Allahabad High Court
Smt. Manorama Jaiswal vs Debt Reocvery Appellate Tribunal ... on 24 November, 2025
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:76605
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 1004572 of 2008
Smt. Manorama Jaiswal
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
Debt Reocvery Appellate Tribunal 147-A-58/1 Jawaharlal Nehru
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
:
Dipak Seth, Dhruv Mathur, I.D. Shukla, Purusottam Awasthi, Rahul Kumar, Ratnesh Chandra, S.K. Mehrotra
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Vinay Shanker, Amit Chandra, Devendra Mohan Shukla
Reserved on 29.10.2025 Delivered on 24.11.2025 Court No. - 6
HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.
1. By means of the instant petition, the petitioner assails the order dated 01.09.2008 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (in short, 'DRAT') dismissing the appeal of the petitioner, as a consequences, the judgment and order dated 16.03.2005 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow (in short, 'DRT') in T.A. No.22 of 2002 has been affirmed.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy, it will be appropriate to briefly take a glance at the facts giving rise to the instant petition.
3. M/s. Black Ocean Chem India Pvt. Ltd., the respondent No.5, had availed financial assistance from the respondent No.4 - Bank. A sanction letter was issued by the Bank on 03.05.1997 indicating that two types of loan were sanctioned for the respondent No.5 Company, one in the nature of a term loan and the other was a credit limit, both with a sanctioned limit of Rs.20.00 lacs each. The Directors of the respondent No.5 - Company furnished their personal guarantees and the primary security as offered by the Company was hypothetication of the raw material and also the plant and machinery. A collateral security was offered which related to the factory/land and building situate at Mohenandpur Parathia, Barabanki Road, Lucknow recorded in the name of Shri Rajeshwar Jaiswal. The petitioner also furnished her title deed relating to her house situate on Plot No.795 Ranopali, Pargana - Haveli, Tehsil and District Faizabad as security for the loans.
4. After availing the aforesaid loans, the respondent No.5 - Company was unable to service its debts, as a consequence, the loans became bad as the respondent No.5 - Company defaulted. The bank, by means of its letter dated 01.01.2001 recalled its loan and, thereafter, invoking the provisions of Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short, 'the Act of 1993') filed an original application before the DRT at Lucknow, which was registered as Case No.207 of 2001.
5. The matter was contested by the petitioner and the Directors of the respondent No.5 - Company, however, their contentions did not find favour with the DRT, who decreed the original application of the Bank vide its judgment dated 16.03.2005.
6. The recovery certificate was also issued and the Recovery Officer put the same into execution. In the interim period, the petitioner filed an appeal before the DRAT. Since, the appeal was to be filed alongwith a pre-deposit, hence, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before this Court, which came to be dismissed and thereafter the petitioner pursued her appeal before the DRAT. However, in the meantime, the property of the petitioner, was put to auction and the auction was confirmed in favour of the private-respondent No.8.
7. The DRAT, after hearing the present petitioner, dismissed the appeal by means of the judgment and order dated 01.09.2008 passed in Appeal No.R/675/2006. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the petitioner has assailed both the decisions of the DRT as well as DRAT, by means of the instant petition.
8. Shri Dhruv Mathur, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that first and foremost, both the DRT as well as the DRAT have committed a grave error in ignoring the contents of the sanction letter. It is urged that the respondent No.5 - Company was granted a CC Limit of Rs.20.00 lacs and a term loan of Rs.20.00 lacs. It is in furtherance thereof that the petitioner had furnished title deed of her property to secure the said loans.
9. The said letter of sanction clearly mentioned conditions for the grant of CC Limit. It is pointed out that the said term loan and the CC Limit was sanctioned on 03.05.1997 and at the given point of time, the valuation made by the Bank of the house of the petitioner, which was furnished as the security, was valued at Rs.44.00 lacs. It is further urged that when the value of the property was Rs.44.00 lacs in the year 1997 then when the auction was held in the year 2006, the property of the petitioner was sold out at a much lesser price and the reserve price fixed was Rs.30.00 lacs and this is apparent error which has not been considered by the DRT and DRAT.
