Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2486 Del
Judgement Date : 10 May, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. M.C.1502/2011
Date of Decision : 10.05.2011
V. P. WADHWA ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Aman Jain, Adv.
Versus
C.S. PARASHER ....Respondent
Through: counsel for the respondent (appearance not given).
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J. (oral)
1. This is a petition filed by the petitioner for quashing the order
of summoning dated 19.02.2010 passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate in complaint case no. 479/1999
(5202/1) titled C. S. Parasher Vs. Suresh Kaushik & Ors.
Under Section 220/341/342/357/506/500/120B IPC and
Section 124 of Delhi Police Act and also to quash the said
complaint.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent no.
2 filed a complaint under Section
220/341/342/357/506/500/120B IPC read with section 124
of Delhi Police Act against Suresh Kaushik, Ved Pal
Singh and V. P. Wadhwa. It was alleged in the complaint that
on 23.05.1999 the complainant was sitting in the office of Mr.
R. K. Saini, Advocate at 114-A and 115-A, Ekta Enclave,
Peera Garhi, Rohtak Road, Delhi who is also a partner in
M/s C.S. Parasher & Co. It is alleged that R. K. Saini had
some dispute with his neighbour V. P. Wadhwa/petitioner
who is running the business of property dealing from his flat
bearing no. 112A Ekta Enclave, Peera Garhi, Delhi. It is
alleged that the flats of R. K. Saini and V. P. Wadhwa are
facing each other. It is alleged that the present petitioner
who is an accused in the complaint had put up a big shutter
on the main door of his flat and he opens his office from 8.00
A.M. till 11.00 P.M., which causes disturbance, annoyance
and inconvenience to Mr. R. K. Saini, Advocate. On
23.05.2009, a complaint was lodged by Mr.R.K.Saini with
P.S. Paschim Vihar, Delhi regarding the unlawful and illegal
activities carried out by the present petitioner as he was
creating public inconvenience and annoyance etc.
3. It is alleged that on learning this fact that a complaint has
been made by the complainant against the petitioner, on
23.05.2009 that V.P.Wadhwa along with some police officials
barged into the office of R.K.Saini in the afternoon and
manhandled them. The exact sequence of allegations made in
the complaint in para (7) and (8), reads as under:
(vii) That to utter shock and surprise Mr. Suresh Kaushik Incharge P.P. Mianwali himself along with a posse of policemen including Mr. Ved Pal Singh constable barged into the office of Mr. R. K Saini advocate on 23.05.1999 in the afternoon and asked all of us to accompany him to the police post Mianwali. When we protested and wanted to know the reason and asked for the warrant, he himself manhandled complainant and dragged him by holding the collar and the shirt while uttering filthy language and saying "SALE MAN TERE KO ABHI DEKHATA HUN WARRANT". He further threatened all of us to kill saying, "JO MERA MUH LAGTA HAIN WAHA JINDA NAHI BACHTA TUMEHE TO ENCOUNTER DIKHAKAR KABHI BHI KHATAM KAR DOONGA". The other policemen Mr. Ved Pal Singh dragged and pushed the colleagues of the complainant Mr. R. K. Saini and Mr. Sunial Kumar Shahi into the police van and took all of us to the above said police post and kept us in illegal detention for six hours without any rhyme and reason and provocation. The complainant and his colleague were let out by the accused only after the intervention of Mr. H. R. Banga, Advocate of Sales and Tax Bar Association.
(viii) That complainant thereafter made representation to the Delhi Bar Association on 24.05.1999 and Delhi Bar Council. In response to the complaint Mr. Rajender Rana Executive Member Delhi Bar Council also made complaint to the Commissioner of Police on 25.05.1999 against the highhandedness and illegal detention of the Advocates by the police Sub Inspector and accused no. 1 in conspiracy with the accused no. 3. No action has however been taken so far. The complainant is therefore constrained to move this Hon'ble Court for justice having no other efficacious remedy against the illegal and unjust detention and the defamation caused by the accused persons of the complainant and his colleagues in addition to other illegal acts as stated in the complaint.
