Allahabad High Court

Rakesh Kumar Nayak vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of ... on 12 September, 2025

Author: Manish Mathur

Bench: Manish Mathur

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH

AFR

2025:AHC-LKO:56297

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 9033 of 2024

Petitioner :- Rakesh Kumar Nayak

Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Home (Police Services) Lko. And 4 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Rishi Raj

Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Raj Kumar Upadhyaya (R.K.Upadhyaya)

Connected with

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 6566 of 2023

Petitioner :- Rakesh Kumar Nayak

Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Home Lko. And 2 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Ramesh Singh

Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Raj Kumar Upadhyaya (R.K.Upadhyaya)

HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR,,J

1. Heard Mr. Rishi Raj learned counsel for petitioner, learned State Counsel for opposite parties no.1 to 4 and Mr. R.K.Upadhyaya, learned counsel for opposite party no.5.

2. Petition has been filed challenging charge-sheet dated 24.05.2023 as well as consequent departmental proceedings. Further prayers are for quashing of the order dated 31.12.2022 initiating departmental proceedings for imposition of major penalty as well as the order dated 23.2.2023 and the charge-sheet dated 26.11.2024.

3. It has been submitted that with regard to an incident which took place in the year 2015, a show cause notice was issued to petitioner on 16.11.2021 which was replied to by him, whereafter by means of order dated 31.12.2022, reference was made to the State Government for initiating departmental proceedings for imposition of major penalty.

4. In pursuance thereof, State Government vide order dated 23.02.2023 granted approval for initiation of departmental proceedings whereafter the charge-sheet dated 24.05.2023 was prepared and was issued to the Enquiry Officer for further issuance to petitioner.

5. It is submitted that however upon receipt of the said charge-sheet, the Enquiry Officer remitted the same to the Disciplinary Authority for making certain amendments in the charge-sheet and it is in pursuance thereof that charge-sheet dated 26.11.2024 terming it to be an amended charge-sheet was issued to petitioner to which he has submitted his reply.

6. The primary gist of challenge to aforesaid proceedings is that the incident pertains to the year 2015 and a charge-sheet has been issued to petitioner for the first time with regard to such an incident after almost nine years in 2024. It is submitted that due to charge-sheet being issued belatedly, prejudice has been caused to petitioner since it would be virtually impossible for him to defend himself by production of any documentary evidence due to passing of nine years.

7. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgements rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Anr. AIR 1990 SC 1308 as well as in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. N. Radhakrishnan reported in (1998) 4 SCC, 154 as well as P.V.Mahadevan vs. M.D.Tamilnadu Housing Board AIR 2006 SC 207.

8. Learned State Counsel has refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner on the basis of counter affidavit filed and submits that earlier in pursuance of allegations leveled against petitioner, a show cause notice had been issued to him which was withdrawn by the competent authority since it was felt that a proper departmental proceedings should be initiated against him in view of serious allegations.

9. It is submitted that it is in pursuance thereof that a charge-sheet was prepared on 24.05.2023 but upon it being sent to the Enquiry Officer, it was seen that certain relevant aspects had not been incorporated therein due to which a need was felt for correction of anomalies and thereafter the charge-sheet dated 26.11.2024 has been issued to which petitioner has already replied and the departmental proceedings shall be concluded expeditiously.

10. It is submitted that petitioner does not acquire any vested right for quashing of departmental proceedings merely on the basis of certain delay. It is submitted that even otherwise no delay has occurred since the said aspect has already been indicated in the counter affidavit as recorded herein above.

11. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the facts as indicated herein above are admitted between the parties.

12.A perusal of the charge-sheet dated 13.11.2024/26.11.2024 indicates that primary gist of allegations leveled against petitioner pertain to negligence on his part in investigation of Case Crime No.471 of 2015 registered under Section 302 IPC read with section 3(2) (V) of SC/ST Act. The narration in charge-sheet indicates the investigation which was undertaken by petitioner by calling of witness and of recording their statements.

13. The allegations primarily is that the entire investigation which was conducted by petitioner by recording of statements of witnesses was not indicated in the general diary as is required in terms of procedure of investigation. It is also indicated that the investigation was not recorded in terms of Section 55 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973.

14. A perusal of the aforesaid charge-sheet therefore clearly indicates that the entire gist of allegations leveled against petitioner is of negligence in recording the conduct of investigation.

15. The aspect whether negligence comes within the purview of misconduct has already been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs J. Ahmed reported in (1979) 2 SCC 286. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is as follows:-

11. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that that conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct [see Pierce v. Foster(1)]. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle .(Indicator Newspapers) (2)]. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur(1) and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza(2). The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under:

"Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct".

In industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct but in Management, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik(3), in the absence of standing orders governing the employee's undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Unio nof India(4), the mamnner in which a member of the service discharged his quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P.H. Kalayani v. Air France, Calcutta(5), wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar instances of which a railway cabinman signals in a train on the same track where there is a stationary train causing headlong collision; a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashes causing heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil [see Navinchandra Shakerchand shah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Co- op. Department Stores Ltd.(1)]. But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty."

16. With regard to delay in initiation of departmental proceedings against petitioner, it is evident that allegations as indicated in the charge-sheet pertain to the year 2015. It is admitted in the counter affidavit that for the first time a show cause notice was issued to petitioner after almost six years on 16.11.2021 for awarding of censure entry under Rule-3 of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, and for withholding of integrity. There is no explanation as to why the first show cause notice was issued to petitioner only after six years of the date of incident.

17. It is also evident from perusal of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the counter affidavit that subsequently decision was taken for initiating departmental proceedings whereafter the charge-sheet dated 24.05.2023 was prepared but due to certain anomalies therein, an amended charge-sheet dated 14.11.2024 was issued on 26.11.2024. Here again, there is no narration or any explanation as to why the opposite parties took a further three years for initiating departmental proceedings in terms of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999 despite the fact that pleadings have been made in paragraph-22 of the writ petition on the ground that departmental proceedings were initiated with delay.

18. The aspect of delay in initiating of departmental proceedings against delinquent employee and prejudice caused to such employee has clearly been adjudicated upon by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bani Singh (supra) in the following manner:-

"4.The appeal against the order dated 16.12.1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said Irregularities, if any-and-came-to-know-it-only-in-1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage.

In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal."

19. The same analogy has thereafter been enunciated in the case of N. Radha Krishnan (supra) in the following manner:-

"19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. the essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he s not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. if the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer enterusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse consideration.

20. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgments in the present case, it is thus evident as enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court, in case delay in initiation of departmental proceedings is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of record. It is evident that in case of such delay in initiation of departmental proceedings, as in the present case, where nine years have elapsed from the date of incident to issuance of charge-sheet, it would be virtually impossible for petitioner to garner documents and evidence in his support.

21. In view of discussion made herein above, it being evident that the only allegation leveled against petitioner is of negligence, which does not amount to misconduct as also for unexplained delay in initiation of departmental proceedings, the same are clearly vitiated for being against judgements propounded by Hon'ble Supreme Court as indicated herein above.

22. Since it is on record that the charge-sheet dated 24.05.2023 already stands withdrawn with issuance of a fresh charge-sheet dated 14.11.2024/26.11.2024, there is no requirement to quash the same. Consequently the departmental proceedings initiated against petitioner in pursuance of charge-sheet dated 26.11.2024 is hereby quashed by issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari.

23. The orders dated 31.12.2022 and 23.02.2023 granting approval for initiation of departmental proceedings against petitioner are resultantly quashed by issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari.

24. Resultantly, the Writ Petition No.9033 of 2024 succeeds and is allowed.

25. Parties to bear their own costs.

26. So far as Writ-A No.6566 of 2023 is concerned, it has been filed seeking only direction to the opposite parties to promote petitioner from the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police (Pay Scale of Rs. 15600-39100, Grade Pay Rs.7600/- revised pay scale Matrix Pay Level-12 Rs.78800-209200) with all consequential benefits w.e.f. 7.1.2022 to 13.01.2023, from the date, when similarly situated persons/juniors to the petitioner were promoted on the post of Additional Superintendent of Police.

27. In view of Writ-A No.9033 of 2024 being allowed, liberty is granted to petitioner to make a fresh representation before opposite party no.1 i.e. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary,Department of Home (Police Services) Government of U.P., Civil Secretariat, Lucknow to consider and decide petitioner's grievance as indicated herein above.

28. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that salary for suspension period i.e. from 1 July, 2020 till 12 April 2021 has already been granted and therefore no directions with regard to same are required to be made.

29. Appropriate orders with regard to directions issued hereinabove shall be ensured within a period of eight weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is served upon the said authority.