10. It was next contended that after the loan had become bad and the respondent No.5 - Company could not repay the loan; the Bank by means of its letter dated 01.01.2001 recalled its loan. It is in furtherance thereof that an original application was filed before the DRT, wherein the Bank had categorically stated that the property of the present petitioner, namely, Smt. Manorama Jaiswal, was taken to secure the repayment of the term loan, as a collateral security.
11. It is further pointed out that the said notice dated 01.01.2001 issued by the Bank was addressed to the Company, its Directors, but it was not addressed nor served on the present petitioner, namely, Smt. Manorama Jaiswal. It is, thus, urged that the petitioner was kept in the dark and even though while filing the original application, under Section 19 of the Act of 1993, it was pleaded by the Bank that the Bank had recalled the loan facility and the recall notice was given to all the defendants before the DRT which was false as shall be evident from the notice itself. The said notice dated 01.01.2001 was placed along with the original application, marked as Exhibit-A/46.
12. It was also pointed out that an impression was given in the pleadings that the notice dated 01.01.2001 was addressed to all i.e. the defaulting Company, its Directors and other Guarantors, but the fact remains that no material could be placed on record to indicate that the recall notice was ever addressed or issued and served on the petitioner. Thus, to that extent, the statement given in the original application filed before the DRT was false and the Exhibit-A/46 clearly amplified this fact that the notice was not addressed to the petitioner and in absence thereof the petitioner was absolved of her liability.
13. It is in this context it was urged that the petitioner was not served with the necessary notice, hence, she was not aware and behind her back the proceedings were initiated and taken forward which finally culminated in the order decreeing the original application by the DRT on 16.03.2005. It was further urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid plea was escalated before the DRAT, wherein it was pointed out that without putting the petitioner to notice and without providing an adequate opportunity, a valuable security of the petitioner could not be auctioned and that too at a much lesser price, which only indicated the malafides of the Bank.
14. It was further urged that the Appellate Court though considered the submissions, but the same were not properly dealt with inasmuch as no proper reasoning has been accorded by the DRAT. Hence, the order passed by the DRAT suffers for the vice of being unreasoned and moreover certain observations have been recorded which are contrary to the material on record, which indicates that the DRAT passed the impugned order dated 01.09.2008 without due application of judicial mind.
15. It is further urged that the house of the petitioner was valued at Rs.44.00 lacs in the year 1997, however, when the auction took place in the year 2006, the entire property of the petitioner was sold out for a total sum of Rs.39.00 lacs. It was further submitted that when the recovery certificate being executed, the Recovery Officer ought to have called for a fresh report, which was not done. The reserved price fixed by the Bank in the year 2006 was even less than the basic value of the property which was got done and available with the Bank. This indicates that the Bank did not proceed by following the legal process rather it was in a tearing hurry to dispose of the property of the petitioner, without following the due process of law.
16. It was further urged that though the auction took place on 09.06.2006, while the appeal of the petitioner was pending and as soon as the appeal came to be dismissed on 01.09.2008, the sale was confirmed on 03.10.2008. The petitioner thereafter preferred the instant petition and in view of the interim order granted, the possession of the house of the petitioner has yet not been transferred and it continues to remain with the petitioner, while the registration of the sale certificate was also stayed.
17. It has also been submitted that while the writ petition was pending, the petitioner had moved an application bearing Civil Misc. Application No.23 of 2024 on 18.09.2024 seeking to amend the writ petition by incorporating certain facts as well as grounds. It is urged that primarily by the amendment, it is sought to be indicated that even though the auction of the property was held on 09.06.2006, but the same could not be confirmed nor the deed was executed as initially the DRAT had stayed the confirmation of sale and after the appeal came to be dismissed, the sale was confirmed on 03.10.2008.
