Allahabad High Court
Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar vs State Of Up And Another on 11 September, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
A.F.R
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:160628
Court No. - 91
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 738 of 2024
Revisionist :- Charanjeet Kaur @ Manpreet Kumar
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
Counsel for Revisionist :- Shobha Vati,Shyam Narayan Verma
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Upendra Kumar Singh
Hon'ble Madan Pal Singh,J.
1. Heard Mr. Shyam Narayan Verma and Ms. Shobha Wati, learned counsel for the revisionist, Mr. Upendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and the learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The present criminal revision has been preferred by the revisionist with the prayer to set aside the judgment and order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.10, Bareilly dated 16th November, 2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 2022 (Surendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Another) under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short "D.V. Act"), Police Station-Baradari, District-Bareilly, whereby the appeal filed by opposite party no.2 against the judgment and order dated 8th September, 2022 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), F.T.C., Court no.1, Bareilly in the case under Section 12 of the D.V. Act has been allowed and set aside the said order of the Civil Judge.
3. The crux of the allegation made by the revisionist is that the marriage of the revisionist was solemnized with Sardar Rao Virendra Singh on 27th May, 2005 in accordance with Sikhism Rites and Customs at Sitarganj, Uttarakhand. From the aforesaid wedlock, three daughters, namely, Devendra Kaur, Ms. Parveen Kaur and Sukhmani Kaur were born. After some time of marriage, the relationship between the revisionist with her in-laws including her husband became strained and incompatible. Consequently, the revisionist had given an application before the Superintendent of Police, Alwar Rajasthan, the last being dated 15th August, 2016 wherein it was alleged that for additional demand of dowry of Rs. 50,000/- as also for her being delivered three female children, her two brothers-in-laws had beaten her badly with sticks from which she had sustained head injuries and her treatment was undertaken at Government Hospital, Govindgarh, Alwar, Rajasthan. On 20th September, 2016, the revisionist, her parents and other family members came to office of Monitor Patrika of Baradari, Stadium Road, Police Station-Baradari, District Bareilly where a meeting/'Panchayat' was fixed. In-laws of the revisionist along with some known persons armed with weapons also came there and participated in the meeting. During the meeting, at around 07:00 p.m. all the members of her in-laws started to abuse the revisionist and her father while threatening that unless they do not fulfil their additional demand of dowry of Rs. 50,000/-, they would not allow the revisionist to stay/live at her in-laws' place along with her three daughters. Consequently, an application was made by the revisionist before the Senior Superintendent of Police Bareilly. Although the most of the cause of action arose in Sitarganj, Uttarakhand but due to said marriage, the last cause of action arose at a office in the name of Monitor Patrika situated at the Police Station-Baradari, District-Bareilly, the revisionist made a complaint bearing Complaint Case No. 984 of 2016 (Smt. Charanjeet Kaur @ Manjeet Kaur Vs. Sardar Rao Virendra Singh @ Bhola Singh and Others) under Section 12 of the D.V.Act, Police Station-Baradari, District-Barielly on 3rd October, 2016. The court below, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case vide ex-parte order dated 8th September, 2022 under Section 12 of the D.V. Act allowed the said complaint and directed her in-laws including her husband either to make arrangement for a residential accommodation to her along with her daughters or to pay Rs. 9,000/- per month under Section 19 of the D.V. Act. The court below has also directed the in-laws of the revisionist to pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- (rupees four lacs only) to the revisionist and her three daughters for their maintenance under Section 20 (3) of D.V.Act. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the opposite party no. 2 filed Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 2022 (Surendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Charanjeet Kaur & Manpreet Kaur) under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. The said appeal was allowed by the appellate court vide order dated 16th November, 2023 on the ground that since the court below had no jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the revisionist under Section 12 of D.V. Act, therefore, the ex-parte order passed by the trial court has been set aside. Hence the present criminal revision.
4. Contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the appellate court, without considering the facts and circumstances of the case and without applying its judicial mind, has passed the impugned order, which per se illegal, arbitrary and unfair in the eyes of law. It is further contended that due to non- fulfilment of additional demand of dowry to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- and also due to the fact that she delivered three female children and not any male child, the revisionist along with her parents were tortured and harassed by her in-laws including her husband. The revisionist was also not permitted by them to live at her matrimonial house along with her daughters. The in-laws of the revisionist clearly refused to bear her and her daughters expenses. Despite the fact that in-laws of the revisionist have a lot of agriculture land and 8 to 10 houses, but due to greed, they used to demand the additional dowry. Due to ill treatment by the in-laws of the revisionist, she and her daughters remained ill most of the time and because of the same, a lump sum Rs. 10 lakhs were spent for their treatment. It is lastly argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist that since the last cause of action arose within the territorial limits of Police Station-Baradari, District Bareilly, therefore the complaint legally lies within the territorial jurisdiction of District Court, Bareilly. Therefore, the court below, while allowing the complaint filed by the revisionist under Section 12 of the D.V. Act has not committed any error under the ex-parte order. It had the jurisdiction to hear the same. Such aspect of the matter as well as the statutory provisions applicable on the subject have completely been ignored by the appellate court, while passing the impugned order.
5. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid, learned counsel for the revisionist states that the impugned judgment passed by the court below cannot be legally sustained and is liable to be quashed.
6. On the other-hand, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and the learned A.G.A. for the State have opposed the present criminal revision by submitting that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
7. Apart from the above, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 states that the marriage of the revisionist and her husband were solemnized at Sitarganj, Uttarakhand where the cause of action arose. It is further submitted that a first class Magistrate under Section 27 of the D.V. Act within whose local jurisdiction, (a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or (b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or (c) the cause of action has arisen, is competent to grant a protection order and other orders and try the offences under this Act. It is then submitted that in the present case, neither the revisionist nor her husband never resided permanently/temporarily or were employed, within the area of Police Station-Baradari, District at Bareilly, where the revisionist filed compliant under Section 12 of D.V. Act. It is next submitted that under Section 2 (s) of D.V. Act, "share household" has been defined by which a complaint is filed at a place where a household is situated in which the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singally or along with the respondent. However, in the present case the revisionist never lived in a domestic relationship either singally or along with her husband in Baradari, District Bareilly. It is, on the basis of the aforesaid legal proposition of law that the court below has no jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the revisionist that the appellate court is correct in holding that the Magistrate i.e. court below had no jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the revisionist under Section 12 of D.V. Act. Therefore, the appellate court is legally justified in setting aside the order of the court below vide the order impugned. As such, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 submits that the present criminal revision is liable to be dismissed.
8. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the present criminal revision.
9. The core issue that is requisite to be addressed before this Court is whether the court below i.e. Civil Judge (Junior Division) F.T.C., Court no.1, Bareilly had jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the revisionist under Section 12 of D.V. Act or not?
10. On going through the provisions of D.V. Act, this Court is of the opinion that precisely, the object of the D.V. Act is to provide various reliefs to those women, who are or have been in domestic relationships with the abuser, where both the parties have lived together in a shared household and are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or through adoption. Besides, relationships with family members living together as a joint family are also included within the ambit of the D.V. Act. The definition of domestic violence as set out in the D.V. Act is very wide and includes any act of physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic abuse or threat of such abuse. The D.V. Act provides for various remedies including right of a woman to reside in the matrimonial home or shared household whether or not she has any title or rights in such home or household; protection orders to prevent the abuser from aiding or committing an act of domestic violence or any other specified act, entering the work place frequented by the aggrieved person attempting to communicate with her etc. That apart, it also provides for monetary reliefs to meet the expenses incurred or losses suffered by the aggrieved person, as a result of such domestic violence. Besides the aforesaid remedies in civil law, the breach of the protection order by the abuser and failure on the part of protection officer in discharging the duties assigned are made punishable offences under the D.V. Act.
11. This Court is of the opinion that the jurisdiction to entertain and decide a complaint underSection 12 of the D.V. Act be reckoned with reference to Sections 3 and 27 of the D.V. Act alone. Section 27 of the D.V. Act is the sole repository of jurisdiction for an application underSection 12 of the D.V. Act and the Magistrate is the statutorily designated forum to entertain an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act and also to try offences under theD.V. Act.
12. For appreciating the above issue it would be worthwhile to reproduce Sections 2 (a), (f) and (s), Section 3 and Section 27 of the D.V. Act, which are quoted hereunder:
"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) `aggrieved person' means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;
x x x
xxxx
(f) `domestic relationship' means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
x x x
(s) `shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household."
"3. Definition of domestic violence.-For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it-
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. Explanation I.-For the purposes of this section,-
(i) `physical abuse' means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) `sexual abuse' includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) `verbal and emotional abuse' includes-
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested;
(iv) `economic abuse' includes-
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, house hold necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, Stridhana, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared house hold and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her Stridhana or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II.-For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes `domestic violence' under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration."
Section 27 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
27. Jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(a) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent Court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.
