Srichand Longani & Sons vs Mala Devi
2012 Latest Caselaw 3548 Del

Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 3548 Del
Judgement Date : 28 May, 2012

Delhi High Court

Srichand Longani & Sons vs Mala Devi on 28 May, 2012

Author: Indermeet Kaur

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                 Date of Judgment:28.5.2012


+            RC.REV. 239/2012 & CM No.9918-19/2012



      SRICHAND LONGANI & SONS                 ..... Petitioner
                  Through: Mr.Pravir K. Jain, Adv.

                  versus



      MALA DEVI                                       ..... Respondent
                           Through:   None.



      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR


INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)

1 Impugned judgment is dated 10.4.2012; the application filed by

the tenant in pending proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA

had been dismissed. Eviction petition filed by the landlord had been

decreed.

2 Record shows that the present eviction petition had been filed by

Mala Devi seeking ejectment of her tenant Srichand Longani & Sons,

partnership firm from the disputed premises i.e. a shop in property

No.5267/XII, New Market, Sadar Bazar, Delhi on the ground of

bonafide requirement.

3 This petition was filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent

Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the DRCA). Contention was that

the petitioner is the owner and landlady of the disputed premises; this

factum is not in dispute. Her submission in the eviction petition is that

she is a widow and along with her two daughters wishes to start some

kind of business; she has two daughters and with their help she will be

able to use this shop at Gandhi Market, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and to carry

out the business; this is the need for herself and her two daughters;

further contention being that she has no substantial source of income;

eviction petition had been filed accordingly.

4 Averments made in the application seeking leave to defend have

been perused. Contention is that the landlord has sufficient

accommodation with her and in fact she has 13 shops; there is no reason

as to why she requires this particular shop; further contention being that

the permission under the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act,

1956 has not been taken. On this issue it has been pointed out to the

learned counsel for the tenant that in view of the judgment of Ravi Dutt

Sharma Vs. Ratan Lal Bhargava AIR 1984 SC 367 permission under

Section 19 of the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 is

not required for a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA; in this

context the Apex Court had held as follows:

„The special procedure contained in Chapter IIIA as introduced in the Rent Act by the amendment Act 1976 makes it no longer a requirement for the landlord to obtained a permission from the Competent Authority under Section 19 of the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance Act, 1956 before instituting an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA."

5 This argument is now no longer pressed before this Court.

Further contention in para 15 is that the daughters of the petitioner are

both married and are living happily in their matrimonial home; the

submission of the landlord that she has no sufficient accommodation is

wrong; she has also 13 other shops from where she is getting rent.

Further submission is that there are no specific denials to these averment

made in the reply filed by the landlord. Orally, it has been urged before

this Court that this petition has been filed against a dead man as the

eviction petition had arrayed Srichand Longani as proprietor of M/s

Srichand Longani & Sons; even on the date of the filing of the petition

Srichand Longani was a dead man. Record shows that this was not

known to the petitioner and when it was brought to the notice of the trial

court; the trial court on 06.10.2010 had directed the tenant to disclose

the name of the legal heirs of Srichand Longani; on an application under

Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code in which names of the legal heirs of

Srichand Longani as detailed in para no.2 of the said application (page

no.225 of the paper book) the said legal heirs had been taken on record.

There is no dispute to this factum. Argument urged before this Court is

that Srichand Longani is in fact partnership firm and all the partners

should have been brought on record; this contention was not urged

before the trial court and that is why this submission is missing in the

order dated 06.10.2010 wherein the trial court had only directed the

tenant to disclose the names of the legal heirs of Srichand Longani

which were then taken on record by allowing the landlady to file the

amended memo of parties. In this context the learned counsel for the

petitioner submits that even after the legal heirs of Srichand Longani

had been brought on record by way of amended memo of parties yet all

of them have not been served and only the petitioner Nand Kishore is

contesting the petition and other tenants should have been served

separately. Apart from the fact that this submission was never a part of

the pleading in the trial court it is even otherwise devoid of any merit.

The eviction petition discloses that M/s Srichand Longani & Sons was

the original tenant; this was a proprietorship firm of Srichand Longani;

if this was a partnership firm, it was the incumbent duty of the tenant to

have brought it to the notice of the trial court. Today certain documents

to support this factum had been filed on record but not being a part of

the trial court this submission now being urged before this Court at this

stage cannot be appreciated. Thus what can be deciphered is that

Srichand Longani was the original tenant; after his death his legal heirs

became joint tenants; they were not tenants-in-common. Impleadment

of one tenant is sufficient in the eyes of law. In this context a co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in Inder Pal Khanna Vs. Bhupinder Singh

Rekhi reported in 2008 VIII AD (Delhi) 328 as held as follows:

"There is no dispute that after the death of the original tenant tenancy devolves upon the legal representatives as joint tenants and not as tenant-in-common and the eviction petition filed by the

landlord against one or the other legal representative of the deceased tenant who is in occupation of the premises is a valid petition."

6 This submission raises no triable issue. The bonafide need of the

landlord has been established. Merely because she is a lady aged 62

years and at this stage wishes to start her business; would not qualify her

need as imaginative or moonshine; it would not deprive her of right to

start a business to earn some kind of livelihood for herself along with

the help of her two daughters. Even presuming that there has been no

specific denial to the submission that both the daughters are married but

the fact that the landlady has no son she obviously has to lean upon her

married daughters for support; both for her business needs as also

otherwise. Further submission that she has not disclosed the details of

her business is also of a little consequence. In this context in Raj

Kumar Khaitan & Ors. Vs. Bibi Zubaida Khatun and Anr. reported in

AIR 1995 SC 576 the Apex Court had held as follows:

"It was not necessary for the appellants-landlords to indicate the precise nature of the business which they intended to start in the premises. Even if the nature of the business would have been indicated nobody could bind the landlords to start the same

business in the premises after it was vacated."

7 Last submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the will

relied upon by the landlord (by virtue of which she has derived title of

this property) also makes a mention of property D-72, Wazir Pur

Industrial Area, New Delhi which factum has been concealed. This

submission petitioner is falsified by the fact that it is the landlady herself

who has filed this document; it is not as if this will had been filed by the

tenant; this will relied upon by the landlord is a document which has

been filed by herself. This document discloses that a factory property at

Wazir Pur Industrial area has also been bequeathed in her name; it is not

the case of the tenant that this factory premises is source of livelihood

for the landlady or that that some kind of business is being carried out at

this factory premises at Wazir Pur Industrial area from where the