18. It is also stated that before confirming the sale, no notice was issued to the petitioner and a major issue which needs to be highlighted is the fact that the value of the petitioner's property is more than Rs.1.75 Crores as on 01.11.1999, but the same was auctioned for a hugely inadequate price of Rs.39.00 lacs, whereas the complete outstanding of the Bank was around Rs.44.00 lacs. The reserved price being substantially low at Rs.30.00 lacs was also arbitrarily fixed and the aforesaid facts should be taken into consideration while deciding the writ petition.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Navalkha & Sons v. Sri Ramanya Das and others, AIR 1970 SC 2037 to contend that settled principles which governs the confirmation of sale must be followed. The Court must look into the fact that the property which is sold must not be less than its market value as it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself regarding the price offered which should be best that could be expected to be offered. It is urged that since this aspect was not taken note of, accordingly, the same renders the proceedings adopted by the Bank as void and no right would accrue in favour of the auction purchaser i.e. the private-respondent No.8.
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Rajiv Kumar Jindal and others v. BCI Staff Colony Residential Welfare Association and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 507, to contend that the object of the auction is to secure the maximum realizable value of a property and in case of any inadequate price or underbidding the same cannot be appreciated. Since, the house of the petitioner was put to auction for a total sum of Rs.39.00 lacs against a market value of more than Rs.1.75 Crores in the year 1999 as per the circle rate, which is fixed by the Government, hence, the selling the property at such a low price is nothing but a fraud, which deserves to be set aside.
21. Shri Vinay Shanker, learned counsel for the Bank has argued that the petitioner was a guarantor which is a fact, which is not disputed. It is further submitted that the principal borrower i.e. the respondent No.5 - Company defaulted in repaying the loan and the Bank had recalled its loan. Thereafter, the Bank had initiated proceedings under Section 19 of the Act of 1993, which was decreed in favour of the Bank. An effort was made to challenge the judgment of the DRT by the petitioner by filing an appeal, which too was dismissed. Accordingly, the two Courts have concurrently held that the petitioner was liable to pay. Hence, these findings of fact cannot be assailed in a writ petition and they are based on material evidence on record.
22. It is further urged that the auction was done in the year 2006 and even after the dismissal of the appeal on 01.09.2008, there was no attempt on part of the petitioner to make an endeavour to clear the loan of the Bank. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sale though was confirmed but on account of the pendency of the instant petition, the auction purchaser has not been handed over the possession. It is further urged that the writ petition was filed in the year 2008 and the application for amendment has been moved by the petitioner in the year 2024 i.e. after 16 years, which clearly indicates the malafides of the petitioner and to keep the matter pending.
23. The grounds, which are sought to be introduced by an amendment, have no bearing and are mere subsequent events which was always in the knowledge of the petitioner, but was not placed on record. Now the application is being pressed having been moved after about sixteen years. Hence, the application for amendment is also malafide and deserves to be rejected. For the aforesaid reasons, it is urged that the petition is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed.
24. Shri Amit Chandra, learned counsel for the respondent No.8 - auction purchaser submits that he had participated in the auction proceedings and against the reserved price of Rs.30.00 lacs had made a highest bid of Rs.39.00 lacs and the said bid was accepted and the auction was confirmed in his favour, however, on account of the ongoing litigation, the petitioner has not been given the possession despite a lapse of two decades. The respondent No.8 had already deposited the entire amount with the Bank a sum of Rs.39.00 lacs, but he is loosing interest on his money and even the property though confirmed in his name, but the possession has not been given. It is a clear case of nexus between the petitioner and the Bank and in the aforesaid cross fire, the respondent No.8 is suffering. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
25. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record.
26. Before adverting to the submissions of the respective parties, it will be appropriate to note certain undisputed facts.
(i) It is an undisputed fact that the respondent No.5 - Company is the principal borrower, who was sanctioned financial assistance by the respondent No.4 - Canara Bank for a total sum of Rs.40.00 lacs.
(ii) It is also an undisputed that to secure the aforesaid financial arrangement, the petitioner had furnished title deeds of her property situate in Ranopali, House No.795 and also handed over the title deeds to the Bank for creating an equitable mortgage. It is also an undisputed fact that the respondent No.5 - Company defaulted on its financial commitments and in view thereof the Bank recalled its loan by means of the notice dated 01.01.2001.
(iii) It is also an undisputed fact that the Bank initiated the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act of 1993, which was contested by the present petitioner. Before the DRT, the defendants No.1 to 3, 6 and 7 had filed their written statements in two sets. One was filed by the defendants No.1 to 3 i.e. the Company and its Directors, whereas the other set of written statements was filed by the present petitioner and Rakesh Jaiswal.
