 14.07.2017.

Thereafter, he preferred an appeal being L.P.A. No.

444/2017. The appeal was disposed of vide order dated

02.01.2019 with following direction:

" At the appellate stage, the appellant has relied on Central Bank of India (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995. According to him, his resignation was, in substance, a case of voluntary retirement and he would have been entitled to get pension in terms of Rules 14 and 29 of the said Regulation. Learned Advocate for the appellant has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shashikala Devi Vs. Central Bank of India & Ors. as reported in (2014) 16 SCC 260. This case has been cited to establish the stand of the appellant that though the letter of the appellant was for resignation, it ought to have been treated as a letter of premature voluntary retirement. But this is not the case the appellant had run before the learned First Court. His case before the learned First Court was that he ought to have been given the benefit of 2010 Settlement, entered into by and between the Bank and its Union resulting in the pension scheme. In such circumstances we cannot permit the appellant to make out altogether a new case at the appellate stage. We do not find any error in the judgment of the learned First Court having regard to the stand of the appellant taken before the learned First Court. We, therefore, do not

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consider it necessary to interfere with the reasoning of the learned First Court in dismissing the writ petition. But considering the new materials brought before us by the appellant at the appellate stage, we dispose of the appeal giving liberty to the appellant to apply afresh before the appropriate forum.

The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. No order as to cost."

Emphasis Supplied

6. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner had argued that the Petitioner having rendered 28 years and 5 months of service was eligible to seek premature retirement as per clause 14 and 29 of the Central Bank of India Pension Regulations, 1995. He further contended that in view of the judgment rendered in the case of Shasikala Devi v. Central Bank of India1 Petitioner's application tendering resignation from service is to be treated as one of VRS/Premature retirement. He places reliance upon paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment of Shasikala Devi which is quoted as under: -

"17. When viewed in the backdrop of the above facts, it is difficult to reject the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that what the deceased employee intended to do by his letter dated 8-10-2007 was to seek voluntary retirement and not resignation from his employment. We say so in the light of several attendant circumstances. In the first place, the employee at the time of his writing the letter dated 8-10-2007 was left with just about one-and-a-half years of service. It will be too imprudent for anyone to suggest that a bank employee who has worked with such commitment as earned him the appreciation of the management would have so thoughtlessly given up the retiral benefits in the form of pension, etc. which he had earned on account of his continued dedication to his job. If pension is not a bounty, but a right which the employee acquires on account of long years of sincere and good work done by him, the Court will be slow in presuming that the employee intended to waive or abandon such a valuable right without any cogent reason. At any rate there ought to be some compelling circumstance to suggest that the employee had consciously given up the right and benefit, which he had acquired so assiduously. Far from the material on record suggesting any such conscious surrender, abandonment or waiver of the right to retiral benefit including pension, we find that the material placed on record clearly suggests that the employee had no source of income or sustenance except the benefit that he had earned for long years of service. This is evident from a reading of the letter dated 8-10-2007 in which the employee seeks release of his retiral benefits at the earliest to enable him to undergo medical treatment that he requires. The letter, as seen earlier, lays emphasis on the fact that for his sustenance the employee is dependent entirely on such benefits. It is in that view difficult for us to attribute to the employee the intention to give up what was rightfully his in terms of retiral benefits, when such benefits were the only source not only for his survival but for his medical treatment that he so urgently required. For a waiver of a legally enforceable right earned by an employee, it is necessary that the same is clear and unequivocal, conscious and with full knowledge of the consequences. No such

1 (2014) 16 SCC 260

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intention can be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The employee's subsequent letters and communication which are placed on record cannot be said to be an afterthought. Being proximate in point of time the letter dated 8-10-2007 must be treated to be a part of the subsequent communication making the employee's intentions clear, at least for the purposes of determining the true intention underlying the act of the employee.

18. It is, in our opinion, abundantly clear that the beneficial provisions of a Pension Scheme or Pension Regulations have been interpreted rather liberally so as to promote the object underlying the same rather than denying benefits due to beneficiaries under such provisions. In cases where an employee has the requisite years of qualifying service for grant of pension, and where he could under the service conditions applicable seek voluntary retirement, the benefit of pension has been allowed by treating the purported resignation to be a request for voluntary retirement. We see no compelling reasons for not doing so even in the present case, which in our opinion is in essence a case of the deceased employee seeking voluntary retirement rather than resigning."

