Delhi High Court
Deep Kumar & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 30 October, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: October 30, 2017
+ W.P.(C) 11484/2015
DEEP KUMAR & ORS
..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Ankit Verma, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel with
Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, Adv. for L&B/LAC
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioners seek a declaration that the acquisition proceedings in
respect of land comprised in khasra nos. 9/4(4-16), 5(4-16), 6(4-16), 15(4-16),
26(0-05), 10/1(4-16) and 2(4-05) in all measuring 28 bighas 10 biswas situated
within the revenue estate of village TikriKhurd, Delhi stands lapsed in view of
Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'New Act'), on the ground that despite Section 4 Notification having been
issued on 23rd February, 2003 being notification
No.F.11(92)/2004/L&B/LA/14103 and Section 6 Notification bearing No.
F.11(92)/2004/L&B/LA/17513 was published on 22nd February, 2007 and award
bearing No. 10/2008-09 having been announced in the year 2008, no compensation
was paid to the owner.
2. Counsel relies upon the decision rendered in the case of Pune
Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & ors., 2014 3
SCC 183, in support of his submission that the acquisition in the present
circumstances would lapse.
3. Counsel also relies on Para 6 of the counter-affidavit to show that the
amount has not been tendered. The same reads as under:-
"6. That the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed as the
possession of the lands which became the subject matter of the present
writ petition was duly taken way back on 22.06.2011 with the entries
in the revenue record, hence if the petitioners were aggrieved with the
possession proceeding and/or acquisition proceedings, they would
have challenged the same at appropriate time. Having laid no
challenge to the acquisition proceedings reflects that the petitioners
were never aggrieved of the acquisition proceedings. It is pertinent to
mention here that for the subject lands of village TikriKhurd, the
appropriate Government has allowed Special Rehabilitation Package
besides the original compensation as granted by the LAC which SRP
has been availed by maximum of the people whose lands were
acquired and taken possession of vide the same notification. The
petitioners/ recorded owner namely Sh. Arjun did not come forward to
receive the compensation and/ or the Special Rehabilitation
Package."
4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the relief so prayed by the
petitioners cannot not be granted, having regard to the fact that the award was
made on 16th February, 2009 within five years prior to the commencement of the
Act of 2013 i.e. on 1st January, 2014, the only relief which the petitioner would be
entitled to, is compensation.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. A similar issue had come up for consideration in the case of Tarun Pal
Singh & Anr. vs. Lt. Governor, Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., W.P.(C)
No.8596/2014, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9789, wherein in paras 7 and 11, the
Supreme Court of India held as under:
"7. It is, therefore, clear that in those cases where the Awards have
been made more than five years prior to the commencement of the Act,
section 24(2) would have applicability, subject to the other conditions
being fulfilled. But, in cases where the Awards have been made within
five years of the commencement of the 2013 Act, section 24(2) would
not apply. It is also clear that once the conditions of section 24(2) are
met, the acquisition itself lapses and therefore no occasion would
arise for invoking the first proviso which is set out after section 24(2).
This is so because the first proviso entails a situation where the
acquisition is saved but the compensation is awarded under the 2013
Act. The proviso cannot blow life into the acquisition which has
lapsed under the main provision of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the
2013 Act. It is for this reason that we think that the first proviso which
has been placed after section 24(2) is not really a proviso to section
24(2) but, a proviso to Section 24(1)(b). The said first proviso and
Section 24(1)(b) can easily be read together. Section 24(1)(b) in effect
relates to all cases where awards have been under the 1894 Act except
those which are covered under Section 24(2). Clearly, awards made
less than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act would
fall under Section 24(1)(b). As such, the general rule in such cases is
that the provisions of the 1894 Act would continue to be applicable, as
if the 1894 Act had not been repealed. However, the said first proviso
carved out an exception to this general rule by providing that in cases
where compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not
been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section
4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with
the provisions of the 2013 Act. This is a provision for the benefit of
landowners inasmuch as even in cases of completed acquisitions, if
the conditions stipulated under the said first proviso stand satisfied,
the compensation would have to be provided under the more
beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act.
11. Coming back to the facts in the present petitions, we find that the
Awards were made within the period of five years prior to the
commencement of the 2013 Act. Clearly, section 24(2) does not apply.
On the other hand, section 24(1)(b) would apply. But, the exception
carved out by the first proviso which has been placed after section
24(2) would also apply. This is so because compensation in respect of
the majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of
the beneficiaries. This is an admitted fact. The consequence of this
would be that all the beneficiaries which include the petitioners herein
who have been specified in the notification under section 4 of the 1894
Act would be entitled to compensation in accordance to the provisions
of the 2013 Act. It is held accordingly."
7. We find force in the submission made by Mr. Yeeshu Jain, learned counsel
appearing for the LAC. The present petitioners do not fall under Section 24(2) but
fall under Section 24(1)(b), would be covered by the decision rendered in the case
of Tarun Pal Singh & Anr. vs. Lt. Governor, Govt. of NCT of Delhi &
Ors.,(supra).
8. Resultantly, the present petitioners are entitled to compensation under the
New Act.
In above terms, the writ petition is disposed of.
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
G.S.SISTANI, J
OCTOBER 30, 2017/aky
