[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Wasim Qureshi on 24 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
Digitally signed by
V PADMAVATHI
Date: 2026.03.25
18:21:29 +0530
2026:CGHC:13914-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 829 of 2026
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Nagarnar, District- Jagdalpur (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - Wasim Qureshi S/o Rafique Qureshi, Aged About 31 Years R/o Rivagahan Police
Station Ghumka, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.) Present Address Kelabadi, Near Ajhar
Aata Chakkti , Durg, District- Durg (C.G.)
2 - Girdhari Yadav S/o Babla Yadav Aged About 40 Years R/o Rawanbhata Supela
Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G.) ...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
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For Appellant/State : Shri Priyank Rathi, GA
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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
24.03.2026
1. Heard Shri Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate for the State
appearing for the appellant on IA-1 of 2026, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 253 days in preferring the instant appeal.
2. The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant of leave
to appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment of acquittal dated
05.03.2025, passed in Special Criminal Case (NDPS Act) No. 58 of 2024, by the
Court of learned Special Judge (NDPS Act) constituted under the Narcotic Drugs
Crmp 829 of 2026
and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS) whereby acquitted the respondents
from the offence punishable under under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the scope of
interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court nonetheless
possesses wide powers of reappreciation of evidence, and where such
reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against
the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to reverse the
same. Learned State counsel submits that the impugned judgment passed by
the learned Trial Court is patently erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the
settled principles of law. Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable
evidence available on record establishing the guilt of the accused/respondents,
the learned Trial Court has erroneously acquitted them on wholly insignificant,
unreasonable, and legally unsustainable grounds. The Court failed to appreciate
that, the charges leveled against the respondents are very serious in nature like
dealing with narcotic drugs and because of this reason the accused are not
entitled for any sympathy by this Court. The learned Trial Court has failed to
appreciate that all the parameters and provisions of the NDPS Act were duly
followed during the course of investigation. The respondents were in
possession of contraband ganja in an illegal manner, which is evident from the
FSL report, youths are targeted, which is adversely affecting the society & its
future. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the circumstances and acquitted
the respondents on account of minor omissions and contradictions.
4. It has also been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case preferred the present
petition, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various
Crmp 829 of 2026
departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery because the
State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of
departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases
the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of
limitation, which is bona fide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore,
being filed after a delay of 253 days from the prescribed period of limitation.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3
SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays
that the delay of 253 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation
Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and
others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has
dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including
the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically
Crmp 829 of 2026
merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession
has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The law
of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The
law shelters everyone under the same light and should not
be swirled for the benefit of a few.
Crmp 829 of 2026
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are
liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."
7. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while considering the
delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented
in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the
Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this
Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights
of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the
decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC
Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81]
while rejecting an application for condonation of delay
for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in
Paragraph 15 as follows:
Crmp 829 of 2026
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the
delay condonation application of the present appellant."
Crmp 829 of 2026
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone
the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one
of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to
various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it
very clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been made
out for condonation of such a long and inordinate
delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes
to condoning the gross delay of more than 12
years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court
long after the lapse of the time prescribed under
the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot
Crmp 829 of 2026
turn around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost
43 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of
his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach
of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long, it
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot
be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with
the merits of the main matter. The court owes a
Crmp 829 of 2026
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to
the conclusion that the High Court committed no
error much less any error of law in passing the
impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court
was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice
is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
Crmp 829 of 2026
The appellants have failed to prove that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and
this vital test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails
and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present
case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly
refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by
observing that such inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we
are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the
delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the
Government adopts systematic approach in handling the
legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to
the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue
loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay
of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal
Crmp 829 of 2026
due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the
machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal
opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc.,
fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and
penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay,
deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss
caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must
not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed
that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to
be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if
there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days
then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was
unable to institute the proceedings within that period of
limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last
is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what
came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it
between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an
appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient
cause must establish that because of some event or
Crmp 829 of 2026
circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation
has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must
be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation.
(See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1981 SC 733)."
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in
the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it
is evident that Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay
is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or
anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts its protection equally
upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a
select few.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State has failed
to provide any proper, or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the
present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law & Legislative Affairs
Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had
forwarded a proposal to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an
appeal against the impugned acquittal order dated 25.11.2024. Thereafter, the
Crmp 829 of 2026
case was processed, and the present petition was ultimately filed. However, this
sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount
to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate delay
of 253 days.
10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary power
under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The learned counsel for the
State has not been able to establish any convincing or bona fide reason for the
delay. Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of 253 days in
filing the petition against acquittal.
11. In view of the above, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal is hereby
rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
padma