13. From bare reading of sub-Sections (a), (f) and (s) of Section 2, Section 3 and Section 27 of the D.V. Act, this Court finds that the contours of a domestic relationship, which is a sine-qua-non for definition of "aggrieved person" as laid down in Section 2 (f) make it abundantly clear that the legislature in its wisdom has given a wide definition to domestic relationship to include any relationship between two persons, who either live at the present moment or have at any point of time in the past lived together in a shared household. The relationship between the two persons can be by consanguinity, marriage, a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or as family members living together as a joint family. It is pertinent to note that the domestic relationship, as envisaged by Section 2 (f) of the D.V. Act is not confined to the relationship, as husband and wife or a relationship in the nature of marriage, but it includes other relationship as well, such as sisters, mother etc. Thus, merely because the husband and wife or a person living in a relationship in the nature of marriage or the two persons living together in any other domestic relationship, as envisaged under Section 2 (f) of the D.V. subjected to domestic violence, such a victim of domestic violence shall not cease to be the "aggrieved person" so as to disentitle her from invoking the provisions of the D.V. Act. As a matter of fact, since there cannot be a legal divorce between the persons living in the relationship in the nature of marriage, the question of restricting the applicability of the provisions to the parties to the marriage subsisting as on the date of coming into force of the D.V. Act and not to apply the said provisions to the aggrieved person, whose marriage stands dissolved by a decree of divorce prior to coming into force of the D.V. Act will run contrary to the objects sought to be achieved by the D.V. Act. A fortiori, if it was intended by the legislature to provide for the remedy only in respect of the act of domestic violence committed prior to the coming into force of the D.V. Act during the subsisting domestic relationship, the expression "have, at any point of time, lived together" was not required to be used in the definition of "domestic relationship" as incorporated under Section 2 (f) of the D.V. Act. Shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singally have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.
14. Once again, the definition of "shared household" like that of "aggrieved person" and "domestic relationship" is wide in its scope and includes not just the household, where person aggrieved lives at present but also the household where the person aggrieved has at any stage lived in domestic relationship either singally or along with respondent.
15. Coming to the definition of "domestic violence" as set out under Section 3 of the Act, which is vital and germane to issue raised herein, it is to be noticed that "domestic violence" includes within its ambit all kind of violence occurring within the family and the Explanation-I attached thereto enumerates the various kinds of domestic abuse widely prevalent in our country and explains the scope and ambit thereof. The definition of the "domestic violence" has already been quoted above.
16. Even a fleeting glimpse at Section 3 of the D.V. Act as reproduced above reflects that "domestic violence" has been widely defined and it covers within its ambit any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent resulting in physical, sexual, psychological and economic abuse or threat of such abuse being inflicted upon a woman who is or has been in domestic relationship with him. Undoubtedly, while the physical or sexual abuse caused by the respondent may be time specific, the emotional abuse caused cannot be time specific and its effects may persist even after the actual occurrence of the act of violence. Rather, the physical or sexual abuse may be the cause of subsequent psychological and emotional effects.
17. Further, the Explanation II attached to Section 3 of the D.V. Act, which provides that for the purposes of determining whether any act, omission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under the said Section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the view that where the act of domestic violence on the part of the respondent is specifically pleaded by the aggrieved person, the petition/complaint seeking the relief under the D.V. Act cannot be dismissed at the initial stage and the matter needs to be examined and determined by the Magistrate as mandated under the provisions of the D.V. Act. From a reading of the provisions of the D.V. Act and with understanding of the scheme of the said enactment, it is clear that it is not necessary that the applicant-woman should have a marriage subsisting and existing with the respondent at the time of filing of such application under Section 12 of the Act. No time period is also prescribed in the said Act as to when the aggrieved person should have been in domestic relationship with the respondent. On the other hand, definition of words "domestic relationship" given in Section 2 (f) of the Act clearly uses the words "at any point of time, lived together in a shared household".
18. Section 27 (c) is like an exception to the provisions contained in Section 27 (a) 27 (b) of the Act of 2005. The "cause of action" may not necessarily accrue at a place covered by Section 27 (a) or Section 27 (b) of the Act of the 2005. The provisions contained in Section 27 (a) and Section 27 (b) of the Act are relatable to the principle of territorial jurisdiction, which is the place where the contingencies enumerated in Section 27 (a) and Section 27 (b) of the D.V. Act that may arise within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular Court and that will become the guiding factor for deciding the place of suing by the aggrieved person.
19. From the aforesaid provision, it is apparently clear that it is not necessary for a woman, who is an aggrieved person should have resided in a share household at the time of filing an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act as domestic violence took place with her by her in-laws or husband or any family members of her-in laws. As per Section 12 of the D.V. Act it is also not mandatory for a Magistrate to consider the domestic incident report of a Protection Officer or any service provider before the passing the order under the Act.
20. The Honble Supreme Court of India in the case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi reported in MANU/SC/0631/2022, while answering on the issues framed thereunder, has held in paragraph 52 as follows:
...
It is held that Section 12 does not make it mandatory for a Magistrate to consider a Domestic Incident Report filed by a Protection Officer or service provider before passing any order under the D.V. Act. It is clarified that even in the absence of a Domestic Incident Report, a Magistrate is empowered to pass both ex parte or interim as well as a final order under the provisions of the D.V. Act.
.
It is held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when she is related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family, to actually reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of commission of domestic violence. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 of the D.V. Act and such a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek reliefs under the provisions of D.V. Act including enforcement of her right to live in a shared household.
