Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench

S. Budha Singh vs Union Territory Th. Deputy ... on 2 September, 2021

                                                            Serial No. 118
                                                           Suppl. cause List


 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT
                  SRINAGAR


                                                WP(C) No. 1726/2021
                                                 CM No. 5771/2021


S. Budha Singh
                                                       ..... Petitioner(s)
                            Through: -
     Mr. A. M. Dar, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Bhat Shafi, Advocate

                                       V/s
Union Territory th. Deputy Commissioner Srinagar
                                                ..... Respondent(s)

Through: -

Mr. M. A. Chashoo, AAG Mr. Bikramdeep Singh, GA

CORAM:

Hon'ble Mr Justice Ali Mohammad Magrey, Judge (ORDER) 02.09.2021

When this matter was taken up for consideration, Mr. M. A.

Chashoo, learned AAG, submitted a communication bearing No.

749/DEOS/2021/582-599 dated 31.08.2021 of Deputy District

Election Officer, Srinagar, perusal whereof reveals that the Deputy

Commissioner, Srinagar has scheduled a meeting of members of

Gurdawara Prabandhak Committee, Srinagar, on Friday, viz

03.09.2021 at 11:00 AM. Copy of the communication is taken on

record.

Mr. M. A. Chashoo, learned AAG, at the very outset

questioned the maintainability of the writ petition for the relief as

prayed for. It is submitted that none of the legal rights are violated of

the petitioner, who claims to be the President of Gurdawara Prabandhak Committee, Srinagar, by merely issuing the notice for

scheduling of meeting of the members of Gurdawara Prabandhak

Committee, Srinagar. He further submits that the writ petition is

premature and based on apprehensions.

When asked about the maintainability of the writ petition, Mr.

A. M. Dar, learned senior counsel invites the attention of this Court

to the notification issued by the Financial Commissioner, Revenue,

vide No. FC-LS/GPC-08/II/2016 dated 05.03.2021, copy of the same

is taken on record. When further asked submits that unless the

electoral rolls are updated as notified in terms of notification (Supra),

no meetings can be conducted by the Deputy District Election

Officer, Srinagar, which amounts to unseating the petitioner.

Perusal of the notification reveals that the Financial

Commissioner, Revenue has notified the schedule for preparation of

electoral rolls with 01.01.2021 as the qualifying date, for the conduct

of elections of District Gurdawara Prabandhak Committees, which by

no stretch of imagination can be declared as any process evolved for

removing the petitioner.

On hearing the learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioner, the Court has noticed the grievance about conducting No

Confidence Motion, which even though made cannot form a ground

for the petitioner to approach this Court in a writ petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for seeking relief as prayed

for. Any member/members of Gurdawara Prabandhak Committee,

Srinagar, are well within their right to exercise their authority for

seeking removal of the petitioner in tune with the scheme of law,

which cannot be stopped by the Court.

Be that as it may, the Court after hearing the parties, is of the

considered view that the petition is based on apprehensions and also

premature.

Petitioner has failed to establish the legal right for maintaining

the writ petition for the relief claimed, as violation of right is sine-

qua-non for grant of writ of mandamus. Law on the subject is no

more res-integra, supported by the Judgments, while dealing with the

scope of 'grant of writs, in case titled 'State of Kerela V. Smt. A.

Lakshmikutty & Ors.; (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases 632', at

Paragraph No.34, has observed as under:

"34. We must refer to the case of Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana & Ors., (supra) which was relied upon by learned counsel for the State Government. It is well-settled that a writ of mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right, but is, as a rule, discretionary. There must be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which a mandamus will lie. The legal right to enforce the performance of a duty must be in the applicant himself. In general, there- fore, the Court will only enforce the performance of statutory duties by public bodies on application of a person who can show that he has himself a legal right to insist on such performance. Applying the principles stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., vol. 1, paragarph 122, this Court observed that a person whose name had been recommended for appointment as a District Judge by the High Court under Art. 233(1) had no legal right to the post, nor was the Governor bound to act on the advice of the High Court and therefore he could not ask for a mandamus. It was observed:

"It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right.

The initial appointment of District Judges under Article 233 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government after consultation with the High Court. The Governor is not bound to act on the advice of the High Court. The High Court recommends the names of persons for appointment. If the names are recommended by the High Court it is not obligatory on the Governor to accept the recommendation.

The consultation of the Governor with the High Court does not mean that the Governor must accept whatever advice of recommendation is given by the High Court. Article 233 requires that the Governor should obtain from the High Court its views on the merits and demerits of persons selected for promotion and direct recruitment."

The existence of a right is the foundation of the jurisdiction of a Court to issue a writ of mandamus. The present trend of judicial opinion appears to be that in the case of non- selection to a post, no writ of mandamus lies."

Again, in the case of 'State of UP & Ors. V. Harish Chandra &

Ors.; (1996) 9 Supreme Court Cases 309', at Paragraph No.10, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:

"10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But so mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provision of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, it any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority. Even though we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that on some occasion appointments have been made by the Appointing Authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the data of selection but such illegal action of the Appointing Authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4.4.87 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ Petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not."