Deputy District Development ... vs Devatbhai Ramsibhai Bhoda
2021 Latest Caselaw 5580 Guj

     C/LPA/99/2021                               ORDER DATED: 08/06/2021




          IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

               R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 99 of 2021

          In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14162 of 2019

                                   With

      CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of 2021
            In R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 99 of 2021
==========================================================
               DEPUTY DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER
                               Versus
                    DEVATBHAI RAMSIBHAI BHODA
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2,3
MS JYOTIBEN BHATT AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MR NK MAJMUDAR(430) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.M.CHHAYA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRZAR S. DESAI

                             Date : 08/06/2021

                        ORAL ORDER

(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRZAR S. DESAI)

1. By way of this Letters Patent Appeal, the appellant herein (original respondent authority) has challenged the oral order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby while allowing the petition being Special Civil Application No.14162 of 2019 preferred by the respondent herein (original petitioner - delinquent) , the learned Single Judge quashed and set aside the order of termination dated 19.07.2019 and directed the present appellant (original respondent) to reinstate the respondent herein (original petitioner) on his original post with continuity of service and salary / wages for the

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interregnum period, as well as the consequential benefits, as if the order of termination was never passed and with a further direction to pay the original petitioner the resultant consequential benefits within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. Names of the parties are mentioned as per their stated in the petition.

2. Brief facts leading to filing of this appeal are stated as under:

2.1 The original petitioner of writ petition being Special Civil Application No.14162 of 2019 (respondent no.1 herein) came to be appointed as Talati-cum-Mantri vide order dated 05.09.2015 after regular process of recruitment undertaken by 'GPSC' against the sanctioned post. The petitioner's appointment was as per the policy of the Government that initially the appointment would be for a period of five years on a fixed salary basis and the same would be of contractual nature on fixed salary. On completion of five years, all such incumbent would be given regular salary and would be conferred status of 'regular employee'. Within a period of five years from the date of his appointment, the petitioner (respondent no.1 herein), after his appointment as Talati-cum-Mantri on 12.09.2015, but before the petitioner could complete

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tenure of five years, FIR came to be lodged against him on 11.12.2018 before Jamnagar ACB Police Station being I-C.R.No.7 of 2018 under the Prevention of Corruption Act on the basis of allegations levelled in the FIR in respect of illegal gratification of an amount of Rs.20,000/-. Pursuant to the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner was arrested and subsequently was enlarged on bail vide order dated 15.12.2018 by the learned Special Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Jamangar in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.2046 of 2018. It was the case of the original petitioner that trap was not successful and nothing was recovered from the petitioner and he was arraigned falsely in the aforesaid FIR.

2.2 Thereafter the present appellant (original respondent no.3) issued Notice dated 09.04.2019 and asked the petitioner to show cause as to why his contractual appointment should not be terminated in view of the alleged misconduct stated in the Notice dated 09.04.2019 referring to the FIR registered against the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid reference, it was stated in the Show Cause Notice that the petitioner has exhibited dereliction in the duty and committed breach of termination of appointment and hence his services are liable to be terminated.

2.3 The petitioner replied to the aforesaid Show Cause Notice and requested to grant him to cross-examine the witnesses while reiterating that he has not committed any

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breach of prevailing rules. According to the petitioner except the false FIR there is no material against the petitioner. Ultimately the authority i.e. Deputy District Development Officer (Revenue), Jamnagar District Panchayat passed an order dated 19.07.2019 terminating the services of the petitioner without holding the full- fledged inquiry, after taking into consideration the reply filed by the petitioner but observing that the representation made by the petitioner in respect of granting permission to the petitioner to cross-examine the officers, employees, complainant and witnesses connected with the FIR and the aforesaid request being unreasonable, the petitioner's reply can not be accepted and accordingly petitioner's services came to be terminated vide order dated 19.07.2019 without holding full-fledged inquiry.

2.4 The aforesaid order passed by the authorities was subject matter of challenge before the Learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge after hearing the parties allowed the petition vide order dated 22.10.2020 which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court by way of present Appeal.

