Jharkhand High Court

Ram Manohar Dubey vs M/S Tata Engineering And ... on 13 July, 2023

                                       1                    L.P.A. No. 56 of 2020
                                                                     With
                                                            L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020


      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                L.P.A. No. 56 of 2020
     Ram Manohar Dubey, aged about 79 years, son of Late Ram Lakhan
     Dubey, resident of Qtr. No.N113/2, Telco Colony, P.O. & P.S. Telco,
     Town Jamshedpur, Dist. East Singhbhum              ... Appellant
                            -Versus-
1.   M/s Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited now Tata
     Motors Ltd., through its duly constituted attorney Sri D.K. Thakur, S/o
     Late G.K. Thakur, resident of Telco Colony, P.O. & P.S. Telco, Town
     Jamshedpur, Dist. East Singhbhum
2.   The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary, Department of Labour
     & Employment Training, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
                                                         ... Respondents
                               With
                      L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020
     M/s Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited now Tata
     Motors Ltd., through its duly constituted attorney Rajesh Kumar Das,
     aged about 56 years, S/o Late P.N. Das, General Manager, Legal
     Services, Legal Department Office, Ground Floor, P.O. & P.S. Telco,
     Dist. East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur-831010            ... Appellant
                            -Versus-
1.   The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary, Department of Labour
     & Employment Training, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S.
     Doranda, District- Ranchi
2.   Ram Manohar Dubey, son of Late Ram Lakhan Dubey, resident of
     Village Tardika, Baijani, P.S. Jagdishpur, P.O. Daijaal, District-
     Bhagalpur currently resident at Quarter No. K2-28, "K" Road No. 8,
     Telco Colony, P.O. & P.S. Telco, Town Jamshedpur, District- East
     Singhbhum                                         ... Respondents
                              -----
                             PRESENT
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
                               -----
For the Appellant   : Mr. Mahesh Tewari, Advocate (In L.P.A.-56/2020)
                       Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, Advocate (In L.P.A.-41/2020)
For the State        : Mr. Suresh Kumar, S.C. (L&C)-II (In both cases)
For Respondent No.1 : Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, Advocate (In L.P.A.-56/2020)
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Mahesh Tewari, Advocate (In L.P.A.-41/2020)

                               -----

C.A.V. on 26.06.2023                       Pronounced on 13.07.2023

Per Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.

These appeals were heard at length on 26.06.2023 and on that day,

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

after hearing the parties, the limitation petitions filed in L.P.A. Nos. 56 of

2020 and 41 of 2020 were allowed and delay was condoned and the

judgment was reserved.

2. L.P.A. No.56 of 2020 has been filed by the concerned workman

aggrieved with the order passed by the learned Single Judge

dated 07.11.2019 in W.P.(L) No.5945/2006, whereby, he has been

pleased to modify the award dated 27.03.2006 passed by the learned

Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No.

13/1995 by directing the petitioner's company to pay a lump sum

compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs to the concerned workman within a period

of 6 weeks from the date of receipt/production of the copy of

that order. The said order passed by the learned Single Judge has also

been challenged by the company, namely, M/s Tata Engineering and

Locomotive Company Limited now Tata Motors Limited in L.P.A. No.41 of

2020.

3. Since common question of facts and laws are involved in both the

L.P.As., with consent of the parties, the Court has heard both the L.P.As.

together.

4. Reference Case No.13/1995 was referred by the appropriate

Government under Section 10(1)(C) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and

the term of reference was as under:

"Whether the termination of service of Sri Ram Manohar Dubey, workman of M/S Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd., Jamshedpur by the management is proper? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?"

Accordingly on the above term, Reference Case No.13/1995 was

registered between the Management and the workman.

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

5. Before the learned Labour Court, the case of the Management

was that the concerned workman, namely, Ram Manohar Dubey was

initially appointed in the company in the year 1959 and he discharged

from the service of the company in or about 1964. The workman was

again employed w.e.f. 01.04.1978 as Attendant in the Town

Administration Department of General Administration Division of the

company.

