Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2712 Del
Judgement Date : 20 May, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 20.5.2011
+ R.S.A.No.63/2009
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ...........Appellants
Through: Mr.Ankur Chibbar, Advocate.
Versus
SHRI EX.L/N RAJ PAL SINGH ..........Respondent
Through: Mr.Samrat Nigam, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Yes
INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)
1 This appeal has impugned the judgment and decree dated
20.11.2007 which has reversed the finding of the trial dated
19.4.2005. Vide judgment and decree dated 19.4.2005 the suit
filed by the plaintiff Raj Pal Singh seeking declaration (to the
effect that the order dated 09.3.1996 dismissing the plaintiff from
services be declared null and void; defendant be directed to
reinstate the plaintiff with full back wages) had been dismissed.
The impugned judgment had reversed this finding. Suit of the
plaintiff stood decreed.
2 Plaintiff was working as a constable in the CRPF since
17.6.1983. He was discharging his duties sincerely; he was
promoted to the post of Lance Naik. On 14.5.1994 he went on
leave with permission of the department; he was unfortunately
implicated in a criminal case. FIR No.233/94, under Section 307
of the IPC at police station Bhajanpura had been registered
against him. He was arrested and released on 31.5.1995. He
reported for duty on 02.6.1995. The further case of the plaintiff is
that the department was informed about the criminal case which
has been registered against him for which he was subsequently
acquitted on 21.8.1996. However, a departmental enquiry was
initiated against him. He was served with charge sheet dated
02.2.1996 on the allegation that he had concealed this fact of the
criminal case which had been registered against him. He
suspended and thereafter dismissed. Contention before the Court
is that the order of the Enquiry Officer dismissing him from
service on 09.3.1996 is illegal and void. Suit for declaration to the
said effect had been filed.
3 In the written statement the contentions raised in the plaint
were denied; it was specifically stated that the plaintiff was guilty
of desertion; he reported for duty on 02.6.1994 after having
deserted w.e.f. 15.5.1994 i.e. for 18 days; he had been awarded
penalty of 'censure'; thereafter the aforenoted FIR had been
registered against the plaintiff on 14.5.1994, which fact had not
been disclosed by the plaintiff. He was rightly held guilty of the
charges levelled against him. The order of the Enquiry Officer
calls for no interference. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
4 In the replication the contention of the plaintiff was that the
fact about the criminal case having been registered against him
had been informed to the department by his brother Ram Krishan.
5 On the pleadings of the parties the following three issues
were framed:
1. Whether the order date 9.3.96 removing the plaintiff from service is null, void, illegal and against the principles of natural justice, if so its effect?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration and injunction as prayed for?
3. Relief.
6 Oral and documentary evidence was led. The trial judge
was of the view that this fact against that a criminal case had
been registered against him had been concealed by him; this fact
had been proved; the order of the Enquiry Officer call for no
interference; the trial judge had noted that the plaintiff had given
different names of his brother who had intimated the department;
in one breath he had stated that Ram Kishan had informed the
department whereas in the next breath he had given the name of
Om Prakash who had been subsequently produced as a witness
and examined as PW-2. His version had been disbelieved; court
was further of the view that there has been no violation of rules of
natural justice. Suit of the plaintiff stood dismissed.
7 In appeal this finding was reversed. The appellate court had
reversed this finding primarily on two counts. The first reason for
reversing the finding of the trial judge was that no defence
assistant had been provided by the department to the plaintiff. It
is an admitted fact that the services of a defence assistant were in
fact not asked for to defend the charges levelled against the
plaintiff; he had pleaded guilty but Enquiry Officer had
nevertheless examined the witnesses of the department who had
been cross-examined; no prejudice had been suffered by the
defendant. In these circumstances the impugned judgment
holding that the non furnishing of the defence assistant to the
plaintiff had caused prejudice to him is clearly an illegality.
8 The second reason for reversing the finding of the trial was
that the testimony of PW-2 had been believed. Impugned
judgment had noted that PW-2 had informed the department on
17.5.1994 about the criminal case which had been registered
against the plaintiff on 14.5.1994; there was no concealment on
his part. The charge levelled against him was thus not proved;
plaintiff was held entitled to the relief.
9 This is a second appeal. It has been admitted and on
12.8.2009 the following substantial questions law were
formulated:
1. Whether the Appellate Court was right to set aside the order on the ground that petitioner was not given right of defence when he had pleaded guilty?
2. Whether the impugned order could be set aside and the respondent could be granted the relief claimed by him in the suit when he had not challenged order dated 4.7.2007 which was the order of the Appellate Authority?
10 On behalf of the appellant it has been urged that the present
suit has been filed seeking declaration to the effect that order of
his dismissal dated 09.3.1996 be set aside. It is pointed out that
an appeal had been filed against the order of the Enquiry Officer
dated 09.3.1996 which has been dismissed by the DIG on
4.7.1997. Admittedly the order of 04.7.1996 is not subject matter
of the challenge. Even assuming that the suit of the plaintiff was
correctly decreed, the result is that the only order dated
09.3.1996 would be set aside and the subsequent order i.e. the
order of the appellate body dated 04.7.1996 would still be
prevailing. This submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant is borne out from the record. Plaintiff not having
challenged the order of the appellate body dated 4.7.1996 which
had dismissed his appeal impugning the order dated 09.3.1996,
clearly shows that the effect of the decree granted to the plaintiff
by the impugned judgment would serve no purpose. The present
suit had been filed on 20.8.1997; plaintiff not having challenged
the order of the appellate body dated 4.7.1996 the suit
challenging order of dismissal dated 09.3.1996 which had merged
with the order of 04.7.1996 was not maintainable. This answers
the substantial question of law no.2.
11 Learned counsel for the respondent has clearly conceded
that on the first substantial question of law he does not have many
words as it is an admitted case that right for a defence assistant
had never been pressed. It is also on record that the plaintiff had
pleaded guilty to the charges levelled against him. In these
circumstances, the non-furnishing of a defence assistant did not in
any manner prejudice the case of the plaintiff.
12 The testimony of PW-2 was also illegally relied upon by the
appellate court. The replication of the plaintiff shows that he had
named Ram Krishan as his cousin brother who had informed the
department about the registration of the FIR against the plaintiff.
He had however produced Om Prakash into the witness box to
substantiate this averment. Trial judge had rightly noted this
assertion and had rejected the testimony of PW-2. This finding
which had been upset in appeal was an illegal and perverse
appreciation of the evidence.
13 Substantial question of law no.1 is accordingly answered in
favour of the appellant; the trial court in a perverse manner had
set aside the order of the trial judge; defence assistant not having
been asked for and the plaintiff having already pleaded guilty to
the charges levelled against him, he suffered no prejudice on this
count. Result of the aforenoted discussion is that the appeal is
allowed. Suit stands dismissed.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
MAY 20, 2011 nandan
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