Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 02.05.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 9 May, 2025
2025:HHC:13271
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 183 of 2025
Reserved on: 02.05.2025
Date of Decision: 09.05.2025.
Jeet Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and others ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashish Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition has been filed for quashing of
FIR No. 222/22, dated 6.7.2022, registered for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 420, 465 and 468 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), at Police Station, Sadar, Una, District
Una, H.P. It has been asserted that the parties have
compromised the matter voluntarily. The trial is at its initial
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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stage. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the FIR be quashed.
2. I have heard Mr. Aashish Kumar, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent-State.
3. Mr. Aashish Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the FIR registered for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 420, 465 and 468 can be
quashed based on the compromise between the parties. He relied
upon the judgments of Jayraj Singh Digvijay Singh Rana Vs. State
of Gujarat and another, 2012 AIR SCW 4092, Piara Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and others, CR.M-M No. 49267 of 2021, decided on
6.2.2023. Pargat Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and others
CR.M-M No. 57804 of 2024, decided on 07.01.2025, Satpal Singh
and others Vs. State of Punjab and another CR.M-M No. 17790 of
2019, decided on 8.9.2021, and K. Bharti Devi and another Vs. State
of Telangana and another, SLP (Crl) 4353 of 2018, decided on
03.10.2024 in support of his submission.
4. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the offences
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punishable under Sections 465, 467 and 471 are offences against
society which cannot be quashed based on the compromise
effected between the parties.
5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
6. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, that where
the settlement between the offender and the victim is regarding
the offences against society, the same will not justify the
quashing of the FIR. The offences punishable under Sections
467, 468 and 471 of the IPC involve the forgery of the document
and such offences cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the
IPC. It was observed: -
13. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State
of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29:
(2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563], a Bench of two learned Judges of
this Court explained the earlier decisions and the
principles which must govern in deciding whether a
criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable
offence should be quashed. In that case, the respondents
were alleged to have obtained letters of credit from a bank
in favour of fictitious entities. The charge sheet involved
the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471
read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus
beneficiary companies were alleged to have got them
discounted by attaching fabricated bills. Mr Justice Dipak
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Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) emphasised
that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence, the
Court was not dealing with a simple case where "the
accused had borrowed money from a bank, to divert it
elsewhere". The Court held that the manner in which
letters of credit were issued and funds were siphoned off
had a foundation in criminal law: (SCC p. 42, para 26)
"26. ... availing of money from a nationalised bank
in the manner, as alleged by the investigating
agency, vividly exposes fiscal impurity and, in a
way, financial fraud. The modus operandi, as
narrated in the charge sheet, cannot be put in the
compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It
is a social wrong, and it has an immense societal
impact. It is an accepted principle of handling
finance that whenever there is manipulation and
cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these
kinds of benefits, it cannot be regarded as a case
having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It
creates a hazard to the financial interests of society.
The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the
economic spine of the nation."
The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal
proceedings was hence set aside by this Court.
14. The same principle was followed in CBI v. Maninder
Singh [CBI v. Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389: (2016) 1
SCC (Cri) 292] by a Bench of two learned Judges of this
Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of
its inherent power under Section 482, quashed
proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read
with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the
appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation, Mr
Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of
documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a
situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with
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the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under
Section 482: (SCC p. 394, para 17)
"17. ... In economic offences, the Court must not
only keep in view that money has been paid to the
bank which has been defrauded, but also the society
at large. It is not a case of simple assault or theft of
a trivial amount, but the offence with which we are
concerned was well planned and was committed
with a deliberate design with an eye on personal
profit, regardless of the consequences to society at
large. To quash the proceeding merely on the
ground that the accused has settled the amount
with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If
the prosecution against the economic offenders is
not allowed to continue, the entire community is
aggrieved."
15. In a subsequent decision in State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi
Stanley [State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376:
(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 282], the Court rejected the submission
that the first respondent was a woman "who was
following the command of her husband" and had signed
certain documents without being aware of the nature of
the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank.
Rejecting the submission, this Court held that : (SCC p.
387, paras 14-15)
"14. ... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is
neither to be considered nor accepted in economic
offences. The submission assiduously presented on
gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under
criminal law is an offence, and it does not depend
upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are
certain provisions in CrPC relating to the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein, but that
altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person
committing a murder or getting involved in a
financial scam or forgery of documents cannot
claim discharge or acquittal on the grounds of her
gender, as that is neither constitutionally nor
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statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender-
neutral in this case. We say no more on this score.
15. ... A grave criminal offence or serious economic
offence or for that matter the offence that has the
potential to create a dent in the financial health of
the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground
that there is a delay in trial or the principle that
when the matter has been settled it should be
quashed to avoid the load on the system. ..."
16. The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject may be summarised in the
following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of
the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to quash a first information report or a
criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section
482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
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16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court
has a wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be
exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the
ground that the offender and victim have settled
the dispute revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482
and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has
been settled, the High Court must have due regard
to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental depravity or
offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the
family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The
decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there
may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming
or predominant element of a civil dispute. They
stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of
the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour may, in appropriate
situations, fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if, in view of the compromise
between the disputants, the possibility of a
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conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set
out in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic well-
being of the State have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or
economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
consequences of the act complained of upon the
financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.
xxxxxx
18. The present case, as the allegations in the FIR would
demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private
dispute over a land transaction between two contesting
parties. The case involves allegations of extortion, forgery
and fabrication of documents, utilisation of fabricated
documents to effectuate transfers of title before the
registering authorities and the deprivation of the
complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a
fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR
are construed as they stand, it is evident that they
implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital
societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or
interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be
merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal
interest in prosecuting serious crimes. In these
circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in
declining to quash the FIR which had been registered
under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of
the Penal Code."
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7. Even this Court had refused to quash the FIR
registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections
120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC in Praveen Kumar Jain vs. CBI
2009 (3) Shim.LC 31.
8. A perusal of the FIR shows that the petitioner had
forged the No Objection Certificate and sold the vehicle. This
certificate was submitted to the Registration and Licensing
Authority for the transfer of the ownership of the vehicle.
Hence, the forgery was committed, and a misrepresentation was
made to the public official, and it cannot be said to be a private
dispute as was held in Parbatbhai (supra). In K. Bharti Devi
(supra), the dispute was regarding the loan, which was held to
be predominantly civil in nature and the FIR was ordered to be
quashed. In the present case, the forgery and cheating involve
the public officials in performing their duties, and K. Bharti Devi
(supra) does not apply to the present case. The judgment of
Parbatbhai (supra) was delivered after Jayraj Singh (supra) and is
to be preferred. The judgments of the High Courts cannot be
followed because of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
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9. Consequently, the present petition cannot be
allowed. Hence, the same is dismissed.
10. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th May, 2025
(Chander)
