Allahabad High Court

Yagya Narayan Chaturvedi vs State Of Up. Thru. Its Addl. Chief Secy. ... on 14 November, 2025

Author: Alok Mathur

Bench: Alok Mathur





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:73225
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
LUCKNOW 
 
WRIT - A No. - 7902 of 2025   
 
   Yagya Narayan Chaturvedi    
 
  .....Petitioner(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State Of Up. Thru. Its Addl. Chief Secy. Home Deptt. Lko. And 2 Others    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)   
 
:   
 
Gyanendra Nath   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
C.S.C.   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 5
 
   
 
 HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

1. Heard Shri Gyanendra Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondents no. 1 to 3.

2. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was working on the post of Police Constable in the U.P. Police and had joined the services on 26.12.1979 and subsequently was working as a reader under the Superintendent of Police, District Ambedkar Nagar, UP. and attained his age of superannuation on 30.6.2021. At the time of his retirement the petitioner got salary in grade of Rs. 64,100/- (Rs. Sixty four thousand and one hundred).

3. The petitioner had continued in service, what increment would have been admissible to him on 1.7.2021 but the same was denied to him due to the fact that he superannuated on 30.6.2021. With regard to the admissibility of one increment to employees who retired on 30th of June and 31st December of the year whether they entitled to the increment following due on the next day of retirement, came up for consideration before this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

4. This Court in a case of P.P. Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and others in Service Single No. 18375 of 2021 considered this aspect of the matter and held that all the persons who retired on 30th June or 31st December would be entitled to the instalment following on the next day of the superannuation. In as much as they have completed the services on the post of which the said increment falls due and accordingly the said benefit could not be denied.

5. It is in the aforesaid circumstances, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that on his superannuation the petitioner has been given the entire amount of his gratuity but he has not been paid the difference amount of leave encashment and commutation of pension after adding one increment to the last pay drawn.

6. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 9.07.2024 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Ambedkar Nagar, in as much s the benefit of one increment which has been added to the last pay drawn of the petitioner has not been included by giving the benefit of commutation of pension and earned leave admissible to the petitioner as well as the arrears of pension.

7. This Court while considering all the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard in the case of P.P. Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and others has observed as under:-

"27. The aforesaid provision clearly indicates provision for increment forming the part of emolument even if not actually drawn although applicable only in case the Government Servant was on earned leave. However, the same does indicate the fact that such an increment can form a part of the emolument even after retirement.

28. Relevant provision to be considered is under Articles 151, 152 and 153 of the Fundamental Rules which have been quoted hereinabove and specifically stipulate that an increment accrues from the date following that on which it is earned. The said provision clearly elaborates the fact that accrual of increments pertains to actual payment and is to be made subsequent to the date on which it is earned. As such, the accrual of increment pertains only to actual payment of a benefit, which has been earned prior to its date of accrual.

29. Considering the aforesaid, particularly in view of Article 151 of the Fundamental Rules, it is apparent that first of July being the appointed date for accrual of increment merely implies actual payment of a benefit such as increment which has been earned prior to such appointed date.

30. It is admitted between learned counsel for parties that increment in terms of aforesaid Government Order is required to be paid to an employee upon completion of six months or more of services rendered in the past year. It is thus quite apparent that entitlement for increment to an employee accrues upon completion of six months or more service in the past year i.e. services already rendered. In terms of paragraph 8 of the aforesaid Government Order, the said fact is apparent that increment is to be paid for services already rendered. Thus, it is seen that the employee becomes entitled for increment upon completion of six months or more of service in the past year i.e. naturally, services already rendered. The cut off date of first July of any year indicated in the Government Order is only for the purposes of payment of the increment which has already fallen due. It is therefore only recognition of a right which has already vested in an employee.

31. The High Court of Judicature at Madras in the case of M Balasubramaniam vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) has dealt with the same issue on the following manner:-

"...........It is equally important to state that there is no rule which stipulates that an employee must continue in service for being extended the benefits of the service already rendered by him.

32. A Division Bench of the same Court in the case P. Ayyamperumal vs. The Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal has followed the aforesaid judgment. The matter was thereafter agitated before Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.22283 of 2018 which vide order dated 23.07.2018 was dismissed on facts.

33. Learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Banerjee. Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 285. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said judgment would be inapplicable in the present case in view of different fact situation since in the aforesaid case, not only was the matter pertaining to dearness allowance but also in view of the fact that the applicant therein was in fact granted superannuation with effect from 01.01.1986 by specific order and therefore Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that since there was a clear direction that he would be deemed to have superannuated with effect from 01.01.1986, it could not be said that he had superannuated on 31.12.1985. In the present circumstance, the superannuation was actually a day before the date on which increment accrues.

34. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties has in turn placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment rendered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Principal Accountant General, Andra Pradesh & Another Vs. C. Subba Rao; reported in 2005(2) L.L.N. 592 with the submission that in the aforesaid Full Bench, it has been categorically held that since increment is an addition to pay, the same would be inapplicable in case of persons who have superannuated prior to the date of its accrual because on the date of accrual, a superannuated employee is not entitled to any salary or pay. The Full Bench has held that in order to be eligible for an increment falling due on the first of the succeeding month, an employee must satisfy not only the condition of becoming entitled but that he should continue to be on duty as a Government Servant since after superannuation on the last working day of the month, he ceases to be such a Government Servant.

