Jharkhand High Court

Prawin Kumar Toppo @ Pravin Kumar Toppo vs The State Of Jharkhand And Another .... ... on 10 June, 2024

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
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Cr.M.P. No. 11 of 2017

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        Prawin Kumar Toppo @ Pravin Kumar Toppo          .... Petitioner
                                   --     Versus   --
        The State of Jharkhand and Another               .... Opposite Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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For the Petitioner :- Ms Chandana Kumari, Advocate For the State :- Mr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the O.P.No.2 :- Mr. Pranay Kumar Sinha, Advocate

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5/10.06.2024 Heard Learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for

the respondent State as well as the learned counsel for the O.P.No.2.

2. The prayer in this petition has been made for quashing of

the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance

dated 22.8.2016 in connection with Complaint Case No.2763 of 2014,

pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi.

3. The complaint case has been filed alleging therein that

O.P.No.2 is the owner of the premises where the State Institute of Rural

Development (SIRD) is working. The State Institute of Rural

Development (SIRD) is the tenant of the complainant. There is dispute

with regard to the aforesaid properties between one Ashok Kumar

Kejriwal and the complainant and for which different cases are pending

before the different courts. On 15.9.2014 at around 1 p.m the

complainant along with Shri Chandrashekhar (witness) went to the

premises of State Institute of Rural Development (SIRD) to meet with

the petitioner and to submit her representation in writing with respect to

the vacation of premises by the State Institute of Rural Development

(SIRD) and possession to be delivered to the complainant. Since the

accused was not in the chamber and was present in the south campus of

the premises and as such, the representation was given to him there

only and it was received by one of the staff of the accused. After

receiving of the same, the accused became furious and started abusing

the complainant in filthy language and when the protest was made by

O.P.No.2, the accused continued to intimidation whereupon the

complainant rushed to the nearby police station and narrated the entire

incident and gave the complaint to lodge the FIR. On 17.9.2014, she

again visited the police station to enquire about the action taken against

the accused but no FIR was lodged against the accused due to his high

post, power and position and as such, the present complaint has been

lodged.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the

petitioner is an I.A.S officer and he was posted as Director in State

Institute of Rural Development (SIRD) from September, 2014 to May,

2015 and subsequently he was transferred and was discharging his duty

as Labour Commissioner. She submits that the said State Institute of

Rural Development (SIRD) office was being operated in the premises in

question and O.P.No.2 has alleged that she is the owner of the said

property. According to her, maliciously the present case has been lodged

against the petitioner who happened to be Director of State Institute of

Rural Development (SIRD). She further submits that in the complaint

petition itself it is alleged that if the State Institute of Rural Development

(SIRD) is going to vacate the house in question the delivery of

possession should be provided to the O.P.No.2. She submits the civil

case is also going on between the O.P.No.2 and one Ashok Kumar

Kejriwal being Title Suit No.447 of 2014. She submits that although the

allegations in the complaint petition is made under the relevant

provisions of Prevention of Witch Craft (DAAIN) Practice Act, 1999,

however the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance under

section 504 and 506 of the IPC. She submits that maliciously the

present case has been lodged against the petitioner who at that time

was posted as Director of State Institute of Rural Development (SIRD)

and said SIRD was being operated in the said premises upon which the

claim is being made by O.P.No.2 and for that civil dispute is already

pending between O.P.No.2 and one Ashok Kumar Kejriwal.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent State submits that the

learned court has taken cognizance pursuant to complaint case.

6. Learned counsel for the O.P.No.2 submits that the case is

made out and the allegations are there of insulting the O.P.No.2 and the

entire aspect can be looked into by the learned Court in the trial and at

this stage, the High Court may not interfere with the proceeding under

section 482 Cr.P.C. On this ground he submits that this petition may

kindly be dismissed.

7. In view of above submission of the learned counsels

appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on

record and finds that in the complaint petition itself it is disclosed in

paragraph no.3 that if the State Institute of Rural Development (SIRD) is

going to vacate the said premises the possession of the same be

delivered to the complainant alone as she is rightful owner. For the

property in question a Title Suit being Title Suit No.447 of 2014 is

pending between the O.P.No.2 and one Ashok Kumar Kejriwal and

further it transpires that State Institute of Rural Development (SIRD) is

tenant of the said premises. The allegations are made in the complaint

petition under Prevention of Witch Craft (DAAIN) Practice Act, 1999,

however the learned court has been pleased to take cognizance under

section 504 and 506 of the IPC. At paragraph nos.22, 23 and 24 of the

judgment rendered in the case Vikram Johar v. The State of Uttar

Pradesh and Another reported in 2019 0 Supreme (SC) 496 by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein sections 504 and 506 of the IPC has

been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, those paragraphs are

quoted hereinbelow:

"22. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, following principles have been laid down :

"11. We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under

Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only consider the inherent probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint.

In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] , this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have."

23. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following effect :

"13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC."

24. In another judgment i.e. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, this Court has again occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the above case

also, case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 :

"11. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation"

would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC."

8. In view of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court it is crystal clear that for invocation of section 504 IPC, there

should be intentional insult, the insult must be such as to give

provocation to the person insulted, and the accused must intend or

know that such provocation would cause another to break the public

peace or to commit any other offence and that should be of such a

degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to

commit any other offence. These ingredients are lacking in the case in

hand. Further for the property in question the said suit is already

pending which further suggest that the case is arising out of a property

in which State Institute of Rural Development (SIRD) is tenant and in the

complaint it is disclosed that if the State Institute of Rural Development