Calcutta High Court
Jeju Metals Private Limited vs Slr Metaliks Limited on 2 September, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
ORIGINAL SIDE
COMMERCIAL DIVISION
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Krishna Rao
G.A. (Com) No. 4 of 2024
In
C.S. (COM) No. 404 of 2024
(Old No. CS 166 of 2022)
Jeju Metals Private Limited
Versus
SLR Metaliks Limited
Ms. Sutapa Dutta
Ms. Shweta Poddar
... For the plaintiff.
Mr. Varun Kothari
Mr. Nikunj Berlia
Ms. Urvashi Jain
Ms. Srija Chakraborty
Mr. Sandip Manna
Mr. Mosarat Reyaz
... For the defendant.
2
Hearing Concluded On : 13.08.2025
Judgment on : 02.09.2025
Krishna Rao, J.:
1. The defendant has filed the present application being G.A. (Com) No. 4
of 2024 praying for revocation of leave granted under Clause 12 of the
Letters Patent, 1865.
2. It is the case of the defendant that no cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of this Court but the plaintiff has wrongly filed the suit
before this Court.
3. Mr. Varun Kothari, Learned Advocate representing the defendant
submits that the defendant is involved in the manufacturing of pig iron
and alloy steel and has its plant at Vijayanagara District, Karnataka.
He submits that the defendant itself does not manufacture LAM Coke,
instead, the defendant procures coking coal from various countries by
importing the same and enters into agreements with companies such
as the plaintiff for conversion of coking coal into LAM Coke.
4. Mr. Kothari submits that after discussions between the parties, the
defendant had issued an e-mail dated 20th December, 2020, along with
a draft Letter of Intent (LOI) for perusal of the plaintiff. In response to
the said e-mail, the plaintiff by its e-mail dated 24th December, 2020,
sent the LOI with some amendments. In the said email, it was also
informed that after finalization of the LOI, two personnels of the
plaintiff shall visit the plant of the defendant for signing the same.
5. Mr. Kothari submits that the personnels of the plaintiff visited the plant
of the defendant for signing of the LOI on 28th December, 2020 and
accordingly, the LOI was executed at the plant office of the defendant at
ND Kere, Tq: HB Halli, District: Vijayanagar (Karnataka). He submits
that the plaintiff has made a bald statement that the LOI was signed at
the office of the plaintiff which is not correct. He submits that the
plaintiff has filed the suit before this Court only on the basis that the
registered office of the plaintiff is situated within the jurisdiction of this
Court.
6. Mr. Kothari relied upon the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench
of this Court in the case of Siddhi Vinayak Industries Pvt. Ltd. and
Anr. Vs. Mahesh Goyal & Ors. reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Cal
3119 and submits that if the defendant shows clearly that no part of
the cause of action arose within jurisdiction, the leave should be
revoked as a matter of course.
7. Ms. Sutapa Dutta, Learned Advocate representing the plaintiff submits
that the plaintiff's registered office is situated at Kolkata. Untill, mid
2022, the plaintiff was operating the factory premises of Bharat NRE
Coke Limited (in liquidation) at Dharwad in Karnataka. Since
possession was taken back by the liquidator of the said company and
thus the plaintiff presently does not have any establishment at
Dharwad. She submits that it is the specific case of the plaintiff that
the agreement was entered into by the plaintiff at Kolkata, the
correspondences were executed by the plaintiff mainly from Kolkata
and the entire payment of the invoices were made by the defendant to
the plaintiff's account at Kolkata. In support of her submission, she has
relied upon the judgment in the case of Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd.
Vs. Ganesh Property reported in (1998) 7 SCC 184 and submits that
all the paragraphs of the plaint, correspondences has to be considered
to find out the cause of action. She has further relied upon the
judgment in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 and submits
that the cause of action means entire bundle of facts pleaded in the
plaint.
8. Ms. Dutta submits that the defendant entered the appearance in the
proceeding on or about 4th November, 2022, with an application being
G.A. No. 2 of 2022 for vacating of an interim order and the defendant is
contesting the suit since then. She submits that the application filed by
the defendant for vacating the interim order was dismissed for default
and thereafter the defendant has filed an application being G.A. No. 3
of 2023 for restoration and the same was disposed of by restoring the
application being G.A. No. 2 of 2022.
