Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Tarlochan Singh vs Union Of India on 29 December, 2023
Author: Tashi Rabstan
Bench: Tashi Rabstan
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
LPA No. 49/2022
CM No. 3419/2022
CM No. 4028/2023
Reserved on : 12.12.2023
Pronounced on : 29.12.2023
1. Tarlochan Singh
Age 57 years, S/O Roop Singh
Prop. Tarlochan Singh and Sons
C/O Camp Gole Gujral, Jammu
2. Madan Lal, Age 60 years
S/O Kaka Ram,
Prop. Kaka Ram and sons
C/O Pounei Chak,
P/O Akalpur, Jammu
3. Chardikalan Road Lines,
Through partner Daljeet Singh, age 38 years
S/O Harbans Singh,
R/O Akalikour, Singh Nagar,
Diagan, Jammu
4. S.K.Traders
Through partner Davinder Singh,
Age 63 years S/O Balwant Singh
R/O 267/13, Nanak Nagar, Jammu
5. Jasvinder Paul Singh, age 63 years
S/O Harbans Singh,
Proprietor Punjab Oil Carrier,
C/O 94/06 Transport Nagar
Narwal, Jammu
6. Avneet Oil Carrier,
Through Partner Mohinder Singh, Age 56 years,
S/O Santokh Singh,
R/O H.No.23-A, Karan Nagar,
Jammu
7. Vinod Kumar, age 56 years,
S/O Moti Lal,
R/O Plot No.2, Rehari Colony,
Jammu
....... Appellant(s)
Through: Mr Amit Gupta, Advocate
Page 1 of 16
LPA no.49/2022
Versus
1. Union of India
Through Secretary to Government of India,
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Gases, New Delhi.
2. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (Marketing Division),
Through its Chief General manager,
C/O Railway Loco Shed, Jammu Tawi.
3. Chief Depot Manager CDM, Jammu
Indian Oil Corporation Limited,
C/O Railway Loco shed Jammu Tawi
4. M/s Puri & Puri through Sanjay Puri
S/O Sh. A.K.Puri R/O 60 A/D,
Gandhi Nagar, Jammu.
......Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Rahul Pant, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Arushi Shukla, Advocate,
Mr. Anuj Dewan Raina, Advocate,
Mr. Abhishek Wazir, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE TASHI RABSTAN, JUDGE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SEKHRI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
TASHI-J:
1. The instant appeal has been filed against the judgment dated
13.05.2022 passed in WP(C) No. 1776/2021 titled Tarlochan Singh and
others V. Union of India and others whereby the learned Writ Court has
refused to quash the Notice dated 20.08.2021 and dismissed the writ petition.
Although without conceding to the prayer of the writ petitioners-appellants
herein to allot additional requirement of Tank Trucks (TTs) yet the Writ
Court granted liberty to respondent No.2-Corporation to consider their
grievance as projected by them in the writ petition if the TTs are still
required by them.
2. Factual matrix of the case, as is gatherable from perusal of the
file, is that the respondents floated a Tender Notice No.RCC/NR/PSO/OPS/
PT-141/ 20-21 for transportation of bulk petroleum products by road for
advanced winter supplies (AWS) for bulk Oil Storage and handling location
in J&K (UT) for a period of three years with an option for extension up to
further two years but at the sole discretion of the Corporation. As per clause
1.4 of NIT, the tenderer had to offer minimum three number of TTs in case
of General and General MSE tenders and minimum two numbers in case of
SC/ST. The tenderers had to participate with ready built TTs as well as with
Purchase Invoice chassis. The writ petitioners-appellants, claiming to be
eligible, participated in the tendering process and their rates were found as
Lot-1 as the rates were quoted per KL/Km. In the Reverse Auction process,
the tenderer was allowed to place his offer in terms of the percentage of the
departmental estimate displayed on the portal and the band allowed for the
same was 0% to -10% of the departmental estimate.