The Management contended before the learned Labour Court that

the Company is having work standing orders certified under the provisions

of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which provides

procedure for taking disciplinary action against erring employees and

misconducts have also been discussed therein. In the same Standing Order,

Sub-clause XXV is also there which speaks of unauthorized occupation or

use of Company's quarter as an act of misconduct on the part of the

employee and if it is proved, it renders the employee liable to be

terminated. As per Rule 26 of the Standing Orders of the Company, an

enquiry is required to be held if any misconduct is alleged against the

employee.

The Company is having housing colony and it provides

accommodation to its employees. It was alleged that the Quarter No.K2/7 of

the Company situated at Cross-Road No.23 in Telco Colony was

unauthorizedly occupied by the workman. The Company vide letter dated

20.03.1982 advised the workman to vacate the quarter, which was

refused by the workman. In spite of several opportunities provided to the

workman to vacate the quarter, he did not do so and that is why there

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is misconduct of unauthorized occupation or use of the Company's quarter.

Thereafter, charge-sheet No.11/82 was served to the workman and he was

asked to submit his explanation by 11.05.1982 and Enquiry Officer was

appointed. Since the workman did not submit his explanation in spite of

giving several opportunities to him, the enquiry was proceeded exparte

and finally on 14.07.1982, the workman participated in the enquiry.

After completion of the enquiry, a report was submitted by the Enquiry

Officer, whereby, the workman was found guilty of charge of

unauthorized occupation of the said quarter under Sub-clause XXV of Order

24. The competent officer of the Company, after going through the enquiry

report, has passed order of punishment and the workman was discharged

from his service.

It was also contended by the Management before the learned Labour

Court that the said discharge is not for his past conduct. The workman was

served with charge-sheet on 20.03.1982 for having been found missing

from his appointed place of work without authority on 15.03.1982 and after

following proper procedure for taking disciplinary action, he was suspended

as a measure of punishment for 15 days from 01.04.1983 to 15.04.1983

vide office order dated 30.03.1983. The workman has committed

misconduct on 17.03.1982 for which a charge-sheet was issued on

26.03.1982 and enquiry was conducted as per Standing Orders of the

Company, in which, the workman was found guilty and he was punished for

suspension for 15 days.

The Management has also contended before the learned Labour Court

that the workman was discharged from service w.e.f. 01.05.1983 and

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statement of demand was raised for the first time on 15.12.1989 to the

Management and after six years of raising demand, the dispute was

referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication before the learned

Labour Court in the year 1995. On this ground, the Management has

pleaded that the reference is stale one.

6. The workman appeared before the learned Labour Court

and contested the reference and contended that his service was terminated

in the year 1964 by the Management due to his Trade Union activities.

The workman was taken into service after long litigation in the year 1978.

The workman was allotted Company's Quarter No.K-2/7 situated at cross-

Road No.23 in Telco Colony, which was unauthorizedly occupied by

Mr. I.A. Khan, who was police personnel of the Government of Bihar and

during Emergency period he was deputed in Telco. After approaching

the high officials of the police department of the State of Bihar,

Mr. I.A. Khan had vacated the said quarter and after that, the workman

started to live in the said quarter with due information to the Management.

In the year 1982, the Management decided to demolish about 10

quarters including Quarter No.K-2/7 as vacant land was required to be given

to Little Flower School, run and managed by the Telco Management. All the

workmen residing in those quarters demanded substitute quarter for their

accommodation including the workman and the other workmen were

provided substitute quarters, but this workman was refused and he was

chargesheeted for unauthorized occupation and was removed from his

service. Later on, the quarter in possession of the workman was demolished

and vacant land was given to Little Flower School.

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

It was also contended by the workman that he neither committed any

misconduct nor guilty of any misconduct and allegation against him is

completely false, fabricated and grudge oriented. The workman was

victimised for his Trade Union activities. It was contended that he was not

provided another quarter in alternative and charge-sheets were submitted

and punishment of discharge was imposed.