Once the T.A. No.22 of 2002 was decreed on 16.03.2005, it is the present petitioner alone, who had filed an appeal before the DRAT. It will be relevant to notice here that four appellants are none other than Shri Mahadeo Prasad Jaiswal, who is the husband of the petitioner - Smt. Manorama Jaiswal and the appellants No.2 and 3 are the sons of Shri Mahadeo Prasad Jaiswal and Smt. Manorama Jaiswal, who is the wife of Shri Mahadeo Prasad Jaiswal. None of the Directors or other Guarantors, who had furnished their personal guarantees or the Company for that reason preferred any appeal before the DRAT to join hands with the present petitioner, while filing the instant petition.
(iv) Throughout the proceedings i.e. from the year 2001 onwards the petitioner being the guarantor never attempted to pay off or liquidate the loan nor contested the proceedings before the Recovery Officer.
27. Now, in light of the aforesaid undisputed facts, it will be appropriate to consider the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
28. The first limb of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Bank had stated that it had issued a notice to all the defendants, which would naturally include the present petitioner, but no material was brought on record to indicate that any such notice was issued to the petitioner recalling the loan and in absence of the notice the petitioner could not be deprived of her valuable security.
29. Having considered the aforesaid submission, suffice it to state that the status of the present petitioner is that of a guarantor. In law, the status of the principal borrower and the guarantor is coextensive and the creditor is entitled to recover the sum from either the principal borrower or the guarantors or both. Once the loan had been recalled and the notice dated 01.01.2001 for recalling the loan was issued to the Company and the guarantors then even assuming if the petitioner did not receive the notice or it was not addressed to the petitioner, but the fact remains that there is no legal impediment or an obligation which may require the Bank to issue notice prior to the institution of its petition under Section 19 of the Act of 1993 and in absence of such notice the proceedings were not maintainable.
30. Since, there is no legal embargo that a notice must be issued and served on both the principal borrower and the guarantors before institution of a petition under Section 19 of the Act of 1993 till then it cannot be said that mere non-issuance of notice to the petitioner alone would have any fatal impact on the petition filed by the Bank under Section 19 of the Act of 1993 specifically when it is not disputed that the petitioner contested the proceedings before the DRT.
31. Once she had received the summons issued by the DRT along with the petition filed therein and the petitioner had raised this issue before the DRT and she knew that the loan had been recalled. It was always open for the petitioner to have negotiated at that point of time, but no such effort was made rather the proceedings were contested without raising any such objection. Even if at all, the objections had been raised, as already noticed above, it could not have any adverse impact on the proceedings, therefore, alleging that the proceedings stood vitiated for want of issuance of notice to the petitioner cannot be sustained and is accordingly turned down.
32. The next limb of submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the issues raised by the petitioner were not appropriately considered by the DRT or DRAT also does not impresses this Court for the reason that the objections are merely cosmetic in nature. It does not have any substantive bearing on the proceedings. What is significant to note is that the issue which are raised by the petitioner before this Court were never raised before either the DRT or the DRAT. No evidence worth its name was filed either before the DRT or the DRAT and now raising technical issues to defeat the judgments of the DRT and the DRAT on the basis of technicalities cannot be appreciated by this Court, who exercises a limited jurisdiction in powers of the judicial review over a Tribunal under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
33. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice that a decision of this Court in Suresh Chandra Mishra v. State of U.P. and others, 2015 SCC OnLine All 10844, wherein this Court had referred to several decisions of the Apex Court for the purposes of culling out the principles regarding the scope of powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. After noticing several decisions, the principles which was culled out is reproduced as under:-
"... In Radhey Shyam and another Vs. Chhabi Nath and others 2015 (3) SCALE 88, the three Judges Bench held that against judicial orders passed by Civil Court, writ petition under Article 226 would not lie. It has also held that Article 227 is distinct from Article 226 and within the limitation and permissibility of Article 227, the judicial orders passed by Civil Court can be assailed before the High Court.
