[Cites 50, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Vadraj Cement Limited vs Union Of India on 18 March, 2026
Author: Sunita Agarwal
Bench: Sunita Agarwal
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Reserved On : 24/12/2025
Pronounced On : 18/03/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18353 of 2018
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR FIXING DATE OF HEARING) NO. 3 of
2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18353 of 2018
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA
AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY
=============================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
=============================================
VADRAJ CEMENT LIMITED & ANR.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
=============================================
Appearance:
DELETED for the Petitioner(s) No. 2
MR.SHALIN MEHTA, SENIOR COUNSEL WITH MR.GAURAV
MEHTA, MR.AMIT LADDHA AND MR HARDIK P MODH(5344) for
the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS.HETAL PATEL, ASST.GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Respondent(s) No. 2
MR.KIRTIMAN SINGH, SENIOR COUNSEL WITH MR HARSHEEL
D SHUKLA(6158) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
=============================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE
SUNITA AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY
CAV JUDGMENT
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(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL)
1. Heard the learned senior counsels for the parties and
perused the record.
2. The present petition was heard at length on 18.12.2025
and the judgment was reserved. However, on the application,
i.e. Civil Application No.03 of 2025 filed on behalf of the
Union of India, the date 24.12.2025 had been fixed for further
hearing, when the matter was further heard at length and the
judgment was reserved.
3. The petitioner herein, namely Vadraj Cement Ltd.
(Earlier known as ABG Cement Ltd.) is a company registered
under the Companies Act' 1956 and has filed the present
petition initially, through its Managing Director Mr.Vijay
Prakash Sharma. However, on an order dated 07.08.2024
passed in Civil Application (For Amendment) No.01 of 2024,
the petitioner has been substituted to be represented through
Mr.Pulkit Gupta, the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) of
the petitioner Company appointed by the National Companies
Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai vide order dated 02.02.2024
passed in CP (IB) No.3528 / MV / 2018 and confirmed as the
Resolution Professional of the applicant Company by its
Committee of Creditors in their first meeting held on
02.03.2024.
4. However, later on the approval of the resolution plan by
the NCLT, Mumbai vide order dated 01.04.2025, the name
and identity of the company and the petitioner Company
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herein has been substituted to be represented through its
Authorized signatory Mr.Ajay Khushu.
5. The writ petition has been filed to impugn the provisions
of Section 10A(2)(c) of the Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act' 1957" or "the
MCDR Act' 1957") and Rule 8(4) of the Minerals (Other than
Atomic and Hydro Carbons Energy Mineral) Concession
Rules, 2016 (for short, "the Rules' 2016" or "the MCR Rules'
2016"), to be declared ultra vires of Articles 14, 18 and 21 of
the Constitution of India. Further, challenge is to the order
dated 17.11.2017 purportedly issued by the respondent No.1,
namely the Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of
Mines, New Delhi, as communicated to the petitioner on
25.05.2018 by the respondent No.2 namely, the State of
Gujarat through the Secretary, Industries and Mines
Department, Gandhinagar.
6. The final prayer is to issue necessary directions to the
respondent No.2, namely State Government to forthwith take
all necessary steps to execute and register the mining lease
deed with regard to the subject area admeasuring 300.6957
Hectares situated at Village Naniber, Taluka Abdasa, District
Kachchh, as granted vide order dated 08.01.2017 issued by
the State Government.
7. The relevant facts, in brief, to address the controversy at
hands are that vide Government of India letter
No.4/122/96/M-4 dated 01.12.1997 prior approval for
Limestone mining lease for 30 years was granted over the
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land admeasuring 730.60 Hectares situated at Naniber,
Abdasa, District Kachchh. On 26.03.1998, the State
Government (Government of Gujarat) issued Letter of Intent
(LOI) for allotment of 730.60 Hectares of Limestone mining
lease to the petitioners. The true copy of the Letter of Intent
(LOI) is appended at page No. '31' of the paper-book as
Annexure 'P-1'.
8. On 23.06.2010, the State Government sought permission
of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to delete 2105.41
Hectares forest area in 57 villages of four districts of the State
of Gujarat under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act' 1927 (for
short, "the Forest Act"). The issue regarding the allotment of
these portions of land was pending before the Apex Court and
the CEC had submitted a report dated 23.06.2010 before the
Apex Court endorsing the deletion of the aforesaid area
acknowledging the rights of the villagers in response to the
areas notified under Section 4 of the Forest Act.
9. In the meantime, on 28.06.2011, the Environment
Clearance was granted by the Ministry of Environment and
Forest (MoEF) vide letter dated 28.06.2011 for the leased
area of 730.60 Hectares, subject to implementation of the
conditions mentioned therein and environmental safeguards.
(Reference:- Page No. '35' at paragraph No. '6' (annexure 'P-
2') of the paper-book.
10. It seems that in view of the new condition No. '2'
imposed by the CEC in its report dated 23.06.2010, the
petitioner had approached the Apex Court by way of an
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Intervenor Application (IA) No.3026 - 3027 / 2009, seeking
intervention in the said dispute stating that its rights were
affected in the matter of grant of mining lease, as the
proposed land ceased to be a forest land.
11. It seems that the Apex Court, while passing the order
dated 22.07.2011, allowed the application filed by the State
Government for deletion of the forest land. The CEC was in
favour of the deletion subject to certain conditions and also
the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) in its letter
dated 07.01.2010 produced as Annexure 'R-3' before the Apex
Court had stated that the application be considered
favourably under such circumstances. The request made by
the State Government for deletion of the area as shown in its
application was found to be justified and the application was
allowed, as such.
12. Further, with regard to the challenge by the petitioner to
condition No. '2' imposed by the CEC in its report dated
23.06.2010, it was observed therein while disposing of the
intervenor application filed by the ABG Cement Ltd. as under:-
"...However, with regard to the condition no.2 imposed by CEC, we
express no final opinion specially in view of the stand taken by the
State of Gujarat that no lease has formerly been granted to ABG
Cement Limited in any of the areas as notified under Section 4 of
the Act. ABG Cement Limited therefore would be aggrieved by the
condition imposed by CEC, only if the State Government executes a
lease deed in its favour or grants permission for mining, which is
yet to happen. We therefore leave that question open. Learned
senior counsel has further submitted that he would be permitted to
move an application before the Ministry of Environment and
Forests(MOEF)seeking approval for the grant of lease and also to
make a plea before the Ministry of Environment and Forests
(MOEF) for permission under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
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and also to challenge the condition no.2 ABG Cement Limited, if so
advised may raise all those contentions before the Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MOEF) and it is for the MOEF to
consider with which we express no final opinion. IA No. 2881 of
2009 preferred by the State of Gujarat for deletion stands allowed,
as above.
IA Nos. 3026-3027 filed by ABG Cement Limited are accordingly
disposed of."
13. It seems that in view of the observations of the Apex
Court therein that it is for the Ministry of Environment and
Forest to consider the prayer for grant of permission to the
petitioner (ABG Cement Ltd.) under the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980 and also to challenge condition No. '2', the
application dated 20.08.2011 was preferred by the petitioner
for appropriate permission / clarification / exemption to the
Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), a copy whereof is
appended at page No. '51' (as annexure 'P-3') of the paper-
book.
14. On 29.11.2011, the Government of Gujarat executed
mining lease deed for the land admeasuring 336.1843
Hectares, out of the total area of 730.60 Hectares mentioned
in the LOI dated 26.03.1998.
15. On 31.07.2012, the Central Government approved
deletion of the subject land under Section 4 of the Forest Act
with the condition including the prior approval for allotment
of the land to be used for mining. On 11.10.2012, the
petitioner requested the Industries and Mines Department,
Government of Gujarat for granting mining lease for the
balance area of approx. 300 Hectares and the reminder was
sent on 05.11.2012.
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16. On 21.01.2013, the State Government, Industries and
Mines Department requested the District Collector, Kachchh
to forward the proposal for getting approval under the Forest
(Conservation) Act' 1984 regarding allotment of subject land
for mining purpose to the petitioner at Village Naniber,
District Kachchh. On 05.02.2013, a notification was issued by
the State Government inter alia stipulating that none of the
deleted area will be allowed to be used for mining without
obtaining prior approval under the Forest (Conservation) Act'
1984. The copy of the said notification is appended at page
No. '58' (as annexure 'P-4') of the paper-book.
17. On 12.01.2015,the Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Amendment Act' 2015 (for short, "the
Amendment Act' 2015") (Act No.10 of 2015) came into force
w.e.f. 12.01.2015, bringing into force the auction regime for
grant of mining lease.
18. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that though Section 10(A)(1) made all prior
applications ineligible, but Section 10(A)(2)(c) saved the
applications where a Letter of Intent (LOI) was issued prior to
12.01.2015, providing therein that the mining lease, in such
cases, should be granted within a period of two years, i.e. on
or before 11.01.2017.
19. As the petitioner was faced with the changed situation
because of the new enactment, the petitioner again
approached the Apex Court on 08.09.2016 in I.A.NOS.3722 IN
IA 2881 & 3026-3027 (for directions/clarification), In Writ
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Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 202/1995 [T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulpad V. Union of India & Ors], wherein the
following order dated 08.09.2016 was passed:-
"Insofar as the interlocutory application filed by ABG Cement Limited
is concerned, the CEC submitted a separate report dated 1.4.2011. In
the instant report, the same four conditions, which were expressed in
the original report of the CEC dated 23.06.2010, were sought to be
incorporated. It is in the above circumstances, that ABG Cement
Limited has again approached this Court, in view of the liberty
granted to the applicant by this Court's order dated 22.07.2011, to
assail condition no.2.
It would be pertinent to mention, that simultaneously with the filing of
the instant application, ABG Cement Limited also moved an
application on 20.08.2011 under Section 3 of the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980, for permission/clarification/exemption under
the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for conducting
limestone mining operations on the leased land at Kutch, in the State
of Gujarat. On account of the fact, that the Ministry of Environment
and Forests has not taken any decision on the application filed by ABG
Cement Limited, it has again approached this Court, to require
the concerned competent authority to dispose of the application dated
20.08.2011.
During the course of hearing of the instant interlocutory application,
the case projected by the applicant also was, that the order passed by
this Court on 22.07.2011 be clarified, so as to enable the concerned
competent authority, to expeditiously dispose of the application filed
by ABG Cement Limited, under Section 3 of the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980.
We would not have, as a matter of routine, accepted the prayer made
by the learned counsel for the applicant, as has been noticed in the
foregoing paragraphs. However, on examining the complication of the
legal issue involved, we were satisfied, that a determinative order
needed to be passed for an effective disposal of the application filed by
ABG Cement Limited, under Section 3 of the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980. It is therefore, that we would venture to adjudicate upon
the limited issue, which has been projected before us, during the
course of hearing. For the aforesaid purpose, it would be necessary to
narrate some facts relied upon by the applicant. They are being
recorded hereunder.
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It is not a matter of dispute, that ABG Cement Limited moved an
application under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for conducting
limestone mining operations, over land given to it on lease by the
State of Gujarat. In this behalf, it would be relevant to mention, that
by notification dated 21.8.1984, (issued under Section 4 of the Indian
Forest Act, 1927), the Government of Gujarat expressed its intention
to declare certain areas of land as reserved forest, in district Kutch,
in the State of Gujarat.
The land depicted in the Section 4 notification, inter alia, included
land over which ABG Cement Limited, had been granted a mining
lease. By an award dated 9.11.1995, the Forest Settlement Officer,
inter alia, deleted an area of 364.22 hectares, out of the area notified
under Section 4, referred to above.
