[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Mukesh Satnami vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.03.25
10:25:39
+0530 1
2026:CGHC:13948-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1286 of 2021
Mukesh Satnami S/o Shri Govind Satnami, Aged About 23 Years R/o
Village Bandoura, Police Chowki Bazar Charbhantha, P.S. Kawardha,
District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Kawardha, District
Kabirdham Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Mr. Abhishek Banjarey and Mr. Veer Verma,
Advocates
For Respondent-State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
24.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. Abhishek Banjarey and Mr. Veer Verma, learned
counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned
Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent.
2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section
374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,
'Cr.P.C.') is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 06.08.2021 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (Kawardha), (C.G.) in Sessions Trial
No.63/2019, by which the appellant has been convicted for the
offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "IPC") and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of
payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for one
month.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 09.09.2019 at about
08:00 PM, at village Kherjhiti, the deceased Ramesh Dhruve, after
having dinner, had lain down in his house. At that time, an
information was received by PW-5 Shatruhan Dhruve that
Ramesh Dhruve had been stabbed with a knife near Ganesh
Pandal. Upon receiving such information, PW-5 immediately
rushed to the spot and found Ramesh Dhruve lying on the road
with a grievous injury on the left side of his chest, from which
blood was oozing. At the spot, PW-6 Pradeep @ Chhotu Dhruve,
PW-11 Kamlesh Dhruve, PW-12 Purushottam, PW-8 Ramman @
Bheem Nishad and other villagers were present. These witnesses
disclosed that due to prior enmity, the accused Mukesh Satnami
along with a juvenile co-accused had assaulted the deceased with
a knife and fled from the scene.
4. Thereafter, the injured was taken to the District Hospital,
Kawardha, by Dial-112 and 108 vehicles, where PW-13 Dr.
Madhusudan Dongre examined him and declared him dead. The
intimation of death (Ex.P/23) was sent to the police. On the basis
of the said information, merg intimation (Ex.P/10) was registered.
During the course of merg inquiry, on 10.09.2019, PW-15 Nitin
Kumar Tiwari issued notice (Ex.P/3) to the panch witnesses and
prepared the inquest report (Ex.P/4) over the dead body of the
deceased. The dead body was sent for postmortem vide
application (Ex.P/25), and constable PW-14 Ishwari Sahu carried
the body to the District Hospital. The postmortem was conducted
by PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who submitted the report (Ex.P/7),
opining that the death was homicidal in nature caused by a sharp-
edged weapon injury. PW-15 Nitin Kumar Tiwari also inspected
the place of occurrence and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/11).
5. Based on the statement of PW-5 Shatruhan Dhurve, Dehati
Nalishi (Ex.P/14) was recorded, and thereafter formal FIR
(Ex.P/27) was registered against the accused persons. From the
spot, one motorcycle, slippers and blood-stained as well as plain
soil were seized vide seizure memos (Ex.P/21 and Ex.P/22).
During investigation, memorandum statement of the accused
Mukesh Satnami was recorded (Ex.P/6), pursuant to which a knife
was seized at his instance vide seizure memo (Ex.P/1). Sealed
packets containing the clothes of the deceased and blood sample
were also seized from the hospital vide Ex.P/24. The accused
Mukesh was arrested on 10.09.2019 (Ex.P/32), and information of
his arrest was given to his relatives (Ex.P/33). Identification
proceedings were also conducted (Ex.P/36). Further, on
19.09.2019, requisition (Ex.P/29) was sent for preparation of a
detailed spot map, which was subsequently prepared by the
Patwari (Ex.P/12 and Ex.P/13). The seized articles were sent for
chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, and the
FSL report (Ex.P/39) was obtained.
6. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses
including PW-5 Shatrughan Dhruve, PW-6 Pradeep, PW-8 Bhim,
PW-11 Kamlesh and PW-12 Purushottam, who have supported
the prosecution case as well as exhibited 40 documents vide
Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/40. In order to defence, appellant/accused has
examined DW-1 Shakti Kosle, but not exhibited any document.
7. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against
the accused before the jurisdictional criminal Court for the offence
punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. After
committal, the case was registered as Sessions Trial No. 63/2019
and was thereafter transferred to the Court of Sessions,
Kabirdham (Kawardha) for hearing and disposal in accordance
with law.
