Allahabad High Court

Bhagwati Prasad vs State Of U.P.And 2 Ors. on 4 September, 2025

Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery

Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 



 

 

 

 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
WRIT A No. - 64719 of 2013
 

 
Bhagwati Prasad
 

 
..Petitioners(s)
 

 
Versus
 

 
State of U.P. and others 
 

 
..Respondents(s)
 

 

 
Counsel for Petitioners(s)
 
:
 
Manisha Chaturvedi
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)
 
:
 
C.S.C., Sunil Kumar Mishra
 

 

 
Reserved on 01.09.2025
 
Delivered on 04.09.2025
 

 
Court No. - 5
 

 
HONBLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.

1. Impugned order dated 05.07.2013 is reproduced hereinafter:

"कार्यालय क्षेत्रीय प्रबन्धक

उत्तर प्रदेश परिवहन निगम

इलाहाबाद

पत्र सं० 4615/ स्थापना /1-31/सेवा-अभिलेख/कोर्ट-केस/प्रत्या०/13 दिनाँक 5/7/13

कार्यालय-आदेश

प्रस्तुत प्रकरण मा० उच्च न्यायालय इलाहाबाद के समक्ष श्री भगवती प्रसाद सेया निवृत्त कनिष्ठ लिपिक, सिविल लाइन्स डिपो, इलाहाबाद क्षेत्र द्वारा योजित की गई याचिका संख्या 22465/2013 भगवती प्रसाद बनाम परिवहन निगम व अन्य में मा० उच्च न्यायालय इलाहाबाद ने दिनाँक 24.04.2013 को सुनवाई करते हुये याचिका इस निर्देश के साथ निस्तारित की है कि प्रतिवादी वाती के प्रत्यावेदन का निस्तारण याचिका संख्या 3731/2001 रामदुलारे बनाम परिवहन निगम में हुये आदेश दिनाँक 29.11.2002 के आधार पर प्रत्यावेदन प्राप्त होने के 3 माह में निस्तारित किया जाय, के कम में श्री भगवती प्रसाद, सेवा निवृत्त कनिष्ठ लिपिक द्वारा डाक के माध्यम से प्रेषित प्रत्यावेदन इस कार्यालय में दिनोंक 18.06.2013 को प्राप्त हुआ है, से सम्बन्धित है। श्री भगवती प्रसाद सेवा निवृत्त कनिष्ठ लिपिक को आगे सुविधा की दृष्टि से प्रत्यावेदक के नाम से सम्बोधित किया गया है। मामले का विवरण निम्नवत् है:-

प्रत्यावेदक दिनोंक 31.03.2009 को कनिष्ठ लिपिक के पद से सेवा निवृत्त हो गये है। सेवा निवृत्त के उपरान्त प्रत्यावेदक को सेवा निवृत्तक समस्त लाभ ग्रेच्युटी, ग्रास लीव, सामूहिक बीमा का भुगतान समयान्तर्गत किया जा चुका है। फण्ड भुगतान के सम्बन्ध में औपचारिकताओं को पूर्ण कर कर्मचारी भविष्य निधि कार्यालय प्रेषित किया जा चुका है, जहाँ से कर्मचारी के बचत खाते में सीधे भुगतान किया जाता है। मा० उच्च न्यायालय इलाहाबाद के निर्णय दिनॉक 24.04.2013 में याचिका संख्या 3731/2001 राम दुलारे बनाम परिवहन निगम के निर्णय दिनॉक 29.11.2002 के अनुसार वादी के प्रत्यावेदन का निस्तारण किये जाने के निदेश दिये गये हैं। यहाँ यह अवगत कराना समाचीन होगा कि श्री राम दुलारे पंचम वेतनमान की संस्तुतियों के उपरान्त सेवा निवृत्त हुये थे।

प्रत्यावेदक परिवहन निगम में षष्ठम वेतनमान लागू होने की तिथि 13.01.2010 के पूर्व दिनोंक 31.03.2009 को सेवा निवृत्त हो चुका है। इस प्रकार प्रत्यावेदक को षष्ठम वेतनमान का लाभ अनुमन्य नहीं है।

अतः मा० उच्च न्यायालय इलाहाबाद के निर्णय दिनॉक 24.04.2013 के अनुपालन में प्रत्यावेदक का प्राप्त प्रत्यावेदन दिनोंक 18.06.2013 का निस्तारण उपरोक्तानुसार किया जाता है।

(पी०आर० बेलवारियर)

क्षेत्रीय प्रबन्धक"

2. Ms. Manisha Chaturvedi, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on judgments passed by this Court in Ram Dulare vs. Managing Director, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3731 of 2001), decided on 29.11.2022; Kamesh Srivastava and others vs. The State of U.P. and others (Service Single No. 11991 of 2017), decided on 27.02.2020 as well as a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Harwindra Kumar vs. Chief Engineer, Karmik and others, AIR 2006 SC 365 that petitioner is also entitled for benefit of recommendations of Sixth Pay Commission considering that it was adopted by State Government w.e.f. 01.01.2006.

