Paramhans Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 772 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. Interpretation and/or application of Section 11 of The Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (CRPF for short) is in question in this writ petition which has been filed by the petitioner questioning an order of removal of service dated 28th September 1994.

2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

3. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in Central Reserve Police Force. The educational qualification required for appointment to the said post was class XI. A certificate was submitted by the petitioner to that effect. However, at the relevant point of time, he was studying in class XI. The petitioner subsequently was promoted to the posts of Havaldar and Sub Inspector. He was not permitted to sit in the G.D. departmental examination for his further promotion on the ground that at the relevant time, he was only studying in class XI and, thus, did not have the requisite qualification. The petitioner made three attempts to appear at the said examination but he was not allowed to do so. However, in an examination held in the month of October 1991, he was permitted to appear and allegedly came out successful. However, it was discovered that the petitioner had not submitted his matriculation certificate. It was. further discovered that even for the purpose of promotion to the post of Sub Inspector, the petitioner was required to produce the said certificate.

4. Allegedly, at that stage he was approached by an Establishment clerk Shri Bhagwat Swaroop by name, to the effect that a certificate could be procured for him and it would be necessary to submit such a certificate as otherwise his Officer Commanding would be in serious trouble.

5. According to the petitioner, the said matriculation certificate was procured by Shri Bhagwat Swaroop, the Establishment clerk of the Unit. The petitioner filed an application that he had not been able to file the matriculation certificate which he was doing then. The said certificate admittedly was forged one. The petitioner, however, contends that the he was not aware that the actions on the part of the said Shri Bhagwat Swaroop and the concerned officers was by way of a trick to trap him. A departmental enquiry, therefore, was initiated and by reason of an order dated 28th September 1994, he was given the punishment of removal from service.

6. The relevant portion of the order dated 28th September 1994 passed by the Disciplinary Authority is as under:

"4. The undersigned has carefully gone through the departmental enquiry proceedings, report of the Enquiry Officer and representation submitted by the delinquent in reply to the Enquiry Officers report. Though the delinquent pleaded "not guilty", in the initial stage, but vide his defense statement dated 2/6/94, he pleaded guilty and admitted that the certificate produced by him from the Bihar Board of Education was fake. As per the Transfer Certificate available in the service record of the delinquent, he discontinued his studies while studying the Class XI (i.e. on 17/8/1962) whereas the matriculation certificate produced by him, he passed matriculation examination during March 1962. Hence, the matter was verified from the principal Uccha Vidhyalaya Kinjar, Distt. Jahanabad (Bihar). The principal Uccha Vidhayalay kinjar, vide his letter No. 22 dated 16/7/93 intimated that SI Param Hans Singh, while leaving the school was studying in Class XI and he did not appear in the examination of Bihar Vidhyalaya Pariksha Samiti. The Commandant 103 Bn vide his letter No. C.II-2/93-103-SRC-II dated 31/3/93 got verified the authenticity of "Madhyamik Pariksha" certificate submitted by SI Param Hans Singh. Sh. Parimal Banerjee, Additional Secretary Bihar Vidhyalaya Pariksha Samiti, Patna, vide his letter No. 3854 dated 20/7/93 informed that enquiry was made on the basis of photocopy of certificate, but it was found that the name of student was not available on the records. Further, Sh. Jagdish Singh, Joint-Secretary (Vigilance) Bihar Vidhyalaya pariksha Samiti, Patna vide his letter No. 252 dated 22/7/94 informed that during March 1962, High School Kinjar was not the centre of Matric Examination. From the above it has been proved that No. 620020467 SI Param Hans Singh of 103 Bn has not qualified matriculation examination (i.e. Class XI from the Board of Examinations, Bihar, and the certificate produced by him is fake. In Bihar state Pass in Class XI is considered equivalent to the Matric Examination. The delinquent has also admitted in his defense statement that he had committed a serious mistake by producing a fake certificate.

5. In view of above, I agree with the Departmental Enquiry Officer that the charge has been proved beyond any iota of doubt. The delinquent through his representation could not dilute the charge framed against him. Thus it is amply proved that No. 620020467 SI Param Hans Singh of 103 Bn has committed an act of misconduct Under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949 in that he produced matriculation certificate in support of his educational qualification which was found fake on verification from Bihar State Education Board, for which he deserves deterrent and exemplary punishment. No. 620020467 SI Param Hans Singh is not considered a fit person to be retained in a discipline force. I, therefore, impose of penalty of REMOVAL FROM SERRVICE on No. 620020467 SI Param Hans Singh under item (1) under Rule 27 of CRPF Rules 1955."

7. Mr. Amrendra Sharan, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a contention that Section 11 of the CRPF Act does not postulate awarding of a punishment of dismissal/removal from service.

8. The said Act was enacted to provide for the constitution and regulation of an armed Central Reserve Police Force. Section 3 thereof provides for the constitution of the force. Section 4 provides for the appointment and power of superior officers thereof. Section 5 provides for enrolment. Section 7 of the Act mandates that every member of the force shall execute any order by a competent authority. Section 8 provides for superintendence, control and administration of the force which is in the following terms:

"8. Superintendence, Control and Administration of the Force. -- (1) The superintendence of, and control over, the Force shall vest in the Central Government and the Force shall be administered by the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of any rules made there under through such officers as the Central Government may from time to time appoint in this behalf.

(2) The Headquarters of the Force shall be at Neemuch or at such other place as may from time to time be specified by the Central Government.

(3) While on active duty outside its Headquarters, the Force shall be subject to the general control and direction of such authority or officer as may be prescribed or as may be specifically appointed by the Central Government in this behalf."