8. The charges under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of IPC was
framed against the accused, which was read over and explained
to him. The accused denied the charge and pleaded innocence.
The statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
was recorded, wherein he claimed himself to be innocent and
alleged false implication. The accused did not adduce any
defence evidence.
9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 06.08.2021
convicted the accused-appellant for the offence punishable under
Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced him
as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment. Hence,
this criminal appeal has been filed.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant, most respectfully submits that
the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the facts and
circumstances of the present case in their entirety and in the
correct legal perspective. It is submitted that the impugned
judgment of conviction is illegal, erroneous, perverse, and
contrary to law. The learned trial Court has not properly
appreciated the evidence available on record, resulting in
erroneous findings and grave miscarriage of justice. The
conviction has been recorded on mere conjectures and surmises,
despite the prosecution having failed to prove its case beyond all
reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that there are material
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which strike at the root of the prosecution
case. The learned trial Court has also erred in convicting the
appellant without any specific and incriminating question being put
to him under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., thereby causing serious
prejudice to the appellant. Therefore, the case of the present
appellants falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of
the IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case where the
conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under
Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) IPC. Further, as appellant is in jail
since 10.09.2019 and therefore, considering the period he had
already undergone, he be awarded the sentence of the period
already undergone by him. Hence, the present appeal deserves to
be allowed in full or in part.
11. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the
prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by
leading evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that in
view of statements of the prosecution witnesses coupled with
other material available on record, the learned trial Court has
rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC.
It has been contended that appellant has committed heinous
crime of murder and in such circumstances, it is not the case
where conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302
IPC requires to be altered to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC.
Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the
records with utmost circumspection.
Points for Determination
• Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the death of deceased Ramesh Dhurve was homicidal in
nature?
• Whether the prosecution has further proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant/accused caused the
homicidal death of the deceased, and if so, whether the
conviction recorded under Section 302 of the IPC warrants
interference?
Answer to Point No.1
13. This Court has bestowed its anxious consideration upon the entire
oral as well as documentary evidence available on record,
particularly the medical evidence, inquest proceedings, FSL report
and the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, for the purpose of
determining the nature of death of deceased Ramesh Dhruve and
the role attributed to the present appellant.
14. At the outset, it is evident that upon receipt of information
regarding the incident, the injured Ramesh Dhruve was
immediately taken to District Hospital, Kawardha, where PW-13
Dr. Madhusudan Dongre examined him and declared him dead.
The intimation of death (Ex.P/23) was promptly forwarded to the
police, on the basis of which merg intimation (Ex.P/10) was
registered without delay.
15. The inquest proceedings (Ex.P/4) were conducted on 10.09.2019
in the presence of independent panch witnesses. The inquest
report clearly indicates the presence of a stab injury on the left
side of the chest of the deceased. Thereafter, the dead body was
sent for postmortem examination to ascertain the exact cause and
nature of death.
16. The postmortem examination was conducted by PW-3 Dr. Swapnil
Tiwari, who has duly proved the postmortem report (Ex.P/7). As
per his deposition, on external examination, a stab wound
measuring about 2 x 1 cm with a depth of approximately 14 cm
was found on the left side of the chest. A corresponding cut mark
was also noticed on the shirt of the deceased, clearly indicating
the use of a sharp-edged weapon.
17. On internal examination, the injury was found to have penetrated
the chest cavity, causing rupture of the heart and extensive
internal damage, leading to profuse hemorrhage. The doctor has
categorically opined that the injury was ante-mortem in nature and
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The
cause of death has been opined to be shock due to injury to the
heart. It has also been stated that the death occurred within 12-
24 hours prior to the postmortem and the nature of death was
homicidal, thereby ruling out any possibility of accidental or
suicidal death. The medical evidence stands fully corroborated by
the ocular version of prosecution witnesses, particularly PW-12
Purushottam, PW-6 Pradeep and PW-11 Kamlesh, who have
consistently stated that it was the present appellant who inflicted
the knife blow on the chest of the deceased. Their evidence
remains consistent and trustworthy, and no material contradiction
has been elicited in their cross-examination so as to discredit their
testimony.
