Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 4465 Chatt
Judgement Date : 14 July, 2022
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 1236 of 2015
Smt.Sarita Bai W/o. Late Mandur Ram Lohar, aged
about 50 years, R/o. Village Sikri Sarnapara
Police Station Aasta, Civil and Revenue District
Jashpur (CG)
Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh through Station House
Officer, Police Station Aasta, District Jashpur
(CG)
Respondent
For Appellant : Ms Savita Tiwari, Advocate
For State : Mr.Sudeep Verma, Dy.G.A.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal
Judgment on Board
14/07/2022
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant
herein under Section 374(2) of CrPC is directed
against the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 26.8.2015 passed by
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jashpur in
Sessions Trial No. 92/2014, whereby the
appellant/accused has been convicted for offence
under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.
1000/, in default of payment of fine to further
undergo R.I. for one month.
2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on
5.9.2014 between 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. the appellant
assaulted her husband Mandudram by heavy hammer
(ghana) by which he suffered injuries and died
instantaneously. It is further case of the
prosecution that on 5.9.2014 James Toppo (PW1),
deceased Mandudram, Sarita Bai (appellant
herein), Meghnath Ram (PW2) (son of the
appellant and the deceased) and Rohit Kujur (PW
11) all were drinking hadiya (homemade liquor)
in the house of the appellant and the deceased on
the eve of Karma festival and immediately
thereafter the appellant tried to assault her
husband by wooden plank, which was intervened by
James Toppo (PW1 and they were separated and
thereafter in the evening, Rohit Kumar (PW11)
heard noise of the appellant and the deceased,
they were shouting, immediately he reached to
open place / courtyard of the appellant and the
deceased, then he saw that the appellant was
assaulting her husband by heavy hammer (ghana),
by which he suffered injuries and died. Meghnath
Ram (PW2) reported the matter to police station
Aasta on 6.9.2014 that his father has died on
5.9.2014. Merg was registered vide Ex.P9 and
immediately thereafter on the report of Meghnath
Ram (PW2), FIR was registered vide Ex.P10. Merg
inquiry was conducted and thereafter inquest was
conducted. Dead body of the deceased was sent for
postmortem, where Dr.George Jiwan Lakda (PW16)
conducted postmortem and opined that cause of
death was due to excessive bleeding and death was
homicidal in nature. Thereafter the appellant was
arrested and on the basis of his memorandum
statement (Ex.P1), heavy hammer (ghana) and sari
were seized vide Ex.P2. Other articles were also
seized vide Ex.P3. Bloodstained soil and plain
soil were seized from the spot vide Ex.P4. Sari
and hammer (ghana) were sent to FSL for
examination and in FSL report (Ex.P19) blood was
found in sari and hammer seized from possession
of the appellant. After completion of
investigation, chargesheet was filed before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jashpur, who in turn,
committed the case to the Court of Session,
Jashpur, from where the Additional Sessions Judge
received the case on transfer for trial. The
appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered
into defence.
3. In order to bring home the offence, the
prosecution examined 16 witnesses and brought
into record 23 documents. Statement of the
appellant/accused was recorded under Section 313
of CrPC wherein he denied his guilt, however, he
examined none in his defence. However, Ex.D1 was
brought on record as defence document.
4. Learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral
and documentary evidence on record, by its
judgment dated 26.8.2015, proceeded to convict
the appellant herein on the basis of evidence of
eyewitness Rohit Kujur (PW11), extrajudicial
confession made to Jusfina (PW5) and
circumstantial evidence of memorandum statement
recorded and FSL report and sentenced him as
aforesaid which has been called in question by
way of the instant appeal.
5. Ms Savita Tiwari, learned counsel for the
appellant, would submit that the trial Court is
absolutely unjustified in convicting the
appellant herein for offence under Section 302 of
the IPC as there is no evidence on record to
connect the appellant for offence under Section
302 of the IPC. She would further submit that
extrajudicial confession allegedly made to
Jusfina (PW5) is a weak piece of evidence and
evidence of eyewitness is not reliable and
furthermore, memorandum and recovery have not
been proved in accordance with law and even
otherwise, looking to the nature of injury and in
a petty dispute, the offence is said to have been
committed, the act of the appellant would fall
under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
6. On the other hand, Mr.Sudeep Verma, learned
Government Advocate for the respondent/State,
would submit that the prosecution has brought
sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for
offence under Section 302 of the IPC and as such,
the trial Court has rightly convicted the
appellant for offence under Section 302 of the
IPC. He would further submit that it is not a
case where offence under Section 302 of the IPC
can be converted under Section 304 Part II of the
IPC as the appellant assaulted her husband by
hammer with full intention to cause his death and
as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made herein
above and went through the records with utmost
circumspection.