..
It is held that there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed vis--vis allegation of domestic violence. However, it is not necessary that at the time of filing of an application by an aggrieved person, the domestic relationship should be subsisting. In other words, even if an aggrieved person is not in a domestic relationship with the respondent in a shared household at the time of filing of an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act but has at any point of time lived so or had the right to live and has been subjected to domestic violence or is later subjected to domestic violence on account of the domestic relationship, is entitled to file an application under Section of the D.V. Act.
21. With the aforesaid analysis, when the facts of the present case are examined, the Court finds that the revisionist has taken one fold plea for filing the complaint in the competent Court at Bareilly on the ground that the last cause of action has accrued to the revisionist at Bareilly where the revisionist and her family members and the in-laws and their relatives had appeared in a meeting which took place at Bareilly and as per the allegation of revisionist, in such meeting, the in-laws and their relatives had abused the revisionist and her family members.
22. In the case in hand, it is cropped up from the record including the impugned order of the appellate court as well as the trial court that the marriage of the revisionist was solemnized with Sardar Rao Virendra Singh @ Bhola singh on 27th May, 2005 at Sitarganj, Uttarakhand i.e. the parental place of the revisionist. After marriage, the revisionist resided with her husband in her in-laws house at District Alwar, Rajasthan for some time and thereafter she resided with her husband in another house at Alwar. As per the allegation made by the revisionist that since marriage the husband of the revisionist and mother-in-law Smt. Raghuveer Kaur and her both brother-in-laws, namely, Sardar Surendra Singh and Gurendra Singh used to harass and torture her for additional demand of dowry as they were not satisfied with the dowry given by the parents of the revisionist at the time of marriage. For the said act of her in-laws, the revisionist had made complaint before the Police Station Govindgarh, District Alwar, Rajasthan repeatedly and the last being dated 15th August, 2016. It is also alleged by the revisionist that her two brothers-in-laws had beaten her badly with sticks in which she had sustained head injuries and her treatment was undertaken at Government Hospital, Govindgarh, Alwar, Rajasthan.
23. It is not disputed by the private opposite parties that for some time, the revisionist resided in her in-laws house along with them where the alleged domestic violence started with the revisionist, which is shared household. In the present case, as per the allegation of revisionist, she is an aggrieved person
24. It is also mentioned in the impugned judgment of the appellate court that on 20th September, 2016, the revisionist, her parents and other family members and also the family members came to office of Monitor Patrika of Baradari, Stadium Road, Police Station-Baradari, District Bareilly where a meeting/'Panchayat' was fixed in which her in-laws along with some known persons armed with weapons. During the meeting, at around 07:00 p.m. all the members of her in-laws started to abuse the revisionist and her father that unless they does not fulfil the additional demand of dowry of Rs. 50,000/-, they would not take her at her in-laws' place. From the aforesaid it is crystal clear that last cause of action accrued to the revisionist at Bareilly.
25. Before this Court on the issue in hand, no direct settled law has been placed by either of the parties. However, upon bare reading of sub-Sections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 127 Cr.P.C. altogether, this Court is of the opinion that the application filed by the revisionist under Section 12 of the D.V. Act before the Civil Court at Bareilly on the ground of arising of last cause of action with the revisionist by the opposite parties is maintainable.
26. Upon deeper scrutiny of the impugned order passed by the appellate Court, this Court finds that the court below has erred in law in allowing the appeal filed by the opposite party no.2. The appellate court has not recorded any specific finding regarding the material on the record on the basis of which it came to the conclusion that the court at Bareilly has no jurisdiction to try the complaint. The appellate court completely ignored the distinction between the provisions of Section 27 (a) as well as Section 27 (b) on the one hand and Section 27 (c) on the other hand.
27. Under such circumstances, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 16th November, 2023 passed by the appellate court cannot be legally sustained and is hereby quashed. There is no illegally or infirmity in the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Fast Track Court, Court No.1, Bareilly dated 8th September, 2021, which is competent to grant protection order in view of Section 27 (c) of D.V. Act, so as to warrant any interference by this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. The order of the Civil Judge dated 8th September, 2021 is, hereby, affirmed.
28. However, it is clarified that except the issue of maintainability of the complaint under Section 12 of the D.V. Act before the Civil Court, Bareilly, which has been decided by the appellate court against the revisionist holding that the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, this Court is not expressing any opinion on the other issues. Any observations made by this Court herein above shall not adversely affect the rights of the parties to raise before the court below except the issue of jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned to try the complaint made by the revisionist under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. It shall be open for the parties to raise issues, which has not ben decided by this Court before the court concerned as may be permissible under law.
29. The present criminal revision is, accordingly, allowed.
30. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Madan Pal Singh, J.)
Order Date :- 11.9.2025
Sushil/-