18. Further corroboration is found from the recovery of the knife at the
instance of the appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement
(Ex.P/6), which was seized vide Ex.P/1. The FSL report (Ex.P/39)
confirms the presence of human blood on the seized weapon and
articles. The appellant has not furnished any explanation
regarding the presence of blood on the seized articles, which
constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance against him.
Though PW-5 Shatruhan Dhruve is not an eyewitness, his
testimony regarding the immediate aftermath of the incident
supports the prosecution case. The defence witness DW-1 Shakti
Kosle does not inspire confidence and fails to probabilize the
defence version.
19. From the cumulative appreciation of evidence, it is established
that on 09.09.2019 between 08:00 PM to 08:30 PM, the appellant
came to the spot, called the deceased and, during the course of
interaction, inflicted a forceful knife blow on the chest of the
deceased, which proved fatal. The nature of injury, the vital part of
the body targeted, the weapon used and the force employed
clearly demonstrate the intention of the appellant to cause death
or at least to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.
20. In view of the inquest report (Ex.P/4), postmortem report (Ex.P/7),
medical evidence of PW-3, FSL report (Ex.P/39) and the reliable
testimony of prosecution witnesses, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has successfully established that the
death of Ramesh Dhruve was homicidal in nature.
21. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.
Answer to Point No.2
22. In the present case, the prosecution rests its case primarily on
direct ocular evidence of eyewitnesses, duly corroborated by
medical and forensic evidence. It is therefore required to be
examined whether such evidence inspires confidence and proves
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant is author of the crime.
23. This Court shall, therefore, examine the material evidence and
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
(A) Ocular Testimony of Eyewitnesses
24. The prosecution has examined PW-12 Purushottam, PW-6
Pradeep @ Chhotu Dhurve and PW-11 Kamlesh Netam as
eyewitnesses to the incident. PW-12 Purushottam has
categorically deposed that on the date of incident at about 08:00-
08:30 PM, he was present near Ganesh Pandal along with other
villagers when the appellant arrived, called the deceased and
during the course of interaction, inflicted a knife blow on the chest
of the deceased. His testimony clearly attributes a specific overt
act to the present appellant.
25. PW-6 Pradeep has also supported the prosecution case and has
deposed that the appellant took out a knife and inflicted a blow on
the chest of the deceased. His presence at the spot is natural,
and his testimony remains consistent and trustworthy. Nothing
material has been elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his
version.
26. Similarly, PW-11 Kamlesh has corroborated the version of the
aforesaid witnesses and has stated that the appellant assaulted
the deceased by means of a knife on his chest. The testimonies of
these witnesses are consistent, cogent and inspire confidence.
Minor discrepancies, if any, do not affect the core of the
prosecution case.
27. Though PW-8 Ramman @ Bheem Nishad has not fully supported
the prosecution, he has admitted the presence of the appellant at
the spot. His partial hostility does not dent the prosecution case in
view of the reliable and consistent testimony of other
eyewitnesses.
(B) Medical and Scientific Evidence
28. The ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses finds full corroboration
from the medical evidence. PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who
conducted the postmortem (Ex.P/7), has found a deep penetrating
stab injury on the left side of the chest, which caused rupture of
the heart and resulted in death. The injury is consistent with the
use of a sharp-edged weapon like a knife.
29. The FSL report (Ex.P/39) further corroborates the prosecution
case by confirming the presence of human blood on the seized
knife and clothes of the appellant. The appellant has failed to offer
any explanation regarding the presence of blood on these articles.
(C) Recovery of Weapon and Articles
30. Another significant incriminating circumstance against the
appellant is the recovery of the weapon of offence at his instance.
The prosecution has proved that during the course of
investigation, the memorandum statement of the appellant was
recorded vide Ex.P/6 in the presence of independent witnesses,
wherein he disclosed that he had concealed the knife used in the
commission of the offence along with his blood-stained clothes at
a particular place. Pursuant to the said disclosure, the appellant
led the police and witnesses to the indicated spot and got
recovered a knife, which was seized vide Ex.P/1. The recovery
has been duly proved by the seizure witnesses as well as the
Investigating Officer (PW-15), and nothing substantial has been
elicited in their cross-examination to render the recovery doubtful.
31. The evidentiary value of such recovery is further strengthened by
the medical evidence. PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who conducted
the postmortem, has opined in his query report (Ex.P/8) that the
injury sustained by the deceased could be caused by the seized
knife. The dimensions, nature and depth of the injury, particularly
the penetrating stab wound on the chest reaching up to the heart,
are consistent with the use of the said weapon. Thus, the
recovery of the knife is not a mere formal circumstance, but one
which directly connects the appellant with the commission of the
offence.
32. Apart from the weapon, the prosecution has also proved the
seizure of blood-stained articles, including the clothes of the
deceased as well as those of the appellant, along with blood-
stained and plain soil from the place of occurrence. These articles
were sent for forensic examination, and the FSL report (Ex.P/39)
confirms the presence of human blood on the seized knife and
other articles.
33. Significantly, the appellant has failed to offer any explanation as to
how human blood came to be present on the weapon and his
clothes. In absence of any plausible explanation, this
circumstance assumes great importance and provides strong
corroboration to the prosecution case, thereby forming a vital link
in the chain of incriminating evidence against the appellant.
(D) Conduct of the Appellant
34. The conduct of the appellant immediately after the incident
assumes significance and constitutes a relevant circumstance
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence on record
clearly indicates that after inflicting the fatal knife injury on the
chest of the deceased, the appellant did not remain at the spot
nor did he make any effort to provide medical aid or assistance to
the injured. Instead, he fled from the place of occurrence. Such
conduct is not only unnatural but also indicative of a guilty mind,
as an innocent person would ordinarily attempt to help the victim
or report the matter to the authorities. The act of absconding
immediately after the incident lends support to prosecution case.
35. Further, the conduct of the appellant during the course of
investigation and trial also deserves consideration. Despite the
recovery of the weapon at his instance and the seizure of blood-
stained articles, the appellant has not offered any explanation
regarding these incriminating circumstances. His silence in the
face of such material evidence, particularly when the facts were
within his special knowledge, assumes importance and permits an
adverse inference to be drawn against him.
36. In his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant
has merely denied the prosecution case and claimed false
implication, without furnishing any plausible or reasonable
explanation for the circumstances appearing against him, such as
the presence of human blood on the seized knife and his clothes,
or his presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. It
is well settled that though the statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is not evidence, the failure of the accused to explain the
incriminating circumstances can be taken as an additional link in
the chain of circumstances. In the present case, such failure on
the part of the appellant further strengthens the prosecution case
and lends assurance to the conclusion regarding his guilt.
(E) Cumulative Assessment of Evidence
37. From the foregoing discussion, the following facts stand firmly
established:
• The deceased suffered a homicidal death due to a stab
injury on the chest;
• The appellant was present at the spot at the relevant
time;
• The appellant inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the
deceased, as deposed by reliable eyewitnesses;
• The medical evidence fully corroborates the ocular
version;
• The weapon of offence was recovered at the instance of
the appellant;
• Human blood was detected on the seized articles;
• The appellant has failed to explain the incriminating
circumstances.
38. The evidence led by the prosecution is consistent, cogent and
trustworthy, and clearly establishes that the appellant is the author
of the crime. There is no material on record to probabilize any
other hypothesis consistent with innocence.
(E) Completion of Chain of Circumstances
39. From the above discussion, the following circumstances stand
conclusively proved:
• Homicidal death of the deceased,
• Motive for commission of the offence,
• Deceased last seen alive in the company of the
accused,
• Recovery of blood-stained bamboo stick at the instance
of the accused,
• Medical corroboration connecting the weapon with
injuries,
• Failure of the accused to explain incriminating
circumstances.
40. The evidence on record, particularly the consistent and reliable
testimony of the eyewitnesses duly corroborated by the medical
and forensic evidence, clearly establishes that it was the present
appellant who inflicted the fatal knife injury on the chest of the
deceased. The prosecution has successfully proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt, and the evidence excludes any
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Thus, this Court holds that
the appellant is the author of the crime.
41. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is answered in the affirmative.
42. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for
consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide
not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to
Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned
counsel for the appellant ?
