Samar Singh Puri vs The State (Nct Of Delhi)
2011 Latest Caselaw 2472 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                    Crl. Rev. P. No.129/2009

                                       Date of Decision : 09.05.2011

SAMAR SINGH PURI                                      ...... Petitioner
                                Through:   Mr. Rajesh Samanotra, Adv.

                                  Versus

THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)                        ...... Respondent
                      Through:             Mr. Pravin Sharma, APP
                                           Adv.


CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

1.     Whether Reporters of local papers may be
       allowed to see the judgment?                        NO
2.     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?             NO
3.     Whether the judgment should be reported
       in the Digest ?                                     NO

V.K. SHALI, J.

1. This is a criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner

against the order dated 09.03.2009 passed by the

learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ms.

Indermeet Kaur Kochhar (as his ladyship then was)

directing the framing of charge under Section 308/354

IPC in respect of FIR No. 20/06 registered by PS Hauz

Khas.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Shri Satish

Kakkar, the complainant is the landlord residing in the

property situated at B-48, Ground Floor, Panchsheel

Enclave, New Delhi. He lodged a complaint that on

10.01.2006 at about 10:30 AM, he was parking his

scooter in the front portion of the property in question

when his tenant Shri S.S. Puri, the present petitioner

who resides on the first floor, came down and uttered

that the complainant has made his life hell and,

therefore, he would not spare him. He allegedly picked

up a cemented brick and hit Shri Satish Kakkar on his

head as a consequence of which blood started oozing and

he suffered injuries. He was taken to the hospital where

he allegedly remained admitted for 3 days. The doctors

had opined the nature of the injuries to be simple.

3. At the time when the complainant Shri Satish Kakkar

was attacked and hit on the head, he raised an alarm

and started crying for help as a consequence of which his

wife Smt. Ramesh Kakkar came to his rescue. It is

alleged that the present petitioner pulled her from the

hair and dragged her and also slapped her on face. On

the basis of these allegations, the learned Additional

District & Sessions Judge framed charges on 09.03.2009

against the petitioner under Section 308, i.e., attempt to

commit culpable homicide and Section 354, i.e., assault

on a woman with an intention/knowledge to outrage her

modesty.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that

so far as the charge under Section 308 IPC is concerned,

that has been erroneously framed against the petitioner

inasmuch as the injuries on the person of the petitioner

are simple in nature. It was also contended by the

learned counsel that merely because the petitioner

remained admitted in the hospital for 3 days for which

there is no prima facie proof, the charge under Section

308 is not sustainable. The learned counsel for the

petitioner relied upon two judgments of this Court in this

regard Surinder Kumar versus State 1997 JCC 45

and Brahm Dutt & Others versus State and Others,

1996 JCC 183

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in

the case of Surinder Kumar, the facts were almost

similar to the facts of the present case. In the reported

case, the assailant had picked up a sword at the time of

scuffle between the two parties because of which injuries

were caused on the person of the victim which were

opined to be simple and the Court had observed that the

facts of the case did not warrant framing of charge under

Section 308 IPC for attempt to commit culpable homicide

as the injuries were simple in nature and inflicted with a

blunt object which would not have been sufficient to

cause the death of the injured. Similarly in Brahm

Dutt's case also the charge under Section 308 IPC was

converted into Section 323, IPC on the ground that the

nature of injuries which were suffered by the victim were

simple and, therefore, could not be considered to be

sufficient to cause the death of the injured.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed

reliance on the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High

Court in a case titled Jangir Singh versus State of

Punjab 1987 C.C. Cases 134 (HC) which is somewhat

similar to the earlier two cases with regard to the nature

of injuries being opined as simple though suffered on the

head. In this case also, it was observed that there was

no intention or knowledge to cause the death of the

victim.