9. Sections 9 to 14 deal with offences and punishments. Section 9 deals with more heinous offences whereas Section 10 deals with less heinous offences. Section 11 deals with minor punishments. It, on a plain reading, provides for punishment specified therein in lieu of or in addition to suspension or dismissal and thus, in our opinion the power to dismiss must be held to have been conferred upon the appropriate authorities by necessary implication.

10. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that a provision cannot be read in a manner which would lead to absurdity. The courts shall carry out the intention of the legislature while interpreting the laws.

11. In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, 2001 AIR SCW 3051, the apex court held:

13. "... The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there."

"In Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. R.B.I. it has been held:

48. "...The State can regulate the exercise of the fundamental right to save the public from a substantive evil. The existence of the evil as well as the means adopted to check it are the matters for the legislative judgment. But the Court is entitled to consider whether the degree and mode of the regulation whether is in excess of the requirement or is imposed in an arbitrary manner. The Court has to see whether the measure adopted is relevant or appropriate to the power exercised by the authority or whether overstepped the limits of social legislation Smaller inroads may lead to larger inroads and ultimately result in total prohibition by indirect method. If it directly transgresses or substantially and inevitably affects the fundamental right, it becomes unconstitutional, but now where the impact is only remotely possibly or incidental. The Court must lift the evil of the form and appearance to discover the true character and the nature of the legislation, and every endeavor should be made to have the efficacy of fundamental right maintained and the legislature is not invested with unbounded power. The Court has, therefore, always to guard against the gradual encroachments and strike down a restriction as soon as it reaches that magnitude of total annihilation of the right."

12. It, in our considered opinion, would not be a correct reading of the statute if it be held that although authorities are entitled to impose punishment of transportation of life or for a term not less than seven years or with imprisonment which may extend up to 14 years or with life, it cannot impose a punishment of dismissal or removal. The very fact that the expression "in lieu of or in addition to" as used categorically and clearly goes to show that the punishment specified in the said provision would not disentitle the disciplinary authority to pass an order of dismissal from service. In this connection, we may also notice the provisions of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules (All India Statutory Rules). Rule 27 forms part of Chapter VI - Discipline. It deals with the procedure for awarding of punishments. The punishments enumerated in the table provided there under are dismissal, removal etc. and thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the authorities are empowered to impose the said punishments. The provisions of the Act and the Rules in a situation of this nature must be read conjointly. By reason of Section 11, merely a discretion has been conferred upon the disciplinary authority to impose the punishment specified therein in lieu of or in addition to an order of suspension or removal. This respect of the matter also has been considered by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Vishwa Nath Singh v. Union of India, 1985(33) BLJR 740 and in Shyamsingh v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Reserve Police, Ajmer and Ors., . The Patna High Court in Vishwa Nath Singh (supra) has held:

"7. The perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor punishments as compared to the heavier punishment prescribed in the preceeding section. It lays down that the Commandant or any other authority or officer, as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under the Act, award any one or more of the punishments to any member of the Force who is found guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty or remissness in the discharge of his duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the only punishments which can be awarded under this section are reduction in rank, fine, confinement to quarters and removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the Force. In our opinion, this interpretation is not correct, because the section says that these punishments may be awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal.

The use of the words 'in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal' appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 before Clauses (a) to (c) shows that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the punishments mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c) may also be awarded."

13. Yet again, a Division Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Deen Dayal Yadav v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, 1974 Lab.I.C. 929 has held that:

"12. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that no punishment such as removal or dismissal from service could be passed, does not seem to be correct. I have already quoted the section above and it is significant to note that in this section the important words are "in lieu of or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following punishments to any member of the Force whom he considers.....' may be passed. The words `in lieu of or in addition to' in my opinion clearly indicate that in addition to the punishment of dismissal from service the punishments prescribed in Section 11 could be passed or in lieu of a punishment for dismissal. It has also been urged that the punishments such as removal or dismissal from the Force could be passed only under Section 12 which I have quoted above but I think this contention also does not seem to be correct because this section clearly lays down that if any person has been sentenced to imprisonment under the Act, then he can be dismissed and shall also be liable to forfeiture of pay etc. The heading of the section also shows that it deals with `place of imprisonment and liability to dismissal or imprisonment'. In my opinion it cannot be said that a punishment of removal or dismissal from Force can only be passed under Section 12 of the Act i.e., to say only when a person has been sentenced to imprisonment. I am strengthened in my view because a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Shyam Singh v. Dy. Inspector-General of Police, Central Reserve police, Ajmer where also it was held that from a perusal of Section 12 it is clear that the punishment of dismissal under the section may be given to a delinquent in addition to the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him under the law. If the authorities mean to proceed under the section, it will not be necessary to observe the formalities of a regular disciplinary inquiry and action may be taken up after a person's conviction and punishment of imprisonment under the Act. It has also been further held that Section 12 does not lay down that a person could not be liable to dismissal if he is not convicted or sentenced under the Act. Similarly with regard to Section 11 it was held that the words 'in lieu of' or 'in addition to suspension or dismissal' appearing in Sub- section (1) of Section 11 before Clauses (a) to (3) show that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of the Force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the minor punishments mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) may also be awarded. It was also held that a perusal of Sections 9, 10 and 11 would clearly show that a delinquent can be punished with dismissal even if he has not been prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 or 10 of the Act. I am therefore, of opinion that the Dy. Inspector General of Police under Section 11 of the Act read with Rule 27 of the Rules could impose a punishment of dismissal or removal from service."

14. For the reasons afore-mentioned, we are of the opinion that the submission of Mr. Amrendra Sharan cannot be accepted. The petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.