43. While dealing with The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent
judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented
by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023
disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test
to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the
accused in doing the act as under:-
"60. Few important principles of law discernible
from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up
thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the
question, what offence the accused could be said
to have committed, the true test is to find out the
intention or knowledge of the accused in doing
the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as
is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300
of the IPC, the act will be murder even though
only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: 'A' is
bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his
revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his
head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will
be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in
shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single
injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be
of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300
of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks
into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter
is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest
of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest
of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter.
The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in
ordinary course of nature to cause death. There
may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally
inflicted the particular injury found to be caused
and that the said injury was objectively sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of
Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of
the offence of murder although only single injury
was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of
Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused
which would otherwise be murder, will be taken
out of the purview of murder, if the accused's
case attracts any one of the five exceptions
enumerated in that section. In the event of the
case falling within any of those exceptions, the
offence would be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of
Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused
is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of
Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under
Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall
within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC.
Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused
may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section
299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of
the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that
situation also, the offence would be culpable
homicide not amounting to murder under Section
304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part
I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of
Section 299, while it would be an offence under
Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd
part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an
accused person falls within the first two clauses of
cases of culpable homicide as described in
Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the
first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within
the third clause, it is punishable under the second
part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first
part of this section would apply when there is
'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would
apply when there is no such intention, but there is
'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that
particular injury was intended, and objectively that
injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the requirements of
Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are
fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the
following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls
under one or the other of the clauses of Section
300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to
that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of
the higher degree of likelihood which is covered
by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower
degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of
as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case
does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of
the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the
knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely
to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between
the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that
under the first part, the crime of murder is first
established and the accused is then given the
benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of
the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of
murder is never established at all. Therefore, for
the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the
offence punishable under the second part of
Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not
bring his case within one of the exceptions to
Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is
distinguished from more 'possibly'. When
chances of happening are even or greater than its
not happening, we may say that the thing will
'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the
court has to place itself in the situation of the
accused and then judge whether the accused had
the knowledge that by the act he was likely to
cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide
(Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300
of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in
mind while dealing with a charge under Section
302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful
homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide
amounting to murder and those not amounting to
murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not
murder when the case is brought within the five
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even
though none of the said five exceptions are
pleaded or prima facie established on the
evidence on record, the prosecution must still be
required under the law to bring the case under
any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC
to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution
fails to discharge this onus in establishing any
one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC,
namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would
not be made out and the case may be one of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder as
described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question
of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to
be applied, the assailant must intend the
particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This
ingredient could rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to
be drawn from the proved circumstances of the
case. The court must necessarily have regard to
the nature of the weapon used, part of the body
injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used
in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the
circumstances preceding and attendant on the
attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that
makes a culpable homicide a murder. The
intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the
ordinary cause of nature to cause death also
makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has
actually been caused and intention to cause such
injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or
acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused
results in the death of the victim, no inference, as
a general principle, can be drawn that the
accused did not have the intention to cause the
death or that particular injury which resulted in the
death of the victim. Whether an accused had the
required guilty intention or not, is a question of
fact which has to be determined on the facts of
each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the
accused had the intention to cause death of any
person or to cause bodily injury to him and the
intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a
single injury which results in the death of the
victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause
thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the
exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an
accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge
in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by
him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the fact that the
act is done without premeditation in a sudden
fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify
that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or
that he only intended a simple injury, would lead
to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the
offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of
the IPC."
44. The prosecution case in the present matter is founded primarily
upon direct ocular evidence, duly supported by medical and
scientific corroboration. Unlike a case resting purely on
circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has examined material
eyewitnesses, namely PW-12 Purushottam, PW-6 Pradeep @
Chhotu Dhurve and PW-11 Kamlesh Netam, who have
consistently deposed regarding the manner of occurrence. Their
testimonies clearly establish that on the date of incident, the
appellant along with the juvenile co-accused came to the spot,
called the deceased Ramesh Dhruve and, during the course of
interaction, the co-accused restrained the deceased while the
appellant inflicted a knife blow on his chest. Their presence at the
spot is natural, their version is consistent and nothing substantial
has been elicited in cross-examination to discredit their
testimonies.