It was further contended that the Enquiry Officer and the person who

has punished the workman, were not competent person on behalf of the

Company and they are not authorised for the purpose under Article of

Association of Telco or under certified Standing Orders of the Telco. The

quantum of punishment passed against him is harsh and disproportionate.

He rendered his service honestly and sincerely. On these grounds, the

workman prayed for reinstatement in service with full back wages.

7. Based on the pleadings of the Management and the workman as well

as documentary evidence and oral witnesses, the learned Labour Court

passed the award dated 27.03.2006 holding that termination of service of

the workman Sri Ram Manohar Dubey is not proper and the same was set

aside and the Management was directed to reinstate the workman in service

with all the back wages benefits with continuity of service.

8. The said award was challenged by the Management in W.P.(L)

No.5945 of 2006, which was decided by the learned Single Judge vide order

dated 07.11.2019 and considering that the workman has already attained

the age of superannuation and to meet the ends of justice and also

considering clear finding of the learned Labour Court that the workman was

not found guilty of any misconduct, the learned Single Judge modified the

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

award to the extent that respondent no.2 i.e. the workman should be

awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs within a period of six

weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of that order.

9. Aggrieved with the order of the learned Single Judge, the

Management and the workman, both have filed separate L.P.As.

10. Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant/Management has submitted that the finding of the learned Single

Judge is erroneous in view of the fact that once the Labour Court has given

finding about domestic enquiry as fair and proper, which has also been

upheld by the learned Single Judge and, accordingly, the learned Single

Judge was not required to only modify the award, however the award itself

was fit to be set aside.

She has further submitted that the said reference has been made

after lapse of 6 and ½ years of dismissal of the workman and that is a stale

reference and reference itself was not maintainable. To buttress this

argument, she relied upon the judgment passed in Prabhakar v. Joint

Director, Sericulture Department and another; [(2015) 15 SCC 1] .

By relying on this judgment, she has submitted that claim made in belated

reference was stale and entire award was perverse.

She has also submitted that the learned Single Judge has modified

the award without considering that the workman was given several

opportunities and he was punished several times for his conduct and after

being re-employed, he worked for less than 5 years. She has submitted that

the said quarter was not vacated in spite of communication issued by the

superior and this aspect of the matter was not appreciated by the learned

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

Single Judge and he has only interfered with the award, which is not

correct. She has submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to

consider that for the period of discharge, the workman was gainfully

employed and compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs was unwarranted. On these

grounds, she has submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge may

kindly be interfered with.

11. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the concerned

workman, namely, Ram Manohar Dubey, has submitted that the learned

Single Judge has not appreciated the facts from the correct angle, both on

the point of law as well as on the point of facts. He has submitted that in

view of the award, the concerned workman is entitled for an amount of

about Rs.30 Lakhs, whereas, the learned Single Judge has modified the

award to the tune of Rs.2 Lakhs only. He has submitted that the learned

Labour Court held that the stand of the Management to ask the vacant

possession of quarter from an employee who is working in the Company

without providing him alternative arrangement for his abode is against

natural justice, ethics and normal human behaviour. He further submitted

that the workman was not guilty of any misconduct and his termination

from service was rightly set aside by the learned Labour Court and

interference by the learned Single Judge was not warranted. He further

submitted that the learned Labour Court has rightly passed the said award

considering that termination was found to be illegal. He further submitted

that the learned Single Judge has travelled beyond the terms of reference

and the learned Single Judge was not expected to interfere with the award

sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

He has further submitted that there is no limitation prescribed in the

Industrial Disputes Act for making a reference and from any angle, it cannot

be said that the reference was stale. To buttress this argument, he relied

upon the judgment passed in Raghubir Singh v. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar; [(2014) 10 SCC 301] .

By relying on this judgment, he has submitted that interference with

the award by the learned Single Judge is unwarranted and the same is fit to

be interfered with by this Court.

12. In view of the above facts and submissions of the learned counsel

appearing for the parties, we have carefully gone through the award dated

27.03.2006, the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 07.11.2019

including the L.C.R.