Relying upon the aforesaid contention, Ld. Counsel concluded his argument by submitting that the instant application may be allowed and all consequential benefits may be extended forthwith.

7. Per contra, Ld. Counsel representing the Respondent Bank had submitted that upon tendering resignation, the admitted dues of the Petitioner have been paid. Once having accepted the rejection of his request for VRS/Premature retirement, and having tendered resignation without any protest in the year 2007; he first time approached the Patna High Court in the year 2016 after a delay of almost 9 years. The writ petition as such suffers from delay and latches.

He contended that the order passed in LPA No. 444/2017 has not laid down any authoritative pronouncement and does not help the case of the Petitioner. As per Regulation 19.7 of the Central Bank of India (Officers') Service Regulations, the Petitioner was ineligible to seek 'premature retirement'. Clause 22 of the Central Bank of India (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995 clearly stipulates that resignation shall entail forfeiture of past service and consequently shall not qualify for Pensionary benefits.

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8. In support of his submissions the Ld. Counsel for Bank has placed reliance upon the following judgment:

(i) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Mohani Devi & Anr.2;

(ii) BSES Yamuna Power Limited v Ghanshyam Chand Sharma & Anr3

(iii) Union of India & Anr. v. Abhiram Verma4.

9. Having heard Ld. Counsel for the rival parties it transpires that the thrust of the writ Petitioner's argument is based upon the judgment rendered in the case of Shasikala Devi (Supra). Admittedly; the Petitioner was an officer whereas the employee in the case of Shasikala Devi (Supra) was a staff upon whom the Officer Service Regulations were inapplicable.

The Respondent Bank has specifically pleaded at para 20 of the counter affidavit delignating the reasons for which the Petitioner is not entitled to claim any benefit of the judgment of Shasikala Devi (Supra). It would be relevant to refer to the same which are extracted as under: -

"20. That the with regard to the statement made in para-19 it is stated that the petitioner is not entitled to seek any benefit by relying on the judgment rendered in the case of Shashikala Devi.

In the case of Shashikala Devi, her husband deceased employee of the bank while making application for resignation had stated about release of terminal benefits for undergoing treatment. In the present case the petitioner made an application for resignation once his request for voluntary retirement was rejected. He was very much conscious about the factum of his not being entitled about grant of pension while making application for resignation and as such did not make any prayer for the same.

The deceased employee in case of Shashikala Devi had completed 34 years of service in Bank. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had specifically taken note of this fact while holding that the employee in that case was entitled to seek voluntary retirement if he chooses to leave permanently. In the present case the petitioner was ineligible to seek voluntary retirement.

In the case of Shashikala Devi the letter which was treated as

2 (2020) 5 SCC 741 3 (2020) 3 SCC 346 4 (2021) 12 SCC 448

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letter of resignation was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as a letter seeking voluntary retirement. In the present case such interpretation is not possible as the petitioner had consciously applied for resignation once his request for voluntary retirement was not accepted.

That the Regulation of 1979 was also inapplicable in the case of Shashikala Devi, however, the same applies to the petitioner.

In the case of Shashikala Devi the employee applied for retirement directly however, in the present case when the request for voluntary retirement was refused and the petitioner was directed to resume his duty, he submitted his resignation without any request for release of his pensionary benefits."

10. This Court find force in the stand taken by the Bank that the judgment of Shasikala Devi (Supra) will not help the case of the Petitioner as the provisions of Pension Regulations of 1995 and OSR 1979 have to be read together in the case of the Petitioner who was an officer employee. Having rendered less than 30 years of service and not attaining the age of 55 years, makes the Petitioner ineligible to seek "premature retirement" as per Clause 19.7. For ready reference, the same is quoted below: -

a) An officer employee of the Bank may be permitted to retire voluntarily from the service of the Bank at any time if he/she has completed 30 years of service as an officer or has attained the age of 55 years, whichever happens earlier, after giving the Bank 3 months', notice in writing.