45. PW-5 Shatruhan Dhruve, though not an eyewitness to the actual
assault, has supported the prosecution case to the extent that he
immediately reached the spot upon receiving information and
found the deceased lying in an injured condition with a bleeding
chest injury. His testimony lends assurance to the prosecution
version regarding the time and place of occurrence and the
condition of the deceased immediately after the incident. The
prompt lodging of Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/14) and registration of FIR
(Ex.P/27) further strengthens the prosecution case and rules out
the possibility of false implication or concoction.
46. During investigation, the memorandum statement of the appellant
(Ex.P/6) was recorded, pursuant to which a knife was recovered
at his instance vide seizure memo (Ex.P/1). The recovery has
been duly proved by the prosecution witnesses and the
Investigating Officer. The medical opinion (Ex.P/8) clearly
establishes that the fatal injury sustained by the deceased could
be caused by the said weapon. Further, the FSL report (Ex.P/39)
confirms the presence of human blood on the seized articles,
including the weapon and the clothes of the appellant. The
appellant has failed to offer any explanation regarding the
presence of blood on these articles, thereby providing an
additional incriminating link in the chain of evidence.
47. The place of occurrence has been duly established by the spot
map (Ex.P/11) and the Patwari map (Ex.P/12 and Ex.P/13). The
seizure of blood-stained soil and other articles from the spot
further corroborates the prosecution version. No material
contradiction has been brought on record to dispute the situs of
the incident. The defence witness DW-1 Shakti Kosle has not
supported the defence in a reliable manner and his testimony
does not create any dent in the otherwise cogent and consistent
prosecution evidence.
48. The medical evidence, as proved by PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, fully
corroborates the ocular version. The postmortem report (Ex.P/7)
reveals that the deceased sustained a stab injury on the left side
of the chest, which penetrated deep into the body and caused
rupture of the heart, leading to death. The injury was ante-mortem
and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The
nature, location and depth of the injury clearly support the
prosecution case that a forceful blow was inflicted by a sharp-
edged weapon.
49. The cumulative effect of the consistent eyewitness account,
corroborative medical evidence, recovery of the weapon at the
instance of the appellant, and the scientific evidence in the form of
FSL report, leads to an irresistible conclusion that it was the
appellant who inflicted the fatal injury to the deceased. The
defence has failed to probabilize any alternative version or to
create any reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. However,
upon careful consideration of the entire factual matrix, this Court
finds that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment. There
is no clear evidence of premeditation or prior concert to commit
murder. The evidence on record indicates that the appellant and
the deceased entered into an altercation immediately prior to the
incident, and in the course of such interaction, the appellant
inflicted a single blow with a knife. It is also significant that only
one injury was inflicted, though on a vital part of the body. There is
no material to indicate that the appellant acted in a cruel or
unusual manner or that he took undue advantage of the situation.
The act appears to have been committed in the heat of passion
during a sudden quarrel.
50. In such circumstances, though the appellant must be attributed
with the knowledge that inflicting a knife blow on the chest is likely
to cause death, the element of intention to cause death, as
required for an offence under Section 302 IPC, is not established
beyond reasonable doubt. The case thus falls within Exception 4
to Section 300 IPC.
51. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be
sustained in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The
evidence on record indicates that the act was committed in the
course of a sudden altercation, without premeditation, and with
only a single blow inflicted, though on a vital part of the body.
While the appellant can certainly be attributed with the knowledge
that such an act was likely to cause death, the intention to cause
death, as required for an offence under Section 302 IPC, is not
established beyond reasonable doubt. The case, therefore, falls
within the ambit of culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC.
52. Accordingly, while affirming the finding that the appellant is the
author of the injury which resulted in the death of deceased
Ramesh Dhruve, the conviction recorded under Section 302 IPC
is set aside and is hereby altered to one under Section 304 Part-I
IPC.
53. Resultantly, the conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC
is set aside and he is convicted under Section 304 Part-I IPC.
Considering the gravity of the offence, the manner of its
commission, and all attending circumstances, the accused is
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10
years. The fine imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact. The
appellant is stated to be in jail since 10.09.2019 being the date of
arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as modified
above.
54. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.
55. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along
with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned
forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send
a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail
where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the
same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail
the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an
appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if so advised, with the
assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu
