Allahabad High Court
Anil Kumar Purwar vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others on 11 September, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:161492
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - A No. - 6896 of 2020
Anil Kumar Purwar
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 4 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
Arpan Srivastava, Arun Kumar Tiwari
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Ashish Pandey, C.S.C.
Court No. - 38
HON'BLE DONADI RAMESH, J.
1. Heard Sri Arun Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for State respondents and Sri Alok Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondent no.5.
2. Present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 26.06.2020 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur.
3. The controversy involved in this writ petition is that initially the petitioner was appointed on 5.7.1989 as LT Grade teacher by the authorized controller of fifth respondent-institution. Accordingly, the petitioner has joined the institution on 6.7.1989 and in the month of August, 1989, salary has been released to the petitioner. Subsequently, they have stopped payment of salary and the petitioner has approached this Court by way of Writ Petition No. 21726 of 1989 and as per the interim direction granted in the said writ petition on 15.11.1989, the petitioner has continued and salary has also been released. But surprisingly, the said writ petition was dismissed for want of prosecution on 13.9.2004 and the said order was recalled and the writ petition was restored to its original number. The petitioner was allowed to continue in service and he was paid salaries till his services were terminated by District Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur, vide order dated 26.06.2020. The respondent no.4 vide order dated 26.06.2020 dismissed services of the petitioner on the ground that earlier writ petition of the petitioner has been dismissed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as the appointment of the petitioner was not against the sanctioned post, the Deputy Director of Education has passed an order on 5.2.1992 directing the District Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur to adjust the petitioner in future vacancy. Accordingly, the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 20.01.1997 adjusted the petitioner in a substantive vacancy after dismissal of Smt. Mamta Parasar as L.T. Grade Teacher.
5. That being the position, the respondents has dismissed service of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 26.06.2020 on the ground that earlier writ petition of the petitioner has been dismissed as the order is contrary to record. In fact, identical matter was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 167 of 2024, Neutral Citation No. 2025:AHC:91662-DB. Relevant paragraphs of the above-referred judgment, are as under:
"7. Learned counsel for the appellants states that essential requirements, therefore, for getting regularized were definitely present in the instant case. The ad hoc appointments of the appellants were done under the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981; the petitioners were possessing all their educational qualifications and that they had continued to teach in the institution till the date of their retirement and not just till 6.4.1991. Learned counsel for the appellants states that even if initially there was an irregularity which had subsequently been remedied conscientiously then the initial irregularity could not be made the basis for taking action against the appellants after the passage of several years. In the instant case, learned counsel for the appellants states that the appellant Jujhar Singh was appointed on 31.8.1987 whereas Devendra Singh was appointed on 26.2.1989. Realizing the mistake, the Committee of Management and also the State Authorities had absorbed these two teachers on 23.1.2006 on substantive vacancies.
8. Relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Mansaram vs. S.P. Pathak & Ors. reported in (1984) 1 SCC 125 and Madras Aluminium Company Limited vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. reported in (2023) 8 SCC 240, learned counsel for the appellants states that if any mistake was committed initially then action should have been taken with regard to it within a reasonable time, specially when there is no limitation prescribed. However, what would be the "reasonable time" would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case; the nature of default; prejudice caused and whether any third party rights had been created. Relying upon the two judgments, learned counsel for the appellants states that even if the appointments were made irregularly in the year 1987 and 1989 respectively of the two teachers namely Jujhar Singh and Devendra Singh, the mistake was rectified conscientiously by the Education Department on 31.3.2006 and now it did not lie in the mouth of the Education Department or the Committee of Management of the Institution to say that the initial appointments were made without any vacancies and, therefore, the regularisation could not be done.
9. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 10 and submitted that admittedly the appellants were appointed on posts which were not vacant. This did not happen because of any fault of theirs. Also the initial appointments were definitely approved on 11.9.1987 and 25/26.7.1989. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that definitely then it could not be said that the appellants were to suffer for no fault of theirs.