3. Heard learned advocate Mr.H.S.Munshaw for the appellant and learned advocate Mr.N.K.Majmudar for the Respondent No.1.

3.1 Learned advocate Mr.H.S.Munshaw submitted that

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the appointment of the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was for a fixed monthly remuneration of Rs.7800/- for a period of five years and was subject to terms and conditions stated in his appointment order dated 05.09.2015. One of the vital conditions of the appointment order of the petitioner (condition no.18) was that in case of serious indiscipline or disobedience or in case of very serious incident, it would be open fro the authority to terminate contractual services of the petitioner. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid condition of appointment order, learned advocate Mr.Munshaw submitted that as per the FIR lodged against the petitioner a demand for illegal gratification was made and hence the FIR made under the Prevention of Corruption Act against the petitioner was lodged. Considering the allegations made against the petitioner in the FIR, the case of the petitioner would fall within the aforesaid condition i.e. condition no.18 of his appointment and, therefore, when the petitioner's integrity was questioned in view of the aforesaid condition, the authority was justified in terminating the service of the petitioner which was of contractual nature. According to learned advocate Mr.Munshaw, the learned Single Judge has committed an error by allowing the petition though the allegations against the petitioner are of serious nature.

3.2 Mr.Munshaw further submitted that considering the nature of employment of the original petitioner

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(respondent no.1 herein) which was of contractual nature, no full-fledged inquiry was required before terminating the services of the petitioner. On the aforesaid two counts, learned advocate Mr.Munshaw assailed the order passed by the learned Single Judge and except these two grounds, no other submissions were made.

4. As against that, learned advocate Mr.N.K.Majmudar for Respondent No.1 while vehemently opposing the submissions made by learned advocate Mr.Munshaw, submitted that the impugned order of terminating the services of the petitioner (respondent no.1 herein) vide order dated 19.07.2019 is a stigmatic order and, therefore, as mandatory under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, a full-fledged inquiry against the delinquent employee - respondent no.1 herein was required to be adjudicated. Terminating the services of the respondent no.1 herein on the basis of summary inquiry would amount to non-observance of principles of natural justice as after issuance of show cause notice, no charge-sheet was issued to the delinquent - employee and in absence of full-fledged inquiry and in absence of any charge-sheet, the charges against the employee cannot be said to be proved.

4.1 Learned advocate Mr.Majmudar further submitted that since the FIR is falsely filed against the delinquent employee and in view of the fact that there is no recovery from the delinquent employee, even the material against

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the delinquent was also not sufficient. Learned advocate Mr.Majmudar relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 2021 (2) GLR 1211 in the case of State of Gujarat and others vs. Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor and another and submitted that in almost identical set of facts when the learned Single Judge allowed the petition and ordered reinstatement of the petitioner, the State carried aforesaid judgment into appeal by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.1596 of 2019 and allied matters and while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court. According to Mr.Majmudar, in that matter also, the delinquent employee was terminated on the basis of registration of FIR against him but since the termination order was not preceded by full-fledged inquiry, the termination was held to be bad and order or reinstatement was passed while allowing the Special Civil Application which was confirmed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court and, therefore, relying upon the aforesaid judgment learned advocate Mr.Majmudar submitted that the termination order dated 19.07.2019 being a stigmatic one, the learned Single Judge has rightly quashed the order of termination as the same was passed without holding full-fledged inquiry.

5. We have perused the order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge and we have also perused the material on record in the form of entire record of Special

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Civil Application including the appointment order of the delinquent employee, Gujarat Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 (for short ' the Rules of 1971') and relevant provisions thereof.

5.1 While allowing the petition, the learned Single Judge in Para:5 has elaborately discussed the provisions of law as under:

"5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the contents of the affidavit filed by the authority as well as the petition and the judgments which are tried to be pressed into service, it appears, prima facie, that undisputedly, the petitioner was appointed on a substantive regular sanctioned post of Talati-cum-Mantri and has been recruited through regular selection process which was undertaken by the Gujarat Public Service Selection Board and it is also not in dispute that in view of policy, instead of granting substantive post for a initial period of 5 years, the petitioner was placed in a fixed salary on a contractual basis. A fact is also not in dispute that except lodgment of FIR against the petitioner, there is no other material to indicate that the petitioner has committed any misdeed and in the FIR also, the petitioner was released on regular bail and the case is pending. So, in view of aforesaid undisputed background of fact, the question posed before the Court as to whether the petitioner is subjected to compliance of principles of natural justice or before taking action against him, the department is required to undergo the regular process of departmental inquiry or compliance of the provisions of the Rules of 1971. This question undisputedly appears to have been in controversy in series of decisions before this Court, time and again. But, then, in the recent time, this very issue has been extensively dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and the same is also confirmed by the Division Bench, whereby the issue is clearly answered and, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that case is made out by the petitioner to grant relief. However, since the Court is considering the observations made in various decisions, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court, the Court would like to reproduce some of the relevant observations which are contained in the order passed by the Coordinate Bench in one of the petitions. Following are the observations which deserve to be reproduced hereunder :

