Smt. Nidhi Sao vs Greenearth Infraventures Private ... on 16 April, 2026

                                                       1




                                                                     2026:CGHC:17484


                                                                                  AFR

                                HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR


                                             MA No. 173 of 2023

                   Smt. Nidhi Sao W/o Shri Ashish Sao Aged About 40 Years Resident Of
AMARDEEP
CHOUBEY
                   301, Block-A Sun Heritage (Sun City Colony), Jagdalpur, District Bastar
Digitally signed
by AMARDEEP
CHOUBEY
                   (C.G.) Through Her Power Of Attorney Holder Shri Ashish Sao, Son Of
Date: 2026.04.20
14:51:47 +0530
                   Shri Dalchand Sao, Aged About 49 Years, Resident Of 301, Block-A,
                   Sun Heritage (Sun City Colony) Jagdalpur, District Bastar (C.G.)
                   (Allottee)
                                                                              ... Appellant
                                                   versus
                   Greenearth Infraventures Private Limited, Resident Of 13a Panchsheel
                   Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) Through Its Shri K.V. Singh (Director), Resident Of
                   13a, Panchsheel Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) (Promoter)
                                                                          .... Respondent

(Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant : Mr. Manish Nigam, Advocate

For Respondent : Mr. Mayank Kumar, Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 16/04/2026

1. The appellant/allottee has preferred the present appeal under

Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation And Development) Act,

2016 being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 15/09/2023

passed by the learned Chhattisgarh Real Estate Appellate

Tribunal, Raipur (C.G.) (for brevity 'the Tribunal') in Appeal

No.20/2022 (Smt. Nidhi Sao Vs. Green Earth Infraventures),

arising out of the order dated 22.11.2018 passed by the learned

Chhattisgarh Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Raipur, C.G. (for

brevity 'the RERA') Case No. M-PRO-2018-00124 (Smt. Nidhi

Sao Vs. Green Earth Infraventures), whereby, it was directed to

the respondent/promoter to complete the finishing work of the

apartment in question and to hand over possession of the same to

the appellant/allottee within a period of two months and also

directed that the appellant shall deposit the balance amount.

2. This is an admitted appeal. The following substantial question of

law arises for adjudication of the matter :

"Whether the Chhattisgarh Real Estate Appellate Tribunal erred in law in dismissing the complaint filed by the appellant/allottee on the ground of limitation ?"

3. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the

appeal is heard finally.

4. The appellant/allottee lodged a complaint against the respondent/

promoter before the RERA alleging, inter alia, that the appellant

entered into a sale agreement on 26/05/2012, to purchase the

Flat No. 210 in Block Orchid-4 situated in "Green Earth City"

located in Amleshwar, Durg, developed by the respondent herein.

The appellant alleges that the respondent was pressurizing her to

take possession of the said apartment while demanding additional

payment. The appellant has also complained that the quality of

construction of the apartment in question is substandard.

Thereafter, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 31 of the

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Authority Act, 2016

(for brevity 'the Act') in the prescribed format (Form M), for return

of amount and compensation on account of inferior quality of

construction and failure of the construction work within time as

prescribed in the sale agreement executed between the parties on

26/05/2012.

5. Notice regarding the said complaint was issued to the respondent.

The respondent appeared before the RERA and submitted a

written reply, denying the allegations made by the appellant. The

respondent stated that the appellant failed to make payments

within the stipulated time as per the sale agreement dated

26/05/2012. The respondent also denied the allegations regarding

inferior quality of construction. It further stated that due to the

appellant's failure to make timely payments, interest was levied on

the outstanding amount in accordance with the terms of the sale

agreement, and the same was demanded from the appellant. The

allegation made by the appellant regarding the pressure to take

possession of the apartment was also denied. Additionally, the

respondent stated in the reply that the appellant had never raised

any complaint or communicated any issue with them regarding

the said apartment. The respondent further stated in reply that a

completion certificate for the apartment in question was obtained

from the competent authority on November 1, 2017.

6. After hearing the parties and upon due appreciation of the entire

facts and circumstances of the case, on the basis of material

available on record, the RERA dismissed the complaint filed by

the appellant. However, a direction was issued to the respondent

to complete the finishing work of the apartment in question and to

hand over the possession of the same to the appellant/allottee

within a period of two months. At the same time, RERA also

directed the appellant to deposit the balance amount in execution

of registry of the said flat.

