Chattisgarh High Court
Purushottam Patel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 16 June, 2022
1
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
WA No. 163 of 2022
Purushottam Patel S/o Late Shri Chhabilal Patel, aged about 60 years,
R/o village Ghuichuva, Post Barpalikala, Tehsil Sakti, District Janjgir-
Champa, Chhattisgarh.
---Appellant
Versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh, through Secretary, School Education
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal
Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. Director, Education Department, Directorate, Indrawati Bhawan, Nawa
Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3. Collector, Korba, District Korba, Chhattigarh.
4. Divisional Joint Director (Education) Bilaspur, District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
5. Smt. Kalpana Sharma, Incharge, Principal Government Higher
Secondary School, Tuman, Block Kartala, District Korba, Chhattisgarh.
----Respondents
For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate.
For Respondents No. 1 to 4 : Mr. Vikram Sharma, Deputy
Government Advocate.
For Respondent No. 5 : None
Date of Hearing : 13.05.2022
Date of Judgment : 16.06.2022
Hon'ble Mr. Arup Kumar Goswami, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant, Judge
C A V Judgment
Per Arup Kumar Goswami, Chief Justice
Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel, appearing for the
appellant. Also heard Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government
Advocate, appearing for the respondents.
2. This appeal is presented against an order dated 07.03.2022
passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S) No. 1510 of
2022, wherein the challenge made to an order dated 04.02.2022 by
which the appellant was placed under suspension for the second time,
was dismissed.
3. The appellant-petitioner is a Principal of Government Higher
Secondary School, Tuman, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. By an order
dated 07.09.2021 passed by the Under Secretary, School Education
Department, he was placed under suspension under the provisions of
Section 9(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification,
Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966, for short, the Rules of 1966, on the
grounds that (i) he used to treat his subordinate staff unequally, (ii) he
did not pay any heed to the suggestions/requests of the local public
representatives and the parents of the students, (iii) he used to pollute
the atmosphere of the school, (iv) he made the students carry out a
rally and raise slogans in connection with incident of theft and
ransacking to the property of the school, (v) in the brief audit, some
financial irregularities were detected. It is stated in the said order that
the aforesaid acts of the appellant is a serious misconduct in terms of
Rules 3 and 5 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965,
for short, the Rules of 1965.
4. As the charge sheet could not be issued within a period of 90
days, the order of suspension dated 07.09.2021 was revoked and the
petitioner again started to discharge his duties as a Principal.
Subsequently, a charge-sheet was issued by the Under Secretary,
School Education Department, on 04.02.2022 stating that a disciplinary
action is proposed against the appellant under the provisions of Rule
14 of the Rules of 1966. As many as 08 charges were framed against
the appellant. On the very same day, the appellant was again placed
under suspension under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(a) read with Rule
9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966.
5. The translated version of the charges levelled against the
appellant are as under:
"1. That, while posted as Principal, Government Higher
Secondary School, Tuman, since 25.06.2008, you
have been behaving with the staff and the people of
the village in an indisciplined and biased manner.
2. That, you have realised a sum of Rs.10,000/- at the
rate of Rs. 500 per teacher for doing the data entry in
Karmik Sampada.
3. That, in the name of ransacking and theft in the
school, under your leadership, you took out a rally of
students in the village and made them raise slogans.
This act of yours is encouraging indiscipline amongst
the students.
4.That, you have withheld/deducted salary of 04
employees of the institution, namely, Shri B.K.Bais
(PTI), Shri Kapilram Sahu (Lecturer), Shri K.P.Kurrey
(Lecturer) and Shri Rajaram Paikra (Assistant Teacher)
for various reasons.
5. That, you are providing House Rent Allowance to
two of the teachers, namely, Shri Manharan Lal Sahu,
Lecturer and Shri Dukhiram Patel, UDT, of your
institution despite they having been allotted
government accommodation in the school.
6. That, after December 2019, you have not granted
project allowance as per rules to most of the
employees despite their working in the project area.
7. That, you have twice paid an amount of Rs. 1000/-
on the same date to Mr. Gajendra for transporting
stationary by vehicle No. CG 10 VA 7765, through
Local Examination Fund Voucher No. 276, dated
29.07.2015 and 277, dated 29.07.2015.
8. That you have withdrawn a sum of Rs. 13,800/-
by attaching bills of various general stores and
photocopy centers and thereby committed financial
irregularities.
The above act of yours falls under the category
of grave misconduct and is against Rule 3 and 5 of the
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965."
6. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the appellant submits
that the learned Single Judge did not consider the meaning of the term
"if it considers expedient so to do" as appearing in Rule 9(5)(b) of the
Rules of 1966. It is submitted that a plain reading of the order of
suspension dated 04.02.2022 would go to show that there was no
consideration as to why the appellant had to be again placed under
suspension. There was no application of mind and the order of
suspension was mechanically passed construing as if whenever the
charge sheet is issued, the authority will be at liberty to issue an order
of suspension again. Mr. Paranjpe places reliance on the judgments
rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman, Life Insurance
Corporation of India & Others v. A.Masilamani, reported in (2013) 6
SCC 530, Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2000) 5 SCC
82, Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India & Another, reported in
(2015) 7 SCC 291, and a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Dayaram Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh (WP No. 4261/2015).
7. Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate,
appearing for the respondents, submits that no interference is called for
with regard to the order of the learned Single Judge and that having
regard to the nature of charges, the respondent authorities considered
it necessary to place the petitioner under suspension. It is further
submitted that Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966 permits placing of an
officer under suspension after a copy of the charge-sheet and other
documents as required under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1966 had been
issued to him and therefore, there is no illegality in issuing the order of
suspension dated 04.02.2022. He relies on U.P. Rajya Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Others v. Sanjiv Rajan , reported in
(1993) Supp. 3 SCC 483
8. The learned Single Judge, at paragraphs 10 and 15 of the
impugned judgment, observed as under:
"10. Sub-Rule (5)(a) deals with the effect of suspension in
case if charge-sheet is not issued within a period of 45
days or 90 days as the case may be in respect of a
government servant. Rule (5)(b) empowers the State
Government to again place an employee under
suspension whose suspension earlier stood revoked
under the 1st or the 2nd proviso to Sub-Rule (5)(a). So far
as the reference of the term "if the government considers
expedient so to do" what is meant is that though at the
first instance for a period of 45 or 90 days as the case
may be, the charge-sheet could not be issued, however,
at a later stage if the Department does issue a charge-
sheet and considering the gravity of the charges and
misconduct if the Department wants, they can still place
the services of the concerned employee under
suspension after issuance of the charge-sheet
xxx xxx xxx
15. From the plain reading of the charges leveled against
the petitioner and also taking note of the fact that the
petitioner is none other than the Principal of the school
himself, the nature of charges becomes quite serious.
Thus in the given factual backdrop if the respondents-
State has placed the services of the petitioner under
suspension under Rule 9(5)(b), the same cannot be said
to be either malafides or arbitrary, nor can it be said to be
contrary to the Rules applicable."
09. Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1966 provides that the appointing
authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary
authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the
Governor by general or special order, may place a Government servant
under suspension (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is
contemplated or is pending, or (b) where a case against him in respect
of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. The
proviso thereto lays down that where the order of suspension is made
by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall
forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances under
which the order was made.
10. Proviso to Rule 9(2-a) of the Rules of 1966 provides that
where the disciplinary authority is the State Government or the High
Court, the copy of the charges and other documents mentioned shall be
issued or caused to be issued to such Government servant within a
period of 90 days from the date of suspension. Rule 9(2-b) of the Rules
of 1966 provides that where the disciplinary authority fails to issue a
copy of the charges and other documents to the Government servant
within a period of 45 days, before expiry of the said period, the
disciplinary authority shall obtain orders in writing of the State
Government for extension of the said period of suspension. It is further
provided that beyond the period of 90 days from the date of the order of
suspension, the period of suspension shall not be enhanced in any
case.
11. Rule 9(5)(a) and 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966 are relevant for
the purpose of this case and therefore, they are extracted hereinbelow:
"9(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have
been made under this rule, shall continue to remain in
force until it is modified or revoked by the authority
competent to do so :
Provided that the order of suspension shall stand
revoked on expiry of the period of forty-five days from the
date of order of suspension in case a copy of charges and
other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not
issued to such Government servant by the disciplinary
authority (if it is not the State Government) without
obtaining the orders of the State Government for
extension of the period for issue of the said documents,
as required under sub-rule (2-b):
Provided further that the order of suspension shall
stand revoked on expiry of the period of 90 days from the
date of order of suspension, in case the copy of charges
and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not
issued to such Government servant.
(b) In respect of a Government servant, whose orders of
suspension stand revoked in accordance with the first or
second proviso of clause (a) the authority competent may,
if it considers expedient so to do, place him under
suspension after a copy of charges and other documents,
as required by sub-rule (4) of Rule 14, have been issued
to him." (emphasis supplied by Court)
12. The translated version of the order of suspension dated
04.02.2022 reads as follows:
"Government of Chhattisgarh
Department of School Education,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar - 492002
Order
Naya Raipur, Dated : 04.02.2022
No. F1-16/2021/20-2 : By even number order dated 07.09.2021 of this
Department, Mr. Purushottam Patel, Principal, Government Higher
Secondary School, Tuman, District Korba, was placed under
suspension under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1996 on the
basis of the allegations that he used to treat his subordinate staff
unequally; he did not pay any heed to the suggestions/requests of the
local public representatives and the parents of the students; he used to
pollute the atmosphere of the school; he made the students carry out a
rally and raise slogans in connection with incident of ransacking / theft
to the property of the school; in the brief audit, some financial
irregularities were detected.
2/ As the charge-sheet could not be issued to Mr. Purushottam Patel,
Principal, within a period of 90 days of his suspension under the
provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1966, the said suspension stood revoked in light of the
circular No. C-6-2/92/3/1, dated 20.05.1992 issued by the General
Administration Department.
3/ Therefore, the State Government, hereby places Mr. Purushottam
Patel, Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Tuman, District
Korba, under suspension with immediate effect under the provisions of
Rule 9(1)(a) read with Rule 5(b) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966, assigning the office of
the District Education Officer, Korba, as his Headquarter.
4/ During the period of suspension, Mr. Purushottam Patel would be
eligible for the subsistence allowance.
By order and in the name of Governor of Chhattisgarh
Sd/- illegible
(Anvesh Dhritlahre)
Government of Chhattisgarh
School Education Department"
13. In Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court laid down that currency of a suspension order should not extend
beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of
charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee.
It was also laid down that if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet
is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the
suspension.
14. In State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by Secretary to Govt.
(Home) v. Promod Kumar, IPS & Another , reported in (2018) 17 SCC
677, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has frowned upon the
practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must
necessarily be for a short duration.
15. In U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that whether the employees should
or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a
matter to be assessed by the concerned authority. Ordinarily, the Court
should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are
passed mala fide or passed without there being even a prima facie
evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in
question.
16. In Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India & Others
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the true import of
the word 'consider'. It was observed that the word 'consider' is of great
significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, 'to think over', 'to
regard as', or 'deem to be'. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the
effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the
term 'consider' postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of the
matter and thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should
reflect intense application of mind with reference to the materials
available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such
application of mind.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Dalbir Singh (supra), while
dealing with Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, at
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 observed as under:
"7. The condition for applying Section 4 of the PO Act
have been delineated in the commencing portion of the
provision in the following words:
"4. When any person is found guilty of having
committed an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and the court by which the
person is found guilty is of opinion that, having
regard to the circumstances of the case including
the nature of the offence and the character of the
offender, it is expedient to release him on probation
of good conduct..."
8. Parliament made it clear that only if the court forms
the opinion that it is expedient to release him on probation
for his good conduct regard being had to the
circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances
which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is
"the nature of the offence".
9. Thus Parliament has left it to the Court to decide
when and how the Court should form such opinion. It
provided sufficient indication that releasing the convicted
person on probation of good conduct must appear to the
Court to be expedient. The word 'expedient' had been
thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as
to mean it as 'apt and suitable to the end in view'. In
Black's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as
"suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a
specified object" besides the other meaning referred to
earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri & Ors.
{AIR (1974) SC 2233}, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
has considered the word "expedient''. Learned Judges
have observed in paragraph 21 thus :
"Again, the word 'expedient' used in these provisions,
has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary
sense, 'expedient' (adj.) means 'apt and suitable to
the end in view', 'practical and efficient'; 'politic';
'profitable'; 'advisable', 'fit, proper and suitable to the
circumstances of the case'. In another shade, it
means a device 'characterised by mere utility rather
than principle, conducive to special advantage rather
than to what is universally right' (see Webster's New
International Dictionary)."
18. A Single Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in
Dayaram Khare (supra), observed as follows:
"The emphasis is on the words 'if it considers,
expedient so to do'. Thus, if a government servant is
required to be again placed under suspension after
issuance of the charge-sheet after expiry of the
prescribed period of 45 days or 90 days, as the case may
be, then such authority is required to record reasons for
such expediency to place such government servant under
suspension, but in the impugned order, no such
expediency has been explained or mentioned. Thus, it
cannot be said that the order dated 23.06.2015 is in terms
of the authority bestowed on the District Education Officer
in terms of Rule 9(5)(b) of the CCA Rules, because
expediency also means there should be an explanation as
to why the disciplinary authority deems it proper to place
the concerned government servant under suspension
again.
In absence of any such explanation in the order, such
order cannot be sustained..."
19. A perusal of Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966 does not lead to
conclusion that in respect of a Government servant whose order of
suspension stands revoked in accordance with the first or second
proviso of Rule 5(a), the authority competent may routinely or
automatically place him under suspension after a copy of charge-sheet
and other documents as required by Rule 14(4) had been issued to
him. It is important to note the expression 'if it considers expedient so to
do' occurring in Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966. Such an expression
cannot be ignored and the expression has to be given its due meaning.
In view of the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the
words 'consider' and 'expedient', it is obligatory on the part of the
authority to record reasons, which would demonstrate formation of
opinion on due application of mind, for placing the Government servant
under suspension again. In other words, reason as to why it was
considered necessary to place the officer under suspension again has
to be indicated.
20. A reading of the order of suspension dated 04.02.2022 would
go to show that the aforesaid order does not reflect that any
consideration was made as to why it was considered expedient to place
the appellant under suspension. We had requested Mr. Vikram
Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, to obtain the relevant
note-sheets leading to passing of the order of suspension dated
04.02.2022 and on perusal of the same, Mr. Sharma very fairly submits
that the note-sheets also do not reflect any consideration as to why
further suspension of the appellant was required.
21. The second order of suspension was passed after about 2 ½
months of resumption of duty by the appellant after revocation of the
first suspension order dated 07.09.2021. The learned Single Judge had
observed that the nature of charges are grave, but that is not how the
competent authority has proceeded in the matter. It was for the
authority to decide whether having regard to the nature of charges,
suspension of the officer is warranted. The order reflects total non-
application of mind and the order of suspension has been passed in a
routine and mechanical manner on a fallacious assumption that
suspension order should invariably follow once a charge-sheet is
issued.
22. In view of the above discussion, the order of suspension
cannot be sustained in law. The same is set aside. The appeal is
allowed and the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Single
Judge is set aside. No cost.
. Sd/- Sd/-
(Arup Kumar Goswami) (Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
Amit/Hem