3. Before the Writ Court, the case projected by the writ
petitioners-appellants in their writ petition was based on the claim that upon
issuance of tender notice by respondent No.2, they participated in the
bidding process for supplying TTs of 12-14KL capacity in the contract in
question for advance supply and writ petitioners-appellants were also placed
in Lot-1 of the lot system prescribed by the respondent No.2 in the NIT. The
writ petitioners-appellants further projected that since engagement of the
contractors was in the order, as prescribed in the NIT as per the ranking
system evolved by the respondent No.2, as such, whatever was the shortfall
in the TTs was to be fulfilled by allotting the same to the writ petitioners-
appellants. Thus, the writ petitioners-appellants aggrieved of the Notice
issued by the respondent No.3 dated 20.08.2021 whereby the existing
advanced winter supplies transport contractors were asked to offer bids for
the additional requirement of TTs (12-14 KL) instead of giving opportunity
to the existing transport contractors to provide TTs to meet the shortfall of
25 TTs, had come up with a writ petition.
4. The stand taken by the respondent no.2 in their objections
before the Writ Court was that after the closure of the tender, the additional
TTs requirement could be offered to the existing contractors who are higher
in ranking than the writ petitioners-appellants in Lot-1 prepared in pursuance
of the NIT. It was also the case of the respondents that they were within their
rights to meet the additional requirement of TTs from the existing dealer/
dealer-transporters as per the provisions of the DOA at established L-1 rates.
Learned Single Judge after hearing the parties has rejected the claim of the
writ petitioners vide judgment dated 13.05.2022.
5. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners-appellants has
reiterated the grounds agitated by him before the learned Single Judge by
contending that the judgment is not sustainable in view of the fact that the
writ petitioners-appellants were next in the ranking in Lot-1, as such, they
were entitled to be given an opportunity to offer their TTs for the additional
demand of 25 TTs. Moreover, instead of giving offer to the existing
contractors, it is they who should have been given the opportunity.
6. The respondent No.2 in his reply has clearly taken a stand that the
tendering process initiated in the year 2020 for the transportation of bulk
petroleum products w.e.f. 01.10.2020 or such other date as specified for a
period of three years with an option for extension of the same for a further
period of two years, was concluded with issuance of letter of intent to the
successful bidder in terms of LOI and subsequently some of the contractors
could not meet the requirement or complete various formalities including
security deposit, purchase invoice and physical verification of tanks etc., as
such, there was shortfall of 25 TTs, thus, compelling respondent No.2 to
meet the requirement, for which notice came to be issued on 20.08.2021 and
the same came to be challenged before the writ Court.
The respondent No.2 also relied upon Circular dated 20.11.2015
whereby policy has been framed by respondent No.2 in which it is provided
that after closure of the tender for any additional requirement of TTs either
within the original NIT number or the revised NIT number, additional
requirement can be inducted from the existing dealer/dealer transporter/
general transporters as per the provisions of DOA at established L-1 rates. It
is relevant to mention here that circular dated 20.11.2015 was never
challenged by the writ petitioners-appellants herein.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. During arguments, learned counsel for the parties submitted
that the respondents have issued a Notice dated 14.06.2023 for engagement
of 60 TTs as ad hoc requirements at Jammu Depot, which has been
challenged by the writ petitioners-appellants in another writ petition
No.1706/2023. We have called the record of said writ petition in which
grounds of challenge are that notice of engagement of ad hoc requirements
of TTs of 60 included 25 TTs that were notified in terms of impugned
Notice dated 20.08.2021 and the subsequent notice has been challenged by
the writ petitioners-appellants herein before the Writ Court in which the Writ
Court vide order dated 03.07.2023 passed detailed order and also passed
interim order in the said writ petition.
9. The writ petitioners-appellants in the recently filed writ petition
before this Court bearing WP(C) No.1706/2023 have prayed for following
reliefs:
(a) an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of writ
of certiorari quashing the notice dated 14.06.2023 whereby all
AWS transport contractors are invited to offer 60 TTs (with
valid RTO registration and PESO License) to meet the
requirement (12-14KL) on ad hoc basis against tender
No.RCC/NR/PSO/OPS/PT-141/20-21 in contravention to the
order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in LPA
No49/2022 titled Tarlochan Singh and others Vs. Union of
India and others and the same is arbitrary, irrational,
discriminatory seriously infringing the fundamental rights of
the petitioners.
(b) For issuance of writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to allot the additional requirement of 60 Nos. of
TTs (12-14KL) to the petitioners under transport category at
Jammu Depot in pursuance to the terms and conditions of
tender No.RCC/NR/PSO/OPS/PT-141/20-21 and in
consonance with the directions passed by the Division Bench
of Hon'ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh in LPA
No.49/2022 titled Tarlochan Singh and others Vs. Union of
India and others.
(c) For issuance of Writ of prohibition prohibiting the
respondents from allotting the transportation of 60Nos of (12-
14KL) TTs other than the successful L-1 bidders falling in
LOT-1 and LOT-2 ranking prepared by the respondents in
pursuance to the tender No. RCC/ NR/ PSO/ OPS/ PT-141/20-
21 and in consonance with the directions passed by the
Division Bench of Hon'ble High Court of J&K and Ladakh in
LPA No. 49/2022 titled Tarlochan Singh and others Vs.