7. Aggrieved by the order of the RERA, the appellant preferred an

appeal before the Tribunal, who by the impugned order dated

15/9/2023, dismissed the Appeal of the appellant/allottee by

taking suo-moto cognizance of the point of limitation in filing the

Complaint before RERA. Thus, this appeal by the

appellant/allottee.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant/allottee submits that the order

passed by the RERA as well as by the Tribunal are arbitrary,

erroneous and has been passed without following due provisions

of law. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal erred in

law in holding that the complaint filed by the appellant before the

RERA was barred by limitation,despite the fact that the Act does

not prescribe any specific period of limitation for filing complaints

before the RERA. In absence of an express statutory provision,

the importation of the Limitation Act cannot be assumed as a

matter of course. According to the learned counsel, the Limitation

Act, by its own framework, applies to "Courts" unless its

applicability is expressly or by necessary implication extended to

quasi-judicial authorities. The Authority under RERA, being a

specialized regulatory body with a distinct adjudicatory

mechanism, does not fall within the strict ambit of a "Court" as

contemplated under the Limitation Act. In support of his

contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme

Court in the matter of Ganesan (represented by its power agent

G. Rukmani Ganesan) Vs. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu

Religious and Charitable Endowments Board and Others

reported in (2019) 7 SCC 108.

9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent

would support the order impugned passed by the learned

Tribunal. He would submit that the complaint filed by the

appellant on 4/9/2018 whereas the cause of action arose on

25/5/2015, which fact can be seen from the agreement. Thus, the

Tribunal rightly observed that the complaint filed by the appellant

before the RERA is barred by limitation. Learned counsel would

also submit that the appeal filed by the appellant before this Court

under Section 58 of the Act tself is not maintainable in view of

reliefs claimed by the appellant, as the appeal is under valued and

also suffers from deficit of Court fee.

10. In reply to the aforesaid objection raised by the respondent

regarding under valuation of appeal and deficit of Court fee,

learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant

is pressing only relief clause (i) & hence the objection of

respondent is sustainable.

11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record

and the impugned orders with utmost circumspection.

12. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and perusing

the record, the core issue that arises for consideration is whether

the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground

of limitation by holding that the complaint filed before the RERA

was time-barred.

13. At the outset, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework

of the Act. A careful reading of the Act reveals that there is no

prescribed period of limitation for filing a complaint under Section

31 before the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer. The statute is

conspicuously silent on this aspect. For the sake of convenience,

Section 31(1) of the Act is quoted below :

"31. Filing of complaints with the Authority or the adjudicating officer- (1) Any aggrieved person may file a complaint with the Authority or the adjudicating officer, as the case may be, for any violation or contravention of the provisions of this Act or the Rules and Regulations made thereunder against any promoter, allottee or real estate agent as the case

may be."

XXX XXX XXX

14. In such circumstances, the question arises whether the provisions

of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be imported into

proceedings under the Act. It is a settled principle of law that the

Limitation Act applies primarily to "courts" and not to quasi-judicial

authorities, unless expressly provided or necessarily implied.

15. The RERA is a specialized regulatory body created for expeditious

adjudication of disputes between allottees and promoters. It does

not strictly fall within the ambit of a "Court".

16. In the matter of Ganesan (supra), the Supreme Court in paras 27

and 28 held as under:-

"27. Section 29(2) provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 21 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Whether prescription of appeal of limitation of any suit or application in any special or local law relates to suit, application or appeal to be filed in court or it may refer to statutory authorities and tribunals also, is the question to be answered. Different special or local laws have been enacted by the legislature covering different subjects, different rights and liabilities,

methodology of establishing, determining rights and liabilities and remedies provided therein. Special or local law may also provide remedy by institution of suits, appeals and applications in the courts i.e. civil court and to its normal hierarchy and also create special forum for determining rights and liabilities and provide remedies. Most common example of creating statutory authorities for determining rights, liabilities and remedies are taxing statutes where assessing authorities have been provided for with hierarchy of authorities. The remedy of appeal and revision is also provided in the taxing statutes in which the authorities are different from the normal civil courts. Section 29(2) in reference to different special or local laws came for consideration before this Court in a large number of cases. This Court had occasion to consider the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, in reference to different statutes which contain provisions of suits, appeals or applications to the courts/ authorities/ tribunals. There are series of judgments of this Court holding that provisions of the Limitation Act are directed only when suit, appeal or application are to be filed in a court unless there are express provisions in a special or local law.

28. Section 29(2) also came for consideration before this Court in several cases. There is another set of cases where it was held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are to be applied even for suit, appeal or application under special/local law is to be filed before statutory authorities and the tribunal. We shall notice both sets of cases to find out the ratio which needs to be applied in the present case.

29. The first case to be noticed is Town Municipal

Council, Athani v. Labour Court. In the above case applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were filed by various workmen of the appellant. The question which was considered by this Court in the above case was as to whether Article 137 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Referring to various articles of the Limitation Act, 1963, this Court laid down the following: (SCC pp. 882-83, para 12).