13. Learned counsel for the State in opposition to the two Special Appeals has relied upon the judgment of Abhishek Tripathi vs. State of U.P. through Secy. Secondary Education, Lucknow & Ors. (Writ Petition No.655 (S/S) of 2014) dated 17.12.2015 and has submitted that any appointment which was made dehors the rules could not be considered to be an appointment worth regularisation. He has also laid much stress on the fact that when the initial appointment was made, the same was not so made on a regular vacancy.
14. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Devesh Vikram, leaned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, the Court is of the view that both the Special Appeals deserve to be allowed. The appellants after they were appointed on 31.8.1987 and 26.2.1989, their appointments were also approved on 11.9.1987 and 25/26.7.1989. After their services were terminated on 17.10.1989, they had approached the High Court by means of Writ Petition No.19879 of 1989, wherein an interim order was passed on 4.12.1989 and the termination order dated 17.10.1989 was kept in abeyance. The writ petition was thereafter dismissed as having become infructuous on 17.10.2001. Upon an application moved by the petitioners, the said order was recalled on 8.3.2010 and on the same day, it was got dismissed as not pressed. However, during the intervening period, the appellants had been absorbed on two existing vacancies by means of an order dated 31.3.2006. The appellants having been absorbed on existing vacancies, the irregularity, if any initially in their appointments, would be deemed to have been cured as per the judgments of the Supreme Court cited by learned counsel for the appellants i.e. Mansaram (supra) and Madras Aluminium Company Limited (supra). As per these judgments definitely if any action had to be taken, it ought to have been taken within reasonable time and that having not been taken, the appellants could not now be penalized. Further, the Court is of the view that as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra) the appellants definitely were not at fault. As per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar (supra) and Jaggo (supra) we find that definitely when there was an irregularity in the appointments of the appellants, that irregularity had been removed and the appointments were regularized."
6. Even in the above-referred matter, there was some irregularity in initial appointment and his appointment was terminated and the said orders were interdicted by this Court in various writ petitions. Accordingly, he has worked and got salaries except for the period 25.02.2017 to 09.01.2018. In the said circumstances, the Court found that they are all entitled for service benefits.
7. In fact, similar view was expressed by a co-ordinate Bench in Writ A No. 5737 of 2018. Based on the above, learned counsel for the petitioner has stressed his argument that the respondents themselves have considered the request of the petitioner and as directed by the Deputy Director of Education in his proceedings dated 05.02.1992, the District Inspector of Schools has adjusted the petitioner in a substantive vacancy vide order dated 24.08.1996. But the said fact was not considered by the respondents while dismissing services of the petitioner vide the impugned order dated 26.06.2020. In view of the above, the impugned order is not only contrary to record but also to the law decided by this Court in several writ petitions, which was upheld by the Division Bench in the Special Appeal.
8. Reply to the said contention, learned Standing Counsel has contended that the very appointment of the petitioner is in excess to the sanctioned strength and when the appointment is irregular, he is not entitled for any benefit and the appointment of the petitioner is on non-sanctioned post, hence, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in the writ petition. Accordingly, the respondents have dismissed the services of the petitioner.
9. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of annexures-9 & 10, it clearly stipulates that, as recommended by the Deputy Director of Education in his proceedings dated 05.02.1992, the District Inspector of Schools has also adjusted the petitioner in a substantive vacancy by proceedings dated 20.01.1997. In view of the same, when the respondents themselves have adjusted and the petitioner is continued, the respondents ought not to have dismissed services of the petitioner for service benefits and also taking the observations made by the Division Bench in Special Appeal No.167 of 2024, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled for service benefits.
10. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26.06.2020 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur - respondent no.4 is set aside. The writ petition is disposed of directing the respondents to release salaries of petitioner from 25.02.2017 to 09.01.2018 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
(Donadi Ramesh,J.)
September 11, 2025
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