7. The second submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner is that the charge under Section 354 IPC is

also not sustainable on account of the fact that the

present petitioner had no intention to outrage the

modesty of Smt. Ramesh Kakkar, wife of the injured. In

this regard, the learned counsel has relied on the

judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in case

titled Ms. Kailash versus Hans Kumar, 2000 (1) RCR

(Criminal) 715 to contend that an offence under Section

354 IPC would prima facie be made out only if the blows

are given on the breast to satisfy the carnal pleasure and

only then it would come within the term of outraging the

modesty of a woman.

8. Learned counsel for the State has contested the claim of

the petitioner and stated that the learned counsel for the

petitioner has very conveniently not referred to the fact

that in the instant case, there was a previous enmity

between the present petitioner and the complainant. It is

in this background that the words uttered at the time of

commission of the offence distinguish the facts of the

present case with the facts of the reported judgments and

consequently the charge under Section 308 IPC is legally

sustainable.

9. With regard to charge under Section 354, IPC, the

learned APP contended that the blows or the slaps which

were given by the petitioner though may not have been

prima facie for satisfaction of his carnal pleasure but the

very fact that he pulled the hair of the victim Smt.

Ramesh Kakkar and dragged her shows that he had full

intention and knowledge to outrage her modesty.

10. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the

respective sides and have perused the record. I do not

find that there is any illegality, impropriety or

incorrectness in framing the charges under Section

308/354 IPC against the present petitioner.

11. So far as the charge under Section 308, IPC, i.e., attempt

to cause culpable homicide is concerned, the same is

prima facie made out in the instant case. There is no

dispute about the fact that at the stage of framing of the

charge, only a prima facie case must be made out and

this will depend upon the facts of each case. The facts of

no two cases are comparable. Rather the facts of the

reported judgments are distinguishable from the present

case. Admittedly, there is a relationship of landlord and

tenant between the victim and the assailant and it has

also come on record that there was an ongoing feud

between the petitioner and the victim. This is further

supported by the fact that the petitioner had allegedly

uttered the words that his life has been made miserable

and therefore, he would not spare the complainant. Seen

in the light of these facts, the hitting of the victim by the

present petitioner with the help of a brick that too a

cemented brick on the head not once but twice and the

injuries being suffered by him in the rear portion of the

head prima facie establishes that the petitioner not only

had intention but also the knowledge that the injury

which he is likely to cause on the vital part of the body of

the injured is likely to cause even death and, therefore,

the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide

against the present petitioner has been rightly framed by

the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

12. The judgments which have been relied upon by the

petitioner in order to support his submission for toning

down the offence to one of Section 323 or 324, IPC are

not applicable to the facts of the present case for the

simple reason that there is a stark dissimilarity in the

facts of the cases reported by the petitioner and the facts

of the case in hand. For these reasons, the prayer

of the petitioner so far as the offence under Section 308

IPC is concerned, has no merit.

13. As regards the offence under Section 354, IPC it is clear

from the reading of the ingredients of Section 354, IPC

that what is prima facie required to be seen is that there

must be an assault or use of criminal force on a woman;

such an assault or use of criminal force must have been :

(a) with an intention to outrage her modesty; or

(b) be with the knowledge that her modesty is likely to

be outraged

The word 'modesty' has not been defined in the Code

while as in the case of Roopan Deol Bajaj versus K.P.S.

Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309, while referring to Oxford

Dictionary, the Supreme Court observed that modesty is

a quality of being modest and in relation to woman, it

means womanly propriety of behavior, scrupulous

chasity of thought, speech and conduct.

14. In the light of the said definition, the behaviour of the

present petitioner in assaulting Smt. Ramesh Kakkar and

slapping her on face and the fact that he held the hair of

the woman and dragged her is sufficient, in my view,

prima facie to satisfy the ingredients of Section 354, IPC

that is not the way a normal civilized person would

behave with a woman. I do not agree with the judgment

cited or the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the assault must be for carnal pleasure in

my view. It need not be so in all cases of assault.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, I feel that even the charge

under Section 354, IPC against the present petitioner

does not call for any interference.

16. For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit

in this petition, which accordingly fails and is hereby

dismissed.

V.K. SHALI, J.

May 09, 2011 MA