Raitan Lal vs Ramesh Chand Gupta
1987 Latest Caselaw 469 Del

JUDGMENT

P.K. Bahri, J.

(1) This Civil Revision has been brought under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, against the eviction order dated March 3, 1984 passed by Shri S. M. Gupta, Additional Rent Controller, under clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

(2) The petitioner is the tenant in a room and a tin shed shown red in the plan filed Along with the petition at the monthly rent of Rs. 13 per month in house No. 2841, Gali Rajputana, Subzimandi, Delhi. The case set up by the respondent was that he at present is residing with his wife and five children in house No. 65, Majlis Park, Azadpur, which is owned by his wife but the said house is not suitable for him and for his family members inasmuch as the house is located in the unauthorised colony which lacks facility of proper sewerage and roads. Moreover his business premises are located near the house in question and it would be more convenient for him to live in the house in dispute. It was also pleaded by him that it takes about an hour for him to reach the business premises from his present residence and his children also feel difficulty in going to their schools as during the rainy season a lot of water accumulates around the house.

(3) The petitioner contested the petition pleading that he alone is not the tenant in the premises in question and in fact the premises stood let out earlier to one Hub Lal Singh, father-in-law of the petitioner and on death of Hub Lal Singh about 18 years ago the tenancy rights were inherited by his son, namely, Bishamber Dass and also by the petitioner's wife. He also took the plea that the respondent is not the sole owner/landlord of the premises in question and without joining the other co-owners the eviction petition was not maintainable. The letting purpose of the premises was disputed by the petitioner asserting that the premises were let out to him for commercial purpose as well. He also pleaded that the respondent is having reasonably suitable accommodation and has no bonafide need for the premises in question inasmuch as the respondent is having one room ' which he got vacated from Mohan Lal, tenant in the house in question and has also two rooms more in the house in question. He also took the plea that the respondent had filed an eviction case against Ram Saran Dass on the ground of bonafide requirement but during the pendency of that case Ram Saran Dass had died and the respondent accepted the legal heirs of Ram Saran Dass as tenants and did not pursue the eviction case. So, it was asserted by the petitioner that in case the respondent had any bonafide need to shift to the house in question, the respondent would not have compromised the matter with the legal heirs of Ram Saran Dass. Thus, be pleaded that the real motive in filing the eviction petition against him is to put pressure on him to increase the rent. It is admitted by the petitioner in his statement that he has been paying rent to the respondent since the death of respondent's mother Smt. Subhadara Devi and he had attorney to respondent as he was told that there had taken place oral partition of the property amongst the respondent and his brothers and sisters and the house in question has fallen to the share of the respondent.

(4) The petitioner has produced on record Ex. R 1 to R5 rent receipts but they are of no help to the petitioner in showing that the petitioner alone is not the tenant in the premises in question. In view of the clear admission of the petitioner in his testimony that he alone has been paying rent to the respondent and getting rent receipts since the death of Subhadara Devi, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to assert that the tenancy of the premises stands in the name of any heirs of Hub Lal Singh. No evidence has been brought on record by the petitioner to prove that at any time Hub Lal Singh was a tenant in the premises in question. Ex. A l & A2, copies from the house- tax record of the Corporation show that the house in question is standing in the name of the respondent alone and the petitioner is recorded as a tenant in the premises in question. So, it is clear that the respondent alone is the landlord I owner of the premises in question. As a matter of fact, counsel for the petitioner did not advance any arguments on this plea of the petitioner that the eviction petition was not maintainable for want of joining any other party to the case.

