Gujarat High Court

State Of Gujarat vs Shamalbhai Virjibhai Patel on 16 September, 2022

Bench: Ashokkumar C. Joshi

     R/CR.A/1388/2008                              JUDGMENT DATED: 16/09/2022




        IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                    R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1388 of 2008


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI
======================================================

       Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
 1                                                                        NO
       the judgment ?
 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                               YES

       Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
 3                                                                        NO
       judgment ?
   Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
 4 to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any              NO
   order made thereunder ?

======================================================
                     STATE OF GUJARAT
                            Versus
            SHAMALBHAI VIRJIBHAI PATEL & 5 other(s)
======================================================
Appearance:
MS CM SHAH, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR P P MAJMUDAR(5284) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.
1,2,3,4,5,6
======================================================

 CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI

                              Date : 16/09/2022

                            ORAL JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is filed by the appellant - State under Section 378(1)(3)

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of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment and

order dated 16.01.2008, passed in Special Case No. 66 of 2007 by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 4, Palanpur,

recording the acquittal.

2. Facts in brief are that on 24.12.2006 at about 13:00 hours, the

respondents - accused, forming unlawful assembly in furtherance of their

common object of causing voluntary hurt to the complainant by stick, iron

pipe etc., the respondent No. 4 slapped the complainant whereas, the

respondent No. 5 slapped one Dineshbhai Khushalbhai Naik, as also gave

filthy abuses to the complainant against his caste in public and beat up the

complainant and thus, the accused committed the offences punishable under

Section 504, 506(2) r/w. 147, 148, 149, 323, 504 and 506(2) of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(i)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989 (Atrocity Act) and

Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, for which, FIR came be to registered

against them.

2.1 Upon FIR being filed, investigation started and the Investigating

Officer recorded statements of several witnesses and produced certain

documentary evidence and after completion of the investigation, Charge-

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sheet was filed against the accused for the offence in question. The case

was committed to the Sessions Court and the learned trial Judge framed the

Charge. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against

the accused. Vide impugned judgment and order, the learned trial Judge

acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred

the present appeal.

3. Heard, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. C. M. Shah for the

appellant - State and learned advocate Mr. P. P. Majmudar for the

respondents - accused.

3.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that

the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to

prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that the impugned

judgment of the trial Court is based on presumptions and inferences and

thereby, it is against the facts and the evidence on record. The learned

Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the learned trial Judge

has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its true and proper

perspective and thereby, has erred in recording the acquittal of the

respondents - accused.

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3.2      The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the

learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to

prove the case beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as prosecution witnesses

have clearly supported the case of the prosecution and narrated the whole

case verbatim. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the

learned trial Judge ought to have considered the depositions of prosecution

witnesses however, the learned trial Judge did not believe the case of the

prosecution and thereby, has committed a grave error.

3.3 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant - State

submitted that despite sufficient material was there on record in support of

the case of the prosecution and though the prosecution successfully proved

its case beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has committed

error in discarding the evidence on record and not believing the same.

3.4 It is submitted that the learned trial Judge has ignored the settled legal

position and thereby, has erred in coming to such a conclusion.

3.5 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, taking this Court through

the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, submitted that

though the prosecution has proved the case against the accused beyond

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reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the

evidence on record and thereby, has committed an error in recording

acquittal. It is submitted that though all the ingredients of the offence

alleged had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge

did not believe the same and therefore, the impugned judgment and order

suffers from material illegality, perversity and contrary to the facts and

evidence on record.

3.6 Thus, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted

although cogent and material evidence had been produced by the

prosecution and the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the trial

Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused and

accordingly, it is urged that present appeal may be allowed by quashing and

setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

4. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Majmudar for the respondents -

accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and order of the trial

Court, submitted that the learned trial Judge has, after due and proper

appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, has come to such a

conclusion and has acquitted the accused, which is just and proper. He

submitted that it is trite law that if two views are possible on the basis of the

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evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in

appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not

ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the

lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality.

4.1 The learned advocate for the respondents - accused submitted that the

ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are not proved by the

prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and there were several contradictions

in the evidence on record. Further, almost all the prosecution witnesses

have turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution and

therefore, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused of the

charges levelled against them.

4.2 Thus, making above submissions, it is urged that no interference is

required at the hands of this Court and eventually, it is urged that the present

appeal may be dismissed.

5. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone

through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court as well as the

material on record.

       R/CR.A/1388/2008                                   JUDGMENT DATED: 16/09/2022




5.1      Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to

refer to the scope in acquittal appeals.           It is well settled by catena of

decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and

consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,

there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of

innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal

jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he

is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having

secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed

and strengthened by the trial Court.

5.2 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the

evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in

appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not

ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the

lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive

at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the

decision is to be characterized as perverse.

       R/CR.A/1388/2008                              JUDGMENT DATED: 16/09/2022




5.3      Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would

not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court

below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if

it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse

and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material

evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the the appellate Court, in

such circumstances, re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on

the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is

connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.

5.4 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal

Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752, the

Apex Court has observed that, "The presumption of innocence which is

attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said

accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law

makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should

not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High

Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not

only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more

importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the

tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily

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dragged to the High Court".

5.5 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal

Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020,

2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under:

"9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:

12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v.

State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535, Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC

445)

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13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)

15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)

"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere

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with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. ... an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."

18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para

28) "(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

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(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;

(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC

401.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference."

9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:

"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn

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(1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636)." (emphasis supplied)

9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:

"31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233)

"10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a

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very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case."

31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court.

While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)

"8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment

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should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case."

31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the

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conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.

31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule."

(emphasis supplied)."

6. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Court has extensively gone through the

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depositions of the prosecution witnesses and the other documentary

evidence and found as under:

i) PW-1 Govindbhai Dungarbhai Naik, Exh. 12, the complainant,

has admitted in his cross-examination that a case was registered

against him at the instance of respondent No. 4 - Virjibhai Muljibhai

Patel for cutting trees for which, Mamlatdar had fined him for

Rs.50/- and therefore, in the circumstance, when there is a case of

enmity, the evidence of the complainant requires to be evaluated

carefully;

ii) PW-2 Dr. Dhirajbhai Bechardas Jain, Exh. 17 has deposed to

state that injuries sustained by Dineshbhai Khushalbhai Naik were

simple in nature and could be possible if any one comes in contact

with thorn;

iii) PW-3 Dineshbhai Khushalbhai Naik, Exh. 20 has admitted in

his cross-examination that there was scuffle between Govindbhai (the

complainant) and Virjibhai (respondent No. 4) on account of cutting

the fencing;



       iv)     PW-4 Vijaykumar Rameshbhai Naik, Exh. 21 and PW-5




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Hemantbhai Sampatbhai Naik, Exh. 22 have been declared hostile

and thus, not supported the case of the prosecution;

v) PW-6 Punjabhai Parsottambhai Naik, Exh. 23 has admitted in

his cross-examination that at the time of the incident, 50-60 came

and all were clamoring and he could not say as to who did what in

the uproar. He has also admitted that he could not say as to who

was speaking caste related abusive words. Thus, this witness does

not support the case of the prosecution;

vi) PW-7 Dilipkumar Kantilal, Exh. 24, PW-8 Valjibhai

Dharmabhai Parmar, Exh. 25, PW-9 Mulabhai Ugarabhai, Exh. 27,

PW-10 Hirjibhai Sardarbhai Patel, Exh. 28, PW-11 Rameshbhai

Jeetabhai, Exh. 30. PW-12 Kamrajbhai Shamalbhai Patel, Exh. 31

have been declared hostile and thus, not supported the case of the

prosecution;

vii) PW-13 Vakhatsinh Lalsinh, Exh. 33 was the PSO at Palanpur

Taluka Police Station at the relevant time. He had registered the

complaint and forwarded to the DySP (SC/ST Cell) for further

investigation;

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viii) PW-14 Jagdishbhai Devlabhai Katara, Exh. 35 was serving as

DySP at Deesa and had investigated the offence. He has admitted in

his cross-examination he had recorded the statements of the

witnesses who were mostly belonged to Naik Caste;