3. However, the Court is not inclined to accept the said argument since on the issue involve in this case a Coordinate Bench of this Court has rejected writ petitions filed by similarly situated persons, i.e., retired employees of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation in Vijay Bahadur vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015:AHC:66918.

4. The aforesaid judgment in Vijay Bahadur (supra) is placed on record by Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for respondents and relevant part of it is reproduced hereinafter:

In (2002) 6 SCC 72, State of Haryana and Another Vs. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, which was a case relating to the implementation of the 4th Pay Commission recommendations the Supreme Court held in paragraph 10 of the judgment reads as follows:

"10. It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge, While taking a decision in the matter several relevant factors, some of which have been noted by this Court in the decided case, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financial position 'and capacity of the State Government to bear the additional liability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind that the priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the State Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the State Government. In the context of complex nature of issues involved, the far reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on the administration of the State Government courts have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matter is not justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any proceeding against such administrative decision taken by the government. The courts should approach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that the decision of the government is patently irrational unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the government while taking the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter. Even in a case where the court holds the order passed by the government to be unsustainable then ordinarily a direction should be given to the State Government or the authority taking the decision to reconsider the matter and pass a proper order. The court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compelling the government to implement the same. As noted earlier, in the present case the High Court has not even made any attempt to compare the nature of duties and responsibilities of the two sections of employees, one in the State Secretariat and the other in the Central Secretariat It has also ignored the basic principle that there are certain rules, regulations and executive instructions issued by the employers which govern the administration of the cadre."

In (2007) 7 SCC 472, Union of India Vs. Arun Jyoti Kundu and Others, which was also a case relating to implementation of the recommendations of the 5th Pay Commission, the Supreme Court also held that it was open to the Government to provide the benefit of the recommendation of the Pay Commission only from a notified date. Paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the judgment read as under:

"20.When a concession was being extended as distinct from implementing a specific recommendation of the Pay Commission with reference to a particular point of time, it is open to the Government to provide that the benefit it proposes to give, would be available only from a notified date. As this Court has observed, neither the Central Administrative Tribunal nor the High Court, can direct the merger of any cadre. That is a policy decision for the Government to take. So long as it is not done, it is not open to the tribunal or the court to issue directions in that regard and to follow it up with what are thought to be consequential directions.

21. We may in this context notice that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi dealing with a similar claim took up the position on the basis of decisions of this Court, that the tribunal would have no jurisdiction to issue the directions sought for by the employees. It is submitted that the correctness of the said decision has been questioned in the High Court at Delhi. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to make any observation regarding that decision. But we note that, that tribunal declined jurisdiction in similar circumstances.

22. Once we find that it was open to the Government to extend a benefit to a set of its employees with effect from a particular day on the basis of some anomaly found in the report of the Fifth Pay Commission, there would arise no discrimination because the very implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission Report would not entitle the respondents to any benefit. The very right to their benefit arose because of the decision of the Government to extend to them a particular benefit not specified in the Fifth Pay Commission Report. It is, therefore, not possible to postulate that the decision of the Government must be given retrospective effect and if no such effect is given, the tribunal or court can interfere and direct the giving of such retrospective effect. Once it is found that paragraph 83.296 is attracted to the case, it has to be found that the applicants before the Tribunal were not entitled to any relief."

In 2007 (8) SCC 231, Chairman & MD, Kerala SRTC Vs. K.O. Verghese and Others, the Supreme Court in Paragraphs 16 to 22 has held as follows:

"16. As we understand this communication in the context in which it was issued, we are of the view that this amounts to a direction in terms of Section 34 of the Act. It must be remembered that this communication was issued when the Government was directed by the High Court to take a policy decision on the question of implementing the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission in respect of the employees of KSRTC. Such a policy decision in the absence of a regulation, could obviously be only in terms of Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, when in compliance with the direction of the High Court, the Government took a policy decision and communicated the same to KSRTC to defer the implementation of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission, it could be understood only as a direction in terms of Section 34 of the Act. The context in which the communication dated 16.5.1995 was issued, according to us, clearly shows that it was intended to be a direction in terms of Section 34 of the Act and the argument that formalities had not been complied with or that the same had not been notified, does not enable the court to hold that the communication dated 16.5.1995 must be understood only as a mere letter in reply and nothing more. The power to issue such a direction is clearly traceable to Section 34 of the Act and the High Court had obviously directed the Government to take that decision having in mind Section 34 of the Act. It is therefore clear that the direction dated 16.5.1995 is a direction in terms of Section 34 of the Act. The High Court, in our opinion, has not considered the effect of the direction issued in O.P. No. 13233 of 1992-A and connected cases, and the decision taken by the Government pursuant to that direction and the status of the communication dated 16.5.1995.