4. The complainant examined himself as CW-1 and supported
the averments made in the complaint and also examined
Sunil Kumar as CW-2. The learned Magistrate after hearing
the arguments and examining the record summoned the
present petitioner and the other police officials as accused
persons to face the trial for an offence under Section 220,
341, 357 and 506 IPC read with 34 IPC. This order was
passed on 19.02.2010. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by
the said order of summoning has assailed the same. It has
been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
the order of summoning has been passed in a mechanical
manner without an application of mind, and therefore, the
summoning order deserves to be set aside. In this regard, the
petitioner has placed reliance on Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. Vs.
Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. (1998) 5 SCC 749.
5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record.
At the very outset, it may be pointed out that normally a
petition challenging the order of summoning and a revision
petition can be filed in three months from the date of passing
of the order of summoning or alternatively if within three
months from the date when the petitioner learnt about the
order of summoning. But in the instant case not only the
petitioner has not chosen to file the revision petition but has
also filed the present petition challenging the order of
summoning under Section 482 Cr.P.C. after a lapse of more
than a year, therefore, prima facie the present petition under
Section 482 against the summoning order is not only highly
belated but ought not to be entertained on account of an
inordinate delay challenging the order of summoning so as to
circumvent the period of limitation within which a revision
petition ought to have been filed. On this ground itself, the
petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. Even if the petition is seen on its merit no doubt the learned
counsel for the petitioner has referred to Pepsi Foods case
(Supra) wherein the Apex Court has observed that the order
of summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious
matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter
of course. It is also not that the complainant has to bring
only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint
to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the
Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has
applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of
allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral
and documentary in support thereof and whether that be
sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge
home to the accused. Similar is the observation passed by
the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs.
Surendra Prasad Sinha AIR 1992 SC 1815 wherein it has
been observed that the process should not be issued
mechanically as a vendetta to harass a person.
7. There is no dispute about these propositions of law that the
order of summoning must reflect application of mind on the
part of the learned Magistrate or that summoning order
should not be issued mechanically.
8. The question which arises for consideration is that as to
whether the order of summoning which has been passed by
the learned Magistrate reflects application of mind on the part
of the learned Magistrate or not. I find that the order of
summoning which has been passed by the learned Magistrate
shows due application of mind after examining the complaint
as well as the witnesses examined by the complainant. The
learned Magistrate has also taken note of the fact that at the
stage of passing a summoning order minute dissection of
evidence is not required to be done as is normally done at the
stage of final decision. At the stage of order of summoning,
the Court has to only see as to whether the prima facie
ingredients are satisfied or not. While doing so the learned
Magistrate has also considered the question as is warranted
under Section 197 Cr.P.C. It has been observed by the
learned Magistrate that when a public official does something
which is beyond the scope of his official duties he does not
enjoy the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. In the instant
case the complainant has deposed as witness that the police
official has connived with the petitioner in extending not only
threat but also in committing various other offences. The
exact sequence of the complaint is produced in para (7) and
(8) of the complaint. Therefore, I feel that in the light of the
order passed by the learned Magistrate, by no stretch of
imagination, it could be said that the learned Magistrate has
not applied his judicial mind. A minute dissection of
evidence is not required to be done at this stage. I,
accordingly, feel that there is no ground for quashing the
summoning order.
9. So far as the quashing of the complaint is concerned, no
argument has been addressed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner. However, I have considered the question of
quashing of the complaint also with reference to the ground
which has been taken. The law regarding the quashing of
the complaint or the FIR has been laid down exhaustively by
Apex Court in case titlted State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal
1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 wherein the Apex Court has given
seven illustrative contingencies in which the FIR can be
quashed. The only contingency which could have been
raised by the present petitioner is the fact as to whether the
averments made in the complaint prima facie satisfied the
ingredients of the offence or in other words that a prima facie
case against the petitioner is not made out. I do not think
that on a perusal of the complaint and the testimony adduced
by the complainant, it can be said that no prima facie case for
the various offences in respect of which summons have been
issued, is not made out against the present petitioner. The
question of previous enmity and various other things raised
by the petitioner are in the nature of defence which he can
take during the course of trial as these are disputed question
of fact. In addition to this in Bhajan lal case (Supra) the
Apex Court has also put the High Court on caution by stating
that the ousting power must be exercised very sparingly and
not as a matter of course. I do not find that this is a case
which warrants the quashing of the summoning order and
complaint. For the reasons mentioned above, I do not find
any merit in the petition, and accordingly, the same is
dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
MAY 10th, 2011 KP
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