9. Ms. Dutta submits that after the period of two (2) years from the date of
entered appearance in the suit, the defendant has filed the present
application on 14th March, 2024, which is an afterthought. She submits
that the plaintiff has filed an application being G.A. No. 5 of 2024
seeking dispensation of lodging the writ of summons as the defendant
already accepted the writ of summons/ plaint and participated in the
proceeding. The said application was allowed and the defendant was
directed to file written statement but the defendant has not filed written
statement as such the defendant has no defence in the suit. She
submits that the defendant has actively participated in the proceeding
has no locus to file an application for revocation of leave under Clause
12 of the Letters Patent, as the same has to be raised at the earliest
stage. In support of her submissions, she has relied upon the judgment
in the case of Siddhi Vinayak Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs.
Mahesh Goyal & Ors. reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 3119.
10. Ms. Dutta further relied upon the judgment in the case of R.
Mathiazhagan & Ors. Vs. P.J. Ethiraj & Ors. passed by the Madras
High Court in C.S. No. 247 of 2013 dated 9th November, 2011 and
submits that the Court while deciding the application for revocation of
leave, cannot go into the evidence and decide the question of facts and
it has to proceed on the assumption that the allegation in the plaint are
true.
11. The issue raised by the defendant is that no cause of action for filing
the suit arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, thus the leave
granted by this Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, is to
be revoked.
12. As per the case made out by the plaintiff, the defendant issued a Letter
of Intent dated 28th December, 2020 to the plaintiff for conversion of
coking coal to be supplied by the defendant on a regular basis to the
plaintiff into Low Ash Metallurgical Coke through the coke plant
operated by the plaintiff at Belur Industrial Area, Dharwad. The said
Letter of Intent was signed by the plaintiff at its office at 46B, Rafi
Ahmed Kidwai Road, within the jurisdiction of this Court.
13. The defendant has relied upon email dated 24th December, 2020,
issued by the plaintiff to the defendant at 2:42 PM with the copy of the
amended Letter of Intent and requested the defendant to finalize the
draft of LOI so that it be signed on Monday. In the email, it is also
mentioned that two key personnels along with Mr. D.K. Singh will be
reaching at the plant of the defendant on Monday.
14. The defendant has further relied upon visitor gate pass of the defendant
plant dated 28th December, 2020, at 11:52 A.M. with respect to three
persons, namely, Mr. D.K. Singh, Mr. Ajay Singh and Mr. N.K.
Maheshwari.
15. The Letter of Intent dated 28th December, 2020, is accepted by Ajay
Kumar Singh on behalf of the plaintiff company and Mr. D.K. Singh
and Mr. Maheshwari have signed as witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff.
The defendant has pleaded about the e-mail of the plaintiff dated 24th
December, 2020 and gate pass dated 28th December, 2020, in
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the application and the plaintiff in its affidavit-
in-opposition has simply denied and reiterated that the plaintiff has
executed the LOI at the registered office of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has
not denied with regard to the existence of the e-mail dated 24th
December, 2020, and gate pass dated 28th December, 2020.
16. In the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that:
"38. "Cause of action" is a phenomenon well
understood in legal parlance. Mohapatra, J. has
well delineated the import of the said expression by
referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The
collocation of the words "cause of action, wholly or
in part, arises" seems to have been lifted from
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of
the courts. As per that section the suit could be
instituted in a court within the legal limits of whose
jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or in part
arises". Judicial pronouncements have accorded
almost a uniform interpretation to the said
compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth
Amendment of the Constitution as to mean "the
bundle of facts which would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of the court.
39. In Read v. Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 : 58
LJQB 120 : 60 LT 250 (CA)] Lord Esher, M.R.,
adopted the definition for the phrase "cause of
action" that it meant
"every fact which it would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to the judgment of the
court. It does not comprise every piece of
evidence which is necessary to prove each
fact, but every fact which is necessary to be
proved".
40. The Privy Council has noted in Mohd.
Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian [AIR 1949 PC 78 :
75 IA 121] that the aforesaid definition adopted by
Lord Esher M.R. had been followed in India. Even
thereafter the courts in India have consistently
followed the said interpretation without exception
for understanding the scope of the expression
"cause of action.
41. Even in the context of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution this Court adopted the same
interpretation to the expression "cause of action,
wholly or in part, arises" vide State of
Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [(1985) 3 SCC 217]
. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and
Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar
Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] observed that it is well
settled that the expression "cause of action" means
that bundle of facts which the petitioner must
prove, if traversed to entitle him to a judgment in
his favour. Having given such a wide interpretation
to the expression Ahmadi, J. (as the learned Chief
Justice then was) speaking for M.N.
Venkatachaliah, C.J. and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.,
utilised the opportunity to caution the High Courts
against transgressing into the jurisdiction of the
other High Courts merely on the ground of some
insignificant event connected with the cause of
action taking place within the territorial limits of the
High Court to which the litigant approaches at his
own choice or convenience. The following are such
observations.
