[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
M/S Chanakya Transport P Ltd vs South Eastern Coalfields Ltd on 7 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:15760-DB
NAFR
Digitally
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
signed by
BABLU
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.04.08
10:13:12
+0530
WPC No. 360 of 2016
M/s Chanakya Transport (P) Ltd. Through Wg. Cdr. Subhash Sindhwani
(Retd) S/o Late Shri R.D. Sindhwani, Aged About 65 Years, R/o
Khamardih, Kachna Road, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 - South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Through The Chairman-Cum-
Managing Director, Seepat Road, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh
2 - Chief General Manager, S E C L, Hasdeo Area, Post South
Jhagrakhand Colliery, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Amrito Das, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr.Vaibhav Shukla, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
7.4.2026
1. Heard Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel for the petitioner as well
as Mr.Vaibhav Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents.
2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for
following reliefs:-
"10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ quashing and setting aside the
order dated 23.01.2014 read along with the
corrigendum dated 25.01.2014 (ΑNNEXURE P/1).
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ directing the respondent
authorities to release the entire payments with held by
them and due to the petitioner.
10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ directing the respondent
authorities to pay interest @ 12% per annum to the
petitioner towards the different payments from the date
it fell due to be paid and till the date of actual payment.
10.4 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem
fit and proper, in the interest of justice.".
3. Facts of the case are that the Petitioner is an ex-servicemen
company promoted and owned by retired defence personnel. It
was sponsored by the Ministry of Defence, Government of
India, through the Directorate General of Resettlement, to
facilitate resettlement of retired personnel and to provide
uninterrupted, reliable, and strike-free coal transportation
services to SECL. The Petitioner was engaged under an
agreement for coal transportation and loading in SECL Hasdeo
Area from 03.02.1996 to 02.02.2005. The Petitioner was solely
responsible for payment of wages to its employees, and SECL
had no role in the jural relationship between the Petitioner and
its employees. The respondent SECL withheld payments due to
the pendency of Writ Petition No.19/2006. The respondent
SECL later agreed to release the principal amount upon
disposal of the petition, while reserving its decision on interest.
Accordingly, this Court disposed of the petition directing the
respondent SECL to decide the issue of interest within two
months.
4. The respondent SECL has admitted its liability to pay the
principal amount, which was withheld only due to the pending
labour dispute, as reflected in its communications. The
respondent SECL has failed to release amounts of Rs.
2,93,599/-, Rs. 4,26,080/-, and Rs. 50,00,000/-. The first two
amounts were deducted from bills and are still retained, while
the bill for Rs. 50,00,000/- has not been processed despite
repeated requests. Due to SECL's failure to decide the issue of
interest within the stipulated time, the Petitioner filed Contempt
Petition No. 535/2013. After issuance of notices, the
Respondents hastily passed the impugned order denying
interest, while remaining silent on payment of the admitted
principal amount. The respondent SECL has failed to explain
the non-release of Rs. 84,65,539/-, including Rs. 2,93,599/- and
Rs. 4,26,080/-, which continue to be unjustifiably withheld.
5. The principal amounts claimed have never been disputed by
the respondent SECL. Despite this, the respondent SECL
continues to withhold payment without justification. The bill for
Rs.50,00,000/- has already been submitted but remains
unattended. Though the respondent SECL proposed release of
payment against a bank guarantee, it failed to specify the
amount or duration despite repeated requests, rendering the
proposal vague. The reliance on Clause 32(1) is misplaced.
The clause permits SECL to assess short payment of wages,
deduct such amount, and pay it to workers, but does not
authorize indefinite withholding of funds.
6. The respondent SECL neither assessed nor paid any alleged
shortfall to workers. On the contrary, it supervised and certified
wage payments during the contract period. The subsequent
withholding of amounts is arbitrary and beyond contractual
authority. The respondent SECL retained the Petitioner's funds
for over 11 years and derived benefit therefrom. The Petitioner
is therefore entitled to payment of interest. Hence, this petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent
SECL has illegally withheld the principal amount due to the
Petitioner. Clause 32(f) does not empower SECL to deduct or
withhold any payment after a lapse of 11 years on the basis of
subsequent litigation by the union. The said clause only permits
SECL to supervise, assess, and deduct any shortfall in wages
at the time of payment and to disburse the same to the workers.
He further submits that the respondent SECL retained the said
amount for over 11 years, utilized it for its own business
purposes, and derived financial benefit therefrom. While the
amount may be insignificant for a large corporation like SECL, it
had a severe financial impact on the Petitioner, a small
enterprise, leading to financial distress, including impoundment
of its vehicles by banks. It is submitted that any settlement
between the Petitioner and its workers is wholly independent of
the respondent SECL. The contention of the respondent SECL
that no claim survives due to such settlement is untenable,
baseless, and unsupported by law. He also submits that that
the SECL's offer to release the withheld amount cannot justify
partial payment while arbitrarily retaining the balance. The
respondent SECL has neither denied nor disputed the
outstanding amounts. It has also misled this Court and the
Petitioner by failing to disclose that part of the principal amount
continues to be withheld, along with the reasons thereof. It is
submitted that the order passed in Writ Petition No. 19/2006
necessarily implies that the SECL was required to release the
entire withheld principal amount, as the question of payment of
interest could arise only upon such release. It is also submitted
that the respondent SECL had earlier acknowledged and
accepted its liability to pay the specific outstanding principal
amounts. The present management cannot resile from or revisit
such admitted liability and remains bound to honour the same.
He contended that the impugned order has been passed in
undue haste, merely to avoid consequences in the contempt
proceedings, without proper application of mind and on illegal
and arbitrary grounds, thereby causing serious prejudice to the
Petitioner. As such, the writ petition deserves to be allowed.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents opposes the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petition as
framed and filed is not maintainable as the disputed question of
facts cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
9. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned
order and other documents appended with writ appeal.
10. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it
raises disputed question of facts.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid
Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v.
Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 was
dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made
an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking
compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution,
which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the
authorities. The Supreme Court in the said case observed as
under:
"6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an
error in entertaining the writ petitions even though
they were not fit cases for exercising power under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court
went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the
deaths had taken place because of electrocution
as a result of the deceased coming into contact
with snapped live wires of the electric transmission
lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie
amounted to negligence on the part of the
appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate
that all these cases were actions in tort and
negligence was required to be established firstly by
the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the
electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1
had snapped and the deceased had come in
contact with it and had died was not by itself
sufficient for awarding compensation. It also
required to be examined whether the wire had
snapped as a result of any negligence of the
appellants and under which circumstances the
deceased had come in contact with the wire. In
view of the specific defences raised by the
appellants in each of these cases they deserved
an opportunity to prove that proper care and
precautions were taken in maintaining the
transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped
because of circumstances beyond their control or
unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the
deceased had not died in the manner stated by the
petitioners. These questions could not have been
decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is
the settled legal position that where disputed
questions of facts are involved a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper
remedy. The High Court has not and could not
have held that the disputes in these cases were
raised for the sake of raising them and that there
was no substance therein. The High Court should
have directed the writ petitioners to approach the
civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of
1995."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the
Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana and
others, (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows:
"16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd.
(Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the
question which arose for consideration was, can
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
award compensation for death caused due to
electrocution on account of negligence, when the
liability was emphatically denied on the ground that
the death had not occurred as a result of
negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts
of some other persons. The Court held that it is the
settled legal position that where disputed questions
of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore,
questions as to whether death occurred due to
negligence or due to act of God or of some third
person could not be decided properly on the basis
of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil
court after appreciating the evidence adduced by
the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi
[(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a
disputed question of fact arises and there is clear
denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The
Court carved out exception to this general rule by
observing that, it should not be understood that in
every case of tortious liability, recourse must be
had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face
of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it
cannot be said that there will be any bar to
proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
(emphasis supplied)
13. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v.
Rajeshwari Shivam, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as
under:
"26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising
its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate
hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the
High Court to make a comparative assessment of
conflicting technical reports and decide which one
is acceptable."
14. Subsequently, in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10
SCC 690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed:
"24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by
way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of
fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is
wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in
the field of private law, having no statutory flavour,
are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to
by the parties. The dispute as to whether the
amount is payable or not and/or how much amount
is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is
no admission on the part of the appellants to infer
that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in
the absence of any acceptance of joint survey
report by the competent authority, no right would
accrue to the writ petitioner only because
measurements cannot be undertaken after
passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take
place but the measurement books of the work
executed from time to time would form a
reasonable basis for assessing the amount due
and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process
could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e.
arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not
have the expertise in respect of measurements or
construction of roads."
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power
Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India
(P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, while dealing with the issue of
exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a
contract, has stated:
"82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is,
undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in
declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual
matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ
petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend
upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by
the petitioner, the questions, which would have to
be decided, and, most importantly, whether there
are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which
is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the
grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there
is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding
disputed questions of fact, particularly when the
dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only,
the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by
way of a civil suit."
(emphasis supplied)
16. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is
well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed
question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India may not be proper.
17. Upon perusal of the pleadings, it appears that the petitioner has
prayed for a direction to the respondents to release the entire
withheld payments due to the petitioner and also to pay interest
at the rate of 12% per annum on various amounts from the date
they fell due until the date of actual payment.
18. In the present case, the relief sought by the petitioner to release
the entire withheld payments and for payment of interest at the
rate of 12% per annum is contingent upon the resolution of
disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid,
it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the
present writ petition.
19. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties, further considering the disputed questions of law
involved in this writ petition, the relief sought by the petitioner
and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the
above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good
ground to entertain this writ petition.
20. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be
and is hereby dismissed. However, liberty is reserved in favour
of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies
available to him under the law. No cost(s).
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
