Jharkhand High Court
Mr. S. Venkatraman vs The State Of Jharkhand on 1 November, 2022
1 Cr.M.P. No. 674 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 674 of 2017
1. Mr. S. Venkatraman, S/o Sri P.V. Balasubramanian @ Sri R.
Subramanian, Dy. GM (Works) of the Tinplate Co. of India Ltd.,
Resident of Bungalow No.9, Narmada Road, Tinplate Colony, P.O. &
P.S. Golmuri, Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum, Jharkhand
2. Mr. Harjit Singh, S/o Late Mahinder Singh, Chief (Corporate Services)
of the Tinplate Co. of India Ltd., Works Golmuri, P.O. & P.S. Golmuri,
Town Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum, Jharkhand, resident of
Bungalow No.06, Golmuri Road, Tinplate Colony, P.O. & P.S. Golmuri
Town, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum
3. Mr. Anjan Dasgupta, S/o Late Debi Prasad Dasgupta, Chief of Vigilance
of Tata Steel Ltd., General Office, Bistupur, P.O. & P.S. Bistupur, Town-
Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum ... Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Ashok Kumar, S/o Sri S.R. Pandey, Resident of Quarter No.19/G4,
Johila Road, Tinplate Colony, P.O. & P.S. Golmuri, Town Jamshedpur,
District- East Singhbhum ... Opposite Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
For the Opposite Party-State : Mr. Pankaj Kumar Mishra, A.P.P.
For Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Vishal Kumar, Advocate
-----
09/01.11.2022. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the petitioners,
Mr. Vishal Kumar, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and Mr. Pankaj
Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the State.
2. This petition has been filed for quashing the entire criminal
proceeding in connection with C/1 Case No.1497/2016 including the order
dated 01.03.2017 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1 st Class,
Jamshedpur, whereby, cognizance has been taken under Sections 341, 348
and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners, pending in the
court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur.
3. The complaint case has been filed on 27.06.2016 by opposite party
no.2 alleging therein that he joined in Tinplate Co India Ltd (TCIL) as a
Junior Administrative Trainee and worked since then in the said company
and at the time of filing complaint posted as Executive Officer at work office
of the said company reporting to the present petitioner no. 1. It has further
been alleged that he had played a very important role and had been
receiving assignment directly from the Managing Director of the Company
and reporting to him over the happenings causing loss to the petitioner no.
1, who threatened the O.P. No.2. On 23.03.2016, petitioner no. 1 held a
meeting directing all concerned officers to re-check the vendors bill of the
period 2015-2016 so that any mistake detected in the bill may be corrected.
After the meeting when O.P. No.2 came to his office and asked office staff
to give vendor's bill file for re-checking. The O.P No.2 was told by office
staff that petitioner no. 1-Mr. S. Venkatraman has taken away the bills file.
The petitioner no. 1-Mr. S. Venkatraman without knowledge of the O.P No.2
get recheck and verified 23 bills of vendor M/s Shree Interiors and one bill
of M/s Ramprakash Fabricators and Contractors by Mr. Sailesh Singh. This
fact indicates that petitioner no. 1 how far biased with the O.P No.2. The
O.P. No.2 came to know that aforesaid bills had earlier been forwarded and
counter signed by him. In scrutiny, it was detected that there was
calculation mistakes in submitting bills as the calculation was made in
square inch instead of square ft. this was the mistakes of the said
contractors which could not be detected by O.P No.2 earlier while counter
signing and forwarding the bills as there was no copy of purchase order
attached with the bill nor there was any circular order for direction issued by
the management petitioner no. 1 to attach copy of purchase order while
submitting bills. O.P No.2 had no access to see purchase order and bill
certification in SAP system. It was not in his memory or mind that purchase
order was made in square ft., and not in square inch. Petitioner no. 1-Mr.
S. Venkatraman is only the passing and sanctioning authority of the
vendors' bills and on his direction the bill payment was to be made by
account department after further scrutinization. The payment of 23 bills of
vendor M/s Shree Interiors had already being made to the vendor on the
basis of the passing of the bills and direction of petitioner no.1- Mr. S.
Venkatraman. As such regarding wrong an excess payment of 23 bills to the
vendor M/s Shree Interiors, the petitioner no. 1-Mr S. Venkatraman, Bill
certifier in SAP system and the account department are only legally liable
and responsible person. When this fact came to the knowledge of petitioner
no. 1 he directly made contacts with the respective vendors and obtained
revised and corrected bill from the vendors without observing formalities of
receiving and filing bills. No entry of revised bills was made in centralize bill
register maintained by works office. This shows that the petitioner no. 1 has
got complicity and nexus with the vendors. The vendors are said to have
admitted that it was their calculation mistakes and there was no hand of the
complainant in calculation Mistakes being committed in the bills. The
petitioner no.1- Mr. S. Venkatraman finding himself to be liable, responsible
and legally accountable for wrong payment made to the vendor M/s Shree
Interiors by the account department on the basis his order and direction. To
cover up his negligence and the liability, responsibility and accountability
and also falsely to implicate the O.P. No.2, informed the petitioner no. 3-Mr.
Anjan Dasgupta Chief Vigilance, Tata Steel Limited. On 26.4.2016, at about
11 A.M., the O.P. No.2 was called on cell phone by petitioner no. 2 Mr. Harjit
Singh to come to his office immediately. When O.P No.2 went to the
chamber of petitioner no. 2-Mr. Harjit Singh he found petitioner no. 1 Mr. S.
Venkatraman, petitioner no.2-Mr.Harjit Singh and accused no. 3-Mr. Anjan
Dasgupta, Chief Vigilance of Tata Steel Limited along with other 3 unknown
persons were present there in the chamber of petitioner no. 2 Mr. Harjit
Singh. The petitioner no. 1 Mr. S. Venkatraman and the petitioner no. 2 Mr.
Harjit Singh told the O.P. No.2 to answer the question of petitioner no. 3-Mr.
Anjan Dasgupta. The petitioner no. 3 by exercising undue influence,
coercion and threat obtained the signature and some writings of the
complainant in question form on blank papers. All the three accused
persons in collusion and complicity with each other by exercising undue
influence and threat obtained the Bank account of the complainant and his
wife. The complainant was also forcibly detained in the office of petitioner
no. 2 for about three hours. On 27.4.2016, again the petitioner no. 2 Mr.
Harjit Singh called the O.P. No.2 to his office when the O/P. No.2 went to
the office of petitioner no. 2, the petitioner no. 3 Mr. Anjan Dasgupta
brought the complainant O.P No.2 in library of TCIL where enquiry was
made by petitioner no.3 Mr. Anjan Dasgupta and he forced to give details of
bank account. The O.P. No.2 told that it was his personal account and then
the petitioner no. 3 Anjan Dasgupta threatened and forced the O.P No.2 to
give his bank details. Being influence by threat and coercion given by the
petitioner no. 3 Mr. Anjan Dasgupta O.P No.2 gave the details of his bank
account. It was pointed out by the O.P No.2 that loan was taken from the
friends, society, relatives and parents. The loan return has also been shown
in the account statement of the O.P.No.2. The petitioner no. 3 also made
query in respect of the vendor's bill. The O.P No.2 told that he had counter
signed over the bills but not made any recommendations to pass the bills.
The complainant O.P.No.2 also told the vigilance people that the petitioner
no. 3 is the passing and sanctioning authority of the vendor's bills and he
also got facility and power to see purchase orders in SAP system whereas
the O.P. No.2 had no power and facility to look purchase order in SAP. The
O.P. No.2 also requested petitioner no. 3 to make query and enquiry from
petitioner no.1- Mr. S. Venkatraman and from account department who may
be sole liable and responsible for wrong passing and payment of the vendor
bills. The petitioner no. 3 Mr. Anjan Dasgupta started to call the vendors and
he pressurized the vendors to write something showing illegal gratifications
against the complainant for falsely implicating the complainant in fabricated
and concocted case. No document of any kind regarding payment of illegal
gratification by any person was shown to the O.P. No.2. The O.P. No.2 was
not aware of what kind of document have been fabricated and created by
petitioner no. 1 against the O.P. No.2 from the vendors by exercising threat,
coercion of being blacklisted and stop payment. The petitioner no. 3
accompanied three other unknown Vigilance persons made no enquiry and
query from the petitioner no.1- Mr. S. Venkatraman and account department
regarding passing and payment of wrong calculated bills submitted by M/s
Shree Interiors in spite of his request made. It clearly indicates that the
petitioner no. 3-Mr. Anajan Dasgupta is in collusion and conspiracy of
petitioner no. 1 and 2 who appears to have managed petitioner no. 3-Mr.
Anajan Dasgupta. The petitioner no. 3 had been simply called by petitioner
no. 1-Mr S. Venkatraman only for the purpose to save and protect him from
the liability and accountability of the wrong payment made and for the
purpose of falsely implicating the OP.No.2 in a concocted case for tarnishing
his image in a pre-planned manner. On 03.5.2016 at about 4 P.M. the
petitioner no. 2-Mr. Harjit Singh called the O.P No.2 to come in his office
immediately and when the O.P. No.2 entered into the cabin of petitioner
no.2 he found petitioner nos. 1 and 2 along with some other officers of the
company present there. Both the petitioner nos.1 and petitioner no.2
started threatening the O.P. No.2 and they were forcing the O.P. No.2 to
give his resignation with immediate effect telling that Sr. Management team
has taken decision to sack and not continue with the service. The O.P. No.2
wanted to know the reasons and demanded any document regarding
complain and charges if made against the O.P. No.2 but both petitioner nos.
1 and 2 denied giving any document to the O.P. No.2 regarding charges
whatsoever. The O.P. No.2 refused to give his resignation without any valid
reason shown to him then petitioner nos. 1 and 2 abused the O.P. No.2
using unparliamentary languages and they told that they may dismiss O.P.
No.2 with immediate effect or may terminate his services one month pre
notice. The O.P. No.2 was illegally detained for more than two hours and
not allowed to go outside from the office. In may ways, the O.P. No.2 was
being humiliated and tortured by petitioner nos. 1 and 2. On 4.5.2016,
when the O.P No.2 went to his office he found that his PC was blocked and
Lotus-email was found disabled. The O.P. No.2 approached to the petitioner
no.1 about the reason for blocking his PC and Lotus email without giving
any prior information. The petitioner no. 1 gave no reasons and he abused
the O.P.No.2 and dragged him out from his office telling that he will sack
the O.P.No.2 immediately. The petitioner nos. 1 and 2 started calling the
vendors and tried to create and manufactured documents against the
O.P.No.2 by giving threats and coercion to the vendors.
4. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
petitioner no.1 is the Deputy General Manager of Tinplate Company,
petitioner no.2 is the Chief of Corporate Services of Tinplate Company and
petitioner no.3 is the Chief of Vigilance of Tata Steel Ltd., who was
appointed as Enquiry Officer against the complainant and the complainant
was employed as an Executive Officer to DGM (Works) of Tinplate Company.
He further submits that opposite party no.2 has passed the bill and allowed
additional claims to the vendors which causes wrongful loss to the company
and, therefore, show-cause was given to him, which was replied by him and
thereafter enquiry was conducted and subsequently opposite party no.2 was
suspended. He further submits that from the bank statement which has
been annexed with the petition, it is crystal clear that on certain dates, the
amount has been transferred in the bank account of wife of the
complainant. He further submits that after the charge-sheet was submitted,
opposite party no.2 has filed a title suit being Title Suit No.58 of 2016
before the court of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division No.1,
Jamshedpur seeking permanent injunction restraining the Management of
Tinplate Company India Limited and their authorities from holding any
departmental enquiry and also prayed for vacating the order of suspension.
In the said suit, opposite party no.2 has made seven officers of the said
Company as defendants and the injunction application was rejected by the
learned Civil Judge, Junior Division No.1, Jamshedpur on 14.07.2016. He
further submits that this fact has been conveniently suppressed by opposite
party no.2 while filing the complaint case. He also submits that
subsequently opposite party no.2 was terminated from service on
12.07.2016 and being aggrieved by the said order, opposite party no.2 has
moved before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur, in B.S. Case No.6 of
2016, wherein he has challenged the order of termination and claimed for
his reinstatement, which is pending. He further submits that in this
background the opposite party no.2 has maliciously filed the complaint case
against the petitioners and the learned court has taken cognizance, which is
not in accordance with law. He also submits that so far as Sections 341, 348
and 506 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned, the ingredients of those
sections are not made out against the petitioners, who are officials of the
Tinplate Company. He further submits that the case of the petitioners is fully
covered in light of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Anjani Kumar v. State of Bihar; [(2008) 5 SCC 248] .
5. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the said judgment read as under:
"12. As the factual scenario goes to show the complaint filed
on 4-2-1993 appears to be a counterblast by Respondent 2 for
the action taken by the appellant against him.
13."7. The pivotal issue [i.e. applicability of Section 197 of
the Code] needs careful consideration. In Bakhshish Singh
Brar v. Gurmej Kaur [(1987) 4 SCC 663 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 29 :
AIR 1988 SC 257] this Court while emphasising on the balance
between protection to the officers and the protection to the
citizens observed as follows :
'6. ... It is necessary to protect the public servants in
the discharge of their duties. ... In the facts and
circumstances of each case protection of public officers
and public servants functioning in discharge of official
duties and protection of private citizens have to be
balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far
is a public servant working in discharge of his duties or
purported discharge of his duties, and whether the
public servant has exceeded his limit. It is true that
Section 196 states that no cognizance can be taken and
even after cognizance having been taken if facts come
to light that the acts complained of were done in the
discharge of the official duties then the trial may have
to be stayed unless sanction is obtained. But at the
same time it has to be emphasised that criminal trials
should not be stayed in all cases at the preliminary
stage because that will cause great damage to the
evidence.'
8. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect
responsible public servants against the institution of
possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences
alleged to have been committed by them while they are
acting or purporting to act as public servants. The
policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection
to public servants to ensure that they are not
prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge
of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if
sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if
they choose to exercise it, complete control of the
prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is
available only when the alleged act done by the public
servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of
his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the
objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted
in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable
connection between the act and the performance of the
official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground
to deprive the public servant of the protection. The
question is not as to the nature of the offence such as
whether the alleged offence contained an element
necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public
servant, but whether it was committed by a public
servant acting or purporting to act as such in the
discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can
be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned
was accused of an offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty
which requires examination so much as the act,
because the official act can be performed both in the
discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of
it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the
official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the
quality of the act which is important and the protection
of this section is available if the act falls within the
scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be
any universal rule to determine whether there is a
reasonable connection between the act done and the
official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule.
One safe and sure test in this regard would be to
consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the
public servant to commit the act complained of could
have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction
of his official duty; if the answer to this question is in
the affirmative, it may be said that such act was
committed by the public servant while acting in the
discharge of his official duty and there was every
connection with the act complained of and the official
duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear
that the concept of Section 197 does not get
immediately attracted on institution of the complaint
case.
9. At this juncture, we may refer to P.
Arulswami v. State of Madras [AIR 1967 SC 776]
wherein this Court held as under :
'6. ... It is not therefore every offence committed
by a public servant that requires sanction for
prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him
while he is actually engaged in the performance
of his official duties; but if the act complained of
is directly concerned with his official duties so
that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have
been done by virtue of the office, then sanction
would be necessary. It is the quality of the act
that is important and if it falls within the scope
and range of his official duties the protection
contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may
be entirely unconnected with the official duty as
such or it may be committed within the scope of
the official duty. Where it is unconnected with
the official duty there can be no protection. It is
only when it is either within the scope of the
official duty or in excess of it that the protection
is claimable.'
10. Prior to examining if the courts below committed
any error of law in discharging the accused, it may not
be out of place to examine the nature of power
exercised by the court under Section 197 of the Code
and the extent of protection it affords to public
servants, who, apart from various hazards in discharge
of their duties, in absence of a provision like the one
may be exposed to vexatious prosecution. Sections
197(1) and (2) of the Code read as under:
'197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
--(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of
the Government is accused of any offence
alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty, no court shall take cognizance of
such offence except with the previous sanction--
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or,
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed, in
connection with the affairs of the Union, of the
Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or,
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed, in
connection with the affairs of a State, of the
State Government:
***
(2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence
alleged to have been committed by any member
of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, except with the previous sanction of the
Central Government.'
The section falls in the Chapter dealing with conditions
requisite for initiation of proceedings. That is, if the
conditions mentioned are not made out or are absent
then no prosecution can be set in motion. For instance,
no prosecution can be initiated in a Court of Session
under Section 193, as it cannot take cognizance as a
court of original jurisdiction, of any offence, unless the
case has been committed to it by a Magistrate or the
Code expressly provides for it. And the jurisdiction of a
Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is
provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt
of a complaint, or upon a police report or upon
information received from any person other than a
police officer, or upon his knowledge that such offence
has been committed. So far as public servants are
concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court,
is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is
obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence,
alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of
the official duty. The section not only specifies the
persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also
specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it
shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions
are satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection
afforded to a public servant is brought out by the
expression, 'no court shall take cognizance of such
offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of the
words, 'no' and 'shall' makes it abundantly clear that
the bar on the exercise of power of the court to take
cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete.
The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint
cannot be taken notice of. According to Black's Law
Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means 'jurisdiction' or
'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power to try and
determine causes'. In common parlance, it means
taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from
entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or
exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public
servant who is accused of an offence alleged to have
been committed during discharge of his official duty.
11. Such being the nature of the provision, the question
is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of his official duty', be
understood? What does it mean? 'Official' according to
the dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and
official act or official duty means an act or duty done by
an officer in his official capacity. In B. Saha v. M.S.
Kochar [(1979) 4 SCC 177 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 939] it was
held :
'17. The words "any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty" employed
in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a
narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these
words are construed too narrowly, the section
will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no
part of an official duty to commit an offence, and
never can be". In the wider sense, these words
will take under their umbrella every act
constituting an offence, committed in the course
of the same transaction in which the official duty
is performed or purports to be performed. The
right approach to the import of these words lies
between these two extremes. While on the one
hand, it is not every offence committed by a
public servant while engaged in the performance
of his official duty, which is entitled to the
protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting
an offence, directly and reasonably connected
with his official duty will require sanction for
prosecution under the said provision.'
(emphasis in original)
Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act
or omission must have been done by the public servant
in the course of his service and that it should have been
in discharge of his duty. The section does not extend its
protective cover to every act or omission done by a
public servant in service but restricts its scope of
operation to only those acts or omissions which are
done by a public servant in discharge of official duty.
12. It has been widened further by extending protection
to even those acts or omissions which are done in
purported exercise of official duty. That is under the
colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the
act or omission must have been done by the public
servant in course of his service and such act or
omission must have been performed as part of duty
which, further, must have been official in nature. The
section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while
determining its applicability to any act or omission in
the course of service. Its operation has to be limited to
those duties which are discharged in the course of duty.
But once any act or omission has been found to have
been committed by a public servant in discharge of his
duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction
so far as its official nature is concerned. For instance, a
public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal
activities. To that extent the section has to be
construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But
once it is established that that act or omission was
done by the public servant while discharging his duty
then the scope of its being official should be construed
so as to advance the objective of the section in favour
of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of
affording protection to a public servant without sanction
shall stand frustrated. For instance, a police officer in
discharge of duty may have to use force which may be
an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction
may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an
act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty
[and without any justification therefor] then the bar
under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. To what
extent an act or omission performed by a public servant
in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official,
was explained by this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C.
Bhari
'17. ... The offence alleged to have been
committed [by the accused] must have
something to do, or must be related in some
manner, with the discharge of official duty. ...
***
19. ... There must be a reasonable connection
between the act and the discharge of official
duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty
that the accused could lay a reasonable [claim],
but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did
it in the course of the performance of his duty.'
13. If, on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that
the act or omission for which the accused was charged
had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty
then it must be held to be official to which applicability
of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed.
***
19. We may mention that the Law Commission in its
41st Report in Para 15.123 while dealing with Section
197, as it then stood, observed:
'It appears to us that protection under the section is
needed as much after retirement of the public servant
as before retirement. The protection afforded by the
section would be rendered illusory if it were open to a
private person harbouring a grievance to wait until the
public servant ceased to hold his official position, and
then to lodge a complaint. The ultimate justification for
the protection conferred by Section 197 is the public
interest in seeing that official acts do not lead to
needless or vexatious prosecution. It should be left to
the Government to determine from that point of view
the question of the expediency of prosecuting any
public servant.'
It was in pursuance of this observation that the
expression 'was' come to be employed after the
expression 'is' to make the sanction applicable even in
cases where a retired public servant is sought to be
prosecuted."
14.When the factual background as noted above is
considered on the touchstone of legal principles set out above
the inevitable conclusion is that certainly mala fides were
involved apart from the applicability of Section 197 of the
Code. It is no doubt true that at the threshold interference by
exercise of Section 482 of the Code has to be in rare cases.