Learned counsel for the applicant also highlights, that the State of
Gujarat by a letter dated 26.3.1998 gave an in-principle
approval in favour of ABG Cement Limited, for carrying on limestone
mining, in an area of land measuring 730.60 hectares, falling within
the revenue estate of village Naniber of Abadasa Taluka, in District
Kutch, in the State of Gujarat. Consequent upon the receipt of the in-
principle approval, ABG Cement Limited paid prospecting charges to
the Government of Gujarat. Out of the area of 730.60 hectares of
land, in-principle allotted to ABG Cement Limited for limestone
mining, an area of 364.22 hectares formed part of a larger area of land
(measuring 10935.2611 hectares), notified under Section 4, referred
to above.
After the deletion of the area of 364.22 hectares expressed in the
award of the Forest Settlement Officer dated 9.11.1995, the remaining
land is still subject to a declaration through an award as reserved
forest. Interlocutory application nos. 1228-1229 were filed by the
State of Gujarat before the CEC. The CEC through IA No. 2881
submitted its recommendations to this Court, for the deletion of
364.22 hectares of land (from out of area of 10935.2611 hectares), as
the same should be treated as reserved forest.
It is necessary to point out, that the CEC recommended the
deletion of 10935.2611 hectares of land, out of the purview of the total
land measuring 33607.9406 hectares, originally notified under Section
4, and while making the above recommendations, just as in the first
report of CEC dated 23.6.2010, it again imposed the same four
conditions:
"The CEC recommended the deletion of 10935.2611 hectares of
land out of the purview of the total land admeasuring
33607.9406 hectares originally notified under Section 4 of the
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Indian Forest Act, 1927. However, the CEC made the following
recommendations:
(i) no area will be deleted on the ground of its
allotment done after the issue of notifications under
Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act; and
(ii) none of the deleted area will be allowed to
be used for mining without obtaining approval
under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; and
(iii) .for deletion of the area approval under the
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 will be obtained.
However, no NPV or compensatory afforestation
charges will be payable as the areas are to be
deleted for settlement of rights as per the
provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927; and
(iv) the balance areas will be notified as
Reserved Forest under section 20 of the Indian
Forest Act, 1980."
Being aggrieved of condition at (ii) above, imposed by the CEC, the
applicant - ABG Cement Limited, in whose favour an area of 730.60
hectares (including the aforesaid area of 364.22 hectares of land) had
been granted an in-principle approval, for carrying on lime-stone
mining, which included the land deleted/excluded from the purview of
the notification issued under Section 4.
As noticed hereinabove, the afore-stated application nos. 3026-3027
filed by ABG Cement Limited, were disposed of on 22.7.2011, when
this Court, while approving the deletion of 10935.2611 hectares out of
the purview of Section 4 notification (including the aforesaid area of
364.22 hectares of land), pointedly observed, that condition no.2
imposed by the CEC was tentative, and that ABG Cement Limited - the
applicant herein would be at liberty to make an appropriate
representation/application to the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
for seeking appropriate clarification (order dated 22.7.2011 has
already been extracted hereinabove).
Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court to the applicant - ABG
Cement Limited, the applicant filed an application seeking the approval
of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, for the grant of a mining
lease, over the area which had already been permitted, subject to the
deletion of the area from the purview of Section 4 notification. That the
applicant made the following requests to the Ministry of Environment
and Forests, in its application filed under Section 3 of the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980:
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"15. In view of the order dated 22.7.2011 passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and, by way of abundant
caution, we would request you to kindly give your approval and
clarify that the provisions of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
would not apply to the said land admeasuring 364.22 hectares,
which has ceased to be Forest Land."
Insofar as the aforesaid prayer is concerned, it was sought to be
clarified to us, during the course of hearing, that the same was based on
an earlier order passed by this Court dated 8.2.1989 in Banwasi Seva
Ashram vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, wherein this Court, inter alia,
mandated as under:
"We are of the view that the lands which are
subjected to the Notification under Section 4 of
the Forest Act would also come within the
purview of Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980 and it would, therefore, be
necessary for the N.T.P.C. to obtain appropriate
clearance under that Act from the appropriate
authority."
We are of the view, that the aforesaid order was with reference to the
transitory period, namely, from the date of the issuance of the
notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act, till the culmination of
the process of declaration under Section 20 of the Forest Act. We
are of the view, that the afore-stated direction was inevitable, in view
of the fact, that in case an individual was desirous of using forest land
for non-forest purposes, permission under Section 2 of the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 was imperative, and it is therefore, that even
during the transitory period, it would be open to the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, to approve a request for use of forest
area for non-forest purposes, under Section 2 afore-mentioned.
During the course of hearing, it was the contention of the learned
counsel for the applicant, that use of reserved forest land and/or forest
land for non-forest purposes needs the prior approval in terms of
section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, which is extracted
hereunder:
"2. Restriction on the dereservation of forests or use of
forest land for non-forest purpose - Notwithstanding
anything contained in any otherlaw for the time being
in force in a State, no State Government or other
authority shall make, except with the prior approval of
the Central Government, any order directing, -
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(i) that any reserved forest (within the
meaning of the expression "reserved forest" in any
law for the time being in force in that State) or any
portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof
may be used for any non-forest purpose;
(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof
may be assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any
private person or to any authority, corporation,
agency or any other organization not owned,
managed or controlled by Government;
(iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof
may be cleared of trees which have grown naturally
in that land or portion, for the purpose of using it for
reafforestation.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section
"non-forest purpose" means the breaking up or
clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for-
(a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices,
rubber, palms, oil-bearing plants, horticulture crops
or medicinal plants;
(b) any purpose other than reafforestation, but
does not include any work relating or ancillary to
conservation, development and management of
forests and wild-life, namely, the establishment of
check-posts, fire lines, wireless communications and
construction of fencing, bridges and culverts, dams,
waterholes, trench marks, boundary marks,
pipelines or other like purposes."
It was however pointed out, that in a given situation, as in the present
case, where the government land is sought to be declared as reserved
forest, but some of the land originally mentioned in the Section 4
notification, is deleted, then clearance under Section 2 of the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 would be a perquisite condition, for use of
the said land for non-forest purposes, only and only, if the deleted land
is forest area and not otherwise.
It was the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant - ABG
Cement Limited, that the area of 364.22 hectares, which was sought to
be deleted from the area notified under Section 4 of the Indian Forest
Act, did not actually remain forest land, and as such, did not require
clearance mandated under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act,
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1980. To support his afore-stated contention, learned counsel for the
applicant has placed reliance on the award of the Forest Settlement
Officer dated 9.11.1995 (with reference to Case No. 1/1995-96), which
expressly pertains to the area of 364.22 hectares of village Naniber of
Abadasa Taluka in district Kutch, in the State of Gujarat. A relevant
extract from the order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer dated
9.11.1995 reveals, that based on the enquiry conducted by the Forest
Settlement Officer, there was a village settlement in the area.
"5.Decision and Points After taking into consideration the
replies of the leader of Local Group Gram Panchayat, Moti Ber,
Group Gram Panchayat's Sarpanch, Nani Ber, Village people
and the leaders, Talati of Moti Ber Group Gram Panchayat- who
also hold charge of Talati of Nani Ber village, the Deputy Forest
Conservator, Kutch western Forest Division's Representatives,
Range Forest Officer, Normal Range, Naliya etc., I am required
to decide the following points:-
Points
1. Whether the area being Firing Survey No.79,80, 82 to
86, 94(part) 96 to 107, 113 to 119 of village Nani Ber of
Abdasa taluka would Remain as 'reserved forest' or not?
.....No.
2. Is there any public or private right & interest involved
in the above Firing Survey Numbers? Yes,in great
proportion
3. What should be the final order? As stated in Point
No.7
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
7.ORDER
While thinking in broad sense in respect of the above
facts and after getting the replies, submissions,
representations of all concerned, and on taking into
account the 'certificate' of the Geologist and in
accordance with the authority vested in me vide Section
11,12,15 & 16 of the Indian Forests Act, 1927, it is
hereby ordered and resolved that the entire area of
village 'Nani Ber' of Abdasa Taluka admeasuring
Hectares 364.22 Are (Acre 900-00 gutha) in relation to
Firing survey No. 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 94(part)
97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 ,105, 106, 107,
113, 114,115,116,117,118 & 119 will not be kept as
'reserved forest' and hence, the question relating to the
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facts of common people does not arise at all, and hence
the Schedule 'A' will be treated as NIL."
(underline is ours)
On a consideration of the order of the Forest Settlement Officer
extracted above, the Forest and Environment Department of the State of
Gujarat has on 23.08.2016 ordered as under:
"In view of above, consequent to due process of
settlement and proceedings therein, as provided in IFA
1927 and forest settlement report, due to reasons
recorded therein, entire area of 364.22 ha, declared
u/s4, not being recommended to be declared as forest
u/s 20, has been deleted, from section 4 thereby leaving
no area to be declared u/s 20. Hence no procedure for
declaring the area u/s 20 was required.
In view of the above situation, state hereby declares
that consequent to completion of legal process of forest
settlement and right examination, appellate procedure,
and the process provided in IFA 1927, from section (4)
to (20) and acceptance of Forest Settlement report,
entire area of 364.22 ha. Of survey numbers 79, 80,
82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 94 part, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,
118, 119 of Nanibar village of Kutch district - initially
declared u/s 4 not being recommended to be fit for
declaring u/s 20, owing to the reasons, recorded in the
forest settlement report - has been deleted, from
section 4 and there being no area left for declaring u/s
20, the notification for section 20 is not required and
entire procedure for declaring the forest may be
deemed to have been completed and area of 364.22
ha. Of survey numbers 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 94
part, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 107, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 of Nanibar
village of Kutch district, declared u/s 4, is reverted back
to its original status of revenue land."
In view of the above, the release of area
measuring 364. 22 hectares, which is the subject matter
of consideration, is clear.
It is not necessary for us to dwell into the instant
aspect of the matter any further. All that needs to be
recorded is, that under Section 3 of the Indian Forest
Act, 1927, the kinds of land which can be declared as
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reserved forest has been expressly delineated therein.
Section 3 afore-mentioned is reproduced below:
"3. Power to reserve forests - The State
Government may constitute any forest-land or
waste-land which is the property of Government,
or over which the Government has proprietary
rights, or to the whole or any part of the forest
produce of which the Government is entitled, a
reserved forest in the manner hereinafter
provided."
(underline is ours)
It is out of the above lands, that the State Government can notify a
reserved forest area, under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The
same is also reproduced below:
"4. Notification by State Government - (1) Whenever it
has been decided to constitute any land a reserved
forest, the State Government shall issue a notification in
the Official Gazette -
(a) declaring that it has been decided to constitute
such land a reserved forest;
(b) specifying, as nearly as possible, the situation
and limits of such land; and
(c) appointing an officer (hereinafter called "the
Forest Settlement Officer") to inquire into and
determine the existence, nature and extent of any rights
alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any
land comprised within such limits or in or over any
forest produce, and to deal with the same as provided in
this Chapter.
Explanation - For the purpose of clause (b), it shall
be sufficient to describe the limits of the forest by
roads, rivers, ridges or other well-known or readily
intelligible boundaries.
(2) The officer appointed under clause (c) of sub-
section (1) shall ordinarily be a person not holding any
forest-office except that of Forest Settlement Officer.
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the State
Government from appointing any number of officers not
exceeding three, not more than one of whom shall be a
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person holding any forest-office except as aforesaid, to
perform the duties of a Forest Settlement Officer under
this Act."
It is apparent from a collective reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the
Indian Forest Act, extracted hereinabove, that in case of a deletion of
an area, which was proposed to be declared as a reserved forest, the
area so deleted will revert to the original nomenclature of the said
area, i.e., the nomenclature which the land had, prior to the issuance of
the notification under Section 4 of the India Forest Act.
Out of the kinds of land expressed in section 3, it is apparent, that if
the land notified under Section 4 was not forest land but waste land, or
some other kind of land over which Government has proprietary rights,
on the deletion of the area notified under Section 4, such land would
stand restored to its original nomenclature as forest land and/or
alternatively such type of land, such as waste land, over which the
Government has proprietary rights. In the afore-mentioned latter
category of land, no clearance contemplated under Section 2 of the
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, can be insisted on. It is only with
reference to reserved forest land, or land which is notified for being
declared as reserved forest, or forest land, that a clearance is
contemplated under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.