"12. ... The scope of the various articles in this division cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal, or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission made that this article will apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court."

30. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nityananda, M. Joshi v. LIC, had occasion to consider the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to an application filed under Sections 33-C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court. The three-Judge Bench categorically held that the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with application to courts, and the Labour Court is not a court within the Limitation Act, 1963. The following was laid down in para 3: (SCC p. 200)

"3. In our view Article 137 only contemplates

applications to courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a court. Further Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is "when the court is closed". Again under Section 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if if th the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Limitation Act, 1963."

(emphasis added)

17. In the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court, it

is manifest that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation

Act, 1963 in the context of various statutes that provide for the

filing of suits, appeals, or applications before courts, authorities, or

tribunals. The provisions of the Limitation Act are primarily

attracted when such proceedings are instituted before a court of

law, unless their applicability is expressly or by necessary

implication extended under a special or local statute. Thus, the

provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable

to a complaint under Section 31(1) of the Act before the RERA.

18. In the case at hand, the appellant filed a complaint before the

RERA under Section 31 (1) of the Act, 2016 which is a creature

under the special Act wherein there is no provision of limitation

and even there is no express provision or implication of

applicability of the Limitation Act. Thus, the Tribunal committed

gross error by applying the provisions of Article 137 of the

Limitation Act to the complaint filed by the appellant under Section

31(1) of the Act before the RERA.

19. It is pertinent to mention here that from the language of the Act

2016, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of

the provisions of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. The

provisions of the Limitation Act, which the legislature did not

incorporate in the Act, 2016, cannot be imported into it by analogy.

An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule

of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to

be expounded 'according to the intent of them that made it'. 'The

will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, and

demands perfect obedience. If the Legislature willfully omits to

incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent

statue, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the

language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court

is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or

introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy of

implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of

justice and equity. To do so 'would be entrenching upon the

preserves of Legislature', the primary function of a Court of law

being jus dicere and not jus dare.

20. In the light of what has been stated above, I am of the considered

view that the Tribunal was in error in importing whole hog the

principle of Article 137 of the Limitation Act into the Act, 2016. In

fact, the scheme of the Act, 2016 clearly indicates that the RERA

is an authority under the said Act. The Chairman of the RERA is to

be appointed by the Government and he is entrusted with various

functions under the Act, 2016. There is no question of treating the

Chairman of the RERA as a Court under the Act, 2016. The

definition of 'Court' refers to the Civil Court constituted by the

Legislature in the State for administration of justice. The

Constitution of Court in this country has been by Legislative

enactments.

21. In view of the aforesaid facts & circumstances, it is held that by

applying Article 137 of the Limitation Act to the case at hand, the

Tribunal committed gross error in dismissing the appeal of the

appellant on the ground of Limitation. Thus, the order impugned is

bad in law.

22. When the complaint under Section 31(1) of the Act filed by the

appellant was dismissed by the RERA, the appellant filed an

appeal before the Tribunal. However, without entering into the

merits of the case, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the

ground that the complaint filed under Section 31(1) of the Act was

beyond the prescribed period of limitation and barred by limitation.

23. A perusal of the Tribunal's order itself, particularly paragraph 11,

reveals that the respondent/promoter had not raised any objection

regarding limitation before the RERA. Moreover, the RERA had

also not framed any issue for determination on the question of

limitation. Despite this, the Tribunal proceeded to dismiss the

appeal solely on the ground of limitation, without adjudicating the

matter on merits.

24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the Tribunal committed a manifest error in dismissing

the appeal solely on the ground of limitation, particularly when no

such objection was raised before the RERA and no issue on

limitation was framed or adjudicated. The Tribunal, for the first

time at the appellate stage, relied upon limitation without it being

raised or considered earlier. This kind of approach shows a

procedural irregularity, as the matter was decided on a ground

that was not properly raised or examined. The Tribunal ought to

have confined its consideration to the legality and propriety of the

order passed by the RERA and adjudicate the appeal on merits.

The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and is liable

to be set aside.

25. As a sequence, the appeal is allowed and the aforesaid

substantial question of law is answered accordingly. The

impugned order dated 15.09.2023 passed by the Tribunal is set

aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal with a

direction to decide the appeal filed by the appellant/allottee afresh

on merits.

26. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on

the merits of the matter and the Tribunal may proceed with the

matter, in accordance with law and on its own merits, without

insisting upon the question of limitation.

SD/-

(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

Gowrli/ Amardeep

Head Note

Article 137 of Limitation Act will not be applicable to a complaint u/S 31(1) of Real Estate (Regulation And Development) Act, 2016 filed before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA).