South Eastern Coalfields Ltd vs Mahendra Kumar Sahu
2026 Latest Caselaw 1388 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

South Eastern Coalfields Ltd vs Mahendra Kumar Sahu on 7 April, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                                          1




         Digitally
         signed by
                                                                          2026:CGHC:15706-DB
         ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI   Date:
         2026.04.08
                                                                                          AFR
         10:14:47
         +0530


                                  HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR


                                                WA No. 272 of 2026

                      1 - South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Through Its Chairman Cum Managing
                      Director,   Seepat   Road,   Bilaspur,   District   Bilaspur    Chhattisgarh
                      (Respondent No. 1 In WP)

2 - Chief General Manager South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Bishrampur Area, District Surguja Chhattisgarh Now District Surajpur Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 3 In WP) ... Appellants versus 1 - Mahendra Kumar Sahu S/o Motiram Sahu Aged About 40 Years Occupation Advocate, R/o Sonhat, P.O. Sonhat, District Koriya Chhattisgarh (Petitioner In WP) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, The State Rehabilitation Department, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 2 In WP) 3 - The Collector District Surguja Chhattisgarh (Now District Surajpur Chhattisgarh) (Respondent No. 4 In WP) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Pankaj Singh as well as Mr. Harash Dave, Advocates

For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Mahendra Kumar Sahu, in person

For State/Respondents : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy No.2 & 3 Advocate General

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

07.04.2026

1. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Counsel assisted by

Mr. Pankaj Singh and Mr. Harsh Dave, learned counsel

appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. Mahendra Kumar

Sahu, respondent No.1 in person and Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri,

learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents No.2 and 3,

on I.A. No.01, which is an application for condonation of delay of

12 days in preferring the writ appeal.

2. On due consideration the grounds mentioned in the application

(I.A. No.01), the same is allowed. Delay of 12 days in preferring

the writ appeal is hereby condoned.

3. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, we

proceed to hear the matter finally.

4. By way of the present writ appeal, the appellants have prayed to

set aside the order dated 06.11.2025 passed in Writ Petition (S)

No.1625/2012 and consequently dismiss the writ petition filed by

respondent No.1/writ petitioner.

5. The brief facts projected before the learned Single Judge were

that the writ petitioner had purchased Survey Nos. 341/381,

186/388(x), 182/25, 186/80 and 186/103 kha, admeasuring total

area of 1.21 acres, situated at Village Govindpur, through a

registered sale deed dated 05.01.1993. The surface rights over

the said land were subsequently acquired by the SECL

authorities, and an award came to be passed on 21.05.2002,

pursuant to which compensation amounting to Rs. 31,291/- was

paid to the writ petitioner. It was the case of the writ petitioner that

he had applied for grant of employment in terms of the

rehabilitation policy issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh dated

25.09.1991. However, the said claim was rejected by the

competent authority vide orders dated 20.08.2002 and again on

08.04.2006 on the ground that the writ petitioner had purchased

the land after the cut-off date i.e. 30.09.1991.

6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition (S)

No.1625/2012 seeking a direction to the SECL authorities to

consider his claim for grant of employment in lieu of the land so

acquired. The said writ petition came to be disposed of by the

learned Single Judge vide order dated 06.11.2025, wherein it was

observed that the action of the SECL authorities in rejecting the

claim of the writ petitioner for employment is not sustainable in the

eyes of law. Accordingly, the orders impugned therein were

quashed, and the SECL authorities were directed to consider the

claim of the writ petitioner for employment within a period of 30

days. It was further observed that the writ petitioner had been

agitating his claim since the year 2012 and had prima facie been

subjected to discrimination; consequently, the SECL authorities

were directed to pay compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- to the writ

petitioner within a period of 30 days from the date of the order

passed in the writ petition.

7. Being aggrieved by the order dated 06.11.2025, passed by the

learned Single Judge, the present writ appeal has been preferred

by the SECL authorities.

8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that

the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is

contrary to the facts on record and the settled principles of law

governing land acquisition and rehabilitation policies. It is

contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that

the claim of the petitioner for grant of employment was rejected

strictly in accordance with the decision taken in the meeting dated

19.07.2002, wherein it was resolved that persons who had

purchased land after the cut-off date i.e. 30.09.1991 would not be

entitled to employment under the Rehabilitation Policy of 1991.

The said decision, having been taken in the presence of public

representatives, villagers, and authorities of the State as well as

SECL, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unknown to the affected

persons.

9. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in

holding that the rejection of the petitioner's claim was not

supported by any material, overlooking the fact that the initiation

of land acquisition proceedings on 30.09.1991 is the relevant date

for determining eligibility. Any transaction subsequent thereto

does not confer any right to claim employment under the

rehabilitation scheme. In this regard, reliance has been placed on

the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs.