8. The first question for consideration would be,
whether death of deceased Mandudram was homicidal
in nature.
9. The trial Court after taking into consideration
the medical evidence particularly evidence of
Dr.George Jiwan Lakda (PW16) and after taking
into consideration the postmortem report
(Ex.P23) conducted by Dr.P.K.Singh came to the
conclusion that cause of death was due to
excessive bleeding and death was homicidal in
nature. The finding recorded by the trial Court
holding the death to be homicidal in nature is
the finding of fact based on evidence available
on record, which is neither perverse nor
contrary to record and even otherwise, it has not
been seriously disputed by the learned counsel
for the appellant.
10. The next question for consideration would
be, whether the appellant was author of crime in
question and what would be the nature of offence,
if any ?
11. Rohit Kujur (PW11) is eyewitness. He has
also joined the company of the appellant and
deceased Mandudram in their house where James
Toppo (PW1) and his father Nirmal Kujur have
joined for drinking hadiya (homemade liquor) and
at that time the appellant tried to assault the
deceased by wooden plank, but anyhow it was
intervened by him and thereafter all have gone to
their respective places, but being neighbour at 2
p.m. he heard noise from the house of the
deceased and the appellant as they were husband
and wife, on hearing noise, when he entered into
the house / courtyard of the appellant and the
deceased, he saw that the appellant was
assaulting her husband by heavy hammer (ghana),
but he did not inform anyone probably on account
of fear and implication in the case, but when the
matter was reported by Meghnath Ram (PW2) to the
police and immediately memorandum statement of
the appellant was recorded vide Ex.P1 and
pursuant to which, heavy hammer (ghana) and sari
were seized vide Ex.P2, which were sent to FSL
and in FSL report (Ex.P19), blood was found in
hammer (ghana) and sari seized from the
possession of the appellant and a chain of
circumstance in order to prove the guilt of the
appellant has been found proved by the trial
Court. The trial Court has held that the
appellant has caused injury by heavy hammer
(ghana) by which he suffered injury and died.
12. Now the question for consideration would be,
whether the appellant is guilty for offence under
Section 302 of the IPC or his case can be
converted under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State
of Chhattisgarh1 has elaborately dealt with the
issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which
reads as under :
"20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) "7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to
1 (2017) 3 SCC 247
the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly."
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) "9. .... '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provisions means "unfair advantage".
14. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court
has held that when and if there is intent and
knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304
PartI IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge
and not the intention to cause murder and bodily
injury, then same would be a case of Section 304
PartII IPC.
15. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh
v. State of Haryana2 has observed as under:
"21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year."
16. Reverting to the facts of the present case in
light of principle of law laid down by the
Supreme Court in the abovestated judgments
(supra), it is quite vivid that on the eve of
Karma festival, the appellant, the deceased,
2 (2002) 3 SCC 327
James Toppo (PW1) and Rojit Kujur (PW11) all
were drinking hadiya (homemade liquor) and in
that course of drinking, the appellant even tried
to assault her husband in influence of liquor,
which was intervened by James Toppo (PW1) and
Rohit Kujur (PW11) and they have gone to their
respective places, but again the appellant and
the deceased entered into quarrel and on hearing
noise Rohit Kujur (PW11) entered into the house
of the appellant and the deceased and seen the
appellant assaulting the deceased by hammer by
which he suffered grievous injury on right
temporal region, which is vital part of body, but
the fact remains that he has not taken any undue
advantage, there was no premeditation, the
deceased and the appellant both were in influence
of intoxication and the deceased has also caused
injury to the appellant, which is apparent from
Ex.P20A in which it has been recorded that the
appellant has also suffered injury on left wrist
joint and other parts of the body by hard and
blunt object and the injuries were simple in
nature. There was no intension on the part of the
appellant to cause death of the deceased, but
while causing such injury the appellant must have
had the knowledge that her act is likely to cause
death of Mandudram as she has assaulted on right
temporal region which is vital part of the body.
Thus, conviction of the appellant under Section
302 of the IPC can be converted under Section 304
Part II of the IPC.
17. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 of the IPC is set aside and he is
convicted for offence under Section 304 Part II
of the IPC. It is stated at the bar that the
appellant is in jail since 7.9.2014 and he has
completed about 8 years of imprisonment, his
sentence is modified to that of the period
already undergone by him. The appellant be
released forthwith unless required in any other
case.
18. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.
Sd/ Sd/
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay S. Agrawal)
Judge Judge
B/
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!