Union of India and others.
10. The operative part of the interim order in the above said writ
petition reads as under:
"In the meantime, in case the Deputy General manager, Jammu
Deport of the respondent No.2-Indian Oil Corporation (IOC)
Limited intends to carry out the operation of the impugned
notice to its operational end, then the Deputy General Manager
of the respondent No.2-Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) shall first
offer to the petitioners the shortfall supply of the 25 TTs even if
it is meant to be on adhoc basis figuring as qualified bidders in
Lot-2 by reference to the advertisement
no.RCC/NR/PSO/OPS/PT-141/20-21 dated 15.10.2020."
11. Perusal of interim order dated 03.07.2023 passed by learned
Single Judge would show that writ petitioners-appellants who had pleaded
before learned Single Judge that after existing Lot-1, respondent No.2 has
moved to Lot-2 and in this view of the matter, interim order came to be
passed. Perusal of the said order further shows that as pleaded by writ
petitioners-appellants in the said writ petition that the requirement of TTs
advertised vide Notification dated 14.06.2023 was to the extent of 60TTs
and the same included 25 TTs that was the shortfall in the earlier bidding
process vide NIT dated 15.10.2020. Therefore, it is clear that the writ
petitioners-appellants had projected before the Writ Court that the process
initiated for additional requirement of 60 TTs included 25 TTs, which is
subject matter of the present appeal. A perusal of the interim order passed in
the aforesaid case shows that respondent No.2 have been directed to first
offer to the writ petitioners-appellants the supply of the shortfall of 25 TTs
even if it is meant to be on ad hoc basis figuring as qualified bidders in
Lot-2.
12. A perusal of circular dated 20.11.2015 relied upon by
respondent No.2 will show that respondent No.2 was well within its right to
meet the additional requirement of TTs, either out of the original NIT
number or the revised NIT number from the existing dealer/dealer-
transporter/general transporters as per the provisions of DOA at established
Lot-1 rates and such contractors could be given the offer at established Lot-1
rates. It is not the case of any of the party that Lot-1 rate as fixed in
pursuance of the bidding process initiated in the year 2020 has been violated.
The contractors, who were already in existing Lot-1 and have been awarded
the contract, have been approached for additional requirement of additional
25 TTs by virtue of notice challenged in the writ petition.
13. The contention of the writ petitioners-appellants is that 25 TTs
form part of the initial requirement as notified in the NIT, as such, they
should have been offered to the contractors in Lot-1 who had not been
earlier awarded the contract, is not correct as in view of the issuance of LOI
to the bidder in Lot-1 as per their ranking in the bidding process was over
and if some of the selected contractors were not in position to satisfy the
respondent No.2, the respondent no.2 was well within its right to offer such
additional requirements / shortfall to the existing dealers/dealer-
contractors/general transporters, who had already been allotted the contract
in pursuance of the bidding process. The writ petitioners-appellants cannot
claim any right to be offered the contract as long as they were fairly
considered as per ranking system evolved by respondents and the contract
was allotted in the order of ranking in Lot-1.
14. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners-appellants has
relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in a case titled as Jai Bholenath
Construction v. The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nanded
and others reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 542. It may be made clear here
that the said judgment is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances
of the present case. The writ petition has not been dismissed on the ground
by relying upon the judgment passed in M/s N.G.Projects Ltd. v. M/s
Vinod Kumar Jain reported in 2022(5) SCALE 105. The aforesaid
judgment deals with a situation where the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
interfered with the decision to declare an eligible bidder as ineligible in a
flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. The case is not relevant
in the backdrop of present writ petition as the writ petitioners-appellants
have not been technically disqualified at any stage, but they claim that they
should be offered additional requirement instead of offering the same to the
existing contractors.
15. A perusal of the relief claimed in the writ petition shows that
impugned in the writ petition was a notice dated 20.08.2021 whereby all the
AWS transport contractors of Jammu Depot were informed that there was an
additional requirement of 25 Nos. (12-14 KL) TTs under transport category
at Jammu Depot against the tender No. RCC/NR/PSO/PT-141/20-21. In the
said notice, it was envisaged that all the terms and conditions of the existing
tender No. RCC/NR/PSO/PT-141/20-21 would be applicable to the newly
offer TTs also. While examining Clause 4 (e) of the general terms and
conditions to the original tender, it is clearly stipulated therein that the
official respondents can engage additional contractors/TTs at any time
without giving any notice whatsoever to the contractor/s already appointed
against the Tender, meaning thereby the notice, impugned before the writ
court, has been issued strictly as per the general terms and conditions of the
original tender. Once the writ petitioners-appellants have participated in the
tendering process without throwing any challenge to Clause 4(e) of the
General Terms and Conditions, after being unsuccessful at the time of the
conclusion of the bidding process initiated by main tender, they cannot be
permitted to question the notice impugned in absence of any challenge to the
terms and conditions contained in the Notice of 2020.