"5. The position of law in relation to effecting termination of service of an employee, even if on the fixed pay, by passing a stigmatic order without following principles of natural justice came to be delineated and discussed by this Court in Imranbhai Anwarbhai

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Majothi v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.17872 of 2017 decided on 30th November, 2017. In that case, petitioner was appointed as Beat Guard. The allegations were raised against him inter alia that he had stolen two passbooks, that he mentioned wrong information in the Register to allow trucks to pass-by illegally.

It was stated in the order leading to his termination of service that he used the passbook for illegal purpose for which it was stolen and due to the act of negligence, caused damage to the forest's properties to a large extent. It was mentioned in the order that if the petitioner was to continue in service, it would entail greater loss and that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service since the petitioner was found to be negligent and careless in discharge of his duties.

5.1 The law on the aspect was discussed with reference to the decisions of the Apex Court. In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [(2000) 5 SCC 152], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under:

"Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry." (para 29) (emphasis supplied)"

5.2 The above statement of law that if the order is punitive and stigmatic in nature, even if the employee concerned is a temporary employee or holding the post as on probation, his dismissal or removal would warrant a regular inquiry and full-fledged compliance of natural justice, emanaged from the early decision of the Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India [(1984) 2 SCC 369].

In that case, the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the Court to go behind the formal order of discharge so as to find out the real cause of action. In that case, the appellant was an IPS Officer, undergoing training as a probationer, arrived late by about 22 minutes at the place, even though prior intimation was sent about the time on which, the candidates were required to reach the venue. The incident of delayed reporting was considered to be one by the authorities calling for an inquiry and an explanation was

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sought for from the petitioner and all other probationer trainees who had arrived late. On the basis of explanation, the Director recommended the Government for discharge of the appellant from service. The Government passed order of discharge on the basis of recommendation of the Director with whom, the only ground prevailing was that the appellant did not show any sign of repentance. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits.

5.3 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. In such circumstances, the Apex Court stated, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged, to go beyond the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court held,

"If .... .... .... the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground where the aggrieved officer is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2). It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2)." (Paras 11 and 13)

5.4 It is the foundation of the order which really matters. The Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal (supra) stated that if from the record and the attendant circumstances of the present case it becomes clear that the real foundation for the order of discharge of the appellant-probationer was the alleged act of misconduct, the impugned order would amount to termination of service by way of punishment and in absence of any enquiry held in accordance with Article 311(2), it was liable to be struck down. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all.

5.5 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [(1980) 2 SCC 593] stated and observed thus,

"53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or

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documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." (Emphasis supplied) (Para 9)"

5.5.1 Having delineated the aforesaid principles, the Apex Court held that the order in the case before it could not be treated as a simple order of retrenchment and that it was an order passed by way of punishment. It was held that such order of dismissal which was passed without holding a regular departmental inquiry cannot be allowed to be sustained.

5.6 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [(1999) 2 SCC 21] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive.

5.7 In Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi (supra), it was thereafter observed and held,

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"6. When the impugned order is assessed, evaluated and considered in light of the aforesaid principles, it is even not necessary to adopt the process of lifting of veil. It is not necessary to remove the facade even, for, the order in these very recitals could be manifestly said to be based on allegations of misconduct. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, even though the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. Even if the temporary, ad-hoc or probationer employee is driven out of service on the ground of misconduct without holding inquiry and stigma is caste on his career by the punitive order, it is also a facet of behaving with hire and fire attitude by the employer."

5.8 Also stand to support the petitioner another decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No.1095 of 2016 decided on 21st September, 2016 in which, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that the order ex facie indicated that the basis of the order of termination was criminal complaint lodged against the petitioner. As the order was passed without compliance of natural justice, it was required indulgence of the Court, stated the Court, after discussing the position of law in that regard.

6. In light of the aforesaid principles and the position of law on the aspect, if the facts of the present petitioner are re-visited, the petitioner was appointed on 28th September, 2012 as Junior Clerk for a fixed period of five years. His tenure was to come to an end as per appointment order on 28th September, 2017. Pursuant to F.I.R. being C.R. No.I09 of 2016 registered on 19th December, 2016, the petitioner was supplied to the impugned order of termination is dated 21st August, 2017.

6.1 Looking at the contents and the recitals in the impugned order mentions about filing of F.I.R. against the petitioner at Vadodara (Rural) Anti Corruption Bureau Police Station, Vadodara. It was stated that the petitioner was a Clerk appointed. The complainant stated that he received a phone call from the petitioner to meet him in connection with the work of getting the land of the complainant converted into non-agriculture, that the petitioner asked the gratification of Rs.60,000/- which was ultimately agreed for Rs.50,000/- and Rs.30,000/- was given to the petitioner. The impugned order thereafter narrated the details of the charges applied against the petitioner under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the factum of his suspension and the extension of suspension from time-to-time. It was thereafter stated that since the

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offence was registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act and since the petitioner had committed a misconduct of asking illegal gratification, his services were liable to be terminated. Thus, it was clear from the bare reading of the recitals in the impugned order that the foundation in the impugned order was alleged misconduct of taking bribe for which F.I.R. was registered. By very nature of the contents of the order, the order could be treated as stigmatic. The order was passed without compliance of principles of natural justice. Since the allegation of misconduct was foundation for the penal action taken against the petitioner, above discussed position of law would operate to grant relief to the petitioner.

6.2 While the impugned order will be liable to be quashed and petitioner will be liable to be reinstated, it is clarified that his reinstatement would be for the period which would make up the total period of the fixed period for which he was appointed.

7. As a consequence of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 21st August, 2017 passed by the Collector, Vadodara, is hereby set aside. The respondents are further directed to reinstate the petitioner on the original post of Junior Clerk with continuity of service and salary/ wages for the interregnum as well as all consequential benefits as if order of termination was never passed. Reinstatement of the petitioner directed by this order shall be upto making up of the total original period of his employment as per the order of petitioner's appointment. The resultant monetary benefits shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. Petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Direct service is permitted."

5.1 In view of the aforesaid observations which have been made on the basis of the decisions delivered by the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that the issue is squarely answered, it need not further to be elaborated.

6. Additionally, this Court has also considered one of the decisions delivered by the Division Bench to which this Court is a party being LPA No.1596 of 2019 and allied matters, decided on 24.7.2020 and the said principles having been laid down and even accepted by the State authority by indicating an inclination not to challenge the same before the higher forum and that being the position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the case is made out by the petitioner.

7. The aforesaid proposition laid down by the Division Bench in aforesaid LPA was the subject matter of implementation of the order contained in MCA No.902 of 2019, wherein while disposing of the said contempt petition on 1.10.2020, the Court recorded clearly that Ms.Vrunda Shah, learned AGP, admits that the State is not going to file any further challenge to the said order and finally, is inclined to comply with the

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same. Even after this disposal of the contempt petition, yet another decision on the very same issue, has come up for consideration before the Coordinate Bench in the petition being SCA No.11880 of 2020 in which also, said proposition is reiterated by the Coordinate Bench while allowing the petition vide order dated 21.10.2020.

8. Hence, in view of this position and the proposition of law, this Court is of the opinion that the petition deserves to be allowed. The order dated 19.7.2019 passed by respondent authority is hereby quashed and set aside and the petitioner will be eligible to be reinstated with a clarification that the reinstatement would be for the period which would make up the total period of fixed period for which he was appointed. The respondents are further directed to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service and salary/ wages for the interregnum as well as consequential benefits as if the order of termination was never passed. The reinstatement of the petitioner directed by this order shall be upto making up of the total original period of his employment as per the appointment order of the petitioner and the resultant consequential mandatory benefits shall be paid to the petitioner, within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this Court.

9. This Court, while parting with the present order, is also making it clear that this will not preclude the authority from proceeding against the petitioner strictly in accordance with law. 10. With these observations, the present petition stands allowed. Rule is made absolute."

5.1 Further, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has also, in case of Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor and another (supra), while confirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge from para:8.1 onwards observed thus.