Thus from the aforesaid pronouncements, it can be summed that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 in the following cases :
(a) Erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction.
(b) Refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) Error of law apparent on the face of the record, but not in concurrent finding of the fact as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or error of law relating to jurisdiction.
(d) Violation of the principles of natural justice.
(e) Arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or discretion.
(f) Arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material.
(g) A patent of flagrant error in procedure.
(h) Order resulting in manifest injustice.
(i) Error both on facts and in law or even otherwise."
34. In light of the facts noticed hereinabove, none of the aforesaid contingency is attracted in the instant case thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance.
35. The next submission which primarily relates to process and procedure which was adopted by the Bank in holding the auction, if examined, would reveal that the same must fail for more than one reason. The issue that the sanction was for a sum of Rs.44.00 lacs and the petitioner was only concerned with the term loan, which was for a maximum limit of Rs.20.00 lacs has no basis as this was never raised before the DRT. The petitioner had ample opportunity to raise the issue before the DRT and the DRAT, but it was not done and even while filing the instant writ petition, no such ground was raised rather they are sought to be incorporated through an amendment application moved by the petitioner only in the year 2024 i.e. after 16 years of filing of this writ petition and even though this Court is not inclined to allow the application for amendment, but nevertheless, the grounds which have been raised are being noticed to satisfy the conscience of the Court that some injustice may not be occasioned.
36. Now, in this backdrop, the record will indicate that the DRT decided the proceedings on 16.03.2005 and as per the provisions contained in the Act of 1993, after the judgment, a recovery certificate is issued to the Recovery Officer. The proceedings went on before the Recovery Officer, which later culminated in an auction. There is nothing to indicate that while the petitioner had contested the proceedings before the DRT and was aware of the judgment and order dated 16.03.2005 and she ought to have contested the proceedings before the Recovery Officer also but it was not done, nor any explanation has been furnished as to what prevented the petitioner to contest the proceedings before the Recovery Officer.
37. A specific question was put to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to what transpired before the Recovery Officer and as to whether the petitioner had furnished her objections regarding the fixing of the reserved price or that the valuation which was being considered by the Recovery Officer, was against the market value and if so what efforts were made and what material was brought on record, before the Recovery Officer to persuade or to establish the fact that the property in question was being sold for a very low price. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that no such objections were filed nor any such objections were taken or filed before the Recovery Officer or before the DRAT.
38. In this view of the matter, where the petitioner did not raise these issues, which are factual in nature either before the DRAT or the DRT or before the Recovery Officer, hence, it cannot be said that the Recovery Officer proceeded to hold the auction in an arbitrary or in an illegal fashion.
39. It will also be relevant to point out that the auction was held on 09.06.2006 and this was known to the petitioner. The appeal of the petitioner came to be dismissed on 01.09.2008 and only subsequent thereto the sale was confirmed on 03.10.2008, whereas the instant petition came to be filed on 16.09.2008. It is on account of the interim order dated 17.11.2008 passed in this petition that a restraint was made against the execution of the sale certificate. Throughout the proceedings, these issues were not raised and now at a much later stage, as noticed above, an application for amendment has been moved to raise such issues does not reflect well on the petitioner.
40. Another issue that requires notice is the fact that the principal borrower and the other guarantors never came before the Court either to file an appeal or a writ petition. Thus, as far as the judgment of the DRAT is concerned, the same attained finality insofar as the principal borrower and the guarantors are concerned, except the petitioner.
41. Now, in this view, where the liability of the petitioner is both joint and several with the principal borrower and other guarantors, who did not come forward to assail the judgment coupled with the fact that the petitioner had contested the proceedings before the DRT as well as the DRAT and having lost there she now seeks another innings before this Court by raising factual issues after 16 years and this cannot be countenanced.
42. Significantly right from the date when the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act of 1993 were initiated by the Bank i.e. in the year 2001, the petitioner had contested the proceedings, but no material has been brought on record to indicate that the petitioner ever wanted to settle or pay the outstanding sum. Even during the pendency of the instant petition since 2008 i.e. for last 17 years, knowing the fact that the property had been put to auction, the petitioner never made any serious effort to liquidate its liability. When the petitioner in the year 2005 did not have enough funds to liquidate the outstanding loan and even while contesting the proceedings before the DRT, no such effort was made, it cannot be said gainfully, at this stage, that since the value of the property has enhanced, hence, the auction held for a low amount, requires to be set aside, merely on the asking without having contested this plea before the Recovery Officer is not actuated with bonafide intent.