13. It is an admitted fact that propriety of the enquiry was taken as

preliminary issue by the learned Labour Court and vide order dated

16.07.2005, the learned Labour Court held the enquiry fair and proper. The

learned Labour Court at paragraph 18 of the award dated 27.03.2006 has

held that prior to joining of the concerned workman in service in the year

1978, the said quarter was under unauthorized occupation of one Mr. I.A.

Khan, who was in company's service in the security department and left the

service on 02.07.1977 and no quarter was allotted to the concerned

workman and the quarter was asked to be vacated by the concerned

workman. The learned Labour Court found that the workman was

chargesheeted on 20.03.1982 and one of the Management witness has

stated that the concerned workman was in occupation of the said quarter

w.e.f. 20.07.1979 and in the charge-sheet, the date has not been disclosed

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

as from which date the said quarter was in authorized occupation of the

concerned workman.

14. The learned Single Judge on the point of occupation of the quarter

has considered the stand of the concerned workman that he was orally

directed by the company's management to occupy the said quarter after

getting the same vacated by one I. A. Khan, who himself was in

unauthorized occupation of the same after leaving the services of the

company. The learned Single Judge found that the concerned workman got

the said quarter vacated after much efforts and came in possession of the

same. The concerned workman was in the company's services at the

relevant point of time. M.W-1 (M. K. Sinha) deposed during the industrial

adjudication that he came to know in the month of June, 1981 that the the

workman had occupied the said quarter. Further, M.W-2 (B. B. Pandey)

deposed that the concerned workman was occupying the said quarter since

20.07.1979. The learned Single Judge found that the Management of the

Company had knowledge about the fact that the concerned workman was in

unauthorized occupation of the company's quarter and no prompt action

was taken to get the said quarter vacated or to allot it in his favour as per

the company's rules. The learned Single Judge found that the quarter of the

concerned workman as well as ten other quarters got vacated by the

Management for the purpose of allotting the same to Little Flower School.

The other workmen were allotted the alternative quarters, however the

concerned workman has not been allotted the quarter. Thus, the writ Court

has found that the finding of the learned Labour Court on the point of

quarter as a valid one.

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15. In course of argument, the Court put question to the learned counsel

appearing for the Management as to whether any proceeding under Section

630 of the Companies Act for vacating the quarter in question has been

initiated by the Management or not? The answer was in negative by the

learned counsel for the Management. Thus, on the point of allotment of

quarter, we find that there is no apparent error in the finding of the learned

Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge.

16. So far as the point of stale reference is concerned, that depends upon

the facts and circumstances of each case as well as reference. There is no

doubt that law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate

Government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act and this power cannot be exercised at any point of time and to

revise the matter which has already been settled. The power is to be

exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. A reference may be made to

the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhakar v. Joint

Director, Sericulture Department and another; [(2015) 15 SCC 1] .

Paragraph 44 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:

"44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry."

17. Thus, it is clear that generally when claim is not required to be

With L.P.A. No. 41 of 2020

referred for reference, however if satisfaction is there and claim is not

settled, the reference can be made.

18. In the case in hand, the Management has issued charge-sheet for

misconduct in the year 1982 for the alleged misconduct of the year 1979

without taking any recourse under the law for vacating the said quarter and

if such a situation is there, only on the ground of delay, the said reference

cannot be said to be stale particularly when the same was not set at rest by

any Court of law at the earlier point of time.

19. Further the said reference on the point of delay was not challenged

by the Management by way of filing any writ petition before the High Court.

It is well-settled that the the High Court can entertain a writ petition

impugning a reference on the ground of non-existence of an actual or

apprehended industrial dispute. A reference may be made to the judgment

passed in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan

and others; [(2000) 1 SCC 371] . Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the said

judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

"27. The Industrial Tribunal is the creation of a statute and it gets jurisdiction on the basis of reference. It cannot go into the question on validity of the reference. The question before the High Court was one of jurisdiction which it failed to consider. A tripartite settlement has been arrived at among the Management, the Labour Union and the Staff Union. When such a settlement is arrived at it is a package deal. In such a deal some demands may be left out. It is not that demands, which are left out, should be specifically mentioned in the settlement. It is not the contention of the Workers' Union that the tripartite settlement is in any way mala fide. It has been contended by the Workers' Union that the settlement was not arrived at during the conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Act and as such was not binding on the members of the Workers' Union. This contention is without any basis as the recitals to the tripartite settlement clearly show that the settlement was arrived at during the conciliation proceedings.