16. Learned senior counsel for respondents would aver that
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
with regard to challenge to the terms and conditions of a tender is extremely
limited and the Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that fixation
of tender conditions is entirely within purview of executive and the Court
has little role to play in the tender process except to interfere with such
actions of executive which are palpably arbitrary or unreasonable. The
Supreme Court has further recognized that the State has prerogative to
impose preconditions and/or qualification for bidders to ensure that
successful bidder has capacity and resources to successfully execute the
awarded contract. In the above context, he submits that writ petitioners have
failed to establish as to how arbitrariness has been occasioned at the instance
of respondents and thus the appeal is liable to be dismissed. To buttress his
arguments, learned senior counsel places reliance on Michigan Rubber
(India) Limited v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216; Meerut
Development Authority case (supra); Tata Cellular v. Union of India,
(1994) 6 SCC 651; Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd v. Commr.
Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation, (2005) 5 SCC 287; Mutha
Associates and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2013) 14 SCC
304; and Maa Binda Express Carrier and another v. North East
Frontier Railway and others, (2014) 3 SCC 760.
17. In Tata Cellular case (supra), the Supreme Court examined
the scope of judicial review in the case of a tender awarded by a public
authority for carrying out certain work. The Court acknowledged that the
principles of judicial review can apply to the exercise of contractual powers
by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism.
However, there are inherent limitations in the exercise of that power of
judicial review. The Court also observed that the right to choose cannot be
considered as an arbitrary power. After examining a number of authorities,
the Supreme Court concluded as by saying that:-
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely
reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative
decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision,
without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the
realm of contract.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In
other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an
administrative or quasi administrative sphere. However, the
decision can be tested by the application of the
"Wednesbury principle" of reasonableness and the decision
should be free from arbitrariness, not affected by bias or
actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative
burden on the administration and lead to increased arid
unbudgeted expenditure.
18. A contract is a commercial transaction and evaluating tenders
and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. After saying
this, the Supreme Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Ors.,
(2007) 14 SCC 517, has held that principles of equity and natural justice
stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide
and is in public interest, the courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial
review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or
prejudice to a tenderer, is made out.
19. Pointing out that mere disagreement with the decision-making
process of the authority is no reason for a Constitutional Court to interfere,
the Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail
Corporation Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 4305, observed that the owner of a project
as author of tender, is best person to understand and appreciate its
requirements and interpret its documents and that the Constitutional Courts
must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents
and it is possible that the owner may give interpretation to tender documents,
which is unacceptable to the Constitutional Courts, but that per se is not a
reason for interfering with the interpretation given. The Supreme Court, thus,
held:
"13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decision making
process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for
a constitutional Court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides,
intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity
must be met before the constitutional Court interferes with the
decision making process or the decision.
....
15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having
authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and
appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The
constitutional Courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation
of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the
understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the
tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project
may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not
acceptable to the constitutional Courts but that by itself is not a reason
for interfering with the interpretation given."
20. The allegation of mala fides would require a high degree of
proof to rebut the presumption that administrative action has been taken
bona fide, was laid down as one of the principles governing burden of proof
of allegations of mala fides levelled by an aggrieved party. The Supreme
Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ) Indian Oil Corprn.
Haldia and others, (2005) 7 SCC 764, observed thus:
".... It is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is on the
person making the allegations and the burden is 'very heavy'. (vide
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [1974 (4) SCC 3]. There is every
presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been
exercised bona fide and in good faith. It is to be remembered that
the allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than made
out and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a
high degree of credibility. As Krishna Iyer, J. stated in Gulam
Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [1976 (1) SCC 800] : 'It (mala fide)
is the last refuge of a losing litigant."
