Jharkhand High Court

Mrityunjay Kumar vs State Of Jharkhand on 23 August, 2023

                             1
                                                            LPA No.182/2022


     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                L.P.A. No.182 of 2022
                                   ------
Mrityunjay Kumar, aged about 49 years, son of Late Ram Narayan Singh,
resident of village-Sultanpur, P.O.-Bhagwanpur, P.S. Hulashganj, District-
Jahanabad, Bihar                               ....      ....              Appellant
                                 Versus
1. State of Jharkhand.
2. Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand,
     Ranchi, Police Head Quarter, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. Deputy Inspector General of Police, South Chhotanagpur Range,
     Ranchi, Jharkhand, P.O. and P.S. -Doranda, District-Ranchi,
     Jharkhand.
4. Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi, P.O.-Kutchery, P.S.-
     Kotwali, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand.
                                        ....        ....         Respondents

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
        HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR
                  ------
         For the Appellant          : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
         For the State              : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C.-II
                                 ------
05/Dated: 23.08.2023

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of

Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated

10.02.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in

W.P.(S) No.7135 of 2013, whereby and whereunder, the order of

dismissal dated 05.06.2013 passed by the disciplinary authority, the

order dated 02.08.2013 passed by the appellate authority, the order

dated 23.09.2015 passed by the revisional authority and the order

dated 20.06.2018 passed by the Director General-cum-Inspector

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General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, has been declined to be

interfere with.

2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ

petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:-

3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that when the appellant was

deputed as Constable in Pundag O.P. Reserve Guard, Ranchi, he

was put under suspension and a charge memo was served vide

memo no.2640 dated 07.05.2012, wherein, it was alleged that on

15.04.2012, the appellant left the Guard and went to Chanho without

permission and when returning, he asked for lift from a motorcycle

and after travelling some distance he took away the motorcycle from

the owner and parked the motorcycle within the campus of Pundag

O.P. In this regard, the owner of the motorcycle lodged an FIR being

Chanho P.S. Case No.40 of 2012 dated 15.04.2012 under Section

392 of the IPC. During investigation, the officer In-charge, Chanho

came to Pundag O.P. He found the motorcycle in the campus of

Pundag O.P. and as he was inquiring, the writ petitioner came out of

his barrack and fires four rounds of bullets from his allotted Govt. rifle

and only after intervention of other police constables, the arm was

taken away from him. Thereafter, on written complaint of Officer In-

charge, Chanho Sri Rajiv Ranjan Lal, an another FIR was lodges

being Jagannathpur (Pundag) P.S. Case No.103 of 2012 dated

16.04.2012 under Section 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms

Act. The writ petitioner was asked to file show cause within one

month.

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4. It is evident from the factual aspect as referred hereinabove

based upon the pleading that the writ petitioner while discharging his

duty as Constable, was subjected to departmental proceeding

initiated vide memo no.2640 dated 07.05.2012.

5. The aforesaid proceeding was initiated on the basis of the

charge levelled against him as per the imputation of charge referred

in the memorandum of charge, for ready reference, the said

memorandum of charge is being referred as under:-

"vkjksfir iqfyl 1000@e`R;qat; dqekj ds fo:) ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] ykijokgh] euekusiu] vkns"kksYya?ku mn.M vkpj.k ,oa ,d v;ksX; iqfyldehZ gksus dk vkjksi yxk;k tkrk gS& ;s iq0 1000 e`R;qat; "kekZ] iqunkx vks0ih0] fjtoZ xkMZ] jk¡ph esa izfrfu;qDr FksA fnukad 15-04-2012 dks vius xkMZ ls fQjkj gksdj pkUgks x;s FksA ogk¡ ij os fdlh futh tku igpku ds O;fDr;ksa ls feyus ds ckn la/;k esa ykSVus ds Øe ,d eksVj lkbZfdy pkyd ls fy¶V ysdj mlds eksVj lkbZfdy ij lokj gksdj ykSV jgs Fks fdUrq og dqN nwj ykSVus ds i"pkr~ eksVj lkbZfdy lokj O;fDr dks uhps mrkj mldh eksVj lkbZfdy ysdj iqunkx vks0ih0 pys vk;s rFkk eksVj lkbZfdy dks iqunkx vks0ih0 ds izkax.k esa [kM+k dj fn;sA bl laca/k esa eksVj lkbZfdy ekfyd }kjk pkUgks Fkkuk dkaM la0 40@12] fnukad 15-4-12 /kkjk 392 Hkk0n0fo0 iathd`r djok;k x;k gSA dkaM ds iathd`r gksus ds i"pkr~ Fkkuk izHkkjh] pkUgksa Jh jktho jatu yky vius lg;ksfx;ksa ds vuqla/kku ds Øe esa iqunkx vks0ih0 izkax.k esa [kM+s voLFkk esa ik;s rr~i'pkr iqunkx vks0ih0 mifLFkr inkf/kdkjh ,oa iqfyl dehZ ls eksVj lkbZfdy ds laca/k esa iqNrkN dj gh jgs FksA mlh Øe esa iqfyl 1000@e`R;qat; dqekj "kekZ vius cSjd ls fudys vkSj vius uke ls vkoafVr ljdkjh jk;Qy ls 4 xksyh tku ekjus dh fu;r ls Qk;j dj fn;kA fdlh rjg e`R;qat; dqekj "kekZ dks "kL+=fofgu fd;k x;kA rnksijkar Qk;j fd;s x;s 4 xksyh dk

LPA No.182/2022

[kks[kk dks cjken dj fof/kor tIrh lwph cukdj tIr fd;k rFkk iq0 1000 e`R;qat; dqekj "kekZ dks pkUgks Fkkuk dkaM la0 40@12 esa fxj¶rkj dj cjken eksVj lkbZfdy dks fof/kor tIrh lwph cukdj tIr fd;k x;kA rRi'pkr Fkkuk izHkkjh] pkUgksa v0fu0 jktho jatu yky ds fyf[kr izfrosnu ds vk/kkj ij txjukFkiqj ¼iqunkx½ Fkkuk dkaM la0 103@12 fnukad 16-04-2012 /kkjk 307 Hkk0n0fo0 ,oa 27 vkElZ ,DV fo:) iq0 1000 e`R;qat; dqekj "kekZ ntZ fd;k x;k gSA vr% iqfyl 1000 e`R;qat; dqekj "kekZ }kjk iqfyl dh Nfo /kqfey djrs gq, ywV tSls t?kU; vijk/k ,oa ljdkjh balkl jk;Qy ls tku ekjus d fu;r ls xksyh Qk;j dj ?kVuk dks vatke fn;k x;k gSA mDr vkjksi ds fy, uxj iqfyl v/kh{kd dk dk;kZy;] jk¡ph dk Kkikad 608@xks0] u0 fnukad 17-04-2012] rnuqlkj jk¡ph ftykns"k la0 1817@12] fn0 17-04-2012 ds }kjk fuyafcr fd;k x;kA"

6. Criminal case was also instituted. As per the case of the

appellant, he was confined to the judicial custody on the ground of

aforesaid criminal case. A departmental proceeding was initiated and

the inquiry officer has started inquiry, when he was in custody and as

such, he could not be able to examine the witnesses, therefore, the

opportunity to defend has not been provided. The inquiry officer has

found the charge proved.

7. The disciplinary authority while accepting the said finding has

dismissed the writ petitioner from service, vide order dated

05.06.2013 and the aforesaid order of disciplinary authority was

affirmed by the appellate, revisional and the Director General cum

Inspector General of Police.

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8. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved thereof, has filed writ

petition being W.P.(S) No.7135 of 2013 which having been

dismissed, hence, the present appeal.

9. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the appellant

has submitted that it is the case where adequate and sufficient

opportunity as per the mandate of Appendix-49, as has been carved

out under the provision of Rule 828 of the Police Manual which

provides the procedure to conduct the inquiry, has not been followed,

therefore, the entire departmental proceeding being not in

consonance with the procedure laid down under Appendix-49 of the

Police Manual, is not sustainable in the eye of law.

10. But the aforesaid aspects of the matter, has not been

appreciated by the learned Single Judge in right perspective.

11. The learned Single Judge, merely on the ground of power of

judicial review which is to be exercised by the High Court in exercise

of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

considering the same to be very limited and as such, the impugned

orders having been refused to be interfered with.

12. The learned Single Judge ought to have taking into

consideration the power of judicial review is well available with the

High Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India in a case where there is violation of principle of

natural justice.

13. The present case is of like nature, wherein, the writ petitioner

was not given adequate opportunity to defend, since, the entire

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proceedings are not on the basis of Appendix-49 of the Police

Manual.

14. It has also been submitted that in the criminal case, the writ

petitioner was acquitted and hence, on this ground, the consideration

ought to have made by the learned Single Judge regarding the

impropriety of the order of dismissal but the same has not been

appreciated.

15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant on the basis of the

aforesaid premise, has submitted that the order impugned is not

sustainable in the eye of law, hence, the instant appeal.

16. Per contra, Mr. Manish Kumar, learned Sr. S.C.-II appearing

for the State has submitted that there is no illegality either in the

order passed by the administrative authority or in the order passed

by the learned Single Judge.

17. According to him, it is not a case where the appellant has not

been provided with adequate and sufficient opportunity. The

appellant had been provided with adequate opportunity to cross-

examine the witnesses.

18. The further submission has been made that the writ petitioner

is taking the ground of not providing adequate and sufficient

opportunity for the first time before this Court, i.e., at the time of filing

of the writ petition but no such ground was taken even though, the

writ petitioner had appeared before the inquiry officer and has also

given its reply and therefore, the ground of violation of principle of

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natural justice as stipulated under Appendix-49 is not well available

for its consideration.

19. The further contention has been made that so far as the

decision of the authority is concerned or non-compliance of the

procedure laid down under Appendix-49 is concerned, the same is

having no bearing if the response furnished in the writ petition in the

reply to the second show cause, has been taken into consideration,

wherein, the writ petitioner has admitted his conduct of taking of the

motorcycle of the complainant, as would appear from paragraph-7 to

the second show cause notice dated 21.05.2013.

20. As such, it has been submitted that here on the basis of such

reply furnished by the writ petitioner in the second show cause

notice, it is very much clear that the writ petitioner has admitted his

fault of taking motorcycle of a passer, who was travelling with the

motorcycle that too by showing his identity card which itself suggests

that the said conduct was in absolute mis-utilization of official

position of a member of disciplined force.

21. The contention, in the aforesaid premise, has been made that if

in such circumstances, the memorandum of charge was framed and

the charges have been found to be proved by the inquiry officer,

based upon the same, if the disciplinary authority, has accepted it by

dismissing the writ petitioner from service, the same cannot be said

to suffer from an error.

22. It has also been submitted that the order passed by the original

authority has been affirmed by the appellate and revisional authority

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and the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police while

exercising the power to deal with the memorial, in that view of the

matter, if the learned Single Judge, has declined to interfere with the

impugned decisions, the same cannot be said to suffer from error.

23. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused

the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by

the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.

24. This Court, before entering into the illegality and propriety of

the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the

administrative authorities, deems it fit and proper to refer certain

undisputed facts.

25. The writ petitioner, admittedly, was posted as Constable and

while coming to duty, he has taken lift over a motorcycle which was

being driven by one M. Jagarnatthan. He was accommodated by

allowing him to sit on the aforesaid bike. But, the writ petitioner, after

showing his identity card, has taken his motorcycle and came to the

Police Station and parked the motorcycle in the premises of the

concerned Police Station.

26. The allegation herein is that he has looted the motorcycle of

one M. Jagarnatthan which amounts to gross mis-conduct of the

public servant that to a member of disciplined force.

27. The argument, in this context, has been made on behalf of the

appellant that the procedure laid down under Appendix-49 of the

Police Manual has not been followed, since, the deposition of the

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witnesses was not recorded in his presence, reason being that,

during the relevant time, he was in custody.

28. This Court before appreciating the aforesaid argument, needs

to refer the stipulation made in Appendix-49, which has been carved

out exercising of power conferred under Rule 828 of the Police

Manual.

29. It is evident therefrom that the entire procedure for initiating the

departmental proceeding has been stipulated therein even recording

the deposition of witnesses. The writ petitioner had participated in

the inquiry, however, notices were also issued but he had not

appeared, since, according to the appellant, he was in judicial

custody.

30. The further argument of the appellant is that a serious

prejudice has been caused due to examination of witnesses in

absence of the appellant and therefore, the entire departmental

proceeding which resulted in the order of dismissal, is bad in the eye

of law.

31. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the

State has submitted that it is not the case that the appellant has not

provided with adequate and sufficient opportunity, it is the appellant

who has chosen not to appear in spite of issuance of several notices.

32. This Court, while appreciating the aforesaid argument as also

considering the stipulation made in Appendix-49 of the Police

Manual while hearing the appeal on 19.08.2023, has called upon the

original record for perusal of this Court.

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33. Accordingly, the original record of the departmental proceeding

has been produced.

34. We have found from the documents that the notices were

issued to the writ petitioner but the admitted case of the appellant is

that he was in judicial custody, hence, the first two witnesses have

not been examined in his presence, i.e., Kisku Bhagat and Arbind

Kumar.

35. But, we, on consideration of the relevant documents have

found that these witnesses, i.e., Kisku Bhagat and Arbind Kumar are

not material witnesses, rather, the material witness is one Rajeev

Ranjan Lal, Officer In-charge who was examined on 25.02.2013.

36. It is the admitted case of the appellant that on the date of

examination of the said Rajeev Ranjan Lal, the appellant had

attended the inquiry proceeding.

37. The question of causing prejudice or non-compliance of the

procedure laid down under Appendix-49 of the Police Manual is

concerned, this Court is of the view that the prejudice in the

departmental proceeding is having material bearing, for the reason

that if the departmental proceeding is decided to be initiated, the

utmost importance in the proceeding is to proceed in the inquiry with

all fairness and transparency.

38. Herein, although, the first two witnesses had been examined

and at the time of examining the witness no.3, the Officer In-charge,

the appellant had participated in the inquiry proceeding.

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39. It is evident from the testimony of witness nos.1 and 2 that they

are formal in nature.

40. The important witness, i.e., witness no.3, who is the Officer In-

charge of the concerned Police Station. The said witness was

examined on 25.02.2013.

41. The appellant admits that he had participated in the inquiry

proceeding on 25.02.2013, hence, the examination of Rajeev Ranjan

Lal, witness no.3, was conducted in presence of the writ

petitioner/appellant.

42. It is evident from the deposition of witness no.3 that he has

supported the imputation of charge made in the charge-sheet. It has

further been supported by the F.S.L. report which is of empty

cartridges of the rifle, belongs to the appellant.

43. The appellant has also accepted the fact about his involvement

as per the statement made at paragraph-7 of the reply to the second

show cause notice, for ready reference, the said statement is being

referred as under:-

"7- egksn;] eSaus eksVjlkbZfdy ywV dh dksbZ ?kVuk ugha dh gSA eSa Jh ,e- txjukFku }kjk esjk igpku i= ns[kus rFkk larq'V gksus ij nh xbZ mldh eksVjlkbZfdy dks ysdj vius izfrfu;qDr LFky iqUnkx vks-ih- vk;k Fkk vkkSj xkM+h dh pkHkh vks-ih- eqa"kh iqfyl Hkjr frokjh dks nh FkhA oSls Hkh ;fn eSa eksVjlkbZfdy yqV dh dksbZ ?kVuk djrk rks bls dnkfi vius izfrfu;qfDr LFky iqUnkx vks-ih- esa ugha ykrk vkSj u bldh pkHkh vks-ih- eqa"kh iqfyl Hkjr frokjh dks nsrkA"

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44. It is, thus, evident that while submitted reply to the second

show cause notice, the writ petitioner has admitted his guilt

committed by him, however, justification has been shown.

45. We, after going through the statement made by witness no.3,

the Officer In-charge that he has supported the entire imputation of

charge of looting the motorcycle and incident of firing by the regular

arm in the premise of the Police Station.

46. The inquiry based upon the testimony of witness no.3 has

found the charge proved. The disciplinary authority has accepted the

said charge and thereafter, dismissed the writ petitioner from service.

47. The question of prejudice, as a ground, is being taken on

behalf of the appellant by putting reliance upon Appendix-49 of the

Police Manual.

48. There is no dispute that the departmental proceeding is to be

initiated on the basis of the procedure laid down but the procedure

even though, not said to be followed as to whether any prejudice has

been caused to the writ petitioner, i.e., the question to be considered

by this Court.

49. The issue of prejudice is only in the context where the

imputation of charge is being disputed by the delinquent employee.

50. Here, the charge is that he had looted the motorcycle and

parked it in the premises of the Police Station and when asked about

the same by the Officer In-charge, then from his own rifle, he has

fired.

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51. The argument of the appellant is that the charges have not

been proved, since, the complainant, the owner of the motorcycle

has not turned up to support that version.

52. Further, the testimony of witnesses has not been recorded in

his presence, the same is being taken as a reason for causing

prejudice.

53. So far as the aforesaid reason of causing prejudice is

concerned, according to our considered view, no prejueice will be

said to have of the writ petitioner, if reply to the second show cause

notice will be taken into consideration, wherein, the appellant has

admitted, however, by denying looting of motorcycle but admitted the

fact that he, on presentation of his identity card and on being

satisfied, he has carried the motorcycle of M. Jagarnatthan to his

deputed place of posting, i.e., Pundag Outpost. He has handed over

the keys of the motorcycle to the Clerk of the Outpost, namely,

Bharat Tiwari.

54. The aforesaid admission of the fact explicitly clarifies that the

appellant has mis-utilized his official position, as would be evident

from the reply to the second show cause notice as quoted and

referred hereinabove.

55. We are conscious of the fact that the appellant herein is the

member of the disciplined force and while, he is admitting the fact

that he has shown his identity card and on being satisfied, he has

taken away the motorcycle to the place of posting, i.e., at Pundag

Outpost.