Shiv Kumar Bhargava, 1995 AIR SCW 595, wherein it has been

held that the rights of a landowner are to be determined with

reference to the date of notification for acquisition and that a

subsequent purchaser cannot claim the benefit of rehabilitation.

10. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that reliance has also

been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Sunil Jain, AIR 2023 SC 415,

wherein it has been categorically held that a subsequent

purchaser has no locus to challenge acquisition proceedings or

claim benefits arising therefrom. Similar view has been reiterated

in Government of NCT of Delhi vs. M/s BSK Realtors LLP,

2024 (5) SCR 1159, thereby affirming that rights flowing from

acquisition cannot be claimed by persons who acquire interest

after the initiation of acquisition proceedings.

11. It is also contended that the finding recorded by the learned

Single Judge regarding non-communication of rejection orders is

perverse and contrary to the material available on record. The

appellants had duly produced documentary evidence, including

the dispatch register (Annexure R-1/3), to establish that the

rejection orders were sent to the petitioner through registered

post. In terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,

service is deemed to have been effected when a document is

properly addressed, prepaid and posted, unless the contrary is

proved, which has not been demonstrated in the present case.

12. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the learned Single

Judge has committed a grave error in awarding compensation of

Rs.10,00,000/- to the petitioner in the absence of any specific

pleading, prayer, or finding of mala fides, negligence or wrongful

conduct on the part of the appellants. The delay in adjudication of

the writ petition cannot be attributed to the appellants, particularly

when the petition remained pending for more than a decade. The

imposition of such an exorbitant monetary liability, therefore, is

wholly unjustified and unsustainable in law. It is next contended

that the writ petition itself suffered from gross delay and laches,

having been filed after nearly 10 years from the date of rejection

of the petitioner's claim. Mere submission of repeated

representations does not extend the period of limitation.

13. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief

even on merits, as he had admittedly purchased the land after

initiation of acquisition proceedings and was neither an original

landholder nor a person fulfilling the eligibility criteria under the

Rehabilitation Policy, 1991. Reliance has also been placed on

SECL vs. Prem Kumar Sharma, AIR 2006 SC 2727, Sanjeev

Kumar Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 2015 CG 139, and R.

Muthukumar vs. Chairman and Managing Director,

TANGEDCO, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 151, to contend that Article

14 cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or to claim parity

based on a wrong decision. It is urged that the impugned order, if

allowed to stand, would open floodgates of litigation and defeat

the very object of the rehabilitation policy, which is intended to

benefit genuine land oustees and not to provide a backdoor entry

into public employment.

14. On the other hand, respondent No.1, appearing in person, would

submit that the very foundation of rejection of his claim by the

appellants is arbitrary and unsustainable in law, inasmuch as the

alleged decision taken in the meeting dated 19.07.2002,

restricting grant of employment to only those landholders who

owned the land prior to 30.09.1991, was never brought into the

public domain. It is contended that such an internal

communication between SECL and the District Collector, not

being notified or made known to the affected persons, could not

have been relied upon to deprive him of his legitimate entitlement

under the Rehabilitation Policy of 1991. He would further submit

that the land owned by him, admeasuring 1.21 acres, was duly

acquired by the authorities and an award was passed in his

favour, pursuant to which compensation was also paid. However,

despite acquisition of his land, his claim for grant of employment

was rejected without proper intimation. It is his case that no

effective communication of the rejection orders was ever made to

him by the appellants, thereby depriving him of an opportunity to

seek appropriate remedy at the relevant point of time.

15. Respondent No.1 would also contend that the action of the

appellants is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India, as similarly situated persons, who had

purchased land even after the cut-off date of 30.09.1991, were

granted employment by SECL and are continuing in service till

date. According to him, once such benefit has been extended to

other persons, denial of the same to him amounts to hostile

discrimination without any reasonable basis. It is further submitted

that the object of the Rehabilitation Policy is to provide relief and

livelihood support to persons whose lands have been acquired,

and the respondent, having lost his land in the acquisition

proceedings, squarely falls within the category of land oustees

entitled for such consideration. The rejection of his claim,

therefore, defeats the very purpose of the policy and results in

grave injustice.

16. Respondent No.1 would also urge that the appellants cannot take

shelter under technicalities or internal decisions to deny him

employment, particularly when his land stood acquired and

compensation alone cannot be treated as adequate rehabilitation.

The denial of employment, according to him, is arbitrary,

unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of the policy. On the

aforesaid submissions, respondent No.1 prays that the

appropriate directions be issued to the appellants to consider and

grant him employment in lieu of the land acquired, along with all

consequential benefits.

17. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.2

and 3 submits that, pursuant to the liberty granted by the learned

Single Judge vide order dated 13.06.2024, an enquiry was

conducted with respect to the entitlement of the writ petitioner in

connection with Revision Revenue Case No. 207/A-67/2010-11. It

is submitted that the enquiry was carried out by the Sub-Divisional

Officer (Revenue), Surajpur, and a detailed report dated

08.07.2024 has been prepared and placed on record. It is further

submitted that, as per the findings recorded in the said enquiry

report, the land in question belongs to the writ petitioner and the

same has been acquired by SECL, and possession thereof has

already been taken over by the acquiring authority. The report

also confirms that an award dated 21.05.2002 was passed and

compensation amounting to Rs.31,291/- was paid to the writ

petitioner.

18. Learned State Counsel would further submit that the enquiry

reveals that the writ petitioner had acquired the subject land by

way of purchase through a registered sale deed dated

05.01.1993, and the same stood duly recorded in his name in the

revenue records, including mutation entries and B-1 records,

thereby establishing his ownership over the land in question. It is

also contended that during the course of enquiry, notices were

issued to the concerned parties including SECL; however, despite

opportunity, no reply was submitted by the General Manager,

SECL, and therefore, the enquiry was concluded on the basis of

available records and material, including the report submitted by

the concerned Patwari along with relevant revenue documents.

19. Learned State Counsel submits that, upon a detailed examination

of the records, it has been clearly opined in the enquiry report that

the writ petitioner had valid title over the acquired land and that

the acquisition proceedings and payment of compensation stand

duly established. He would further submit that on the strength of

the said enquiry report, it is evident that the land in question

belongs to the writ petitioner.

20. We have heard learned Senior counsel for the appellants as well

as respondent No.1, who appeared in person as also the learned

State counsel, at considerable length and have bestowed our

anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced at the

Bar. We have also carefully perused the impugned order passed

by the learned Single Judge and examined the pleadings,

documents and materials available on record.

21. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the

parties as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge

has passed the impugned order in following terms:-

"7. Admittedly, the lands bearing Survey Nos. 341/381, 186/388 x, 182/25, 186/80, 186/103 [k, total area 1.21 acres situated at Village Govindpur belonging to the petitioner were acquired for mining purpose by the SECL under the Act of 1957 and later on, surface right was acquired and an award was passed on 21.05.2002. The claim of the petitioner for employment has been rejected on the ground that he purchased the property after 30th of September, 1991. In letter dated 30th of September, 1991, there is no whisper to the effect that the person who would purchase the property after said date would not get employment. The letter dated 30th of September, 1991 was internal communication between the SECL and the District Collector.

The Collector took decision on said communication on 19th of July, 2002 and held that the persons who have purchased the property after 30th of September, 1991 cannot claim employment according to the rehabilitation policy of the State of Madhya Pradesh.

8. The decision was taken by the Collector after passing of award dated 21.05.2002. From 1991 till 19.07.2002, the purchasers/land oustees were not aware of the fact that they were not eligible or entitled to get employment against acquisition of their lands. The letter dated 30.09.1991 & order dated 19.07.2002 were not public either by SECL or by the State authorities, thus, the action of the SECL as well as the District Collector was illegal, arbitrary and

discriminatory which deprive the petitioner and other persons from their legal rights.

9. The claim of the petitioner for employment has been rejected only on the ground that he purchased the property after 30th of September, 1991 but no document has been placed by the SECL authorities to demonstrate that ban was put on purchase of the land in that area after 30.09.1991.

10. With regard to delay in filing this petition, the SECL has not placed any document to establish that the orders of rejection were duly communicated to the petitioner, therefore, the contention made by Mr. Singh cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

11. The action of the SECL authorities in rejecting the claim of the petitioner for employment is not sustainable in the eyes of law, therefore, all the orders issued in this regard are hereby quashed. The SECL authorities are directed to consider the claim of the petitioner for employment within a period of 30 days from today. The petitioner is agitating his legal and rightful claim since 2012 and prima facie it appears that he has been discriminated, therefore, the SECL authorities shall pay compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- to the petitioner within a period of 30 days from today.

12. With the aforesaid observation(s)/ direction(s), the present petition is disposed of."

22. It is not in dispute before this Court that the land in question,

belonging to respondent No.1/writ petitioner, stood acquired by

the SECL authorities in accordance with law and that an award

dated 21.05.2002 was duly passed in the acquisition proceedings.

