[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Jammu & Kashmir High Court
2026:Jklhc-Jmu:576-Db vs State Through Police Station on 26 February, 2026
Author: Sanjeev Kumar
Bench: Sanjeev Kumar
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Crl A(D) No. 20/2020
c/w Reserved on : 12.02.2026
Conf. No. 11/2015 Pronounced on :26.02.2026
Uploaded on :27.02.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced:
Shonku Ram S/o Sh. Kundi Ram .... Appellant(s)
R/o Kail, Tehsil Majalta,
District Udhampur
Through: - Mr. A. K. Shan, Advocate
V/s
State through Police Station .....Respondent(s)
Majalta, District Udhampur
Through: - Mr. Raman Sharma, AAG (Sr.
Advocate) with Ms. Saliqa Sheikh,
Advocate
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Per : Parihar-J
1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment dated 14.11.2015
rendered by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Udhampur, the "trial
Court" whereby the appellant came to be convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 302 RPC in connection with FIR No. 76/2010 of
Police Station Majalta and sentenced to imprisonment for life along with
fine. The appeal, being one against conviction for a grave offence,
obligates this Court to independently re-appreciate the entire evidence on
record and to satisfy itself as to whether the prosecution has succeeded in
proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It is equally settled that in a
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
reference for confirmation of sentence, the appellate Court must scrutinize
the record in its entirety and arrive at its own conclusions on facts and law.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 22.11.2010 information was
received at Police Station Majalta that at about 6.45 A.M. that the
appellant, on account of previous enmity over landed property, had
inflicted a grievous injury upon Jalla Ram with a drat. An FIR under
Section 307 RPC was registered, which later stood converted to one under
Section 302 RPC upon the death of the injured on the following day. It is
further the case of the prosecution that the appellant was arrested and
allegedly made a disclosure statement leading to recovery of the weapon of
offence from beneath his cart at his house. The prosecution examined
several witnesses including PW-3 Ram Dass, PW-7 Krishan Kumar, PW-
10 Bansi Lal and PW-12 Gharu Ram as eye-witnesses, besides medical and
formal witnesses.
3. The impugned judgment has been assailed primarily on the ground
that, the trial Court gravely erred in recording conviction of the appellant
despite the prosecution evidence being wholly unreliable and legally
insufficient. It is contended that the majority of the prosecution witnesses
have deposed on the basis of hearsay information and not on the strength of
direct knowledge of the occurrence. Their testimonies, therefore, lack
evidentiary value in view of the settled principle that hearsay evidence is
inadmissible unless it falls within recognized exceptions. It is further urged
that several witnesses examined by the prosecution are closely related to
the deceased and are, thus, interested witnesses. While the testimony of
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
related witnesses cannot be discarded merely on that ground, it requires
careful scrutiny and cautious evaluation.
4. We have heard the respective counsels besides minutely assessed the
evidence lead in trial of the appellant.
5. The medical evidence, as deposed by Dr. Anil Mahajan, who proved
the post-mortem report Ext. P-15, establishes that the deceased had
sustained two incised wounds on the left temporal region and above the left
ear, along with multiple bruises and underlying scalp muscle bruising.
According to the medical opinion, Injury Nos. 1 and 2 were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death and were caused by a sharp-
edged weapon. The homicidal nature of death is, therefore, clearly
established. However, it is trite that medical evidence, while proving the
cause of death, does not by itself establish the identity of the assailant. The
prosecution must independently connect the accused with the crime
through cogent and reliable evidence.
6. On a careful examination of the testimony of PW-3 Ram Dass, it
emerges that he did not witness the actual assault. He stated that upon
hearing a hue and cry, he proceeded to the spot and found the deceased
lying on ground with face down while the accused was standing about ten
feet away holding a drat. In cross-examination he admitted omissions in his
earlier statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and also stated that several
villagers had gathered at the spot. His evidence, thus, establishes his arrival
at the scene after the occurrence and not the commission of the actual
assault itself.
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
7. Similarly, PW-7 Krishan Kumar deposed that he reached the spot
after Bansi Lal raised alarm and saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood
while the accused was going towards Bhardai carrying a blood-stained drat.
He admitted that in his earlier statement under Section 164-A Cr.P.C., he
had not mentioned certain material particulars. He too did not depose to
having seen the accused inflicting the blow. His testimony is confined to
the presence of the accused in the vicinity with a weapon after the deceased
had already fallen injured.
8. PW-10 Bansi Lal stated that he heard hue and cry and saw the
accused holding a drat and the deceased lying on the ground with blood
oozing near his ear. He informed Krishan Kumar and Ram Dass. He also
proved seizure memos relating to blood-stained and plain earth. However,
like the other two witnesses, he did not claim to have seen the actual
infliction of injury. Thus, from the cumulative reading of the testimony of
PW-3, PW-7 and PW-10, it becomes evident that none of them are direct
eye-witnesses to the assault. Their evidence only establishes the presence
of the accused near the scene holding a drat after the deceased had fallen.