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56. The aforesaid act of the writ petitioner is an example of mis-

utilization of Police power towards a citizen who was driving on the

road by his motorcycle. The presentation of the identify card to the

passer by looting the motorcycle, cannot be construed to be a simple

in nature by a member of disciplined force.

57. A criminal case was also instituted on the allegation of looting

of the motorcycle being Chanho P.S. Case No.40/12 dated

15.04.2012, but in the same, the appellant has been acquitted and

another case was also instituted on the ground of allegation of firing.

However, in both the cases the appellant has been convicted by the

trial court and acquitted by the higher forum.

58. It appears from the material available on record so far as the

criminal case is concerned, wherein, specific evidence has come

regarding empty cartridges, which was issued in the name of the

appellant. The aforesaid fact also clarifies that there was firing from

the regular arm.

59. We are conscious with the fact that acquittal in criminal case is

having no bearing in the matter of punishment inflicted on conclusion

of departmental proceeding and as such, the acquittal so made in

the criminal cases, will have no bearing in the facts and

circumstances of the case.

60. It further requires to refer herein that in order to examine

regarding the fact that the appellant has made any requisition for

initiation of proceeding in terms of Appendix-49 or has made any

complaint regarding not providing any opportunity of hearing and it is

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the evident from the record that no such complaint has ever been

made by the writ petitioner in course of entire inquiry, rather, he has

tried to justify his action as per the plea taken at paragraph-7 of the

reply to the second show cause notice.

61. It further appears from the original record that the day when the

Rajeev Ranjan Lal, the material witness, was examined in course of

inquiry, i.e., on 25.10.2012, the writ petitioner was well present in the

proceeding. Therefore, it is not a case where the appellant was not

present in course of inquiry. Further, the appellant has also not

made any complaint regarding any unfairness in the inquiry.

62. The aforesaid issue, for the first time, has been raised by the

appellant when the writ petitioner has filed the writ petition.

63. The question herein will be that when the appellant has

admitted his guilt by furnishing the reply to the second show cause

notice, then where is the occasion for the appellant to raise the issue

of prejudice in the subsequent stage.

64. Further, the original record suggests that no such complaint

has ever been made regarding not providing adequate and sufficient

opportunity.

65. The another ground has also been raised that the owner of the

motorcycle, even though, had been noticed but had not appeared for

supporting his complaint, therefore, serious prejudice has been

caused.

66. It appears from the order passed by the learned Single Judge

regarding the procedure which was followed in the inquiry and after

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considering the fact that the petitioner in spite of notices, has not

filed reply to the show cause within the stipulated time. He has also

not made any request before the enquiry officer to permit him to be

represented through a pleader or an agent. The petitioner filed his

show cause reply belatedly on 08.03.2013 after all the four witnesses

were already examined on 08.03.2013. But even though, neither

prayer was made before the enquiry officer to recall any of the

witnesses for the purposes of cross-examination, nor made any

grievance regarding their examination in his absence.

67. The learned Single Judge has also taken note that the

petitioner was also granted a personal hearing, but even at the stage

of personal hearing, no such grievance was made by the petitioner

regarding any procedure or lapses.

68. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore,

based upon the position of law regarding power of judicial review

which is to be exercised in the matter of punishment passed by the

administrative disciplinary authority.

69. This Court is aware with the settled position of law that due to

non-examination of the complainant, the inquiry is to vitiate.

70. But the said position of law is not applicable in the facts and

circumstances of the case, since, the appellant has accepted his

fault of taking away the motorcycle by showing his identity card.

71. Further, the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India is also need to be referred herein, as has been

settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India &

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Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SSC 610. At paragraphs 12

and 13 thereof, the following guidelines have been laid down for

showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary

authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads as under:

"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

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reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i). re-appreciate the evidence;

(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."

72. Further, in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs.

Abrar Ali [(2017) 4 SCC 507], following guidelines have been laid

down by the Apex Court for interference by the High Court in the

matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental

proceeding. The extract of relevant passages, i.e., para 13 and 14,

are referred hereinbelow:

"13. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being

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treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

14. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, [(2011) 4 SCC 584], this Court held as follows:

"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations."

73. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove that the

law has been well settled giving the guidelines to exercise the power

of judicial review to the High Court and this Court on consideration of

the factual aspect, as has been discussed hereinabove, is of the

LPA No.182/2022

considered view that the writ petitioner has failed to make out a

ground for exercise the power of judicial review of the administrative

decision of the disciplinary authority.

74. We, on consideration of the fact in entirety and coming to the

order passed by the learned Single Judge, are of the view that if the

learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the impugned

orders passed by the authorities, which according to our considered