Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 644 j&K/2
Judgement Date : 24 June, 2021
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT SRINAGAR
...
CM no.3976/2021
CM(M) no.99/2021
CM no.3977/2021
Caveat no.426/2021
Date of Order: 24.06.2021
Mohamad Rafiq Kathwari
....... Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr Zubair Ahmad, Advocate
Versus
Meeral Kathwari and others
.........Respondent(s)
Through: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
CM no.3976/2021
1. Application, given averments made therein, is allowed and affixing of
Court fee is dispensed with till the Court reopens in physical mode/
hearing. CM disposed of.
CM(M) no.99/2021 & CM no.3977/2021
2. Exercise of supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India is sought for in this writ petition, aiming at quashing Orders
dated 22nd March 2021 and 6th April 2021, passed by City Munsiff,
Srinagar, (for brevity "Trial Court") on the grounds tailored therein.
3. Heard and considered.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner has stated that Trial Court has proceeded
beyond its jurisdiction and passed impugned order which has
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
occasioned gross failure of justice inasmuch as Section 151 CPC cannot
be invoked to seek police aid for protection of alleged possession
dispute in suit and Trial Court did not record any valid reason for
granting police aid as there is no evidence on record that respondent
no.1 is absolute owner of whole property. According to him order
impugned is based on clear ignorance of settled legal position and grave
injustice has been done as in pursuance of order impugned police is
unnecessarily harassing petitioner. It is contended that Trial Court in a
casual manner on mere asking has directed implementation of order of
interim injunction passed in the year 2016 without inviting objections
from other-side. He also states that respondent no.1 till date has not
filed any application under Order 39 Rule 2(a) CPC for disobedience
of the Order of injunction, as such, order granting police aid is patently
illegal.
5. In terms of impugned order dated 22nd March 2021, when an application
under Section 151 CPC was moved by respondent no.1, the Trial Court
disposed of the same with a direction to SHO P/S Ram Munshi Bagh to
implement interim order dated 2nd March 2016 in letter and spirit on
spot. By another impugned order dated 6th April 2021, certain
clarifications have been made by the Trial Court qua impugned order
dated 22nd March 2021.
6. Perusal of file reveals that a civil suit for declaration and permanent
injunction has been filed by respondent no.1. In terms of order dated
15th February 2016 defendants there had been directed to restrain from
causing any sort of interference in the suit property. In terms of order
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
dated 17th February 2016, the Trial Court directed concerned police to
implement order dated 15th February 2016.
7. According to petitioners, impugned orders, in exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, need to be
set-aside as impugned order have been passed by Trial Court in sheer
abuse of process of court and law.
8. It may not be out of place to mention here that judicial pronouncements
concerning object and scope of power of the High Courts under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, leaves little scope to interfere with the
orders of subordinate courts as a matter of routine. This power cannot
be taken as right of another appeal to aggrieved party nor this power
can be invoked to point out an error of law or fact in the order or
decision of a subordinate court. This power cannot be used to make out
that the decision of subordinate court could have been or must have
been other than what it was. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within
the bounds of their jurisdiction. When subordinate Court has assumed
a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being
exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of
justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may
step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari
or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere
errors of fact or of law unless the requirements that the error is manifest
and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and that a
grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, are
satisfied.
9. It is well-settled that power of superintendence, so conferred on the
High Court, is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being
invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be
exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such
wide power of superintendence in High Court is paving path of justice
and removing any obstacles therein. Power under Article 227 is wider
than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, in the sense that the power of superintendence is
not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters
which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else parameters
invoking exercise of power are almost similar.
10. The power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence that
cannot be used to upset conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those
may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that
no court could ever have reached them. Way back in 1954, a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Waryam Singh v.
Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, has pointed out that the power of
superintendence conferred by Article 227 should be exercised "most
sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere
errors. The Supreme Court in Dr. R. Venkatchalam and others etc. v.
Dy. Transport Commissioner and others etc., AIR 1977 SC 842, has
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
said that the Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of
the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions
of the ideological structure or the scheme into which the provision to
be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp
legislative function under disguise of interpretation. While interpreting
a provision the Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. If a
provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law, it
is for legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.
11. Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian
of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be
counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its
strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised
very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional
power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of
relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public
confidence in administration in larger public interest whereas Article
226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, "the
power under Article 227 may be unfettered but", as held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil,
(2010) 8 SCC 329, "its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial
discipline." The object of superintendence under Article 227, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain the efficiency, smooth and
orderly functioning of the entire machinery of the justice in such a way
as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference
under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
of the justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains
pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the
functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.
The Supreme Court in Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar Hydrabad and another v. Ajit Prasad
Tarway Manager (Purchase & Store) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.
Balanagar Hydrabad, AIR 1973 SC 76; and Kokkanda B. Poondacha
& Ors. v. K. D. Ganapathi & another, AIR 2011 SC 1353, after
recapitulating what has been observed in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case
(supra) qua Article 227, held that "learned Single Judge of the High
Court totally ignored the principles and parameters laid down" by the
Supreme Court "for exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution qua an interlocutory order passed by the Subordinate
Court and set aside the order of the trial Court without assigning any
tangible reason." Jurisdiction under Article 227 must be sparingly
exercised and may be exercised to correct the errors of the jurisdiction
and the like, but not to upset the findings of the fact, which falls in the
domain of an appellate court only. Same is true about the present case.
The Trial Court orders, on the face of it, do not call for any interference
by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. My above views are fortified by the fiats
rendered in Nibaran v. Mahendra AIR 1963 SC 1895; D.N.Banerjee
v. Mukherjee AIR 1953; SC 58; Nizzar Rawther v. Varghese Mathew
AIR 1992 Ker 312; and Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School AIR
2000 SC 3495.
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
12. It is apt to mention here that the power under Article 227 is broader
than that conferred on the High Court by Article 226. For example,
through its power to issue certiorari under Article 226, a High Court
can annul the decision of a tribunal while under Article 227 it can do
that and do something--it can issue further directions in the matter. But
under Article 227, the High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal
inasmuch as it is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed
under Article 227 to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the
inferior Court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct
errors of law in the decision. The power of superintendent conferred by
Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction.
13. As per settled proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in
The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.
Balanagar, Hyderabad (supra) Mohd. Yunus (supra) and Kokkanda
B. Poondacha (supra) that if any order is passed by subordinate court
under its vested discretionary jurisdiction, then the same could not be
interfered with by the High Court either under revisional jurisdiction
under Section 115 of CPC or under supervisory jurisdiction vested
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. If an order is amenable
to challenge before appellate authority, writ petition is not proper
remedy without first filing appeal and getting the same decided by the
appellate court on its merit in accordance with law. In other words, the
High Court should decline to entertain a writ petition under Article 227
on the ground of an alternative remedy of appeal. While saying this, the
Supreme Court in Hameed Kunju v. Nazim (2017) 8 SCC 611, has held
CM(M) no.99/2021 CM no.3977/2021; 3976/2021
that there was no reason muchless justifiable one for the High Court to
have entertain writ petition under Article 227 against the order passed
by Trial Court.
14. From the foregoing discussion and settled legal position, it is deducible
that instant petition does not call for any interference. The powers,
vested in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, are
neither substitution to revisional nor appellate power, inasmuch as
order impugned is neither perverse nor has occasioned serious
miscarriage of justice. Any interference by this Court would only
prolong the trial inordinately. Even otherwise, impugned order does not
warrant interference by exercise of extraordinary or supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court, in that neither the decision-making process
of learned court below suffers from any bias nor do impugned order
cause any miscarriage of justice or otherwise suffer from any error of
law.
15. In the background of preceding discourse, the petition on hand is devoid
of any merit and as a corollary, the same is dismissed, with connected
IA(s). Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated. Needless to say that
it is expected of the Trial Court to expediate disposal of the application
seeking ad interim injunction.
16. Copy of this order be sent down.
(Vinod Chatterji Koul) Judge Srinagar 24.06.2021 Ajaz Ahmad, PS Whether approved for reporting? Yes/No
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