21. The Supreme Court in State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal and Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566, laid emphasis on the need for
furnishing full particulars of allegations suggesting mala fides. The use of
words such as 'mala fides', 'corruption' and 'corrupt practice' was held to
be insufficient to necessitate an enquiry into such allegations. The Court
observed:-
"39. Before we part with this case we must express our strong
disapproval of the observations made by B.M. Lal, J. in Paras 1, 9,
17, 18, 19 and 34 of his concurring opinion. The learned Judge made
sweeping observations attributing mala fides, corruption and
underhand dealing to the State Government. These observations are
in our opinion not at all justified by the record. In the first place it is
difficult to appreciate how any such observation could be made by
the learned Judge without any foundation for the same being laid in
the pleadings. It is true that in the writ petitions the petitioners used
words such as 'mala fide', 'corruption' and 'corrupt practice' but the
use of such words is not enough. What is necessary is to give full
particulars of such allegations and to set out the material facts
specifying the particular person against whom such allegations are
made so that he may have an opportunity of controverting such
allegations. The requirement of law is not satisfied insofar as the
pleadings in the present case are concerned and in the absence of
necessary particulars and material facts, we fail to see how the
learned Judge could come to a finding that the State Government
was guilty of factual mala fides, corruption and underhand dealing."
22. To the above effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt.
Swaran Lata v. Union of India & Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 165. The Supreme
Court held that in the absence of particulars, the Court would be justified in
refusing to conduct an investigation into the allegations of mala fides. Even
when the court examining validity of an action may find a circumstance to
be disturbing, the Supreme Court in A Paeeiakaruppan v. Sobha Joseph,
(1971) 1 SCC 38, held that it cannot uphold the plea of mala fides on the
ground of mere probabilities. A note of caution was similarly sounded by the
Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3, where
the Supreme Court held that it ought to be slow to draw dubious inferences
from incomplete facts particularly when imputations are grave and they are
made against the holder of an office which has high responsibility in the
administration. The following passage from the decision is apposite:
"92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of
establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who
alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily
made than proved, and the very seriousness of such
allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here
the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has
flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief
Minister. That is in itself a rather extraordinary and unusual
occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to
shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians
of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court
should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In
this context it may be noted that top administrators are often
required to do acts which affect others adversely but which
are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may
lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the
bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding
circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be
slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed
before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are
grave and they are made against the holder of an office which
has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the
judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy conduct
against ministers and other high authorities, not because of
any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor
because they are highly placed in social life or administrative
set up-these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial
approach-but because otherwise, functioning effectively
would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this
standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of
mala fides made by the petitioner against the second
respondent."
23. In the case in hand, as per the terms and conditions of the NIT
and the Circular of 2015, the respondents have liberty to procure additional
TTs without insisting upon the earlier successful bidder. Since the writ
petitioners were successful bidders in the tender and the initial requirement
of TTs was met, so the life of the tender was complete and the writ
petitioners could not later on bank upon the tender to claim right to supply
additional TTs. There is no express clause in the tender which obliges the
respondents-corporation to extend the benefit of the same to the bidders,
who were earlier successful in the tender. Moreover, the writ
petitioners/appellants have otherwise no grievance qua the terms and
conditions mentioned in the tender notice and rightly so as they participated
in it and were also successful bidders in the same. The conditions of the
tender notice gave discretion and choice to the Corporation to proceed in the
matter. The Circular of 2015 issued by the respondent-Corporation also give
discretion to the respondents in the matter of procuring additional TTs so the
writ petitioners cannot claim any vested right for additional TTs which was
sought to be procured by the Corporation through impugned notice of
20.08.2021.
24. There is no public interest involved in the matter to persuade
this Court to interfere with the impugned judgment of learned Single Judge
inasmuch as it does not suffer from any infirmity and the claim raised by the
appellants of legitimate expectation is misconceived. The respondent No.2
was well within its right to offer additional requirement of 25 TTs also to the
existing contractors who had already been awarded the contract and who
were definitely figuring higher in ranking in Lot-1 than the writ petitioners-
appellants herein. It may not be out of place to mention here that when
requirement of 60TTs was notified, the writ petitioners-appellants herein
were also considered on ad hoc basis pursuant to interim order passed by
this Court in WP (C) No.1706/2023.
25. After giving our thoughtful consideration and deep
contemplation to the issues agitated in the appeal, we arrive at an
inescapable conclusion that the judgment passed by learned Single Judge,
being an elaborate and reasoned one, deserves no interference from us, as
the same cannot be found fault with, while viewing from any angle. The
learned Single Judge, in our view, has rightly put the controversy to quietus.
The judgment of learned Single Judge is, thus, upheld.
26. The net result is that the Appeal is dismissed along with
application(s) being bereft of merit. Registry to place copy of this order in
the record of WP(C) No.1706/2023.
(Rajesh Sekhri) (Tashi Rabstan)
Judge Judge
Jammu
29.12.2023
"Madan Verma-Secy"
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