It is also borne out from the record that compensation, as

determined under the said award, was paid to the writ petitioner.

The enquiry report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer

(Revenue), Surajpur, pursuant to the liberty granted by the

learned Single Judge, further reinforces and substantiates the

factum of acquisition of the subject land as well as the title of the

writ petitioner over the same. The said report, based on revenue

records, mutation entries and other contemporaneous documents,

unequivocally establishes that the writ petitioner was the recorded

owner of the acquired land at the relevant point of time. In such

circumstances, the status of the writ petitioner as a land oustee

stands duly established.

23. The principal controversy, however, revolves around the

entitlement of the writ petitioner to claim employment under the

Rehabilitation Policy of 1991, particularly in view of the fact that

he had purchased the land after the cut-off date i.e. 30.09.1991.

The appellants have sought to justify rejection of the claim on the

basis of a decision allegedly taken in a meeting dated 19.07.2002.

However, it is evident from the record that such decision was not

part of any statutory policy nor was it ever notified or made known

to the affected persons. Thus, the same could not have been

relied upon to deny substantive benefits to the writ

petitioner/respondent No.1.

24. It is a settled principle of law that any administrative decision

having civil consequences must be transparent and made known

to the persons likely to be affected. An internal administrative

arrangement, which has neither been published nor

communicated, cannot be enforced to the detriment of an

individual. In the present case, there is no material to indicate that

the alleged restriction based on the cut-off date was ever brought

into the public domain. Therefore, denial of employment to the writ

petitioner on the strength of such an undisclosed decision cannot

be sustained.

25. At this juncture, during the course of hearing, a pointed query was

put by this Court to respondent No.1, who appeared in person, as

to whether he seeks consideration for grant of employment in

terms of the Rehabilitation Policy or would be satisfied if

reasonable compensation is awarded to him in lieu thereof. In

response, respondent No.1 fairly and candidly submitted that he

would be satisfied if a just and reasonable compensation is

awarded and that he does not wish to press his claim for grant of

employment any further.

26. It is pertinent to note that respondent No.1, though now a

practising Advocate, has appeared in person and has been

pursuing the present litigation pertaining to his individual

grievance for a considerable length of time. The record reflects

that he has been agitating his claim since the year 2012, even

prior to entering the legal profession, and has continued to pursue

the same with diligence. His present stand before this Court

indicates a pragmatic approach aimed at bringing finality to the

long-pending dispute.

27. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, on

instructions, submitted that in the event this Court is inclined to

award reasonable compensation in lieu of employment, the

appellants would abide by such direction and ensure compliance

within a stipulated time. The said submission substantially

narrows the controversy and paves the way for an equitable

resolution.

28. In light of the aforesaid stand taken by both the parties and having

regard to the fact that respondent No.1 is now a practising

Advocate who has been pursuing this matter since long, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would

be adequately served by granting monetary compensation in lieu

of directing consideration of his claim for employment. Such a

course would ensure quietus to the dispute and obviate the need

for further rounds of litigation.

29. In light of the aforesaid stand taken by both the parties and

considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would

be better served by granting monetary compensation to the writ

petitioner in lieu of directing consideration of his claim for

employment. Accordingly, the direction issued by the learned

Single Judge for consideration of the claim of the writ petitioner for

grant of employment is set aside.

30. This Court further finds that the compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-

awarded by the learned Single Judge is on the higher side,

particularly in the absence of any specific finding of mala fides or

deliberate wrongdoing on the part of the appellants. At the same

time, it cannot be ignored that the writ petitioner has been

pursuing his claim for a considerable period and has suffered

prolonged litigation. Therefore, balancing the equities and in order

to do complete justice between the parties, this Court deems it

appropriate to modify the compensation awarded by the learned

Single Judge. The compensation is accordingly reduced from

Rs.10,00,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only), which,

in the considered view of this Court, would constitute fair and

reasonable recompense in the facts of the case.

31. The aforesaid amount shall be paid by the appellants to

respondent No.1 within a period of 30 days from the date of

receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, failing which the same

shall carry consequences in accordance with law.

32. Resultantly, the writ appeal is partly allowed. The impugned

order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is

modified to the extent that the direction for consideration of grant

of employment is set aside and the compensation is reduced to

Rs.5,00,000/- as indicated hereinabove.

33. All pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed

of. There shall be no order as to costs.

                      Sd/-                                    Sd/-
            (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                      (Ramesh Sinha)
                    Judge                                  Chief Justice
Anu


                                Head-Note

Rejection of claim for employment under the Rehabilitation Policy on the

basis of an unnotified cut-off date, arising from an internal administrative

decision is legally unsustainable.