"8.1 In the cognate matter also, almost similar observations are visible and as such, we do not propose to over burden the present order. These observations if to be examined in the background of present fact situation, the same are found to be just and proper. It appears here that the original petitioners were dealt with by issuance of show cause notice with respect to serious charges levelled against them and the notice was given stating as to why in terms of their appointment, they may not be dismissed from the services. Now, this show cause notice appears to have been replied at length by the original petitioners and subsequently, by giving a brief opportunity, without conducting full-scale departmental inquiry, an order of dismissal came to be passed. This procedure which has been adopted

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by the department against both the original petitioners and undisputedly, no departmental inquiry having been conducted against them, the learned Single Judge, on the basis of relevant proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, was justified in his view that in the absence of full-scale departmental inquiry, the services of the writ petitioners cannot be terminated in the manner in which it has been put to an end. We see no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, particularly having gone through the relevant record made available to us.

8.2 This view which has been taken by the learned Single Judge, to which we are also in agreement, stands fortified by few decisions by the Division Bench of this Court which have already been relied upon by the learned Single Judge.

8.3 The bone of contention of appellants - State authorities is that since the original petitioners are employed on a contract basis and fixed pay, the Department is not under an obligation to conduct a detailed full-scale departmental inquiry. Now, this contention has been the subject matter of scrutiny on earlier occasion before a Coordinate Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018 between Vadodara Municipal Corporation v. Manishbhai Nayanbhai Modh, decided on 20.2.2018. The relevant observations contained in the said decision are reflecting in Para.4.1 which are also based upon the decision of the Apex Court and in consonance with the provision of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The said observations have also been considered at length by the learned Single Judge which are reflecting in Para. 5.7 of the impugned order.

9. Yet in another decision again by the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019 between Rahul Aydanbhai Vak v. State of Gujarat, decided on 15.4.2019, in which the same issue has been considered. The relevant discussion of the Division Bench in the said case is contained in Para.7, 8 and 9, in which in no uncertain terms, almost in similar set of circumstance, the Division Bench has clearly opined that full-scale departmental inquiry will have to be undertaken, if initiation of action on the basis of unsatisfactory work, gross negligence or indiscipline or any act which may tantamount to be stigmatic and as such, consistently this view has been clearly opined by the Division Bench.

10. Yet in further decision which is brought to our notice rendered in Special Civil Application No.10928 of 2014, decided on 29.9.2014, in which also the Division Bench has examined even the status of contractual employment. But since we are not called upon nor concerned with the said issue to be dealt with in the present case, we refrain ourselves from commenting anything and leaving the said issue as it is.

11. From the overall material on record and in consideration of

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aforesaid observations, we see no distinguishable material to take a different view or deviate from the same. Since almost in similar issue, the proposition is to the effect that whenever any charge is levelled and action is found to be stigmatic, a full-scale departmental inquiry deserves to be undertaken irrespective of whether the delinquent was a regular employee or contractual employee on a fixed salary. As a result of this, we are of the considered opinion that since undisputedly by a brief procedure, an action is initiated against the respondents herein while dismissing their services, said action itself is found to be not on the touchstone of aforesaid proposition of law. As a result of this, no error is committed by the learned Single Judge. Having perused these material, we are not satisfied with the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants in both these appeals.

12. Additionally, we are also of the opinion that these Letters Patent Appeals have arisen out of the learned Single Judge's decision. The scope of Letters Patent Appeal is well defined by the Apex Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company, reported in 2016 LawSuit (SC) 94. Relevant Para.5 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter :

"Once the learned Single Judge having seen the records and come to the conclusion that the industry was not functioning after January, 1995, there is no justification in entering a different finding without any further material before the Division Bench. The appellate bench ought to have noticed that the statement of MW-3 is itself part of the evidence before the Labour Court. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief."

Hence, we see no other distinguishing circumstance pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants and as such, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge."

5.2 In both the aforesaid judgments, the entire case law has elaborately been discussed and it is held that in absence of full scale departmental inquiry, services of the delinquent cannot be terminated if the order of termination is found to be stigmatic and hence we are unable to take a different view as the same is based on

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numerous judgments referred to in those decisions.

6. Hence, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge and, therefore, present Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.

6.1 In view of above, connected Civil Application would not survive. It is disposed of accordingly.

(R.M.CHHAYA, J)

(NIRZAR S. DESAI,J) MISHRA AMIT V.