Gauhati High Court
Md Badrul Hoque vs The State Of Assam And 6 Ors on 3 November, 2025
Author: Devashis Baruah
Bench: Devashis Baruah
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GAHC010231362025
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/6184/2025
MD BADRUL HOQUE
SON OF LATE AFTAN ALI, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE- BAKARSHAL, P.O.
JABINPUR, DISTRICT- SRIBHUMI, ASSAM, PIN- 788713
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 6 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.
OF ASSAM, DEPARTMENT OF TRIBAL AFFAIRS (PLAIN), C-BLOCK, 3RD
FLOOR JANATA BHAWAN, DISPUR, GUWAHATI-6
2:THE DIRECTOR
WELFARE OF PLAIN TRIBES AND BACKWARD CLASSES (WPT AND BC)
ASSAM
RUKMININAGAR
GUWAHATI- 6
3:THE CHAIRPERSON
BISHNUPRIYA MANIPURI DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
ASSAM
WPT AND BC DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-6
4:THE CHIEF ENGINEER
PWD (ROADS)
ASSAM
CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI-3
5:THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER
P.W.D. SILCHAR BUILDING CIRCLE
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SILCHAR
6:THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
PWD
SILCHAR BUILDING DIVISION
SILCHAR
7:THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
JANATA BHAWAN
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
Advocate for the petitioner (s) : Mr. K. Uddin, Advocate
Advocate for the respondent (s) : Mr. R. Dhar, SC, Tribal Affairs
Mr. B. Gogoi, SC, PWD & Finance
Date on which judgment is reserved : NA
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 03.11.2025
Whether the pronouncement is of the
Operative part of the judgment? : NA
Whether the full judgment has been
Pronounced? : Yes
Heard Mr. K. Uddin, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. R. Dhar, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Tribal Affairs Department, Government
of Assam and Mr. B. Gogoi, the learned counsel who appears on
behalf of the PWD as well as the Finance Department.
2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
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seeking a mandamus directing the respondents to make payment
of an amount of Rs.2,14,398/-.
3. It is pertinent to take note from the materials on record that
the petitioner was issued a work order on 05.02.2014 by the
Superintending Engineer, PWD, Silchar Building Circle, Silchar.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner upon
completion of the work submitted bills to the tune of Rs.8,94,791/-
in the year 2015 and out of the said an amount, certain payments
were made. The last payment was made on 18.11.2016. It is the
case of the petitioner that an amount of Rs.2,14,398/- is pending
since 2016, and as such, the petitioner has approached this Court
by filing the present writ petition.
5. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner as well as the learned counsels appearing on
behalf of the respondents.
6. Mr. R. Dhar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that in respect of certain alleged dues, filing
of a writ petition after almost a decade takes away a valuable right
of the respondents to have a defence in as much as the relevant
records would not be available for making necessary verification.
He, therefore, submitted that this is a case wherein this Court
ought not to entertain the writ petition in view of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water
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Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu ,
reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, wherein the Supreme Court clearly
observed that a litigant cannot be permitted to behave like
"Kumbhakarna". Paragraph Nos. 16 and 17 of the said judgment
are reproduced herein below:-
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction.
As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would
be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated
stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the
way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant
who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the
greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep
and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury
to the lis.
17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in
approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the
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same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such
enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That
apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more
significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless
to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility
had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of
ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of
justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect
others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and
may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable
realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality.
A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons
-- who compete with "Kumbhakarna" or for that matter "Rip Van
Winkle". In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have
thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."
7. From a perusal of the above quoted paragraphs, it is
seen that the Supreme Court in the said judgment had
categorically observed that the equitable jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be exercised
when the petitioner has been negligent in approaching the Court
on the ground of delay and laches.
8. This Court upon hearing the learned counsels finds it pertinent
to observe that there is no explanation as to why the petitioner has
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approached this Court after 9 years.
9. Taking into account the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
and Others (supra), it is the opinion of this Court that the
petitioner had acted as Kumbhakarna and Rip Van Winkle, and as
such, it is the opinion of this Court that this is not a fit case for
exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for
which this Court is not inclined to entertain the instant petition.
10. Accordingly the writ petition stands dismissed.
11. Before parting with the record this Court, however, observes
that the dismissal of the instant writ petition shall not preclude the
petitioner to approach the appropriate Civil Court, if so otherwise
permissible under the law.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