17. The High Court has rested its decision on the direction of the Government dated 27.3.1984 authorizing KSRTC to pay pension to its employees as per KSR and the acceptance of the same by KSRTC by issue of the order dated 5.9.1984, obeying the direction and providing for payment of pension in terms of KSR as an incorporation of KSR by reference. Proceeding from this, the High Court has held that pension is payable to all the employees of KSRTC in terms of Part III of KSR and this led to the position even as regards the date of payment as fixed by the Government for its employees. The High Court, though it noticed the decision in Union of India v. P.N. Menon and Ors. (1995)IILLJ307SC regarding the entitlement of KSRTC to look into various aspects like its financial ability to pay, has proceeded to reason that in view of the adoption of Part III of KSR, the Corporation had lost its right to fix a cut-off date in the absence of any direction under Section 34 of the Act. The court has also held that communication of the Government dated 24.9.1992 had only directed deferring of payment of pension as recommended by Fifth Pay Commission and this meant that the Corporation had no right to fix a cut-off date especially in the absence of any regulation framed by it.

18. We are not in a position to endorse this reasoning or conclusion of the High Court. KSRTC is an autonomous Corporation established under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. It can regulate the service of its employees by making appropriate regulations in that behalf. Until such regulations are framed, it is entitled to take note of its financial health in considering whether a particular recommendation for enhanced pay or pension in respect of Government employees should be adopted by it and if it is to adopted by it, from what point of time. This, of course, would be subject to any direction that may be issued by the State Government in terms of Section 34 of the Act.

19. In the letter dated 24.9.1992 referred to by the High Court, the Government had indicated that since the financial position of KSRTC was not sound, the question of accepting the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission relating to pension and allied matters may be deferred for better times.

20. When the High Court intervened and directed the Government to take a policy decision and not leave the matter pending in view of the fact that the pensioners were generally senior citizens, the Government reconsidered the question and after examining the position in detail in the context of the financial position of KSRTC, took a decision that the grant of benefits of the Fifth Pay Commission to the pensioners of KSRTC may be deferred for better times. We have already held that this was a direction to KSRTC in terms of Section 34 of the Act. KSRTC was therefore bound to implement this direction in the absence of a regulation in that behalf.

21. The High Court, in our view, is not correct in thinking that there is any compulsion on KSRTC on the mere adoption of Part III of KSR, to automatically give all enhancements in pension and other benefits given by the State Government to its employees. There is no provision in Part III of KSR containing such a stipulation. It only provides for payment of pension. The question of revision or enhancement of pension to its employees is left to KSRTC, an autonomous Corporation, subject of course to any direction that may be issued by the State Government under Section 34 of the Act. The mere adopting of Part III of KSR does not therefore shackle or control the power of KSRTC to take a decision in the absence of any regulation already framed, that the enhanced pensionary benefits as recommended by the Fifth Pay Commission need not be paid commencing on the same date as the State Government employees but the question of enhancing pension could be considered at a later point of time. There is nothing in Part III of KSR to control the power of KSRTC to decide that the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission may be implemented with effect from a particular date or that it need not be implemented at all in view of the precarious financial condition of KSRTC. The reasoning therefore that the direction to adopt Part III of KSR and the order adopting it by KSRTC would denude KSRTC of its power to fix a cut-off date for adopting and implementing the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission is found to be not sustainable.

22. Learned Counsel for the respondents argued that what the Government has directed is only to defer the payment of pension and that meant that pension as recommended by the Fifth Pay Commission had become payable but only the actual payment stood deferred to a future point of time. In the context of what has happened here, this argument cannot be accepted. Obviously, the issue was whether the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission regarding enhanced payment of pension and other allowances to retired employees should be implemented by KSRTC in the situation in which it was placed and the direction of the Government was that since the financial position was not sound, the question had to be deferred. The letter dated 16.5.1995 uses the expression:

"It has been decided that grant of benefits of the Fifth Pay Commission to the pensioners of KSRTC may be deferred for better times."

As we understand it, this communication means that the very question of adopting the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission stood postponed for better times and it is not possible to read and understand it as directing that pension had to be paid in terms of the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission but its actual payment may be postponed. The grant itself was put off to a later point of time by the said communication. We, therefore, overrule this submission on behalf of the respondents. "

`In (2010) 11 SCC 694, State of West Bengal Vs. Subhas Kumar Chaterjee and Others, the Supreme Court held that the fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which for the executive to discharge. Paragraph 14 of the said judgment reads as follows:

"14 This Court time and again cautioned that the court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compel the Government to implement the same. Equation of posts and equation of salaries is a matter which is best left to an expert body. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. Even the recommendations of the Pay Commissions are subject to acceptance or rejection, the Courts cannot compel the State to accept the recommendations of the Pay Commissions though it is an expert body. The State in its wisdom and in furtherance of its valid policy may or may not accept the recommendations of the Pay Commission. [See: Union of India v. Arun Jyoti Kundu (2007) 7 SCC 472 and State of Haryana and Anr. v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. (2002) 6 SCC 72]. It is no doubt true, the constitutional courts clothed with power of judicial review have jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have remedy only if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction while fixing the pay scale for a given post."

Thus, on a conspectus of facts and law laid down by the Supreme Court, I find no merit in the above writ petitions. The writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)

5. In view of Vijay Bahadur (supra) no circumstances exist to take a contrary view. Learned counsel for petitioner has also not come up with any submission that Vijay Bahadur (supra) is still not a good law.

6. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

September 04, 2025