43. It will further be relevant to notice that though it was urged that in the year 1996, the value of the house of the petitioner was Rs.44.00 lacs and while fixing the reserved price, the Bank valued the property at Rs.39.00 lacs coupled with the fact that the Bank itself had got a valuation certificate of Rs.44.00 lacs does not come to the help of the petitioner for the reason that this fact was known and was available to be raised, but it was not raised before the Recovery Officer of the DRT or the DRAT.
44. The record would further indicates that the proceedings relating to recovery of the Bank dues was initiated in the year 2001 and throughout the proceedings, there has been no effort of the petitioner to mitigate its loss. If the petitioner felt that the auction was bad for want of proper valuation, she could have furnish her objections which was not done. If, it was thought that the property was very valuable and it was being sold for a pittance, the petitioner could have taken appropriate steps at the relevant time, however, no such effort was made. Even while filing the appeal, the petitioner first filed a writ petition to reduce the pre-deposit required to file an appeal, by moving a writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed and, thereafter, the appeal was filed before the DRAT and even then, no effort was made to settle the loan or enter into any settlement with the Bank.
45. At this stage, this Court refers to the observations made by the Apex Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, as under:-
"46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [AIR 1969 SC 556] , Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order."
46. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find that the petitioner made any genuine effort to settle the loan or contest to proceedings on substantive plea in defence before the DRT and in law the petitioner was very well aware that the petitioner was a guarantor and had mortgaged her property to secure the loan and that the liability of a guarantor is coextensive with the principal borrower. Once the judgment had attained finality for the principal borrower, it cannot be set aside merely at the behest of the guarantor without having first cleared the loan but that is not the case here. Hence, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner do not find favour with this Court.
47. As far as the decisions of the Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Navalkha & Sons (supra) and Rajiv Kumar Jindal (supra) are concerned, the proposition may not be disputed, but its adherence to the present facts is a little doubtful.
48. In the case of Navalkha & Sons (supra), the Apex Court was considering the issue in context with the assets of a Company and its creditors. Here, neither the Company nor its Guarantors and the Directors contested the proceedings. The petitioner though contested the proceedings, but did not raise the issues regarding the alleged low valuation of the property in question before the DRT, DRAT or even before the Recovery Officer, hence, the same cannot be permitted to be raised at a such late stage and that too in a writ petition especially in light of the facts of this case and now the writ petitioner cannot be permitted to achieve something indirectly, which could not be achieved directly.
49. Even the decision of the Apex Court in Rajiv Kumar Jindal (supra) does not come to the aid to the petitioner inasmuch as the proceedings in the case of Rajiv Kumar Jindal (supra) were being conducted under the BIFR. The facts were quite different and even in the instant case, nothing has been brought to the notice, to indicate that at the given time when the property was put to auction, what efforts were made or what material was placed before the Recovery Officer relating to the valuation or the sale of the property.
50. Lastly, it may be noticed that though the auction had taken place on 09.06.2006 and the petitioner was aware of the same, but no such effort was made before the DRAT to raise issues regarding the valuation and admissibility of the document, which is now sought to be raised and even after the appeal was dismissed on 01.09.2008 and the sale was confirmed on 03.10.2008 and the instant writ petition was pending, yet it took 16 years for the petitioner to raise factual grounds through an application for amendment, which also does not indicate the bonafide of the petitioner. Objections raised before this Court are superficial in nature and without substance.
51. This Court in exercise of its power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India cannot reverse findings of fact or set aside the judgment of the DRT or DRAT unless they are shown to be perverse, which could not be established. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the two impugned judgments of the DRT dated 16.03.2005 and DRAT dated 01.09.2008. Accordingly, the instant writ petition lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Jaspreet Singh,J.)
November 24, 2025
Rakesh/-