"If an impression gains ground that even
in cases which fall outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, certain members of
the court would be willing to exercise
jurisdiction on the plea that some event,
however trivial and unconnected with the
cause of action had occurred within the
jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would
seek to abuse the process by carrying the
cause before such members giving rise to
avoidable suspicion. That would lower the
dignity of the institution and put the entire
system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to
say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the
growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be
failing in our duty to the institution and the
system of administration of justice. We do
hope that we will not have another occasion to
deal with such a situation."
17. In the case of Siddhi Vinayak Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (supra),
the Coordinate Bench of this Court considering the judgments in the
case of Madanlal Jalan Vs. Madanlal & Ors. reported in AIR 1949
Cal 495 and in the case of Parasram Harnandrai Vs. Chitandas &
Ors. reported in AIR 1952 Cal 82 held that:
"Thus the legal principles which appears from
the Madanlal Jalan (Supra) and Parasram
Harnandrai (Supra) as follows:
(1) That the application lies for revoking the
leave granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent;
(2) That such an application should be made at
an early stage of the suit and delay and
acquiescence may be a bar to such an application;
(3) That if the application depends on difficult
questions of law or fact the Court should not revoke
leave on a summary application but should decide
the question at the trial;
(4) That if the defendant shows clearly that no
part of the cause of action arose withing
jurisdiction the leave should be revoked as a matter
of course;
(5) That if only a part of the cause of action
arose within jurisdiction, then it is a question of
discretion for the court to give or refuse leave or
where leave has already been granted to revoke or
maintain the leave;
(6) That assignment is a very important part of
the cause of action in a suit by the assignee;
(7) That in giving or refusing leave or
maintaining or revoking leave the court will
ordinarily take into consideration the balance of
convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in
favour of the defendant, apply the doctrine of forum
convenience;
(8) That the court may refuse leave or revoke
leave on the ground of balance of convenience
although there be no evidence of bad faith of abuse
of process on the part of the plaintiff;
(9) That if the cause of action is founded on an
assignment within jurisdiction of a negotiable
instrument the court will in recognition of the
principle of negotiability insist on a far greater
degree of balance of convenience in favour of the
defendant and will more readily give or maintain
leave than in other cases of assignment;
(10) That if the court is satisfied that the
suit has been filed mala fide for the purpose of
harassing or oppressing the defendant or might
result in injustice the court should in all cases
readily refuse leave or if leave has already been
granted revoke the leave as a matter of course.
(11) Where an application for revocation
of leave is made at the initial stages of a suit, the
allegations in the plaint must be falon to be correct,
and the Court will not enter into disputed questions
of fact.
(12) The Court cannot decide questions of
mala fides of the plff. in instituting the suit in a
particular forum except at the trial of the action.
(13) The balance of convenience to be
decided, in such an application, must be shown to
be 'overwhelmingly in favour of the deft, to such an
extent, that to force the deft, to come to this Court
would amount to a denial of justice. The Court will
not enter into 'nice' calculations for ascertaining the
respective convenience or inconvenience of the
parties, This is what is meant by the phrase mere
balance of convenience' is not enough."
(14) In considering the 'balance of
convenience', what is to be considered is not the
importance of the matter to be proved, but the
volume of the evidence, and the convenience or
inconvenience of producing it at a particular forum.
(15) In deciding the question of 'balance of
convenience, statements of a general nature
contained in affidavits affirmed for that purpose,
without particulars are useless. The Court must
consider the facts and cannot proceed to act on
vague allegations, devoid of particulars.
(16) In deciding applications for
revocation of leave, it is always useful to consider
as to which Court was the 'Natural
forum' for an action."
18. The plaintiff has also taken plea that correspondences were made by
the plaintiff from the registered office of the plaintiff from Kolkata and
payments were also transferred in the account of the plaintiff at
Kolkata within the jurisdiction of this Court.
19. The defendant has not filed written statement. The defendant has filed
the present application on the basis of the email dated 24th December,
2020 and the gate pass dated 28th December, 2020. It is true that the
Court should not consider any other documents and/or statement
except the facts pleaded in the plaint at the time of considering an
application for revocation of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters
Patent, 1865.
20. This Court also finds that the plaintiff has filed the suit in the year
2022 and the defendant entered appearance in the year 2022 itself and
contested the application filed by the plaintiff and also filed an
application for vacating interim order but the defendant has filed the
present application after the period of two years.
21. Considering the above, this Court did not find that the defendant has
made out any case for revocation of leave granted under Clause 12 of
the Letters Patent, 1865.
22. G.A. (Com) No. 4 of 2024 is dismissed.
(Krishna Rao, J.)
