Gujarat High Court
Deputy Collector, Special Land ... vs Amarsinh Kalubhai Parmar on 22 April, 2022
Bench: Gita Gopi
C/CA/695/2022 ORDER DATED: 22/04/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 695 of 2022
In
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 26755 of 2021
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DEPUTY COLLECTOR, SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
Versus
AMARSINH KALUBHAI PARMAR
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Appearance:
MS VRUNDA C SHAH, ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3
for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
Date : 22/04/2022
ORAL ORDER
1. This Civil Application has been filed by the applicants
praying for condonation of delay of 746 days in filing of
the above First Appeal.
2. Learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that
there is a delay of 746 days in filing the First Appeal
against the judgment and award dated 27.09.2017 passed
by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge,
Panchmahal at Godhra in Land Reference Case No.78 of
2016. It is further submitted that the judgment and
award was passed on 27.09.2017, the application for
certified copy was moved on 06.11.2017 which came to
be supplied on 07.02.2018. The certified copy was
provided to the Office of the Government Pleader on
C/CA/695/2022 ORDER DATED: 22/04/2022
10.05.2018. The Executive Engineer, Ahmedabad
Irrigation Circle submitted the opinion on 30.04.2018
which was received by the Department on 10.05.2018
and on 24.07.2018, the Deputy Collector, Special Land
Acquisition Officer received approval pursuant to the
permission of the Committee. Further, on 01.08.2018,
the Committee granted permission to the Department to
prefer an Appeal against the judgment and award.
2.1. It is further submitted that pursuant to the
permission on 14.08.2018, necessary sanction was sought
for from the Legal Department, which was granted on
20.09.2018 and vide communication of the Legal
Department, permission was given to prefer an Appeal on
04.10.2018. Necessary documents were supplied to the
Office of the Government Pleader and under instructions,
the draft memo of the Civil Application was sent for
approval. It is further submitted that there has been no
negligence from the side of the authorities concerned and
the delay has occurred because of the various procedures
to be adopted for administrative approval and therefore,
the delay of 746 days in preferring the Appeal may be
condoned.
3. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has referred to the
decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Lilavatiben Kodar
C/CA/695/2022 ORDER DATED: 22/04/2022
Ranchod and Others reported in (2002) 3 GLR 26, where
it has been held as under :-
"while dealing with an application of condonation
of delay has been, to see that ordinarily no
meritorious matter is thrown overboard on the
technical grounds of delay. The purpose and design
incorporating the provisions of section 5 of the
Limitation Act is to see that ordinarily a substantial
justice is required to be given and ordinarily, unless
there are circumstances running counter to the spirit
of the provision of section 5, the meritorious
matters are required to be dealt with and
adjudicated upon on merits. It is rightly said that
no party or person would stand benefited by filing
appeal or application late without any reason
ordinarily when he has made up his mind to
challenge the impugned order, award, judgment or
decision, as the case may be."
4. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and
Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987
SC 1353 it has been observed as under :-
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'.
The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to
apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which
subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose
for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this
Court. But the message does not appear to have
percolated down to all the other Courts in the
C/CA/695/2022 ORDER DATED: 22/04/2022
hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and
cause of justice being defeated. As against this when
delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that
a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the
parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not
every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine
must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic
manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
to have vested right in injustice being done because of
a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the
delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it
was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not
a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine
of equality before law demands that all litigants,
including the State as a liti- gant, are accorded the
same treatment and the law is admin- istered in an
C/CA/695/2022 ORDER DATED: 22/04/2022
even handed manner. There is no warrant for according
a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the
applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact
experi- ence shows that on account of an impersonal
machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly
hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal) and the in-herited bureaucratic methodology
imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-
on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to
understand though more difficult to approve. In any
event, the State which represents the collective cause of
the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata
status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with
the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course
of the interpretation of the expression "suffi- cient
cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced
in its application to matters at hand with the end in
view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference
to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits."
5. Thus, taking into consideration the principle as laid down
in the above referred judgment and when the delay of
746 days is sufficiently explained, the same is condoned.
The application is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Sd/-
(GITA GOPI, J)
CAROLINE