In view of the above, we direct that in the application filed by the
applicant - ABG Cement Limited, the concerned competent authority
shall, in the first instance, determine the nomenclature of the land
deleted from the notification issued under Section 4 of the Indian Forest
Act, 1927, prior to the notification. If it emerges, that the relevant land is
forest land, then and then alone, the concerned competent authority will
further determine, whether permission should be granted to the applicant
to carry on non-forest operations, namely, mining operations for
conducting limestone mining. If the released land was originally not
forest land, no forest clearance would be required.
The instant application stands disposed of in the above terms.
The concerned competent authority is directed to take a final decision
on the application dated 20.08.2011 filed by the applicant herein - ABG
Cement Limited under Section 3 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980,
within two months from the date of passing of this order."
20. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that soon after getting the order dated 08.09.2016,
the petitioner wrote a letter dated 23.09.2016 to the
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Additional Chief Secretary, Industries and Mines Department,
Government of Gujarat, appending the office orders dated
26.03.1998, the letter dated 24.06.2014 and the order of the
Apex Court dated 08.09.2016, praying for issuance of the
grant order for Limestone mining lease in favour of the ABG
Cement Ltd. (the then Company) for the remaining part of LOI
area, i.e. 300.69.57 Hectares as per the decision of the Apex
Court and to issue necessary directions to the Collector,
Kachchh in that regard. The said communication is at page
No. '109' (Annexure 'P-7') to the writ petition.
21. It is stated in the writ petition that in furtherance
thereof, on 03.01.2017, the Geologist in the office of the
Commissioner of Geology and Mining proposed granting of
mining lease. However, the State Government, acting
belatedly, issued the order dated 08.01.2017 of granting lease
to the petitioner for the balance area of 300.6957 Hectares,
for Limestone mining lease for captive consumption, as per
the terms and conditions mentioned therein. [Reference:-
Page No. '112' Annexure 'P-8' to the writ petition.] It is the
case of the petitioner in the writ petition itself that the order
granting mining lease was communicated to the petitioner on
09.01.2017, just two days prior to the expiry of the period of
two years, contemplated in Section 10(A)(2)(c) of the Mines
and Minerals (Amendment) Act' 2015, which came into force
with effect from 12.01.2015.
22. The authorized officer of the petitioner Company
immediately approached the concerned official for taking
steps to execute the lease deed on 10.01.2017 and
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11.01.2017, however, the officials were all engaged in the
Global Investors Summit held between 09.01.2017 to
13.01.2017 at Gandhinagar and other programs held at
Kachchh.
23. On 11.01.2017, the petitioner addressed a letter to the
Geologist at Bhuj, Kachchh requesting further details of the
stamp duty payable and formalities concerned for furnishing
of the performance bank guarantee required for executing the
lease deed. (See Annexure 'P-9' at page Nos. '119' - '120' of
the paper-book)
24. A perusal of the said letter indicates that the petitioner
submitted the relevant documents including the Village map
with the demarcation for lease area admeasuring 300.69.57
Hectares; copy of approval of mining plan from the Indian
Bureau of Mines over the entire area of 730.60 Hectares; copy
of the environmental clearance over an area admeasuring
730.60 Hectares; copy of deposited exploration charges over
an area admeasuring 730.60 Hectares; letter from the Section
Officer, Industries and Mines Department dated 24.06.2014
about the status of mining lease granted to ABG Cement Ltd.,
the grant letter dated 08.01.2017 from the Industries and
Mines Department, State of Gujarat, including Form 'K'
requesting to execute the mining lease deed for Limestone
mineral over the area admeasuring 300.69.57 Hectares in
Village Naniber, Taluka Abdasa, District Kachchh.
25. On 16.01.2017, the Geologist, Kachchh even wrote to the
Deputy Collector (Stamps) inquiring about the stamp duty
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payable by the petitioner Company, namely ABG Cement Ltd.
However, the stamp duty rate had not been provided. The
petitioner paid an amount of Rs.10,000/- towards security
deposit with the authority and the copies of the
communication dated 16.01.2017 from the Geologist, Deputy
Collector (Stamps), Kachchh and the Challan No.231 dated
16.01.2017 for payment of Rs.10,000/- as security deposit, as
aforesaid, are appended as Annexures 'P-10' and 'P-11' of the
paper-book.
26. The petitioner again approached the Commissioner,
Geology and Mining Department at Gandhinagar by writing a
letter dated 24.01.2017 requesting his office to assist the
petitioner for execution of lease agreement of the mining
lease. It is stated in the writ petition itself that inspite of
sincere and frantic efforts made by the petitioner, the State
Authorities did not permit the petitioner to take steps to
execute and register the lease deed taking aid of the
impugned Rule 8(4) of the Rules framed under the
Amendment Act' 2015.
27. It is contended therein that since there was no default
on the part of the petitioner, the State Government sought
opinion of the Central Government vide communication dated
03.06.2017, wherein it was observed that:-
"As per our understanding, this lease can be executed as it has
been granted before 12/1/2017. Please confirm our understanding
or guide k'is accordingly."
28. By way of abundant caution, the petitioner also wrote a
letter dated 25.07.2017, to the Government of India, Ministry
of Mines, New Delhi to permit the Government of Gujarat to
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sign the lease agreement with the petitioner. A Special Civil
Application No.15271 of 2017 was filed by the then company,
namely ABG Cement Ltd. wherein, notice was issued to the
respondents vide order dated 23.08.2017. During the
pendency of the said writ petition, vide impugned order
(termed as ex parte) dated 17.11.2017, it was intimated by the
Under Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Mines,
New Delhi, with reference to the clarification letter dated
03.06.2017 of the State Government, that:-
"6. Where as the date of commencement of the period of ML is the
date on which a duly executed deed is registered. Finality with
regard to an application getting converted to ML is achieved only
when the duly executed deed is registered. The position in this
regard it further fortified by considering the fact that until the
point the executed deed is registered, the State Govt can revoke
the order granting the lease. However, after the ML deed is
executed and registered, the powers of the State Govt in this
regard i.e. to terminate the lease are curtailed. Termination of an
ML can be done by the State Govt only in the event of the lessee
not allowing entry and inspection, being convicted of illegal
mining, default in making payment of royalty, violation of transfer
norms, etc. There is proper procedure prescribed in this regard.
Unless a duly executed deed for ML is registered it remains a mere
application and the saving under 10A (2)(c) will cease to be
available after 11.1.2017. Construction of rule 8(4) is a
continuation of the statutory procedure as was stipulated in MCR,
1960. Nothing new has been added.
7. Therefore, the construction of rule 8 is in consonance with the
provisions of the Act in that rule 8 stipulates that the exercise of
converting an application to an ML, is completed by 11.1.2017
which process includes grant, execution and registration.
8. Where as the Rule 8(4) envisages that the execution of lease and
its registration would be required to construe it as grant for the
purpose of section 10A(2)(c). In this regard, it is reiterated that the
2 year period which lapsed on 11.01.2017, was provided in the
MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 which needs to be complied with for
considering the eligibility of applications. Thus, after 11.01.2017
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the mining lease applications covered by 10A (2) (c), which have
not been granted, has become ineligible.
9. Now therefore, it is inform that after 11.01.2017, the mining
Lease applications covered by 10A (2) (c), which have not been
granted, have become ineligible, including the said application of
M/s ABG Cement Ltd."
29. It is submitted in the writ petition that the petitioner
Company was informed about the order dated 17.11.2017 only
on 25.05.2018 and by an order dated 18.06.2018, the Special
Civil Application No.15271 of 2017 was rendered infructuous
and dismissed with the liberty to the petitioner to challenge
the communication dated 17.11.2017 before the appropriate
forum, as may be permissible in law.
30. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred the writ petition
before the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, which was registered as Writ Petition (C) No. 1055 of
2018, which was later withdrawn by the order dated
16.11.2018 passed by the Apex Court with the liberty to
approach this Court.
31. The present writ petition was, then, presented on
26.11.2018. Vide detailed order dated 04.12.2018, while
recording the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioners, It was noted that:-
"... At this stage, upon prima facie consideration of submissions
made by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners and
a careful perusal of the record, more particularly, relevant sections
and rules governing subject writ petition vis-a-vis clarification
sought for by the State authorities and information given by
Ministry of Mines of Government of India vide order dated
17.11.2007 and the requirement of consideration of contentions
raised qua challenge to the vires in this petition in detail along with
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interpretation of word 'grant' so reflected, at this stage, we are
inclined to issue notice to the respondents returnable on
26.12.2018.
... In the meanwhile, status quo qua subject lease land granted in
favour of the petitioners vide order dated 08.01.2017 passed by
Department of Industries of Mines, State of Gujarat to be
maintained by the parties.
... Issue notice to the learned Attorney General of India."
32. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, on the
submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the Union
of India namely, the respondent No.1 that pursuant to the
judgment and order dated 08.09.2016 of the Apex Court
passed on the interlocutory application filed by the petitioner
Company, namely the then ABG Cement Ltd., a final decision
was required to be taken on the application dated 20.08.2011
filed under Section 3 of the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980
and only thereafter the process for issuance of letter of grant
could be initiated, we have issued directions to the learned
Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 to file an affidavit
of the competent officer to bring on record the decision on the
application dated 20.08.2011 filed by the petitioner, if any.
33. Pursuant thereto, an affidavit dated 01.11.2025 of the
Regional Controller of Mines to the Government of India in
the Indian Bureau of Mines, Regional Office, Gandhinagar,
Gujarat was filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 - Union of
India, Ministry of Mines, wherein it is stated that after getting
the order dated 08.09.2016, the Company, namely M/s ABG
Cement Ltd. ought to have approached the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) for
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disposal of its application dated 20.08.2011. It is contended
that in view of the development, which took place after
passing of the judgment and order dated 08.09.2016 of the
Apex Court irrespective of the nomenclature of the land, final
decision upon the application dated 20.08.2011 for grant of
approval was required to be taken by the competent authority
of MoEF&CC. The petitioner company (M/s ABG Cement
Ltd.), however, had not approached the MoEF&CC for
disposal of its application dated 20.08.2011.
34. The submission in the affidavit filed on behalf of the
Union of India is that the ABG Cement Ltd. moved the
application dated 20.08.2011 to the MoEF&CC, inasmuch as,
in the order dated 31.07.2012 issued by the Central Ministry,
wherein the Central Government approved to delete 1103.227
of the forest area notified under Section 4 of the Forest Act,
the following conditions were mentioned:-
"i No area will be deleted on the ground of its allotment done after
the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Indian forest Act,
ii None of the deleted area will be allowed to be used for mining
without obtaining prior approval under the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980.
iii The State Government shall ensure compliance of the conditions
mentioned here in above"
35. The contention is that the Government of Gujarat vide
Gazette notification dated 05.02.2013 also contemplated that
none of the deleted area will be allowed to be used for mining
without obtaining prior approval under the Forest
(Conservation) Act' 1980. The conditions of the said
notification, as relied upon by the respondent No.1, are to be
noted as under:-
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"The Government of Gujarat approached the Hon'ble Supreme
Court vide I.A. No. 1228 and I.A. 1229 with the request to permit
the above deletion of Section 4 lands. The Hon'ble Supreme Court,
vide their judgments dated 22-7-2011 and dated 23-9-2011
permitted to the above deletion with the following conditions.
i No area will be deleted on the ground of its allotment done after
the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Indian forest Act,
ii None of the deleted area will be allowed to be used for mining
without obtaining prior approval under the Forest (Conservation)
Act, 1980.
iii The State Government shall ensure compliance of the conditions
mentioned here in above"
36. It is, thus, submitted on behalf of respondent No.1 Union
of India that, in any case, prior approval under the Forest
(Conservation) Act' 1980 was mandatory even for the deleted
area for the purpose of use for mining activities.
37. It is submitted that irrespective of the nomenclature of
the subject land, final decision upon the application dated
20.08.2011 of the petitioner in terms of the order of the
Supreme Court dated 08.09.2016 was to be taken by the
Central Ministry, i.e. namely MoEF&CC. In other words, the
approval of the MoEF&CC while disposing of the application
of the petitioner dated 20.08.2011 was necessary for grant of
mining lease.
38. It is further contended therein that even after deletion of
the area admeasuring 364.22 Hectares of Naniber Village vide
State Government notification dated 05.02.2013, prior
approval from the MoEF&CC under Section 03 of the Forest
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(Conservation) Act' 1980 was necessary for taking up mining
activities in the said area. No such proposal, however, had
been submitted by the petitioner Company either on the
online portal or offline. The grant order dated 08.01.2017
issued by the State Government, therefore, is not in
consonance with the MoEF&CC letter dated 31.07.2012 and
the State Government Notification dated 05.02.2013.
39. It is further submitted that the environmental clearance
dated 28.06.2011 granted to the petitioner was conditional
subject to the grant of forestry clearance as also the final
outcome of the application of the petitioner under the order of
the Apex Court.
40. Moreover, as per Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act' 1957 of
the Amendment Act' 2015 and Rule 8 of the Rules framed
thereunder, the requirement of execution of the lease deed
had not been fulfilled before the cutoff date, i.e. 11.01.2007.
No mining lease deed could be executed in favour of the
petitioner after the cutoff date, which is 11.01.2017 and, as
such, prayers made in the writ petition are liable to be
rejected.
41. However, from the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union
of India, Ministry of Mines, namely the respondent No.1
herein, atleast, it is admitted that no decision whatsoever has
been taken on the application dated 20.08.2011 by the
MoEF&CC in terms of the judgment and order dated
08.09.2016 passed by the Apex Court, wherein the competent
authority was directed to take a decision within a period of
two months from the date of the said order.
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42. Coming to the stand of the State authorities in their
affidavits-in-reply dated 28.02.2024 and 30.10.2025, it is
stated therein that the lease deed cannot be executed after
expiry of the period prescribed in Section 10A(2)(c) of the
Amendment Act' 2015, inasmuch as, the condition of the letter
of grant dated 08.01.2017 were not fulfilled prior to the said
date. It is submitted that the grant of mining lease was
subject to and as per the terms and conditions stated in the
said order, which clearly provides that:-
"With a request to approach the collector of Kachchh, Dist. Kachchh
or execution of mining lease deed. The applicant is required to
execute and register the lease deed for the said grant order as per the
provisions prescribed in Rule 8(4) of Minerals(other than Atomic and
Hydro Carbons Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016"."
43. The contention is that after receipt of the letter of grant,
the ABG Cement Ltd. through its authorized signatory had
contacted the Geologist, Commissioner of Geology and
Mining, Gandhinagar by writing a letter dated 11.01.2017,
wherein it required details of the stamp duty and registration
charges for execution of the lease deed. But the petitioner did
not annex any document / communication along with the said
letter that substantiated that effort was made to intimate the
District Inspector of Land Reforms (DILR), Kachchh for
measurement of the subject land before 11.01.2017, which
was necessary condition for culmination of the order of grant
into mining lease deed. Further, by the letter dated
24.01.2017, the ABG Cement Ltd. requested the
Commissioner, Geology and Mining, Gandhinagar to grant
couple of days for payment of stamp duty and atleast four to
six weeks for furnishing performance bank guarantee.
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44. In light of the same, the respondent No.2 herein, namely
the Industries and Mines Department, Gandhinagar sent a
communication dated 03.06.2017 to the Secretary, Ministry of
Mines, New Delhi seeking guidance with regard to the
execution of mining lease over an area admeasuring
300.69.57 Hectares and the said request was rejected vide
order dated 17.11.2017 by the Ministry of Mines, Government
of India, inasmuch as, the mining lease applications covered
by Section 10A(2)(c) became ineligible after 11.01.2017. No
relief, as such, can be granted to the petitioner herein.
45. On the contention of the petitioner about the delay on
the part of the State authorities, it is submitted that "delay is
no ground, whatsoever, either in fact or in law to enable the
petitioner to claim the applicability of the statutory provisions,
inasmuch as, the question as to whether the statute can
operate in the facts and circumstances of the present case." It
is stated therein that there is no vested right with the
petitioner to seek for execution of the mining lease; the order
for grant was subject to fulfillment of conditions for execution
of the lease deed to make the petitioner eligible; the execution
of mining lease is not an empty formality and a decision to
grant lease being conditional cannot be treated as a decision
for grant of lease; no right, as such, had accrued in favour of
the petitioner by mere issuance of the letter of grant dated
08.01.2017.
46. It is contended that no interest can be created in the
subject land prior to the registration and even otherwise,
under the old regime, in case lease deed was not executed on
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account of the fault of the applicant, the State Government
was empowered to revoke the grant. However, by virtue of
Rule 8(4) of the Rules' 2016, revocation of grant is automatic,
in cases where after, the order for grant of mining lease
issued under sub-rule (2) of Rule 8, mining lease has not been
executed in the format specified in Schedule B VII and
registered on or before 11.01.2017.
47. It was argued by the learned Assistant Government
Pleader appearing for the State respondent that in view of the
forfeiture clause in Rule 8 sub-rule (4), as a result of failure of
the petitioner in getting the lease deed executed and
registered on or before the cut off date, i.e. 11.01.2017, it was
not incumbent for the State Government to issue any order of
revocation of the grant. Rather, the order of grant of mining
lease issued under sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 automatically stood
revoked and, thereafter, the State Government is denuded of
the power to execute the lease deed. It is the case of the
respondent State that the grant of lease being being guided
by the statute and there being no vested or fundamental right
to seek grant of mining lease, no estoppel would operate
against the State by mere issuance of the letter of grant dated
18.07.2017. The ineligibility of the petitioner came into
existence from the next date, i.e. 12.07.2017 by operation of
the statute, namely Section 10A(2)(c) of the Amendment Act'
2015 read with Rule 8(4) of the Rules' 2016 framed
thereunder.
48. Mr.Shalin Mehta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the petitioner, in order to impress upon the case of the
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petitioner, though initially sought to make submissions on the
validity of Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act' 1957 inserted by Act
No.10 of 2015 w.e.f. 12.01.2015 as also Rule 8(4) of the Rules'
2016 being ultra vires, on the test of scrutiny of Articles 14,
19 and 21 of the Constitution of India (as per prayer 10(B) of
the writ petition), however, after a brief submission thereon,
the learned Senior Counsel has continued his arguments to
assail the order dated 17.11.2017 passed by the respondent
No.1 rejecting the claim of the petitioner on the ground of
ineligibility. The submissions is that there is no question of the
petitioner having become ineligible when there is complete
inaction on the part of the respondent No.1 in complying with
the directions issued by the Apex Court in the order dated
08.09.2016.
49. It was submitted that the letter of intent, in favour of the
petitioner herein for grant of 730.60 Hectares of land in
Naniber Village, Kachchh was issued as early as on
26.03.1998, which was on the basis of in-principle approval
granted by the Central Government vide letter dated
01.12.1997, subject to fulfillment of five conditions therein.
50. Out of total area, 366.38 Hectares was revenue land,
whereas the remaining 364.22 Hectares was reserved land
notified under Section 4 of the Forest Act. However, the State
Government sought permission of the CEC to delete
2105.42.41 Hectares of authorized area comprising of 57
villages in four districts of the State of Gujarat under Section
4 of the Forest Act. When the issue was pending before the
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Apex Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad1, the CEC in
its report dated 23.06.2010 endorsed the deletion of the area
approved by the Forest Settlement Officer after
acknowledging the rights of the villagers in response to the
areas notified under Section 4 of the Act, wherein condition
No. '2' read as "None of the deleted area will be allowed to be
used for mining without obtaining approval under the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980".
51. The petitioner, M/s ABG Cement Ltd., for deletion of the
said condition, sought intervention of the Apex Court and
under the order dated 22.07.2011. While accepting the
request of the State of Gujarat for deletion of the area notified
under Section 4 of the Forest Act as justified, no final opinion
was expressed with regard to the condition No. '2' imposed by
the CEC, specifically in view of the stand of the State
Government that no lease had formally been granted to ABG
Cement Ltd. in any of the areas notified under Section 4 of the
Act and later deleted.
52. The Apex Court had noticed the stand of the MoEF&CC
in its letter dated 07.01.2010 therein about the request made
by the State of Gujarat for deletion of the area while granting
the aforesaid relief. However, on the question of deletion of
condition No. '2' in the approval granted by the CEC dated
23.06.2010, the petitioner had been permitted to move
application before the MoEF&CC seeking approval for grant
of lease and for permission under the Forest (Conservation)
Act' 1980 and also to challenge the condition No. '2', if
I.A.NOS.3722 IN IA 2881 & 3026-3027
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advised. It was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that
the Apex Court had kept all contentions open to be raised
before the MoEF&CC while granting opportunity to the
petitioner to approach the Apex Court again.
53. The submission, thus, is that when the petitioner
approached the Apex Court, again by filing the intervenor
application No.3722 for direction / clarification of the order
dated 07.05.2010 / 22.07.2010, it was noticed therein, in the
order of disposal of the said application dated 08.09.2016,
that the ABC Cement Ltd. had moved application dated
20.08.2011 under Section 3 of the Forest (Conservation) Act'
1980 for direction / clarification / exemption under the
provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980 and the
MoEF&CC had not taken any decision on the same and hence,
the petitioner was constrained to approach the Apex Court.
54. It is submitted that the application dated 20.08.2011
before the MoEF&CC was filed by way of abundant caution
seeking approval under the provisions of the Forest
(Conservation) Act' 1980 though the said provisions does not
apply to the subject land admeasuring 364.22 Hectares when
it ceased to be the forest land.
55. Even the Apex Court has noted in the order dated
08.09.2016 that only in case an individual was desirous of
using forest land for non-forest purposes, permission under
Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980 was
imperative. However, in the given situation, where the State
Government land had sought deletion of the declared land as
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reserved forest and when the land originally mentioned under
Section 4 notification was deleted, then clearance under
Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980 would be pre-
requisite condition for use of said land for non-forest purpose,
only and only if the deleted land was forest area and not
otherwise.
56. The Apex Court has, further, noticed the contention of
the learned counsel for the applicant ABG Cement Ltd. therein
that the area of 364.22 Hectares, which was sought to be
deleted from the area notified under Section 4 of the Forest
Act, did not actually remain a forest land and, as such, the
clearance as mandated under Section 2 of the Forest
(Conservation) Act' 1980 was not required.
57. Having considered the said arguments, the Apex Court
had further taken into consideration the order of the Forest
Settlement Officer dated 09.11.1995, which expressly
pertained to the area of 364.22 hectares of the subject land,
wherein based on the inquiry conducted by the Forest
Settlement Officer, it was recorded that there was a village
settlement in the area. Further reference therein is of the
order dated 23.08.2016 of the Forest and Environment
Department of the State of Gujarat, wherein it is mentioned
that consequent to the due process of settlement proceedings
and the Forest Settlement report, the entire area of 364.22
Hectares, declared under Section 4 of the Forest Act, not
being recommended as forest under Section 20, and later
deleted from Section 4 notification, no further procedure for
declaring the said area under Section 20 of the Forest Act was
required.
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58. Attention of the Court is invited to the contents of the
order dated 08.09.2016 of the Apex Court, wherein based on
the order dated 23.08.2016 of the Forest and Environment
Department of the State of Gujarat, it was recorded that on
completion of the inquiry and acceptance of Forest Settlement
report dated 09.11.1995, entire area of 364.22 Hectares of
Nanibar village of Kutch district (subject land) initially
declared under Section 4 not being recommended to be fit for
declaring under Section 20, owing to the reasons recorded in
the forest settlement report, has been deleted from
notification under Section 4 and, thus, be reverted back to its
original status of revenue land.