(5) AS. for letting purpose is concerned, again the petitioner categorically admitted in his testimony that he had taken the premises in question on rent for residential purposes and has been using the premises in question for residential purposes only. The only point to be seen is whether the respondent was able to prove or .not that the respondent bonafide requires the premises in question for residence for himself and for his family members dependent upon him and whether the respondent is in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation or not ? It is admitted fact that the house where the respondent is living with his family members is owned by the respondent's wife and it comprises of two rooms and other facilities. However, the respondent has decided to shift to the house in dispute and had given good reasons for making this decision. The house in question is admittedly located about 150 yards from the shop of the respondent whereas the accommodation where presently respondent is residing is located at a distance and it takes about one hour for the respondent to reach his shop. It is also pertinent to mention that one room had been vacated by a tenant in the house in dispute and the respondent is keeping it vacant. It is obvious that respondent could not have shifted to the said room vacated by Mohan Lal, showing, as it is not sufficient for the respondent and his family members which comprises of respondent, his wife and five children. But it shows the bonafide of the respondent that the respondent is not actuated by any malafide intention in filing the eviction petition against the petitioner inasmuch as the respondent is keeping one room vacant for the last more than four years so that he could shift to the house in question the moment the petitioner vacates the premises in question. The respondent has denied that any eviction petition was filed against Ram Saran Dass and any compromise has been made with the legal heirs of Ram Saran Dass. Apart from making a bald statement in this respect, the petitioner has not produced any evidence to prove that any such eviction petition was filed by the respondent against Ram Saran Dass, tenant, and later on had not pursued that eviction petition. The best evidence in the shape of copy of the eviction petition and any order made thereon had not been produced by the petitioner. So, it cannot be held that any such eviction petition was filed by the respondent against Ram Saran Dass, tenant, and any compromise had been made with the legal heirs of Ram Saran Dass.

(6) The learned Additional Rent Controller has made reference to M/s, J. K. Industries Limited v. Lt. Col. M. M. Lal, 1981(2) Rcr 178(1), wherein it has been held that where a landlord has no legal right to reside in a particular premises then the said premises cannot be considered suitable accommodation for the residence of the landlord. The learned Additional Rent Controller held that the respondent had no legal right to live in the premises owned by his wife and thus the said house in which the respondent is presently residing cannot be considered reasonably suitable alternate accommodation available to the respondent. Counsel for the petitioner, however, vehemently argued that the proposition laid down in the aforesaid case is not correct as has been held in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore, 1983 Rlr 19(2). It is true that in the case of Sat Pal the Single Judge deciding the matter had expressed the view that the observations made in the aforesaid case of M/s. J. K. Industries Ltd. (supra) that the landlord should have a legal right to reside in a particular accommodation so that the said accommodation could be treated as reasonably suitable accommodation available to the landlord are not correct and there has been some misunderstanding of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant, . The Hon'ble Judge went on to hold that it is not necessary that the landlord should have any legal right to reside in a particular accommodation what is to be seen is whether the landlord bonafide requires the demised premises for his own residence. However, the judgment given in the case of Satpal (supra) came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent case reported as Smt. Prativa Devi v. T. V. Krishnan, It 1987 (1) S. C. 764 (4), and and the said judgment was over-ruled with the observations that the said judgment did not lay down good law, so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself has now explained the observations given in the case of Phirose Bamanji Desai (supra) and has reiterated that in order to see whether a particular premises are reasonably suitable for the landlord or not it is necessary to know whether the landlord has any legal right to reside in the said premises. So, the Additional Rent Controller was right in following the judgment given in the case of J. K. Industries Ltd. (supra).

(7) At any rate, in the present case, the petitioner has given sound reasons for his bonafide requirement of the house in question in as much as by shifting to the house in question he would have not to waste one hour daily in coming to his business premises. It is also clear that the respondent has no legal right to live in the premises owned by his wife and the said house cannot be considered available to the respondent as alternative reasonably suitable accommodation. In the case of Smt. Prativa Devi (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and he has a complete freedom in the matter and it is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. There is no evidence to show that the respondent was actuated by any mala fide intention in seeking eviction of the petitioner. Hence, I find no infirmity in the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller. I thus find no merit in this revision petition which I hereby dismiss. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs in view of the fact that at the time of hearing no one appeared to argue the case on behalf of the respondent.