9. The prosecution case rests substantially upon the testimony of PW-
12 Gharu Ram, who deposed that he witnessed a scuffle between the
accused and the deceased, wherein the accused allegedly first delivered a
fist blow and thereafter struck the deceased on the head with a drat. In his
cross-examination, however, he candidly admitted that the son of the
deceased is his son-in-law, thereby establishing a close relationship with
the family of the deceased. It is trite that the evidence of a related or
interested witness cannot be discarded solely on the ground of relationship;
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
nevertheless, such testimony must be subjected to careful scrutiny and
evaluated with circumspection. In Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 2010 SC 979 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the testimony of an
interested witness requires cautious examination and must inspire
confidence before being relied upon. Similarly, in Dalip Singh v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364, the Apex Court observed that while related
witnesses are not necessarily unreliable, their evidence must be scrutinized
with greater care and caution.
10. In the present case, the learned Trial Court appears to have accepted
the testimony of PW-12 without undertaking the degree of careful
evaluation mandated by the aforesaid settled principles of law because his
presence at crime scene is not described by any other witness, he resides
5 Km away from that place and is not proved to be a chance witness.
Moreover, the other witnesses indicated that the accused was seen moving
towards Bhardai, whereas PW-12 stated that the accused fled immediately
after the assault. The possibility of embellishment or exaggeration,
particularly in the backdrop of admitted relationship, was neither addressed
nor tested against surrounding circumstances and independent
corroboration.
11. Equally significant is the conduct of PW-3, PW-7 and PW-10.
During investigation, these witnesses had reportedly stated that they had
actually seen the appellant committing the murderous assault upon the
deceased. However, when examined at trial, they materially deviated from
their earlier version and merely stated that they reached the spot after the
occurrence had concluded. Notably, despite this substantial departure from
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
their previous statements, they were not declared hostile by the
prosecution. In such circumstances, the prosecution is bound by the version
deposed by them in Court, and their evidence must be appreciated in the
manner stated during trial. The earlier statements made under Section 161
Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can only be used for
the purpose of contradiction.
12. Therefore, the cumulative effect of (i) reliance on a closely related
witness without adequate caution, and (ii) the material improvement and
dilution in the testimonies of PW-3, PW-7 and PW-10, creates a serious
dent in the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court, by failing to
reconcile these inconsistencies and by not appreciating the evidentiary
limitations in their proper legal perspective, has fallen into error warranting
appellate interference.
13. Another aspect which casts doubt upon the prosecution case is the
discrepancy regarding the timing of the incident. The FIR records that
information was received at 6.45 A.M., whereas the eye-witnesses
consistently stated that the occurrence took place between 8.00 and 8.30
A.M, such variation in timing assumes significance, particularly when the
FIR is stated to have been based on information from reliable sources. The
inconsistency remains unexplained and affects the credibility of the
prosecution version.
14. As regards the recovery of the weapon of offence, though the
prosecution examined witnesses to the disclosure and recovery, the fact
remains that the accused was already seen at the spot allegedly holding a
drat. The recovery does not materially advance the prosecution case in the
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
absence of unimpeachable evidence connecting the recovered weapon to
the fatal injuries beyond doubt, this is because the eye witness account is
that the weapon was oozed with blood but when the weapon was shown to
them in trial, they admit of there being not any dried blood stains over it.
The evidence relating to recovery, therefore, does not cure the infirmities in
the prosecution case regarding the actual assault.
15. The plea of insanity under Section 84 IPC read with Section 105 of
the Evidence Act was raised during trial but fairly not pressed before this
Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dahya BhaiChimanbhai Thakkar
v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, held that if the accused succeeds
in creating reasonable doubt regarding his mental incapacity at the relevant
time, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC. The record reveals that
the appellant was, at one stage, kept under observation for psychiatric
issues and the trial was suspended. However, after being declared fit to
stand trial, proceedings were resumed. There is no material to indicate that
at the time of commission of the offence, the appellant was incapable of
knowing the nature of his act.
16. In criminal jurisprudence, the prosecution must establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt, and where two views are possible, the one
favourable to the accused must be adopted. Suspicion, however strong,
cannot take the place of proof. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Munna Pandey v. State of Bihar 2023 (11) SCR 1005
and Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2010 SC 979 reiterate that
conviction cannot be sustained on conjectures or on evidence which does
not form a complete and unbroken chain pointing only towards the guilt of
2026:JKLHC-JMU:576-DB
the accused. In the present case, though homicidal death is proved and
motive of land dispute is suggested, the prosecution has failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant, who inflicted the fatal
injuries. The principal witnesses did not see the assault; the solitary witness
who claims to have seen it is closely related and his testimony is not
corroborated on material aspects; discrepancies exist regarding timing and
manner of occurrence; and the chain of circumstances is not complete. In
such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
17. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court
under Section 302 RPC cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed. The
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.11.2015 are set
aside and as a consequence thereof, reference made by the trial Court is
declined and shall form part of the record. The appellant is acquitted of the
charge and shall be released forthwith, if in custody and not required in any
other case. Copy of the judgment shall be notified to the trial Court along
with the record for further sequential steps.
(SANJAY PARIHAR) (SANJEEV KUMAR)
Judge Judge
JAMMU
RAM MURTI
26.02.2026
Whether the order is speaking?: Yes
Whether the order is reportable?: Yes