The present case appears to be of that nature and falls under
Category (7) indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . The continuance of
the proceedings by the prosecution would amount to abuse of
the process of law. The criminal proceedings in the Court of
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in PS Case No.
63 of 1993 are quashed. The appeal is allowed."
6. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners further relied on the
judgment passed by the Karnataka High Court in Sri Samiulla B. v.State
of Karnataka & others in Writ Petition No.9520 of 2022 (GM-RES).
7. Paragraph 5 of the said judgment reads as under:
"5. The case at hand is the one where the termination of the
complainant happens pursuant to the losses incurred by the
petitioner or the TTC news channel. Therefore, the criminal
proceedings to be initiated as an alternate method to arm
twist the petitioner instead of knocking the doors of an
appropriate Court for an appropriate relief, cannot be
permitted to continue, as it would result in abuse of the
process of law and miscarriage of justice."
8. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that there
are judgments of this Court as well as other High Courts that if the
workman has filed the complaint case after termination of his service, that
is malicious prosecution. On these grounds, he submits that entire criminal
proceeding is required to be quashed by this Court.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Vishal Kumar, learned counsel for opposite
party no.2 submits that what has been argued by Mr. Das, learned counsel
for the petitioners is also subject matter before the learned court which is
being examined by the learned Labour Court. He further submits that the
cognizance has been taken under Sections 341, 348 and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code against the petitioners. He took the Court to one of the
annexure of the counter affidavit wherein the certificate has been annexed
and submits that the amount in question has already been returned back to
one of the Director. He further submits that the Court sitting under Section
482 Cr.P.C. may not exercise its power at this stage, as has been held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments. He relied in Rashmi Kumar
(Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada; [(1997) 2 SCC 397] . By relying on
this judgment, he submits that the ingredient has been made out against
the petitioners and the learned court has rightly taken cognizance. He
further relied upon the judgment in Fakhruddin Ahmad v. State of
Uttaranchal & another; [(2008) 17 SCC 157] . By relying on this
judgment, he submits that the cognizance order is in accordance with law
and the prayer made in the petition is misconceived one and this Court may
not entertain this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
10. In light of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties, this Court has gone through the materials on the record and finds
that the complaint case was filed alleging therein that in scrutiny it was
detected that there was calculation mistakes in submitting the bills as the
calculation was made in square inch instead of square ft. This was the
mistake of contractors which could not be detected by opposite party no.2
earlier while counter signing and forwarding the bills as there was no copy
of purchase order attached with the bill. Prima facie, it appears that for the
action being taken by the Management, the complaint case has been filed
by opposite party no.2 and the injunction application filed by opposite party
no.2 was rejected by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division No.1,
Jamshedpur on 14.07.2016 and pursuant to filing of the charge-sheet and
proper enquiry, the services of the petitioner has been terminated on
12.07.2016. Admittedly, the complaint case has been filed after submission
of the charge-sheet and opposite party no.2 has implicated the petitioners,
who are officials of the Company maliciously on the ground that they have
proceeded against him. Admittedly in the case in hand, the opposite party
no.2 has tried to restrained the Management by way of filing the suit to not
to take any action against him for the said charge. The termination order is
being examined by the learned Labour Court. It appears that since the
opposite party no.2 has not been exonerated, he has filed the complaint
case against the petitioners. Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code
prescribes the punishment for wrongful restraint. In the case in hand,
criminality is not made out against the petitioners as the action was taken
against opposite party no.2, which is civil in nature. Section 348 of the
Indian Penal Code prescribes for wrongful confinement to extort confession,
or compel restoration of property. The ingredient of this section is not made
out against the petitioners, who are the officials of the Company. There is
no allegation of wrongful confinement to extort confession against the
petitioners. Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes for punishment
for criminal intimidation. What intimidation has been made by the
petitioners, has not been made in the complaint case. Thus, the ingredients
of these sections are not made out against the petitioners.
11. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the entire criminal
proceeding in connection with C/1 Case No.1497/2016 including the order
dated 01.03.2017, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate,
1st Class, Jamshedpur is, hereby, quashed.
12. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed and disposed of.
13. It is made clear that the proceeding which is pending before the
learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur shall be decided on its own merit
without being prejudiced to this order.
14. Interim order dated 11.04.2017 stands vacated.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Ajay/