11. Furthermore, the judgment of Shasikala Devi (Supra) cannot be applied to the case of the Petitioner de hors the clear stipulation in Regulation 19.7 of the OSR, 1979. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of LIC v. Shree Lal Meena5 has specifically held that while pension schemes do form beneficial legislation but the same cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. The judgment in Shree Lal Meena was rendered by a bench of Three Judges. The relevant part of the judgment is being quoted as below: -

"26. There are some observations on the principles of public sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being beneficial legislation.( See Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India, (2014) 16 SCC 260 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 319; Asger Ibrahim Amin v. LIC, (2016) 13 SCC

5 (2019) 4 SCC 479

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797 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 12) We may, however, note that as per what we have opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to be read as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable of another interpretation. We may also note that while framing such schemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a contributory nature and their financial implications. Such financial implications are both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus, it would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours to extend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by the legislature."

Emphasis supplied

12. Resignation and voluntary retirement connote distinct concepts in service jurisprudence. Resignation entails forfeiture of past service including the benefits of pension. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held as such in the case of Ghanshyam Chand Sharma (supra). The relevant part of the judgment is being quoted as below: -

"13. The view in Asger Ibrahim Amin3 was disapproved and the Court held that the provisions providing for voluntary retirement would not apply retrospectively by implication. In this view, where an employee has resigned from service, there arises no question of whether he has in fact "voluntarily retired" or "resigned". The decision to resign is materially distinct from a decision to seek voluntary retirement. The decision to resign results in the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the applicable provisions. These consequences are distinct from the consequences flowing from voluntary retirement and the two may not be substituted for each other based on the length of an employee's tenure."

13. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Abhiram Verma (supra) has re-affirmed the proposition of law rendered in the case of Ghanshyam Chand Sharma (supra). The relevant part of the judgment is being quoted as below: -

"12. Therefore, from the aforesaid facts, the only conclusion would be that on 15-4-2000 the respondent tendered "resignation" for lack of promotional avenues/aspects and it was not a case of "voluntary retirement".

13. Even, there is a distinction between the "resignation" and "voluntary retirement". A person can resign at any time during his service, however, an officer cannot ask for premature/voluntary retirement unless he fulfils the eligibility criteria.

14. This Court had an occasion to consider the distinction between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement" in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena6,

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which has been subsequently followed by this Court in BSES Yamuna Power Ltd.2 In para 22, it is observed and held as under : (LIC case6, SCC pp. 491-92) "22. The principles in the context of the controversy before us are well enunciated in the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Cecil Dennis Solomon7. On a similar factual matrix, the employees had resigned sometime in 1988. The RBI Pension Regulations came in operation in 1990. The employees who had resigned earlier sought applicability of these Pension Regulations to themselves. The provisions, once again, had a similar clause of forfeiture of service, on resignation or dismissal or termination. The relevant observations are as under : (SCC pp. 467-68, para 10) '10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions "superannuation", "voluntary retirement", "compulsory retirement" and "resignation" convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary.' "

14.1. The law laid down by this Court in Shree Lal Meena6 has been reiterated by this Court in the subsequent decision in BSES Yamuna Power Ltd.2 and in the subsequent decision, this Court also considered the observations made in para 26 in Shree Lal Meena6 that while pension schemes do form beneficial legislation in a delegated form, a beneficial construction cannot run contrary to the express terms of the provisions. It is further observed that the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication. Therefore, having tendered the "resignation", the respondent has to suffer the consequences and now cannot be permitted to take "U" turn and say that what the respondent wanted was "premature retirement" and not "resignation".

14. In case of Mohini Devi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at para 10 of its judgment while re-affirming the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement has disapproved the fact that the employee if aggrieved by rejection of his application for voluntary retirement, did not choose to challenge the said decision and later raising a plea to treat the resignation as voluntary retirement.

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Admittedly; the Petitioner in the present case has now sought to challenge the rejection of his application for voluntary retirement dated 08.09.2007, which certainly suffers from delay and latches, consequently cannot be allowed.

15. Having regard to the above discussions and the judicial pronouncements, the present writ petition is devoid of any merit and no relief can be granted to the Petitioner.

16. Consequently, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order to cost.

(Deepak Roshan, J.) November 27, 2025 Amardeep/-

N.A.F.R.

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27/11/2025