35. Upon consideration of the aforesaid, Full Bench judgment, with utmost respect, this Court is unable to concur with the same. The learned Full Bench in the judgment itself has quoted Article 151 of the Civil Service Regulations with the observation that 'the Government Servant would get a right for annual increment only after conclusion of the year and therefore on the day when the increment falls due, it would not become payable, but it would become payable only from the next day.

36. In view of said Article 151 of Civil Service Regulations, it is apparent that the Full Bench also noticed the fact that the increment is earned by a Government Servant for services rendered in the past year and the Government Servant becomes entitled to it on the concluding day of the year but it would actually become payable only from the next day. The said observation also makes it clear that it is only the actual payment of the increment, which is to be made on the first of July of the year and has actually been earned by the Government Servant for the services rendered during the past year when he was in service. As such, the actual payment of an increment earned during service is merely consequential to the actual act of earning the increment while in service. It is merely a fortuitous circumstance that the Government Servant has superannuated on the date when the increment, earned earlier, is to be actually paid. It is also a relevant fact that the opposite parties have framed the U.P. State Transport Corporation Officers Service (General) Regulations 1998.

37. Regulation 3(n) has defined pay as an amount drawn monthly as follow:-

(n) "Pay" means amount drawn monthly by an officer as-

(i) basic any sanctioned for the post;

(ii) special pay or personal pay;

(iii) any other emoluments which may be specially classed as pay by the Board. It does not include dearness allowance, travelling allowance and other allowances;

38. Annual increment has been defined in Regulation 9 of the Regulation is as follow:

9. Annual increment.- (1) (a) An annual increment may be allowed to an officer in accordance with the provisions of sub-regulation (2) at the rate as shown in the scales of pay admissible to the officer concerned unless the increment has been withheld as a disciplinary measure or at the Efficiency Bar.

(b)All the officers will be granted increment on the first day of the month in which the increment falls due.

(c) If probation is extended, such extension will not count for increment, unless the Appointing Authority directs otherwise.

(d) An officer who has remained off duty on extraordinary leave, study leave or any other such similar leave, the date of increment shall correspondingly be shifted and the period of such leave shall not be counted for the purposes of increment. An officer who officiates in a higher post or in a higher time scale of pay shall be eligible to count for increments the period spent by him on such higher post or higher time scale of pay in his lower post when reverted to that post or time scale of pay.

(2) To reward an officer for excellent performance and in order to motivate him for continuous excellent performance, the Board may grant premature increments subject to a maximum of three to an officer in the time scale of pay.

39. The aforesaid provisions in the Service Regulations are inconsonance with the Fundamental Rules and the Civil Service Regulation and clearly indicate the fact that increment is earned/allowed to an officer for services rendered by him in the past year.

40. The condition and procedure for applicability of increment has been made in the Government Order dated 08.12.2008, which has been adopted by the Corporation.

41. A perusal of paragraph 8 of the Government Order dated 08.12.2008 does not indicate any such condition that increment is to be paid only in case the employee is in service as on First July of the year. Once the authorities concerned have not indicated any such factor in the Government Order, it is not for this Court to construe such a meaning in the Government Order, which has deliberately been omitted.

42. In view of aforesaid, it is quite apparent that an employee becomes entitled for an increment upon completion of six months or more of service rendered in the past year.

43. It is also to be noticed that the impugned order has been passed only on the basis of that judgments passed by the High Court at Madras and by Hon'ble the Supreme Court are inapplicable because, the Corporation was not a party in those proceedings. It is settled law that it is the ratio decidendi which is applicable with regard to any lis and not as to the party in the dispute. The authority concerned should have appreciated that the present dispute is the same as was being agitated before High Court at Madras and there is no distinction whatsoever. However, this aspect has been lost sight of while passing the impugned order.

44. So far as the submission of learned counsel for opposite party is concerned that granting relief as has been sought by the petitioner would imply that pension of an employee would be more than the last pay drawn does not appear to be reasonable in view of fact that even if such an increment is allowed, the immediate effect will be on the last pay drawn only with consequential effect upon the pension of superannuated employee. Therefore it cannot be said that in case of allowing such an increment, the pensionary benefits of an employee would be more than the last pay drawn.

45. Upon consideration of aforesaid factors, the writ petition is liable to succeed and therefore writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 24.09.2020. A further writ in the nature Mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties no.2 and 3 to grant increment due to petitioner on 01.7.2010 with all consequential benefits.

46. Orders pertaining to same and actual payment thereof shall be made within a period of six months from the date a copy of this order is produced before concerned authority.

Consequently, the writ petition stands allowed. "

8. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand has opposed the writ petition but could not dispute the aforesaid facts.

9. Accordingly in light of the above, I find legal position with regard to the admissibility of rule of one installment which was payable on 1st July was claiming himself to the petitioner and benefit of the same will have to be granted to the petitioner, while granting him leave encashment, pension and other post retrial dues.

10., In light of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed to the extent that he denied the benefit of one increment of the leave encashment, commutation of pension etc.

11. Accordingly, opposite party no.2 pass a fresh order, in light of the above, expeditiously, say within a period of six weeks form the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it.