59. It is pointed out that in view of the aforesaid report of
the Forest Settlement Officer dated 09.11.1995 and the order
of the Forest and Environment Department of the State of
Gujarat dated 23.08.2016, the Apex Court had concluded
therein that, "the release of area measuring 364.22
Hectares, which is the subject matter of consideration,
is clear."
60. It was further recorded therein on a collective reading of
Sections 3 and 4 of the Forest Act; that in case of deletion of an
area, which was proposed to be declared as a reserved forest,
the area so deleted will be reverted to the original
nomenclature of the said area, i.e. the nomenclature which the
land had prior to the issuance of the notification under Section
4 of the Forest Act.
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61. Considering Section 3 of the Forest Act, it was observed
therein that it is apparent that if the land notified under
Section 4 was not a forest land but waste land, or some other
kind of land over which Government has proprietary rights, on
the deletion of the area notified under Section 4, such land
would stand restored to its original nomenclature; as forest
land or alternatively to the type of land, such as waste land etc.
over which the Government has proprietary rights. In the
aforesaid category of land, no clearance contemplated under
Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 can be
insisted on. It was also observed therein that it is only with
reference to a reserved forest land, or land which is notified for
being declared as a reserved forest, or forest land, that a
clearance as contemplated under Section 2 of the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980, is required.
62. Thus, while disposing of the interlocutory application
filed by the petitioner Company, namely ABG Cement Ltd., it
was provided by the Apex Court that the concerned authority
shall, in the first instance, determine the nomenclature of the
land deleted from the notification issued under Section 4 of the
Indian Forest Act, 1927, prior to the notification. And only If it
emerged, that the subject land was a forest land, then and then
alone, the concerned competent authority will be required to
determine, whether permission should be granted to the
applicant / petitioner ABG Cement Ltd. to carry on non-forest
operations, namely, for conducting limestone mining. However,
if the released land was originally not a forest land, no forest
clearance would be required.
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63. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, thus, is that in view of the said observation made by
the Apex Court and the facts recorded therein that the Forest
and Environment Department of the State of Gujarat passed an
order dated 23.08.2016 reverting the subject land to its
original status of being revenue land, there cannot be a quarrel
that the subject land was not a forest land originally and was
kept aside only for declaration as a reserved forest under
Section 4 of the Forest Act, which was later deleted from the
said notification. The subject land having been restored to its
original nomenclature of being a revenue land, in essence, no
further permission was required to carry on mining operations,
under Section 3 of the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980.
64. It is contended that the petitioner had approached the
Apex Court by way of an abundant caution so as to clarify the
said position as liberty was already reserved with the
petitioner in the previous order dated 22.07.2011 passed by
the Apex Court.
65. It was urged that once the Apex Court in the order dated
08.09.2016 had directed the competent authority to take a final
decision on the pending application dated 20.08.2011 of the
petitioner, the then ABG Cement Ltd. under Section 3 of the
Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980, categorically providing that
the competent authority would be required to determine the
nomenclature of the land deleted from the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Forest Act, considering its nomenclature
prior to the notification, no exception can be taken by
respondent No.1 to the order of grant dated 08.01.2017 to the
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nomenclature of the subject land, that too when no decision
was taken.
66. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would
vehemently argue that the concerned competent authority of
the MoEF&CC of the Government of India is guilty of non-
compliance of the directions contained in the judgment and
order dated 08.09.2016 which obliged it to decide the
petitioner's application. The stand taken by the respondent
No.1 in its affidavit dated 01.11.2025 relying upon the
conditions in the order dated 31.07.2012 issued by the
MoEF&CC, approving deletion subject to the condition therein
and the Government of Gujarat notification dated 05.02.2013
mandating that none of the deleted areas will be allowed to be
used for mining without obtaining prior approval under the
Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980, to submit that prior approval
was pre-requisite is wholly misconceived.
67. The contention is that the aforesaid two orders were
relevant for transitory period and after deletion of the land in
question from the notification under Section 4 of the Forest
Act, having been reverted to its original position being a
revenue land, there was no question to agitate the issue
requiring prior approval under the Forest (Conservation) Act'
1980, inasmuch as, the provisions of the said enactment would
not be applicable.
68. The contention, thus, is that the petitioner had already
approached the Industries and Mines Department, Government
of Gujarat for granting the mining lease for the balance area of
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300 Hectares by writing an application on 11.10.2012, after
the Central Government approved deletion of the subject land
vide order dated 31.07.2012 issued by the MoEF&CC.
69. After grant of letter of intent as early as on 26.03.1998,
the matter for grant of mining lease for the balance area
remained pending only because of the said area being notified
under Section 4 of the Forest Act. However, when everything
was sorted out with the deletion of the subject land under
Section 4 and the order dated 23.08.2016 passed by the Forest
and Environment Department of the State of Gujarat and the
observations and directions in the judgment and order dated
08.09.2016 of the Apex Court in IA No.3722 (for declaration /
clarification) filed by the petitioner, there remained no legal
impediment in the matter of grant of mining lease in favour of
the petitioner even after enforcement of the Amendment Act
No.10 of 2015 w.e.f. 12.01.2015.
70. It was urged that the delay absolutely had been caused
on the part of the State authorities. There is no question of
ineligibility being attracted by virtue of Section 10A(1) of the
Act' 1957, inasmuch as, with the letter of grant issued by the
State Government on 08.01.2017, right accrued in favour of
the petitioner to seek execution and registration of the lease
deed, by fulfilling the conditions therein. It is not the case of
the respondents that there is a failure on the part of the the
petitioner in fulfilling the conditions of the letter of grant
dated 08.01.2017, and the execution and registration of
mining lease deed could not be made on account of any
inaction or non-performance of the requirements by the
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petitioner. Rather, in the instant case, the letter of grant
dated 08.01.2017, was issued by the State authorities at the
fag end of the expiry of the period of two years prescribed
under Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act' 1957 as inserted by the
Act No.10 of 2015.
71. The petitioner rushed to the State authorities for
fulfillment of the requirement post-grant as per Rule 8 of the
Rules' 2016. The formalities of furnishing the performance
bank guarantee, signing of a mine development and
production agreement with the State Government in the
specified format and the submission of revised mining plan
could not be completed prior to 11.01.201, because of the
short period of two days given to the petitioner.
72. The categorical case of the petitioner that the order
dated 08.01.2017 of granting mining lease was communicated
to the petitioner on 09.01.2017, giving only two days time to
complete the process of execution and registration of the
lease deed cannot be disputed by the respondents. Inspite of
best efforts made by the petitioner, the formalities for
execution of the lease deed could not be completed on or
before 11.01.2017. However, the petitioner had deposited
Rs.10,000/- towards security deposit with the authority vide
Challan dated 16.01.2017. Where after, the State authorities
did not permit the petitioner to take further steps to execute
and register the lease deed.
73. It was argued that in the present case, the petitioner is
not claiming any vested or fundamental right to seek
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execution of the lease deed or even there is no question of
estoppel. The present is a case where the grant of mining
lease made in favour of the petitioner vide letter of grant
dated 08.01.2017 is saved by Section 10A(c) of the Act' 1957
(with Amendment Act of 2015.), the statutory scheme itself.
74. It was submitted that Section 10A(2) is an exception to
sub-section (1) of Section 10A, inasmuch as, it saves the right
of the applicants to seek grant of mining lease subject to
fulfillment of the conditions therein. In the case of the
petitioner, all the requirement of Section 10A(2)(c) had been
fulfilled and the letter of grant was issued within the period of
two years from the date of commencement of the Amendment
Act, i.e. before 11.01.2017. Only steps remained that of
fulfillment of requirement of the letter of grant as per Rule
8(2) of the Rules' 2016 framed under the Act. Forfeiture of the
right to seek execution of the lease deed as per sub-rule (4) of
Rule 8 cannot be attracted in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case, where the petitioner is not
responsible for non-completion of the formalities.
75. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in
Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar 2, it was
argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that
the Latin maxim commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet
(no party can take undue advantage of his own wrong) is
squarely attracted in the facts of the present case. The
elementary principles of the said maxim of law is fully
recognized in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits
(2007) 11 SCC 447
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of illustration from every branch of legal procedure. The
observations made in paragraph No. '16' of the said decision
pressed before us, read as under:-
"16. It is settled principle of law that a man cannot be permitted to
take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain
favourable interpretation of law. It is sound principle that he who
prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-
performance he has occasioned. To put it differently, "a wrongdoer
ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong"."
76. Reliance is placed on various decisions to substantiate
his submissions that the date 11.01.2017 cannot be treated as
sacrosanct in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case, as follows:-
i. State of Rajasthan V. Shree Cement Ltd. 3
ii. Kamlesh Metacast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan 4
iii. State of Rajasthan V. Kamlesh Metacast Pvt. Ltd.
[Civil Special Application No.754 of 2021 in S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No.13426 of 2020 decided on 03.01.2022]
iv. Wonder Cement Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan 5
v. State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. Shree Cement
Limited, Order dated 22.01.2019 passed in D.B. Special
Appeal Writ No. 26/2019 by Rajasthan High Court.
vi. State of Rajasthan and Others Versus Ojaswi
Marbles and Granites Pvt. Ltd. and Others6
vii. State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. UltraTech Cement
Limited and Ors., Order dated 31.03.2023 passed in D.B.
2022 SCC Online Raj 3543
2021 SCC Online Raj 735
2017 SCC Online Raj 4470
2021 SCC OnLine Raj 4226
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Special Appeal (Writ) No. 987/2021 in S. B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 356/2017 by Rajasthan High Court.
viii. Indocil Silicons Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Ors.7
ix. Smt. A.V. Shakuntala Vs. The Union of India,
Ministry of Mines and Others8
x. V. Velmurugan Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and
Ors.9
xi. Gujarat Pottery Works Vs. B.P. Sood, Controller of
Mining Leases for India10
xii. State of West Bengal and Another V. Chiranjilal
(Mineral) Industries of Bagandih and Another 11
xiii. Heidelberg Cement India Limited Vs. Union of
India-Order dated 11.05.2018 passed by Hon'ble Gujarat
High Court passed in Civil Application No.01 of 2018
in Special Civil Application No.417 of 2017.
xiv. Heidelberg Cement India Limited Vs. Union of
India-Order dated 27.12.2019 passed by Hon'ble Gujarat
High Court passed in Special Civil Application
No.417 of 2017.
xv. Heidelberg Cement India Limited Vs. Union of
India-Order dated 28.01.2020 passed by Hon'ble Gujarat
High Court passed in Special Civil Application No.417 of
2017.
2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1852
ILR 2017 KAR 16
AIR 2020 Mad 193
AIR 1967 SC 964
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1149
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77. Further, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in
the State of Karnataka V. BL Rani Samyuktha & Anr. 12, it
was argued that the Apex Court had issued direction therein
to Government to consider the application for mining lease
where even in a case where even the stage for completion of
conditions mentioned in the approval letter of the Central
Government was not complete. In case of the present
petitioner, on the other hand, right had been accrued with the
grant of approval and only formalities of execution of the lease
deed remained. There cannot be any frustration or forfeiture
of right to seek execution of lease deed, when there was no
failure on the part of the petitioner.
78. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions of the
Division Bench of this Court in the cases of Heidelberg
Cement India Limited Vs. Union of India passed in Special
Civil Application No.417 of 2017 dated 11.01.2017,
11.05.2018 and 27.12.2019 in the cases, wherein only the
letter of intent was issued but the lease deed could not be
executed within the time frame on account of pendency of the
application for environmental clearance before the competent
authority and further notification issued by the Ministry of
Mines on 04.01.2017. The submission is that even in such
cases, where environmental clearance was not granted,
subject to grant of said certificate before the commencement
of the mining activity, directions was issued to consider the
case of the petitioners for grant of mining lease.
Civil Appeal No.3604 of 2023 decided on 10.05.2023
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79. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would
vehemently urge that the present is one of such cases, where
the Constitution Court is required to intervene to set right the
wrong committed not only by the State respondents in
protracting the matter of grant of lease for no reason or
justification, but also by the Central Ministry (MoEF&CC),
which is guilty of non-compliance of the order of the Apex
Court dated 08.09.2016.
80. Mr.Kirtiman Singh, the learned Senior Advocate assisted
by Mr.Harsheel D. Shukla, the learned counsel for the
respondent No.1, namely the Union of India placing the
affidavit dated 01.11.2025, contents of which have been noted
hereinbefore, would vehemently submit that in view of sub-
rule (4) of Rule 8 of the Rules' 2016, it was mandated that the
lease deed was executed and registered on or before
11.01.2017. The forfeiture of right to seek execution of the
lease deed is automatic and as a consequence thereof, the
letter of grant dated 08.01.2017 would loose its legal efficacy.
The letter of grant contains conditions as per sub-rule (2) of
Rule 8 and in view of sub-rule (3), it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to furnish the performance bank guarantee and
complete the formalities for the purpose of execution and
registration of the lease deed on or before 11.01.2017. The
consequence of failure provided under sub-rule(2) of Rule 8 is
the forfeiture of right of the petitioner under Clause (c) of sub-
section(2) of Section 10A. The date 11.01.2017 is sacrosanct.
No pending application can be adjudicated after the said date,
in view of the statutory mandate, which required closure of
the old regime.
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81. No writ in contravention of the statutory provision can
be issued, inasmuch as, no estoppel can operate against the
statute. The grant of lease deed included different stages of
according right to a lessee for mining lease and all the stages
were required to be concluded before the cut off date, i.e.
11.01.2017.
82. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Karnataka High
Court in the case of BL Rani Samyuktha12 to submit that no
directions can be passed by this Court for grant of mining
lease.
83. Placing reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court
in the case of Arcelormittal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of
India13 and the order dated 06.06.2025 in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.4160 of 2024 in the case of Arcelormittal India (P) Ltd.
v. Indian Bureau of Mines, it was argued that the statutory
law provided the cut off date, i.e. 11.01.2017 as sacrosanct
and no mining lease can be executed after the said date.
84. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1 has
further relied upon the following decisions to substantiate his
arguments:-
i. State of T.N. v. Hind Stone14
ii. State of Rajasthan v. Sharwan Kumar Kumavat15
iii. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India 16
(2024) SCC OnLine (Del) 1401
(1981) 2 SCC 205
(2023) 20 SCC 747
(2012) 11 SCC 1
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iv. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. Union of India 17
v. Coromandel Mining & Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of
India18
vi. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. v. Indian Bureau of Mines
dated 06.06.2025 in W.P. (C) 4160 of 2024.
85. Ms.Hetal Patel, the learned Assistant Government
Pleader for the state has adopted the arguments of the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1, to
rebutt the contentions of the petitioner herein seeking for
execution of the mining lease deed.
ANALYSIS
86. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and
perused the record, the undisputed factual position emerging
from the record is:-
I. A prior approval (in-principle approval) under the first
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5 with reference to the
application of the petitioner dated 22.05.1995 for limestone
mining lease, was granted by the Central Government vide
communication dated 01.12.1997 for area admeasuring
730.60 Hectares of land for a lease period of 30 years.
II. Pursuant thereto, on 26.03.1998, the letter of intent was
issued by the Government of Gujarat subject to the
conditions therein:-
2023 SCC OnLine Ori 706
2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 452
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"
i. To submit the Mining Plan duly approved / certified by the
Indian Bureau of Mines, Udaipur (Rajasthan).
ii. To Clearance Certificate from MoEF pursuant to their
circular dated 27.01.1994.
iii. Prospecting charges towards the expenses incurred by the
Govt. for tests.
iv. To follow conditions and Instructions as mentioned in the
Site Clearance from the Govt. dated 11.11.1997 vide letter bearing
ref. no. J-11076/8/97/IA-(M)
v. To follow the conditions as laid down and as applicable as
per MHRD Act-1 (A) and MCR-1960 also Forest Conservation Act
1980. "
III. The mining plan for the entire area of 730.60
Hectares was approved on 19.02.1999 under the Act' 1957.
Further, in terms of the notification dated 10.04.2003 of
the Government of India, in the year 2007, the mining plan
dated 19.02.1999 was reviewed albeit before execution of
any mine lease.
IV. On 28.06.2011, the environmental clearance was
granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forest for the
project for the entire lease area of 730.60 Hectares, in
accordance with the EIA Notification 2006, subject to
implementation of the conditions of environmental
safeguard mentioned therein.
V. On 04.12.2012, the mining lease for Phase-I area
336.1843 Hectares (out of total 730.60 Hectares) was
executed. However, on account of the issue relating to the
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nomenclature of the remaining land included in the Section
4 notification as forest land, no mining lease was executed
at that point of time.
VI. By the judgment and order dated 22.07.2011, the
Apex Court had allowed the application filed by the State
Government for deletion of forest land from the notification
under Section 4 of the Forest Act, which included the
subject land, in view of the own stand of the Ministry of
Environment and Forest that the request made by the State
of Gujarat for deletion of the area was granted.
VII. The petitioner also filed intervenor application
seeking approval for grant of lease for remaining area
challenging the condition No. '2' mentioned in the letter of
the Central Government, as noted hereinbefore. However,
the Apex Court had disposed of the intervenor application
of the petitioner with the observation that it is for the
Ministry of Environment and Forest to consider the same.
VIII. On 20.08.2011, the petitioner filed application
seeking appropriate permission / clarification / exemption,
which remained undecided till date inspite of the
categorical directions issued by the Apex Court in the
judgment and order 08.09.2016 in the subsequent
intervenor application filed by the petitioner for directions
and clarification.
IX. On 31.01.2012, the Government of India approved
deletion of the subject land from notification under Section
4 of the Indian Forest Act, subject to the conditions
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including prior approval for allowing the land to be used for
mining. The petitioner submitted the request to the
Industries and Mines Department, Government of Gujarat
vide writing letters dated 11.10.2012 and 05.11.2012 for
grant of mining lease for the balance area of approximately
300 Hectares.
X. On 21.01.2013, the Industries and Mines Department,
State Government requested the Deputy Collector,
Kachchh to forward the proposal for getting approval under
the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980 regarding allotment of
the remaining area.
XI. On 05.02.2013, notification was issued by the State
Government that none of the deleted areas will be allowed
to be used for mining without obtaining prior approval
under the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980.
XII. In view of the above, on another intervenor
application filed by the petitioner, the Apex Court by
judgment and order dated 08.09.2016 directed the
concerned authority of the Central Ministry to determine
the nomenclature of the land while observing that if the
subject land was originally not a forest land, no forest
clearance was needed. It was clarified by the Apex Court
therein that only if the subject land was found to be forest
land originally, then and then only the concerned
competent authority would further consider forest
clearance.
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XIII. The order dated 08.09.2016 of the Apex Court, in
IA No.3722 in IA No.2881 and 3026 - 3027 in Writ Petition
(Civil) No.202 of 1995, filed by the petitioner, categorically
records that the Forest and Environment Department of the
State of Gujarat, on 23.08.2016, had released the area
admeasuring 364.22 Hectares, of the subject land,
consequent to completion of the legal process of forest
settlement and right exemption, appellate procedure and
acceptance of Forest settlement report dated 09.11.1995,
holding that the subject land be reverted to its original
status of revenue land.
XIV. There is no dispute about the fact that the original
nomenclature of the subject land was revenue land and it
was originally not a forest land. The dispute pertaining to
nomenclature of the subject land as a forest land and the
necessity for seeking approval of the Central Government
under the Forest (Conservation) Act' 1980, arose only
because of the notification under Section 4 of the Indian
Forest Act' 1927 issued by the Central Government
notifying the lands of Village Naniber, Taluka Abdasa,
District Bhuj - Kachchh as forest land, which was later
released / revoked.
XV. It is in these facts and circumstances of the case,
that after getting the order from the Apex Court, the
petitioner on 23.09.2016 requested the Government of
Gujarat to issue the order granting limestone mining lease
in his favour for the balance area of 300.6957 Hectares.
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XVI. On 03.01.2017, the Geologist in the Office of the
Commissioner of Geology and Mining, proposed grant of
mining lease and on 08.01.2017, the grant order was issued
which was intimated to the petitioner on 09.01.2017, only.
XVII. With the execution of the mining lease as per the
mining plan dated 19.12.1999 submitted for the entire area
of 730.60 Hectares, there was a requirement to review the
mining plan for Phase - II area of 300.6957 Hectares after
deletion of the area reserved for Geopark and the
opportunity to submit a mine closure plan under Rule 23(A)
with financial assurance as contemplated under Rule 23(F),
would then arise.
XVIII. As per the case of the petitioner, the question of
fulfillment of condition No. '3(k)' of the grant order dated
08.01.2017 pertaining to the financial assurance under
Rule 23(F) of the Minerals Conservation and Development
Rules' 1988, would arise only when the Indian Bureau of
Mines takes up the mining plan for review. However, by the
notification dated 27.02.2017, with the supersession of the
said rule vide Mineral Conservation and Development
Rules' 2017, the requirement of mine closure plan under
the sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 would not be applicable by
virtue of the Second proviso to the said Rule, in case where
performance security is furnished. The petitioner is liable
either to furnish performance security or financial
assurance.
XIX. As regards the condition Nos. 3(f) and 3(g), about
the submission of accurate map of the area sanctioned
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giving description of the situation and boundaries duly
attested by the District Inspector of Land Records and the
requirement to get demarcation of the area by the
Collector; and also the payment of performance security as
per Rule 8(3)(a) of the Rules, 2016, the said requirements
could not be fulfilled for no fault of the petitioner.
XX. It is also the case of the petitioner that when
mining plan was approved for the entire area of 730.60
Hectares, there was no provision for tendering
performance security. The requirement for tendering
performance security in respect of non-auction lease land
was introduced vide Rule 8(3) of the MCR Rules' 2016 on
04.03.2016 for the first time. Moreover, there was a
deduction from the remaining Phase-II area by the
respondent for Geopark and the balance area was left out
to 300.6957 Hectares. The performance security under
Rule 8(3)(a) of the Rules' 2016 was to be calculated as
0.50% of the value of estimated mineral resources. It was
impossible for the petitioner to be aware of the mineral
resources available in Phase - II area of 300.6957
Hectares, inasmuch as, such exercise was to be conducted
by the respondent No.2 to cull out the quantum of
performance security.
XXI. The petitioner had already given the undertaking
on 11.01.2017 itself by writing the letter to the Geologist,
Commissionerate of Geology and Mines, Bhuj - Kachchh
that it was ready to pay the required stamp duty and
registration charges. Along with the said letter, the
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petitioner also submitted the copy of the environmental
clearance; the copy of the approval letter of mining plan
from Indian Bureau of Mines over an area of 730.60
Hectares; the copy of village map with the demarcation for
lease deed execution over the remaining area admeasuring
300.6957 Hectares. The petitioner cannot be held
responsible for its inability to furnish the performance
security on or before 11.01.2017.
XXII. The case of the petitioner is that it had complied
with the conditions to the best of its ability and since only
two days were given, non-compliance of any of the
conditions of the letter of grant, which were procedural
compliances, cannot come in the way of the petitioner
depriving it of its rights accrued in pursuance to the
issuance of the grant order dated 08.01.2017.
87. In view of the above-noted peculiar and undisputed facts
and circumstances of the instant case, the question is as to
whether the cut off date 11.01.2017 can be treated as
sacrosanct as asserted by the respondents and the petitioner
be held ineligible under Section 10A of the Amendment Act of
2015. The further question is as to whether any direction
issued by this Court to consider the case of the petitioner for
execution and registration of the lease deed in terms of the
grant order dated 08.01.2017 would be in violation of the
statutory scheme or in other words, any directions issued by
this Court would amount to compel the State authorities to do
acts contrary to the statutory provision.
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88. At this stage, it would be profitable to note the
provisions of Section 10A of the MMDR Act' 1957 and Rule 8
of the MCR Rules' 2016.
"10A. Rights of existing concession holders and
applicants.―(1) All applications received prior to the date of
commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, shall become ineligible.
(2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the following shall remain
eligible on and from the date of commencement of the Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015:―
(a) applications received under section 11A of this Act;
(b) where before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 a
reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence has been granted in
respect of any land for any mineral, the permit holder or the
licensee shall have a right for obtaining a prospecting licence
followed by a mining lease, or a mining lease, as the case may be,
in respect of that mineral in that land, if the State Government is
satisfied that the permit holder or the licensee, as the case may
be,―
(i) has undertaken reconnaissance operations or prospecting
operations, as the case may be, to establish the existence of
mineral contents in such land in accordance with such parameters
as may be prescribed by the Central Government;
(ii) has not committed any breach of the terms and conditions of
the reconnaissance permit or the prospecting licence;
(iii) has not become ineligible under the provisions of this Act; and
(iv) has not failed to apply for grant of prospecting licence or
mining lease, as the case may be, within a period of three months
after the expiry of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence, as
the case may be, or within such further period not exceeding six
months as may be extended by the State Government;
Provided that for the cases covered under this clause including the
pending cases, the right to obtain a prospecting licence followed by
a mining lease or a mining lease, as the case may be, shall lapse on
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the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2021:
Provided further that the holder of a reconnaissance permit or
prospecting licence whose rights lapsed under the first proviso,
shall be reimbursed the expenditure incurred towards
reconnaissance or prospecting operations in such manner as may
be prescribed by the Central Government.
(c) where the Central Government has communicated previous
approval as required under sub-section (1) of section 5 for grant of
a mining lease, or if a letter of intent (by whatever name called)
has been issued by the State Government to grant a mining lease,
before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, the mining
lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment of the conditions of the
previous approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two
years from the date of commencement of the said Act:
Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First
Schedule, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted
under clause (b) of this subsection except with the previous
approval of the Central Government.
(d) in cases where right to obtain licence or lease has lapsed under,
clauses (b) and (c), such areas shall be put up for auction as per
the provisions of this Act.
Provided that in respect of the minerals specified in Part B of the
First Schedule where the grade of atomic mineral is equal to or
greater than the threshold value, the mineral concession for such
areas shall be granted in accordance with the rules made under
section 11B.
"8. Rights under the provisions of clause(c) of sub-section
(2) of section 10A.- (1) The applicant in whose favour:
(a) the State Government has issued a letter of intent (by
whatever name called) in writing before January 12, 2015,
for grant of a mining lease for minerals not specified in the
First Schedule to the Act; or
(b) the Central Government has communicated the previous
approval in writing before January 12, 2015, under sub-
section (1) of section 5, for grant of a mining lease for
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minerals specified in Part C of the First Schedule to the Act,
shall submit a letter of compliance to the State Government,
of the conditions mentioned in the letter of intent or the
conditions mentioned in the previous approval granted by
the Central Government, as the case may be; and the State
Government shall send an acknowledgement of receipt of
the letter of compliance to the applicant in Schedule II
within a period of three days of receipt thereof.
(2) After receipt of letter of compliance under sub-rule (1), the
State Government shall issue an order for grant of the mining lease
within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of such letter
subject to verification of fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in
the letter of intent or previous approval of the Central Government,
as the case may be:
Provided that in case the conditions as mentioned in the (i)
letter of intent issued by the State Government, or (ii) previous
approval granted by the Central Government are not fulfilled,
the State Government shall, after giving the applicant an
opportunity of being heard and for reasons to be recorded in
writing and communicated to the applicant within a period of
sixty days from the date of receipt of letter of compliance,
refuse to grant a mining lease for non-compliance of conditions
mentioned in the letter of intent or the previous approval of the
Central Government, as the case may be.
(3) Upon issuance of an order of grant of mining lease under sub-
rule (2), the applicant shall:
(a) furnish a performance security to the State Government in
the form of a bank guarantee in the format specified in Schedule
IV or as a security deposit for an amount equivalent to 0.50% of
the value of estimated resources, which may be invoked by the
State Government as per the terms and conditions of the Mine
Development and
Production Agreement, published by the Government of India in
the Ministry of Mines, vide Part I, Section-I of the Gazette of India,
dated the 2nd July, 2015, and the mining lease deed. The
performance security shall be adjusted every five years to
correspond to 0.50% of the reassessed value of estimated
resources; and
(b) sign a Mine Development and Production Agreement with the
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State Government in the format specified by the Central
Government after compliance of conditions specified in this sub-
rule.
(4) Where an order for grant of mining lease has been issued under
sub-rule (2), the mining lease shall be executed with the applicant
in the format specified in Schedule VII and registered on or before
11th January, 2017, failing which the right of such an applicant
under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 10A for grant of a
mining lease shall be forfeited and in such cases, it would not be
mandatory for the State Government to issue any order in this
regard.
(5) The State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing and communicated to the applicant, reduce the area
applied for at the time of grant of the mining lease.
(6) The date of the commencement of the period for which a mining
lease is granted shall be the date on which a duly executed mining
lease deed is registered."
89. There cannot be a dispute that the execution of the lease
deed on completion of the requirement of Rule 8(3) upon
issuance of an order of grant of mining lease as per sub-rule
(2) of Rule 8, was not an empty formality. The order of grant
could have been forfeited in case of failure of the applicant to
get the lease deed executed upon completion of the
requirement of sub-rule (3) of Rule 8, by virtue of sub-rule (4)
of Rule 8.
90. According to Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), the
word "forfeiture" means:- "The divestiture of property without
compensation; Or The loss of right, privilege, or property
because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty."
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91. In STO v. Ajit Mills Ltd.19, the Apex Court, while
considering the words "any sum collected by the person by
way of tax in contravention of Section 46 shall be forfeited
to the State Government" occurring in Section37(1)(a) of the
Bombay Sales Tax Act' 1959, and challenge to the forfeiture
clause being bad, has noted the connotation word "forfeiture"
in paragraph Nos. '18' and '19' as under:-
"18. Coming to "forfeiture', what is the true character of a
"forfeiture'? Is it punitive in infliction, or merely another form of
exaction of money by one from another? If it is penal, it falls within
implied powers. If it is an act of mere transference of money from
the dealer to the State, then it falls outside the legislative entry.
Such is the essence of the decisions which we will presently
consider. There was a contention that the expression "forfeiture"
did not denote a penalty. This, perhaps, may have to be decided in
the specific setting of a statute. But, speaking generally, and
having in mind the object of Section 37 read with Section 46, we
are inclined to the view that forfeiture has a punitive impact.
Black's Legal Dictionary states that "to forfeit" is "to lose, or lose
the right to, by, some error, fault, offence or crime', "to incur a
penalty'. "Forfeiture', as judicially annotated, is "a punishment
annexed by law to some illegal act or negligence . . .'. "something
imposed as a punishment for an offence or delinquency'. The word,
in this sense, is frequently associated with the word "penalty'.
According to Black's Legal Dictionary,
The terms "fine", "forfeiture", and "penalty", are often used
loosely, and even confusedly : but when a discrimination is
made, the word "penalty" is found to be generic in its character,
including both fine and forfeiture. A "fine" is a pecuniary
penalty, and is commonly (perhaps always) to be collected by
suit in some form. A "forfeiture" is a penalty by which one loses
his rights and interest in his property.
More explicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained the concept
of "forfeiture" in the context of statutory construction. Chief Justice
Taney, in the State of Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co. [11 L
Ed 714, 722] observed :
(1977) 4 SCC 98
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"And a provision, as in this case, that the party shall forfeit a
particular sum, in case he does not perform an act required by
law, has always, in the construction of statutes, been regarded
not as a contract with the delinquent party, but as the
punishment for an offence. Undoubtedly, in the case of
individuals, the word forfeit is construed to be the language of
contract, because contract is the only mode in which one person
can become liable to pay a penalty to another for breach of
duty, or the failure to perform an obligation. In legislative
proceedings, however, the construction is otherwise, and a
forfeiture is always to be regarded as a punishment inflicted for
a violation of some duty enjoined upon the party by law ; and
such, very clearly, is the meaning of the word in the act in
question."
19. The same connotation has been imparted by our Court too. A
Bench has held [Bankura Municipality v. Lalji Raja & Sons, (1953) 1 SCC
392 : AIR 1953 SC 248, 250 : 1953 SCR 767 : 1953 Cri LJ 1101] :
"According to the dictionary meaning of the word 'forfeiture' the
loss or the deprivation of goods has got to be in consequence of a
crime, offence or breach of engagement or has to be by way of
penalty of the transgression or a punishment for an offence. Unless
the loss or deprivation of the goods is by way of a penalty or
punishment for a crime, offence or breach of engagement it would
not come within the definition of forfeiture."
This word "forfeiture" must bear the same meaning of a penalty for
breach of a prohibitory direction. The fact that there is arithmetical
identity, assuming it to be so, between the figures of the illegal
collections made by the dealers and the amounts forfeited to the State
cannot create a conceptual confusion that what is provided is not
punishment but a transference of funds. If this view be correct, and we
hold so, the legislature, by inflicting the forfeiture, does not go outside
the crease when it hits out against the dealer and deprives him, by the
penalty of the law, of the amount illegally gathered from the
customers. The Criminal Procedure Code, Customs & Excise Laws and
several other penal statutes in India have used diction which accepts
forfeiture as a kind of penalty. When discussing the rulings of this Court
we will explore whether this true nature of "forfeiture" is contradicted
by anything we can find in Sections 37(1), 46 or 63. Even here we may
reject the notion that a penalty or a punishment cannot be cast in the
form of an absolute or no-fault liability but must be preceded by mens
rea. The classical view that "no mens rea, no crime" has long ago been
eroded and several laws in India and abroad, especially regarding
economic crimes and departmental penalties, have created severe
punishments even where the offences have been defined to exclude
mens rea. Therefore, the contention that Section 37(1) fastens a heavy
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liability regardless of fault has no force in depriving the forfeiture of the
character of penalty."
92. The further observation on the expression "forfeiture" in
paragraph No. '35' therein are relevant to be noted
hereinunder:-
"35. The expression "forfeiture" may now be examined. For one
thing, there is authority to hold that "shall be forfeited" means
"liable to be forfeited', depending on the setting and the sense of
the statute. Lord Porter, in Attorney-General v. Parsons [(1956) AC
421] observed, in the context of language suggestive of automatic
forfeiture, negativing such inference :
The strength of the opposite opinion rests upon the fact that
"forfeiture" in Section 1(1) must, on the construction which I
have adopted, mean "liable to forfeiture', whereas, as my noble
and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton points out in his
opinion, which I have had an opportunity of reading, it bears the
meaning of "forfeiture" and not liable to "forfeitures" in sub-
section (2)(iv). This is true, but the collocation is different.
Admittedly the word "forfeited" may bear the meaning "liable to
forfeiture" at the will of the person to whom the right of
forfeiture is given and does not, in every case, imply automatic
forfeiture." (p. 443)
"Lord Cohen, in the same judgment, considered it appropriate
to read 'forfeiture' as meaning 'liable to be forfeited'. Although
there was a conflict of opinion on this point, it is sufficient to
state that such a construction is tenable......"
93. While saying so, in light of the language in Section 37(2)
and Section 37 (3) of the statute therein, it was held therein
by the Apex Court that since forfeiture therein required
holding an inquiry and to make such an order by the
Commissioner, as he thinks fit, the Commissioner was vested
with the discretion to forfeit the whole or any lesser sum or
none at all. In that sense, the words, "shall be forfeited", were
given the meaning as "shall be liable to be forfeited", it was
held therein that this significance of "forfeiture" as "liability
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to forfeiture" saves the equity of the statute. The
Commissioner must have regard to all the circumstances of
the case, including the fact that amounts illegally collected
had been returned to the purchasers to whom they belonged
before passing the final order and that the forfeiture should
operate only to the extent, and not in excess of the total
collections less what has been returned to the purchasers. It
was, thus, held that "Forfeiture is a penalty in its generic
sense, but not a penalty in the specific signification in Section
37(1) and (4)" therein.
94. In the instant case, considering the dictionary meaning
of the word "forfeiture", which connotes "the loss of right,
privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation,
or neglect of duty.", coming to the expression "shall be
forfeited" occurring in sub-rule (4) of Rule 8 of the MCR
Rules' 2016, considering the setting and stand of the Statute,
it would be proper to give it a meaning "liable to be forfeited",
however, in light of the language of sub-rule (4) of Rule 8, it
would not be mandatory for the State Government to issue
any order in that regard.
95. Considering the dictionary meaning of the word
"forfeiture", meaning "loss of right because of breach of
obligation" in light of the sentence, occurring in the sub-rule
(4) of Rule 8 "failing which, the right of such an applicant
under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 10A for grant of
mining lease would be forfeited", it can be discerned that with
the issuance of the order of grant under sub-rule (2) of Rule 8
by the State Government, the applicant (petitioner herein) has
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been conferred with the right to seek execution and
registration of the mining lease, subject to fulfillment of its
obligation to the requirements mentioned in sub-rule (3) of
Rule 8.
96. Section 10A(2) inserted by Act No.10 of 2015 w.e.f.
12.01.2015 provide for saving of rights of the existing
applicants and is an exception to sub-section (1) of Section
10A wherein all applications received prior to the date of
Amendment Act' 2015, have been rendered ineligible.
97. The clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 10A,
attracted in the present case, contemplates the following:-
i. Where the Central Government has communicated
previous approval under sub-section (1) of Section 5 for
grant of mining lease; or
ii. if the letter of intent (by whatever name called) has been
issued by the State Government to grant mining lease
before the commencement of the Amendment Act' 2015;
iii. the mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfillment of
conditions of the previous approval or of the letter of
intent;
iv. within a period of two years from the date of
commencement of Act, i.e. on or before 11.01.2017.
98. In the instant case, all the requirement of clause (c) of
sub-section (2) of Section 10A had been met or fulfilled much
prior to the enactment of the Amendment Act' 2015 w.e.f.
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12.01.2015. The only requirement in sub-section(2)(c) was to
issue the letter of grant subject to fulfillment of conditions of
the previous approval or the letter of intent within a period of
two years, i.e. on or before 11.01.2017, which has also been
fulfilled with the issuance of the letter of grant dated
08.01.2017, issued by the State Government, though on the
verge of the expiry of the period of two years.
99. The words used in clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section
10A "shall be granted subject to fulfillment of conditions..."
cast a mandate upon the State Government to grant mining
lease within a period of two years on or before 11.01.2017,
where all conditions of the grant were fulfilled.
100. There is a delay absolutely on the part of the State
Government in granting approval for the mining lease, inspite
of the settlement of the dispute pertaining to the
nomenclature of the subject land, after it was released from
the notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act.
101. Moreover, a conjoint reading of Section 10A(2)(c) and
Rule 8(4) of the Rules' 2016, makes it evident that with the
order for grant of mining lease having been issued under sub-
rule (2) of Rule 8, a right had been accrued to the applicant
under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 10A for grant of
mining lease, which may be forfeited or lost by the applicant
on a breach of its obligations.
102. However, in the instant case, the forfeiture of the right
for grant of mining lease accrued upon the petitioner herein
by virtue of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 10A in view
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of the sub-rule(2) of Rule 8 will not be attracted in view of the
facts and circumstances of the present case, where there is no
breach of obligation or neglect of duty on the part of the
petitioner.
103. For the fact that the order of grant issued on 08.01.2017
was served upon the petitioner only on 09.01.2017, the
inability of the petitioner in completing the process for
execution and registration of the mining lease deed inspite of
best efforts made by it, would not result in attracting of the
forfeiture clause occurring in Rule 8(4). Such a stipulation
which defeats the accrued right of the petitioner on or before
11.01.2017 (for the mining lease granted) (within a period of
two years of the date of enforcement of Amendment Act'
2015) for the default on the part of the State authorities,
would itself be contrary to the legislative intent in
incorporating Section 10A(2)(c) for saving the rights of those
applicants, whose applications had been processed in
accordance with law within the period of two years from the
date of commencement of the Act' 2015.
104. The submission made by Mr.Kirtiman Singh, the learned
Senior Advocate that the cut off date "11.01.2017" is
sacrosanct and the forfeiture clause would apply
automatically, irrespective of the question as to who was at
fault, is unacceptable.
105. Apart from the bald assertions made in the affidavit of
the respondent No.2 State Government and the respondent
No.1, Union of India, that the Collector, Bhuj - Kachchh had
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intimated that the performance security deposit had not been
made on or before 11.01.2017, nothing much could be
demonstrated before us to demolish the case of the petitioner
that no fault or failure can be attributed to the petitioner for
non-execution / registration of the mining lease. None of the
decisions relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent No.1 (Union of India), would of any benefit to the
respondents, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case. As is demonstrated before us, this Court, the
other High Courts and even the Supreme Court had issued
appropriate directions for consideration of the pending mining
lease applications, depending upon the facts of each case
before them, even after the cut off date, I.e. 11.01.2017.
106. We may also seek guidance from the observations in the
decision of the Apex Court in Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd.
v. State of Odisha20, wherein while noticing the amendment
in Section 11 and inserted provisions of Section 10A by
Amendment Act' 2015, it was noted that:-
"22. Newly inserted provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015 are to
be examined and interpreted keeping in view the aforesaid method
of allocation of mineral resources through auctioning, that has
been introduced by the Amendment Act, 2015. Amended Section
11 now makes it clear that the mining leases are to be granted by
auction. It is for this reason that sub-section (1) of Section 10-A
mandates that all applications received prior to 12-1-2015 shall
become ineligible. Notwithstanding, sub-section (2) thereof carves
out exceptions by saving certain categories of applications even
filed before the Amendment Act, 2015 came into operation. Three
kinds of applications are saved:
22.1. First, applications received under Section 11-A of the Act.
Section 11-A, under new avatar is an exception to Section 11 which
mandates grant of prospecting licence combining lease through
(2017) 2 SCC 125
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auction in respect of minerals, other than notified minerals. Section
11-A empowers the Central Government to select certain kinds of
companies mentioned in the said section, through auction by
competitive bidding on such terms and conditions, as may be
prescribed, for the purpose of granting reconnaissance permit,
prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of any area
containing coal or lignite. Unamended provision was also of similar
nature except that the companies which can be selected now for
this purpose under the new provision are different from the
companies which were mentioned in the old provision. It is for this
reason, if applications were received even under unamended
Section 11-A, they are saved and protected, which means that
these applications can be processed under Section 11-A of the Act.
22.2. Second category of applications, which are kept eligible
under the new provision, are those where the reconnaissance,
permit or prospecting licence had been granted and the permit-
holder or the licensee, as the case may be, had undertaken
reconnaissance operations or prospecting operations. The reason
for protecting this class of applicants, it appears, is that such
applicants, with hope to get the licence, had altered their position
by spending lot of money on reconnaissance operations or
prospecting operations. This category, therefore, respects the
principle of legitimate expectation.
22.3. Third category is that category of applicants where the
Central Government had already communicated previous approval
under Section 5(1) of the Act for grant of mining lease or the State
Government had issued letter of intent to grant a mining lease
before coming into force of the Amendment Act, 2015. Here again,
the raison dêtre is that certain right had accrued to these
applicants inasmuch as all the necessary procedures and
formalities were complied with under the unamended provisions
and only formal lease deed remained to be executed.
22.4. It would, thus, be seen that in all the three cases, some kind
of right, in law, came to be vested in these categories of cases
which led Parliament to make such a provision saving those rights,
and understandably so. (emphasis supplies) "
107. In view of the above discussion, we find substance in the
submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
that the application of the petitioner herein cannot be
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rendered ineligible by invoking sub-section (1) of Section 10A
as observed in the impugned communication dated
17.11.2017 of the Under Secretary to the Government of
India, Ministry of Mines, New Delhi.
108. on a clarification sought by the Government of Gujarat
vide communication dated 03.06.2017. It is noteworthy that as
per the own understanding of the Industries and Mines
Department, Government of Gujarat, lease could be executed
as it had been granted before 12.01.2017, but a guidance was
needed before taking final action.
109. The only basis of holding the mining lease applications of
the then ABG Cements Ltd. as ineligible, as stated in the
impugned communication of the Government of India dated
17.11.2017 is the provisions of Rule 8. As per the
understanding of the Government of India, as expressed
therein, Rule 8(4) is to be construed being in consonance with
the statutory provisions of Section 10A and that it stipulated
that the exercise of converting an application to a mining
lease was to be completed by 11.01.2017, which included
process of grant, execution and registration. The execution of
the lease deed and its registration would have to be
considered as grants for the purpose of Section 10A(2)(c).
110. The reasoning given therein that after 11.01.2017, the
mining lease applications covered by Section 10A(2)(c),
wherein lease deed had not been executed have became
ineligible, in our considered view, is a result of misreading of
the statutory provision and is in complete ignorance of the
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effect of the "forfeiture" clause contained in sub-rule (4) of
Rule 8, as held hereinbefore.
111. We, therefore, reach at an irresistible conclusion that
the respondent No.1, namely the Secretary, Ministry of Mines,
Government of India, New Delhi has committed an error of
law in holding the application of the petitioner as ineligible,
though the grant order under Section 10A(2)(c) had been
passed prior to 11.01.2017, i.e. within the period of two years
of the enactment of the Amendment Act 10 of 1995.
112. We, therefore, find it a fit case for granting relief as
prayed in paragraph Nos. '10(c)' and '10(d)', of the present
petition, for quashing and setting aside the order /
communication dated 17.11.2017 of the Under Secretary,
Ministry of Mines, Government of India, New Delhi,
recommending the application of the petitioner to be
declared as ineligible, and issue directions to the respondent
State for execution of the lease deed as per the order of grant
dated 08.10.2017.
113. The respondent No.2, namely the Secretary, Industries
and Mines Department, Gandhinagar, Gujarat is directed to
take all necessary steps to complete the process to execute
and register the mining lease deed of the subject land, i.e. for
an area admeasuring 300.6957 Hectares situated at Village
Naniber, Taluka Abdasa, District Kachchh under its order
dated 08.01.2017 for grant of limestone mining lease, subject
to fulfillment of all the conditions of the letter of grant dated
08.01.2017 by the petitioner and strictly in accordance with
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/18353/2018 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 18/03/2026
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the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 of the Minerals (Other
than Atomic and Hydro Carbons Energy Mineral) Concession
Rules, 2016, within the shortest possible time. It is provided
that in case of non-fulfillment of any of the conditions of the
order of grant dated 08.01.2017 by the petitioners, it would
be open for the respondent No.2 to pass a reasoned order
strictly in accordance with law, revoking the grant under due
intimation to the petitioner.
114. In any case, the entire exercise shall be completed as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
115. As regards prayer '10(b)', as noted hereinbefore, the
same has been given up by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner at the inception of the arguments.
116. Subject to above observations and directions, the
present petition stands allowed. Pending civil application
stands disposed of, accordingly.
(SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ )
(D.N.RAY,J)
SAHIL S. RANGER