28. The State Government failed to give due consideration

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to the direction of the High Court in its judgment dated 23-3- 1989. The State Government also failed in its duty to bring to the notice of the High Court its notification dated 17-3-1989 making the impugned reference. It appears to us that the reference had occasioned while the judgment had been reserved by the High Court. In any case it was expected of the State Government to bring to the notice of the High Court before making a reference its decision to make the reference. After the judgment had been announced and directions issued by the High Court to hear the appellant it was incumbent on the State Government, in the circumstances of the case, to recall the reference. It could not direct the appellant to raise its objection to reference before the Industrial Tribunal for which the Industrial Tribunal certainly lacked jurisdiction. The State Government before making the reference did not consider all the relevant considerations which would clothe it with the power to make the reference under Section 10 of the Act. We find substance in the submissions of Mr Pai. Wholesale reference of all the disputes in the charter of demands of the Workers' Union for adjudication was also bad inasmuch as many of such disputes were already the subject- matter of the tripartite settlement. This also shows non- application of mind by the State Government in making the reference."

20. Thus, we find that the finding of the learned Labour Court as well as

the learned Single Judge on the point of stale, is correct.

21. The certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India will only lie if the decision relates to anything collateral

to the merit, an erroneous decision upon which would affect its jurisdiction,

a writ of certiorari would lie, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees Association;

(AIR 1952 SC 179). This aspect of the matter was again subject matter

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (AIR

1954 SC 440), wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 as under:

"7. ... The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate

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tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of any person [ Vide Per Lord Cairns in Walshall's Overseers v. London and North Western Railway Co., (1879) 4 AC 30, 39.].

xxx xxx xxx

9. Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the court itself may not be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances [Vide Halsbury, 2nd Edn., Vol. IX, p. 880]. When the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is well settled that the court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess [ Vide Banbury v. Fuller, 9 Exch. 111; R v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners, 21 QBD 313].

10. A tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may violate the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. ..."

(Emphasis supplied)

22. Under what circumstance, the writ of certiorai can be issued was

again the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu

Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque & others; (AIR 1955 SC 233) wherein, at

paragraphs 21 and 23, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as

under:

"21. ... On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in

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exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and are not in dispute.

xxx xxx xxx

23. It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. ... The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case."

(Emphasis supplied)

23. The decision of the Tribunal can be questioned only if it is on any

unsupported evidence. A reference may be made to the judgment passed in

Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and

others; (AIR 1957 SC 264), wherein it has been held at paragraph 19 as

under:

"19. ... It is equally well settled that the decision of the Trinbunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless at the least it is shown to be fully unsupported by evidence."

(Emphasis supplied)

24. It is further well-settled that an error of law which is apparent on the

face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact,

however grave it may appear to be. A reference may be made to the

judgment passed in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and another;

(AIR 1964 SC 477), wherein it has been held at paragraph 7 as under:

"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has

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been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC 233] , Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals [AIR 1958 SC 398] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168])."

(Emphasis supplied)

25. In view of the above judgments, certiorari will only lie if the finding of

fact recorded by the Tribunal found not correct, in appeal until and unless it

is proved glaring discrepancy or mistake had taken place. In the case in

hand, nothing could be pointed out as to any glaring discrepancy or mistake

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in the impugned award of the learned Labour Court is there. Thus, we find

that the learned Single Judge has rightly not interfered with the finding so

far as setting aside the punishment is concerned. We also find that for delay

of raising the reference, no sufficient cause has been shown by the

concerned workman and further it has been held in catena of decisions that

if reference is made belatedly, the Court can mould relief by way of

restricting monetary benefit, which has been held in paragraph 43 in the

case of Prabhakar (supra), which is quoted hereinbelow:

"43. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters."