Chandra Pal @ Rachit vs State Of U.P.
2025 Latest Caselaw 12242 ALL

Allahabad High Court

Chandra Pal @ Rachit vs State Of U.P. on 10 November, 2025

Author: Rajiv Gupta

Bench: Rajiv Gupta, Samit Gopal

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 



 
Reserved on: 23.09.2025
 

 
Delivered on: 10.11.2025
 

 

 

 

 

 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
JAIL APPEAL No. - 2708 of 2012
 

 
Chandra Pal @ Rachit
 

 
..Appellant(s)
 

 
Versus
 

 
State of U.P.
 

 
..Respondents(s)
 

 
      
 

 
Counsel for appellant(s)
 
:
 
A.K. Rai, Amit Kumar Gaur, Araf Khan, Ashwini Kumar Ojha, Karmendra Kumar, Lihazur Rahman Khan, Mangla Prasad, Mohd Umar Khan, Ravindra Nath Rai, Ravindra Pratap Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)
 
:
 
A.G.A.
 

 

 
With
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1574 of 2012
 

 
Atarkali
 

 
..Appellant(s)
 

 
Versus
 

 
State of U.P.
 

 
..Respondents(s)
 
      
 

 
Counsel for appellant(s)
 
:
 
Mohd Umar Khan, Ravindra Pratap Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)
 
:
 
Govt. Advocate
 

 
Court No. - 66																			       A.F.R.
 

 
HONBLE RAJIV GUPTA, J.

HONBLE SAMIT GOPAL, J.

(Per Samit Gopal, J.)

[Delivered by Samit Gopal, J. for the Bench under Chapter VII Rule 1(2) of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952]

1. Four persons namely Chandra Pal @ Rachit, Smt. Atarkali, Bablu (jeth) and Smt. Sharda (jethani) were named as accused in the FIR out of whom Bablu (jeth) and Smt. Sharda (jethani) were exonerated during investigation and thus Chandra Pal @ Rachit and Smt. Atarkali were only put to trial who were convicted by the trial court. Both the convicted accused Chandra Pal @ Rachit and Smt. Atarkali preferred jail appeals before this Court. A represented appeal was filed by Atarkali before this Court which is numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 1574 of 2012. The jail appeal preferred by Chandra Pal @ Rachit was numbered as Jail Appeal No. 2708 of 2012. The represented appeal of appellant Atarkali was admitted vide order dated 20.12.2012 whereas the jail appeal of accused Chandra Pal @ Rachit was admitted vide order dated 19.07.2012. The aforesaid appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 28.03.2012 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge (T) Court No.4, Ghaziabad in Session Trial No. 897 of 2011 (State of U.P. Vs. Chandra Pal @ Rachit and another) whereby the accused Chandra Pal was convicted and sentenced under Section 498-A IPC to two years R.I., fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to one month additional imprisonment, under Section 304-B IPC to life imprisonment, fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to two years additional imprisonment, under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act for one year imprisonment, fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to one month additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The accused Atarkali was convicted and sentenced under Section 498-A IPC to two years R.I., fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to one month additional imprisonment, under Section 304-B IPC to ten years imprisonment, fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to two years further additional imprisonment, under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act to one year imprisonment, fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to one month additional imprisonment. All the sentences were also directed to run concurrently. It was further ordered that out of fine as imposed after the period of appeal, half of the said amount would be paid to the children of the deceased as per rules. Further it was ordered that benefit of set off of the period already undergone by the accused shall be given to them.

2. The present case started on an application dated 12.03.2011 given by Ramesh Chandra to the In-charge, P.S. Masoori, District Ghaziabad of which Prince son of Vivek Kumar was the scribe alleging therein that on 11.10.2010 he had married his daughter Jyoti as per rites and rituals and given gifts of Rs. 2,40,000/-. After marriage his daughter was being abused which was told by her on telephone and she informed him that her in-laws are demanding dowry and stating that she may bring Rs. 2 lakh from her maternal house for purchase of a plot. She told them that it is not possible for her parents to arrange for the said amount on which her husband started assaulting her and continued his demand. On her informing her family members, they went to her matrimonial house where they were also abused and assaulted and a demand of Rs. 2 lakh was raised before them and it was stated that if it is not fulfilled then his daughter would be murdered. On 12.03.2011 he received an information on phone that his daughter has died. He went to the said place and did not find her husband, mother-in-law, jeth and jethani there who had committed the said offence. Their names are Chandra Pal @ Rachit, Atarkali (mother-in-law), Bablu (jeth) and Sharda (jethani), the said application is Exb: Ka-1 to the records.

3. On the basis of the said application, a First Information Report was transcribed on 12.03.2011 at about 14:10 hours at Police Station Masoori, District Ghaziabad as Case Crime No. 165 of 2011, under Sections 498-A, 504, 304-B IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act against Chandra Pal @ Rachit, Atarkali (mother-in-law), Bablu (jeth) and jethani Sharda. The Chik FIR is Exb: Ka-2 to the records.

4. The investigation in the matter started and inquest on the body of the deceased was conducted on 12.03.2011, the same is Exb: Ka-4 to the records.

5. The postmortem of the deceased Smt. Jyoti was conducted on 13.03.2011 at about 01:00 pm by Dr. Ajay Agrawal. The doctor found the following injuries on her body:

1. Ligature mark 30cm x 0.5cm all around neck 8cm from right ear 7cm from left ear, 10cm from chin, ecchymosis present.

2. Contusion 5cm x 2cm just below chin.

3. Contusion 2cm x 1cm on left deltoid region.

The cause of death was opined as asphyxia due to antemortem strangulation. The postmortem report is Exb: Ka-3 to the records.

6. A recovery memo dated 12.03.2011 was prepared by the police with regards to the recovery of two chunaris which were having a knot in them which is stated to be the cloth by which the deceased was hung. The said recovery memo is Exb: Ka-11 to the records.

7. The investigation concluded and a charge sheet No. 144 of 2011 dated 24.05.2011, under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 504 IPC and D.P. Act was submitted against Chandra Pal @ Rachit and Atarkali. In so far as two other co-accused persons named in the FIR namely Bablu (jeth) and Sharda (jethani) are concerned, they were exonerated. The said charge sheet is Exb: Ka-9 to the records.

8. Cognizance on the same was taken by the court concerned vide order dated 23.06.2011.

9. Vide order dated 19.08.2011 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge (T) Court No.4, Ghaziabad charge under Section 304-B IPC and in the alternative under Section 302 IPC, 498-A, 504 IPC and D.P. Act was framed against two accused persons. The accused were read over the same who denied the charges and claimed to be tried.

10. The prosecution in order to prove its case produced Ramesh Chandra the first informant as PW-1, Anshu the sister of the deceased as PW-2, Prince the cousin of the deceased and scribe of the FIR as PW-3, Sub-Inspector Vinod Kumar Tripathi who conducted the inquest as PW-4, Dr. Ajay Agrawal who conducted the postmortem examination as PW-5, Head Constable Hukam Singh who transcribed the Chik FIR as PW-6, Pyare Lal Maurya the Nayab Tehsildar who conducted the inquest as PW-7, Rajesh Bharti the Circle Officer who was the second Investigating Officer from 28.04.2011 and concluded the investigation by filing charge sheet as PW-8 and Kapil Dev Singh the Circle Office who was the first Investigating Officer as PW-9. The accused in defence produced two witnesses namely Mukesh as DW-1 and Devpal as DW-2.

11. The trial court after considering the evidence on record came to its conclusion that the accused are guilty of offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further in so far as the alternative charge as framed under Section 302 IPC is concerned, came to its conclusion that since the accused have been convicted under Section 304-B IPC the alternative charge under Section 302 IPC becomes redundant, it thus convicted the accused-appellants as above. The present appeal has been thus filed before this Court.

12. PW-1 Ramesh Chandra is the first informant and the grandfather of the deceased who stated that the incident is of 12.03.2011. Jyoti on telephone in the night of 11.03.2011 told them that she has threat to her life. At that time her jeth Bablu and jethani Sharda had come there in the morning. The first informant and other persons went to her house where they found Jyoti to be dead. She was lying on a cot. Her marriage was solemnized on 11.10.2011 with Chandra Pal in which gifts and dowry were given. He has given around Rs. 40,000/- to her in-laws. Her in-laws were further demanding money as dowry for purchase of a plot. Jeth, jethani, mother-in-law and her husband Chandra Pal used to assault her for dowry. He had spent around Rs. 2,40,000/- in marriage. After marriage, the accused persons were demanding Rs. 2 lakh for purchase of a plot and all the four accused persons had told that if the money is not given then Jyoti would be murdered. It was told by Jyoti to him. He dictated the report to Prince on which he may made a signature. The same is Exb: Ka-1 to the records.

In his cross examination, he states Omwati mother of Jyoti who is alive lives in the house. The husband of Omwati was ill and has died. The marriage of Jyoti with Chandra Pal is the second marriage. The first husband of Jyoti died in an accident. He knows that first wife of Chandra Pal is no more. The relationship was proposed by Kiran the sister of Chandra Pal. He has no land in his name. He has a small house in which his elder son lives on the top and his younger daughter-in-law lives on the ground floor. He is a labourer. He earns Rs. 15,000/- per month and takes care of his wife. He dictated the report to Prince at the matrimonial house of Jyoti. He reached there at about 11:00 am by hiring a vehicle. He has a mobile phone. Chandra Pal also keeps a mobile phone. Chandra Pal had called him. Bablu and Sharda met him at the place but later he states that they had run away at the time of incident. They had come there. He received information about the death of Jyoti in the morning. He does not know who informed him. The person was from outside the house of Chandra Pal. Ashok had married for the second time from which Jyoti was born. Anshu is the daughter of Ashok who is aged about 16-17 years. Chandra Pal had taken Anshu with him. It is incorrect to state that Chandra Pal had taken Anshu for roaming around and after returning back home, he had a fight with Jyoti and Jyoti committed suicide because of it. The police prepared papers in his presence. He was interrogated by the police. He did not see anyone assaulting Jyoti. He found her lying on the cot. He had given Rs. 40,000/- after about 2 months of marriage. The said money was taken by him from someone. It is incorrect to state that he did not give Rs. 40,000/-. It is incorrect to state that the accused persons did not demand dowry from Jyoti. It is incorrect to state that that accused persons abused her for dowry and assaulted her. After two months of marriage, they used to demand money and the accused had taken money twice. He was demanding more money but police was not informed about it. The in-laws of Jyoti had assaulted her. Jyoti had shown her injuries but no medical examination was done. It is incorrect to state that there was no assault done on Jyoti due to which no medical examination was got done. It is further incorrect to state that there was no demand of dowry and as such no report was lodged. It is incorrect to state that he did not get the relationship finalized and did not give any money. It is incorrect to state that he is telling a lie.

13. P.W.-2 Anshu is the sister of the deceased. She states that the incident is of 12.03.2011. On the day of the incident she was in the house of her sister and had gone to fetch some articles. On 09.03.2011 she had gone along with her grandfather to the house of her sister to give articles of Holi wherein both the mother and son had clung her grandfather and stated that there was a demand of Rs. Two Lakh for purchase of plot and he may give the money. She stayed back at her house as her sister pleaded for her to stay back. Her sister told her that she has contusions in her legs. She had contusions on her waist. She stated that the accused persons have assaulted her. The accused persons had a fight with her throughout the whole night. Chandra Pal, Atarkali, Bablu and Sharda had quarreled with her. Her sister told her that she may tell her grandfather that he may take her back from the said place. She stayed there for 02 days. The accused persons used to quarrel with her in front of the witness. On the day of incident she was at the house of her sister but for sometime she had gone to the market to bring some articles. It took around 30 minutes for her to get the articles. When she reached home back she saw her sister lying on a cot and was dead. She saw her sister covered with a quilt and all the accused persons told her that they are going to call a doctor and went away. She was alone in the house. The neighbours had collected there. A doctor had come who declared her dead. She saw injury mark on her neck. She gave the number of her grandfather to a neighbour and told him to inform him after which 5-6 persons came to the matrimonial house of her sister. Police had also come. Police did not interrogate her. The dead body was taken to the cremation ground and then she came back to house.

In her cross-examination she states that she is illiterate. She went there 5-6 days prior to Holi. Her grandfather had gone with her along with articles. She was told by her mother to go there. She was not interrogated by the Investigating Officer or other police officials. She does not remember whether the C.O. had recorded her statement or not. The C.O. did not ask her age from her. Now she is aged about 15 years. She knows Bablu and Sharda. Police had enquired from her regarding the presence of Bablu and Sharda. Bablu and Sharda were present there. She does not remember the reason for it. She does not know why the police has written regarding absence of Bablu and Sharda. She does not know that Bablu and Sharda do not live in village since last six years. She does not know about directions. She and her grandfather had gone with articles of Holi. Police had written that she alone had gone with the articles which is false. She does not remember whether she had told the police that the mother and son had clung with grandfather and told him as to what he has done. She does not remember whether she told the police that her sister with folded hands requested her to stay back. She does not remember whether she told the police that her sister had contusions in her leg and she was ill due to the same. After the death of her sister the persons who had gone from the house included her grandfather also. She had shown the injury marks to her grandfather. She had told her grandfather that Chandra Pal, Atarkali, Bablu and Sharda had a quarrel with Jyoti and had assaulted her. She cannot tell the reason why she did not tell it to the police. She states that it is incorrect that she is living at the house of Chandra Pal since last one month and Chandra Pal used to take her to roam about. She further states that it is incorrect that her sister used to fight with Chandra Pal due to the same. When police had reached the place she did not show the injuries to the police. Her family members had shown it to the police. She had shown the injuries to her mother and her mother had shown it to the police. She does not know whether she told the police that the doctor declared her dead. The doctor was called by the neighbours. Chandra Pal and family members had run away from the house. When she had gone to Hasanpur Chandra Pal, Atarkali and Jyoti were present there. Jyoti has a son aged about 01 year and she was aged about 20 years. She does not know whether the wife of Chandra Pal has died. The husband of Jyoti had died. She does not know about the expenses incurred in the marriage of Jyoti. She did not affix her thumb impression on any document before the police. She did not see her sister dying. Chandra Pal used to assault her earlier. It is incorrect to say that she is telling a lie. Further it is incorrect to state that she and Chandra Pal were having illicit relationship and due to the same she is not telling the real fact. It is incorrect that after giving articles of Holi she returned back to her house and was not present at the place of occurrence at the time of incident. It is incorrect that she is a student of class-11th and is speaking a lie.

14. P.W.-3 Prince is the scribe of the first information report. He is also the cousin brother of the deceased. He states that the incident is of 12.03.2011. Jyoti is the daughter of his tau. After receiving a phone call from her matrimonial house he with his grandfather, father, mother and people of the locality went to the matrimonial house of Jyoti. When they reached there they saw Jyoti lying dead on a cot. She was married on 11.10.2010 with Chandra Pal. About Rs. Two lakh Four thousand was spent in the marriage but still the in-laws of Jyoti being her mother-in-law, Chandra Pal the husband used to assault her and used to demand dowry from her. When his sister came to Ghaziabad then she told him about her in-laws fighting with her and assaulting her and told him that they are demanding Rs. Two lakh for purchase of a plot and used to say that either she may get the money from her maternal house or else she would be murdered. The accused Chandra Pal and Atarkali murdered his sister. He wrote the report about the incident on the dictation of his grandfather, the same is already marked as Exb: Ka-1 to the records. He along with his grandfather and other persons with the report had gone to the police station where a case was registered.

In his cross-examination he states that the Investigating Officer did not record his statement. The report was written at Hasanpur and the paper for it was taken from the police and he was carrying a pen with him. He did not write the report on the saying of the police. After writing the report it was given to the police in village Hasanpur. He reached Hasanpur at about 11-12 pm. He is a graduate. They started from Ghazaibad at about 10-10.30 am. He has also previously visited the house of Jyoti. He does not know as to who are the neighbours of Jyoti. He stayed at Hasanpur for about one hour. The dead body was taken to Ghaziabad. Two police constables went with the dead body. He does not know whether he had signed any other paper apart from the application. 8-10 people had gone from Ghaziabad in a vehicle. He knows Anshu who is aged about 18 years but then he states that he does not know her. Anshu did not go with him. He does not know that Chandra Pal used to take Anshu for roaming around and it was the reason for fight between him and Jyoti. He states that it is incorrect that due to fight with Jyoti due to Anshu she committed suicide. He had written what was dictated to him by Ramesh. He states that it is incorrect that Chandra Pal has not murdered her. He states that it is incorrect that Jyoti committed suicide.

15. P.W.-4 S.I. Vinod Kumar Tripathi conducted the inquest on the dead body of the deceased. When he reached the place of occurrence Naib Tehsildar, P.L. Maurya was present there and on his directions he prepared the inquest in front of five witnesses and got it signed. The dead body was then sealed and sent for postmortem examination. C.O. Kapil Dev Singh had reached the said place and on his directions he had taken into possession two chunnis which were tied on the clamp in the room and prepared the memo of it. The death appeared due to hanging. There was a blue injury on the neck and small injury on the chin.

16. P.W.-5 Dr. Arvind Agarwal conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased. The injuries as found by him have already been noted above. He opined that the death had occurred around 1 days before and was due to strangulation.

In his cross-examination he states that apart from injury on the neck there were two other injuries on the body of the deceased.

17. P.W.-6 Head Constable Hukam Singh had transcribed the chik First Information Report in the present matter and had prepared the corresponding GD for the same, the copies of the same have been marked as Exb: Ka-2 to the records.

18. P.W.-7 Pyare Lal Maurya is the Naib Tehsildar. He states of reaching the place of occurrence and getting the inquest conducted in his presence after appointing five witnesses to it.

19. P.W.-8 Rajesh Bharti C.O. is the second Investigating Officer of the matter. He took the investigation from Kapil Dev Singh, C.O. from 28.11.2021. He concluded it and filed a charge-sheet against Chandra Pal @ Rachit and Atarkali only, the same is Exb: Ka-9 to the records. He states that in so far as the accused Bablu and Sharda wife of Bablu are concerned, the independent witnesses have stated that they did not live at the place of occurrence and used to live at another place. They were exonerated in the matter.

20. P.W.-9 K.D. Singh C.O. is the first Investigating Officer of the matter. He states of taking up the investigaiton. He further states that on 02.04.2011 he transcribed Parcha no.V of the case-diary in which he mentioned that on 31.03.2011 the accused Chandra Pal and Smt. Atarkali surrendered before the court concerned. He recorded the statements of the accused. Two chunnis were taken into possession, the recovery memo of the same is Exb: Ka-11 to the records. He states that during investigation he had been informed that accused Bablu and Sharda did not reside in village Hasanpur. The said fact was told by Kumari Anshu the sister of the deceased.

21. The accused Chandra Pal in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 20.01.2012 denied the prosecution case. He stated that Anshu had gone with him to roam about and under misconception the deceased committed suicide. He further states that the marriage was second marriage of himself and the deceased also. No dowry was taken in it.

22. Smt. Atarkali in her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 20.01.2012 also denied the prosecution case. She stated that Anshu had gone to roam about with her son and under some misconception the deceased committed suicide.

23. Mukesh was examined as D.W.-1 in the matter from the defence side. He is neighbour of the accused. He states that his house is situated at a distance of about 10 steps from the house of Chandra Pal. He further states that the sister-in-law of Chandra Pal had come around 7-8 days before the incident. There was never any demand of dowry and the family used to live together with love. The marriage of Chandra Pal was a second marriage and also the marriage of the deceased was second marriage and no dowry was taken. Chandra Pal had taken his sister-in-law twice for roaming around due to which there was quarrel between him and his wife. The wife of Chandra Pal had committed suicide due to her sister. He on hearing shouts reached the place of occurrence. Bablu and Sharda had left the village around 7-8 years back.

24. Devpal was produced as D.W.-2. He states that the incident is of 11-11.30 am. Chandra Pal and his mother never demanded any dowry and never used to indulge in any assault with the deceased. Bablu and his wife had left the village around 8-9 years ago and at the time of incident were not living in the village. He has a common wall to the house of Chandra Pal. At the time of incident the sister-in-law of Chandra Pal had come to the house and sometimes used to casually stay at the house of Chandra Pal and sometimes used to go to her house. Chandra Pal had taken his sister-in-law to roam about which he had seen them going once or twice. He had heard about it also as he had taken his sister-in-law to roam about. There was tension between the husband and wife. On the said night the deceased committed suicide by hanging and died. He came to know of it in the morning.

25. Learned counsel for the appellant raised separate arguments for both the accused persons. In so far as the accused/appellant Chandra Pal @ Rachit the husband of the deceased is concerned it is submitted that he is in jail since 13.3.2011. It is further submitted that the only submission with regards to him is the question of sentence. It is submitted that conviction of the said accused/appellant is not being challenged. It is further submitted that although he is in jail since 13.3.2011 and the submission is only with regards to the question of sentence, but there shall be no claim of any compensation with regards to him for the period he has undergone in jail till date.

26. Heard Shri Ashwini Kumar Ojha, learned counsel for the appellant- Chandra Pal @ Rachit, Shri Ravindra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the appellant- Atarkali, Shri A.N. Mulla and Shri Jitendra Kumar Jaiswal, learned AGAs for the State and perused the record.

27. Learned counsel for said appellant submitted that trial court has awarded maximum sentence prescribed under law to him for the convicted offence. It is submitted that the trial court while considering the question of sentence has opined that he is the husband of the deceased and husband is the custodian of the wife and marriage was a second marriage but still he murdered his wife by strangulation which is a serious offence and thus there is no possibility of any leniency being shown to him. It is submitted that the trial court proceeded to convict him and awarded the maximum punishment of life imprisonment for the said offence. It is thus submitted that the same is totally unwarranted inasmuch as the accused-appellant was not convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. which was the alternative charge framed against him and the trial court has held that since he has been found guilty for an offence under Section 304-B I.P.C., the charge under Section 302 I.P.C. would become redundant and thus proceeded to convict him and sentence him accordingly. It is submitted that the conviction is excessive. It is further submitted that at the time of incident the accused/appellant was aged about 20 years as would appear from the fact that his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 20.1.2012 in which he has disclosed his age as 21 years which was not disputed by the trial court. It is submitted that while awarding sentence of life imprisonment there would be no chance of reformation of the said accused/appellant. It is further submitted that the sentence as awarded is against the principles of sentencing and is too severe. It is submitted that ends of justice would be served if the sentence as awarded to the said accused/appellant of life imprisonment is reduced to a reasonable sentence looking to the facts of the case.

28. In so far as the other accused/appellant Smt. Atarkali is concerned, it is submitted that she is the mother-in-law of the deceased. It is further submitted that the F.I.R. in the present matter goes to show that there is no specific allegation against her and there is no overt act assigned to her. It is submitted that in so far as the allegations in the F.I.R. are concerned the allegation although is that the in-laws of the deceased were demanding dowry but there is a specific allegation that the deceased told the informant and other family members that her husband used to assault her and make demand of dowry. It is submitted that the said appellant has been made an accused with general and omnibus allegation. It is submitted that only because of the reason that she happens to be the mother-in-law of the deceased and mother of the husband she has been made an accused in the present matter. It is submitted that the fact that marriage of the deceased with Chandra Pal @ Rachit is a second marriage is not disputed. It is submitted that demand of dowry by the present appellant would be an improbability. It is submitted that role of the mother-in-law is identical to that of co-accused Bablu the jeth and Smt. Sharda the jethani of the deceased who have been exonerated by the police during investigation. It is submitted that thus there are fair chances of false implication of the present appellant also. It is submitted that identical allegations have been levelled against the appellant Smt. Atarkali as that of Bablu and Smt. Sharda who have been exonerated by the police during investigation. It is submitted that time and again the Honble Apex Court and this Court have held that there is a tendency of false implication of family members in matters regarding dowry death with general and omnibus allegations and benefit has been extended to them because of the said reasons and thus the present appellant/Smt. Atarkali the mother-in-law of the deceased, also deserves to be acquitted in the present matter.

29. At the first instance while dealing with the principles of sentencing of an accused, it is clarified that the law is trite. A Division Bench of this Court in Nadeem Vs. State of U.P. : Criminal Appeal No. 580 of 2019 : 2025:AHC:135692-DB, has considered the objective of punishment and the principles of sentencing and has held in paras- 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 as under:-

22. Third, as to objective of punishment, in Machi Singh & Ors. vs State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470, observed as below: The reasons why the community as a whole does not endorse the humanistic approach reflected in death sentence-in-no-case doctrine are not far to seek. In the first place, the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the foundation of reverence for life principle. When a member of the community violates this very principle by killing another member, the society may not feel itself bound by the shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realized that every member of the community is able to live with safety without his or her own life being endangered because of the protective arm of the community and on account of the rule of law enforced by it. The very existence of the rule of law and the fear of being brought to book operates as a deterrent for those who have no scruples in killing others if it suits their ends. Every member of the community owes a debt to the community for this protection. When ingratitude is shown instead of gratitude by killing a member of the community which protects the murderer himself from being killed, or when the community feels that for the sake of self-preservation the killer has to be killed, the community may well withdraw the protection by sanctioning the death penalty. But the community will not do so in every case. It may do so in rarest of rare cases when its collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The community may entertain such a sentiment when the crime is viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or the anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime.

23. In that, it was further observed that (i) Manner of commission of murder, (ii) Motive for commission of murder, (iii) Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime,(iv) Magnitude of crime and, (v) Personality of victim of murder, were relevant factors to be considered by the courts.

24. In Anil alias Anthony Arikswamy Joseph vs State of Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 69, the Supreme Court maintained that the probability that the accused would not commit criminal act of violence as may constitute the threat to the society, is a relevant circumstance. It may help the court to determine if there is no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation. In that, it was observed as below:

In Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] this Court has categorically stated, the probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to the society, is a relevant circumstance, that must be given great weight in the determination of sentence. This was further expressed in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar [Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1150]. Many a times, while determining the sentence, the courts take it for granted, looking into the facts of a particular case, that the accused would be a menace to the society and there is no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation, while it is the duty of the court to ascertain those factors, and the State is obliged to furnish materials for and against the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the accused. The facts, which the courts deal with, in a given case, cannot be the foundation for reaching such a conclusion, which, as already stated, calls for additional materials. We, therefore, direct that the criminal courts, while dealing with the offences like Section 302 IPC, after conviction, may, in appropriate cases, call for a report to determine, whether the accused could be reformed or rehabilitated, which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

(emphasis supplied)

25. Fourth, as to aggravating and mitigating circumstance to be considered, to award appropriate punishment, in Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, considering the provisions of legislative policy that underlines the structure of our criminal law as contained in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court first observed - it may not be possible to make an exhaustive enumeration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered while sentencing an offender. At the same time, it was maintained that a discretion to be exercised by the judge, judicial, after balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime. Considering the same in the context of capital sentence, following pertaining observations pertaining came to be made: In that regard, it was observed as below:

202. Drawing upon the penal statutes of the States in U.S.A. framed after Furman v. Georgia [33 L Ed 2d 346 : 408 US 238 (1972)] , in general, and clauses 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Penal Code, 1860 (Amendment) Bill passed in 1978 by the Rajya Sabha, in particular, Dr Chitale has suggested these aggravating circumstances:

Aggravating circumstances: A court may, however, in the following cases impose the penalty of death in its discretion:

(a) if the murder has been committed after previous planning and involves extreme brutality; or

(b) if the murder involves exceptional depravity; or

(c) if the murder is of a member of any of the armed forces of the Union or of a member of any police force or of any public servant and was committed (i) while such member or public servant was on duty; or (ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such member or public servant in the lawful discharge of his duty as such member or public servant whether at the time of murder he was such member or public servant, as the case may be, or had ceased to be such member or public servant; or

(d) if the murder is of a person who had acted in the lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or who had rendered assistance to a Magistrate or a police officer demanding his aid or requiring his assistance under Section 37 and Section 129 of the said Code.

203. Stated broadly, there can be no objection to the acceptance of these indicators but as we have indicated already, we would prefer not to fetter judicial discretion by attempting to make an exhaustive enumeration one way or the other.

26. In Anshad vs State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 381, the Supreme Court re-emphasized the need to account that aggravating and mitigating circumstances while awarding the appropriate punishment to convicts. In that regard, it was observed as below:

32. We have perused the reasons given by the High Court for awarding the sentence of death. Apart from referring to some of the aggravating circumstances like the betrayal of confidence of the deceased by A-1 and murder for committing robbery on a helpless widow, the High Court only referred to some of the judgments of this Court and then almost abruptly came to the conclusion that the sentence of death was called for in the instant case. We notice with regret that the High Court did not take into account any of the mitigating circumstances at all. Courts are expected to exhibit sensitiveness in the matter of award of sentence particularly, the sentence of death because life once lost cannot be brought back. This Court has in cases more than one emphasised that for determining the proper sentence in a case like this while the court should take into account the aggravating circumstances it should not overlook or ignore the mitigating circumstances. The manner in which the crime was committed, the weapons used and the brutality or the lack of it are some of the considerations which must be present to the mind of the court. Of course, the High Court has the power and jurisdiction to enhance the sentence of life imprisonment to death but that power has to be sparingly exercised, in rarest of the rare cases for special reasons to be recorded. The courts must be alive to the legislative changes introduced in 1973 through Section 354(3) CrPC. Death sentence, being an exception to the general rule, should be awarded in the rarest of the rare cases for special reasons to be recorded after balancing the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances, in the facts and circumstances of a given case. The number of persons murdered is a consideration but that is not the only consideration for imposing death penalty unless the case falls in the category of rarest of the rare cases. The courts must keep in view the nature of the crime, the brutality with which it was executed, the antecedents of the criminal, the weapons used etc. It is neither possible nor desirable to catalogue all such factors and they depend upon case to case.

(emphasis supplied)

27. In Ramnaresh & Ors. vs Sate of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257, referring to Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 and Machi Singh & Ors. vs State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470, the Supreme Court re-emphasized the need to consider the cumulative effect of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It was observed that the balance between the two must be entertained. Also, the Supreme Court may note of certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Relevant to our discussion, the Supreme Court noted as below:

76. The law enunciated by this Court in its recent judgments, as already noticed, adds and elaborates the principles that were stated in Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] and thereafter, in Machhi Singh [(1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 681] . The aforesaid judgments, primarily dissect these principles into two different compartmentsone being the aggravating circumstances while the other being the mitigating circumstances. The court would consider the cumulative effect of both these aspects and normally, it may not be very appropriate for the court to decide the most significant aspect of sentencing policy with reference to one of the classes under any of the following heads while completely ignoring other classes under other heads. To balance the two is the primary duty of the court. It will be appropriate for the court to come to a final conclusion upon balancing the exercise that would help to administer the criminal justice system better and provide an effective and meaningful reasoning by the court as contemplated under Section 354(3) CrPC.

Aggravating Circumstances

(1) The offences relating to the commission of heinous crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping, etc. by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital felony or offences committed by the person having a substantial history of serious assaults and criminal convictions.

(2) The offence was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another serious offence.

(3) The offence was committed with the intention to create a fear psychosis in the public at large and was committed in a public place by a weapon or device which clearly could be hazardous to the life of more than one person.

(4) The offence of murder was committed for ransom or like offences to receive money or monetary benefits.

(5) Hired killings.

(6) The offence was committed outrageously for want only while involving inhumane treatment and torture to the victim.

(7) The offence was committed by a person while in lawful custody.

(8) The murder or the offence was committed to prevent a person lawfully carrying out his duty like arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement of himself or another. For instance, murder is of a person who had acted in lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 CrPC.

(9) When the crime is enormous in proportion like making an attempt of murder of the entire family or members of a particular community.

(10) When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person relies upon the trust of relationship and social norms, like a child, helpless woman, a daughter or a niece staying with a father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime by such a trusted person.

(11) When murder is committed for a motive which evidences total depravity and meanness.

(12) When there is a cold-blooded murder without provocation.

(13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the conscience of the society.

Mitigating circumstances

(1) The manner and circumstances in and under which the offence was committed, for example, extreme mental or emotional disturbance or extreme provocation in contradistinction to all these situations in normal course.

(2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration but not a determinative factor by itself.

(3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in commission of the crime again and the probability of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.

(4) The condition of the accused shows that he was mentally defective and the defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct.

(5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life, would render such a behaviour possible and could have the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given situation like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading to such a peak of human behaviour that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence.

(6) Where the court upon proper appreciation of evidence is of the view that the crime was not committed in a preordained manner and that the death resulted in the course of commission of another crime and that there was a possibility of it being construed as consequences to the commission of the primary crime.

(emphasis supplied)

28. Fourth, it is equally important that Courts may keep in mind the fundamental principle of proportionality of the punishment to the offence. In Ruli Ram Vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 691, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

23...The punishment has to be always proportionate to the crime. Punishment serves a purpose inasmuch as it acts as a deterrent for those who have the propensity to take the law into their own hands. The principle of proportion between crime and punishment is a principle of just deserts that serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable. As a principle of criminal justice it is hardly less familiar or less important than the principle that only the guilty ought to be punished. Indeed, the requirement that punishment not be disproportionately great, which is a corollary of just deserts, is dictated by the same principle that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal conduct is punishment without guilt.

(emphasis supplied)

29. In Suresh (2019) 14 SCC 151, the Supreme Court again considered the sufficiency of sentence to be awarded and it did not approve over lenient view being taken. In that regard it made the following useful discussion:

11. In State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh [State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh, (2003) 8 SCC 13 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1935] , relating to the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC, this Court found sentencing for a period of 2 years to be too inadequate and even on a liberal approach, found the custodial sentence of 6 years serving the ends of justice. This Court underscored the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability; and while also indicating the societal angle of sentencing, cautioned that undue sympathy leading to inadequate sentencing would do more harm to the justice system and undermine public confidence in the efficacy of law. This Court observed, inter alia, as under:

12. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. [Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724]

13. Criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges, in essence, affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence, sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably, these considerations cause a departure from just deserts as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.

14. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilised societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences.

15. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in McGautha v. California [McGautha v. California, 1971 SCC OnLine US SC 89 : 28 L Ed 2d 711 : 402 US 183 (1971)] that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case is the 19 of 28 only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished.

30. From the above, in the first place it is seen, there is no structured or well codified law of sentencing. Yet, first there exist different objectives of sentencing such as (i) Retributive, (ii) Deterrent, (iii) Punitive, (iv) Correctional or Reformative. Second, as to choice of objective of sentencing to be pursued in the proven facts of any case, is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised by the Court concerned. Third, though no hard and fast rule exists, at the same time, rule exists in favour of proportionality of sentence (to be awarded qua the offence committed). It must be borne in mind by Courts, even while choosing the objective of punishment to be awarded. Non consideration of that factor may lead to undue harsh results in certain cases. Fourth, where lesser than maximum punishment is permissible and desirable to be awarded, the Courts may consider both- the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, while awarding befitting/proper/appropriate or enough sentence as may pass the test of proportionality.

31. Examined in that light, we first note, broadly there may exist five aggravating circumstances such as (i). nature and gravity of the offence; (ii). degree of deliberation and pre-meditation to commit the offence; (iii). impact of the offence committed on the victim and the society; (iv). deterrence objective to be created/pursued in the interest of the society; (v) previous proven criminal history of the accused. Also, there may exist other aggravating circumstances of like nature or as may be noticed by Courts in proven facts of individual cases. To that extent, the specific enumeration of the aggravating factors (noted by us), is only illustrative but in no way exhaustive.

32. Similarly, some of the well recognised mitigating factors are (i) very young or old age of the convict; (ii). any ailment suffered by the convict; (iii). family responsibilities of the convict; (iv) prior conviction of the convict; (v) probabilities of reform of the convict and (vi) probability of any possible risk to the society, etc.

30. Further in the judgement of Nadeem (Supra) the Court has also considered the situation of awarding of maximum sentence/life sentence and thus in paras-36, 37, 38 has held as under:-

36. Award of maximum/life sentence to all convicts without assigning any reasons or without offering any consideration to either the objective of the punishment to be awarded or to the aggravating and mitigating circumstance of each case, may result in implementation of law, that may appear too harsh as may not serve any useful purpose to the society. It practically amounts to a punishment that may be described - be jailed till dead. It may never be the purpose of handing out punishments to all convicts found guilty of any offence, irrespective of the individual facts of each case. Enforcement or acceptance of such sentencing, by way of policy, by the learned trial courts may itself indicate violation of the rule of proportionality.

37. More importantly, it may indicate lack of judicial reasoning and lack of application of judicial mind to critical aspects of criminal jurisprudence. If the learned trial courts were to remain indifferent or if they were to be given wide margin in that regard to allow such errors to creep in their orders it may leave the appeal court with avoidable work. In a State as populous as Uttar Pradesh, involving large pendency of appeals at the High Court, many involving life sentence awarded to the convicts, it leads to additional pressure on the appeal court, in bail matters. That leads to further constraint of time with the appeal court, to consider more appeals for hearing. All in all, a cascading effect arises from such harsh sentencing as may travel upward.

38. Therefore, in our opinion the time is right that the learned trial courts may remain reminded of their duties and obligation to not only pass correct orders of conviction based on evidence but they may also remain fine - tuned on the aspect of sentencing. Primarily, in cases involving conviction under Sections 307, 304, 304-B and 376 IPC, we have come across instances that make us implore the learned trial courts to not fall in error, by awarding unduly harsh sentences, than may be awarded upon consideration to all relevant factors.

31. The Division Bench further in the judgement in the case of Nadeem (Supra) has also relied upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of P. Rathinam Vs. Union of India : (1994) 3 SCC 394 with regards to relation with reduction of crime wherein it has been held in para- 42 as under:-

42. Fourth, as to the personal deterrent effect of the punishment, for the reasons noted above, we find, the third aggravating factor also present to the extent, minimum punishment may not deter the appellants from engaging/involving in such activities again. Yet, we may keep in mind that in P. Rathinam Vs. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 394, the Supreme Court expressed its doubt if award of punishment has a direct relation with reduction of crime. In that, it observed as below:

62. The aforesaid is not enough for our purpose. We have also to know as to whether infliction of punishment can be said to have a direct relation with the reduction of criminal propensity. It would be enough in this context to state that it has been seriously doubted whether imposition of even death sentence has been able to reduce the number of murders. Bhagwati, J. as he then was, in his dissenting judgment in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1982) 3 SCC 24 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 535 : AIR 1982 SC 1325] has brought home well this aspect of the matter.

63. While on the question of sentencing it would be rewarding to note that sentencing has been regarded as a subtle art of healing, and the legal and political people uninstructed in the humanist strategy of reformation, fail even on first principles. Justice Iyer in his aforesaid book has further stated at p. 47 that it puzzles a Judge or a Home Secretary to be told in Shavian paradox:

If you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you must improve him. And men are not improved by injuries.

64. What was said by Victor Hugo in his Les Miserables is instructive:

We shall look upon crime as a disease. Evil will be treated in charity instead of anger. The change will be simple and sublime. The cross shall replace the scaffold, reason is on our side, feeling is on our side and experiment is on our side.

(emphasis supplied)

32. The Court then finally in para-48 of the judgement has held as under:-

48. Then, in Ruli Ram (supra) and Chandrakant Patil Vs. State through CBI, (1998) 3 SCC 38, another principle was stated by the Supreme Court that the maximum punishment permissible in law should be reserved for gravest instances. We are also cognizant, in Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644, it has been recognized with the Supreme Court that primarily, sentence awarded should be reformative as may not condemn the offender as a criminal, for all his life. Thus, keeping in mind the principles discussed in the decisions of the Supreme Court noted above, on a rough and ready estimate, we find three out of five aggravating circumstances are made out against the appellants and two mitigating circumstances made out in their favour.

33. The policy of sentencing in a case under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code 1860, has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) : (2014) 4 SCC 375, and the policy of sentencing has been held as under:-

2. Limited notice on the question of sentence imposed on the appellant-accused having been issued by this Court the scope of the present appeal stands truncated to a determination of the question as to whether sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant-accused for commission of the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code is in any way excessive or disproportionate so as to require interference by this Court.

3. Section 304-B (2) of the Penal Code which prescribes the punishment for the offence contemplated by Section 304-B(1) is in the following terms:

304-B. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.

(emphasis supplied)

5. The power and authority conferred by use of the different expressions noticed above indicate the enormous discretion vested in the courts in sentencing an offender who has been found guilty of commission of any particular offence. Nowhere, either in the Penal Code or in any other law in force, any prescription or norm or even guidelines governing the exercise of the vast discretion in the matter of sentencing have been laid down except perhaps, Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which, inter alia, requires the judgment of a court to state the reasons for the sentence awarded when the punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term of years. In the above situation, naturally, the sentencing power has been a matter of serious academic and judicial debate to discern an objective and rational basis for the exercise of the power and to evolve sound jurisprudential principles governing the exercise thereof.

6. In this regard the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169] (under the old Code), another Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580], a three-Judge Bench decision in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 681], are watersheds in the search for jurisprudential principles in the matter of sentencing. Omission of any reference to other equally illuminating opinions of this Court rendered in scores of other monumental decisions is not to underplay the importance thereof but solely on account of need for brevity.

7. Two recent pronouncements of this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] and Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra [Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 402] reflect the very laborious and painstaking efforts of this Court to summarise the net result of the judicial exercises undertaken since Jagmohan Singh [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169] and the unresolved issues and grey areas in this regard and the solutions that could be attempted. The aforesaid decisions of this Court though rendered in the context of exercise of the power to award the death sentence, whether the principles laid down, with suitable adaptation and modification, would apply to all lesser situations so long the court is confronted with the vexed problem of unravelling the parameters for exercise of the sentencing power is another question that needs to be dealt with.

8. For the sake of precision it may be sufficient to take note of the propositions held in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] to have flown from Jagmohan Singh [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169] and the changes in Propositions (iv)(a) and (v)(b) thereof which were perceived to be necessary in the light of the amended provision of Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The above changes were noticed in Sangeet [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] and were referred to as evolution of a sentencing policy by shifting the focus from the crime (Jagmohan Singh [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169]) to crime and the criminal (Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580]). The two concepts were described as Phase I and Phase II of an emerging sentencing policy.

9. The principles culled out from Jagmohan Singh [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169] in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] and the changes in Propositions (iv)(a) and (v)(b) may now be specifically noticed : (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580], SCC pp. 736-39, paras 160-61 & 163-64)

160. In the light of the above conspectus, we will now consider the effect of the aforesaid legislative changes on the authority and efficacy of the propositions laid down by this Court in Jagmohan case [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169]. These propositions may be summed up as under:

(i) The general legislative policy that underlines the structure of our criminal law, principally contained in the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, is to define an offence with sufficient clarity and to prescribe only the maximum punishment therefor, and to allow a very wide discretion to the Judge in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment.

With the solitary exception of Section 303, the same policy permeates Section 302 and some other sections of the Penal Code, where the maximum punishment is the death penalty.

(ii)(a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which should be considered when sentencing an offender, is possible.

The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless boiler plate or a statement of the obvious that no jury [Judge] would need. (Referred to McGautha v. California [28 L Ed 2d 711 : 402 US 183 (1971)], L Ed 2d p. 727.)

(b) The impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment.

(iii) The view taken by the plurality in Furman v. Georgia [33 L Ed 2d 346 : 408 US 238 (1972)] decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, to the effect, that a law which gives uncontrolled and unguided discretion to the jury (or the Judge) to choose arbitrarily between a sentence of death and imprisonment for a capital offence, violates the Eighth Amendment, is not applicable in India. We do not have in our Constitution any provision like the Eighth Amendment, nor are we at liberty to apply the test of reasonableness with the freedom with which the Judges of the Supreme Court of America are accustomed to apply the due process clause. There are grave doubts about the expediency of transplanting western experience in our country. Social conditions are different and so also the general intellectual level. Arguments which would be valid in respect of one area of the world may not hold good in respect of another area.

(iv)(a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by the Judge judicially, after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime.

(b) The discretion is liable to be corrected by superior courts. The exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused.

In view of the above, it will be impossible to say that there would be at all any discrimination, since crime as crime may appear to be superficially the same but the facts and circumstances of a crime are widely different. Thus considered, the provision in Section 302, Penal Code is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that it confers on the Judges an unguided and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of awarding capital punishment or imprisonment for life.

(v)(a) Relevant facts and circumstances impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime can be brought before the court at the pre-conviction stage, notwithstanding the fact that no formal procedure for producing evidence regarding such facts and circumstances had been specifically provided. Where counsel addresses the court with regard to the character and standing of the accused, they are duly considered by the court unless there is something in the evidence itself which belies him or the Public Prosecutor challenges the facts.

(b) It is to be emphasised that in exercising its discretion to choose either of the two alternative sentences provided in Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court is principally [Ed.: The word principally is emphasised in Bachan Singh case, (1980) 2 SCC 684.] concerned with the facts and circumstances, whether aggravating or mitigating, which are connected with the particular crime under inquiry. All such facts and circumstances are capable of being proved in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act in a trial regulated by the CrPC. The trial does not come to an end until all the relevant facts are proved and the counsel on both sides have an opportunity to address the court. The only thing that remains is for the Judge to decide on the guilt and punishment and that is what Sections 306(2) and 309(2) CrPC purport to provide for. These provisions are part of the procedure established by law and, unless it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons, they must be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered to show that they are constitutionally invalid, and, hence, the death sentence imposed after trial in accordance with the procedure established by law is not unconstitutional under Article 21. (Jagmohan case [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169], SCC p. 36, para 29)'

161. A study of the propositions set out above, will show that, in substance, the authority of none of them has been affected by the legislative changes since the decision in Jagmohan case [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169]. Of course, two of them require to be adjusted and attuned to the shift in the legislative policy. The first of those propositions is No. (iv)(a) which postulates, that according to the then extant Code of Criminal Procedure both the alternative sentences provided in Section 302 of the Penal Code are normal sentences and the court can, therefore, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the particular case, in its discretion, impose either of those sentences. This postulate has now been modified by Section 354(3) which mandates the court convicting a person for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, not to impose the sentence of death on that person unless there are special reasonsto be recordedfor such sentence. The expression special reasons in the context of this provision, obviously means exceptional reasons founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as well as the criminal. Thus, the legislative policy now writ large and clear on the face of Section 354(3) is that on conviction for murder and other capital offences punishable in the alternative with death under the Penal Code, the extreme penalty should be imposed only in extreme cases.

***

163. Another proposition, the application of which, to an extent, is affected by the legislative changes, is No. (v). In portion (a) of that proposition, it is said that circumstances impinging on the nature and circumstances of the crime can be brought on record before the pre-conviction stage. In portion (b), it is emphasised that while making choice of the sentence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court is principally [Ed. : The words principally, merely, crime, but also and criminal are emphasised in the original as well.] concerned with the circumstances connected with the particular crime under inquiry. Now, Section 235(2) provides for a bifurcated trial and specifically gives the accused person a right of pre-sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring on record material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant to or connected with the particular crime under inquiry, but nevertheless, have, consistently with the policy underlined in Section 354(3), a bearing on the choice of sentence. The present legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences, including one under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court should not confine its consideration principally or merely [Ed.: The words principally, merely, crime, but also and criminal are emphasised in the original as well.] to the circumstances connected with the particular crime [Ed.: The words principally, merely, crime, but also and criminal are emphasised in the original as well.], but also [Ed.: The words principally, merely, crime, but also and criminal are emphasised in the original as well.] give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal [Ed.: The words principally, merely, crime, but also and criminal are emphasised in the original as well.].

164. Attuned to the legislative policy delineated in Sections 354(3) and 235(2), Propositions (iv) (a) and (v) (b) in Jagmohan [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169], shall have to be recast and may be stated as below:

(a) The normal rule is that the offence of murder shall be punished with the sentence of life imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule and impose the sentence of death only if there are special reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be recorded in writing before imposing the death sentence.

(b) While considering the question of sentence to be imposed for the offence of murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court must have regard to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well as the criminal. If the court finds, but not otherwise, that the offence is of an exceptionally depraved and heinous character and constitutes, on account of its design and the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to the society at large, the court may impose the death sentence.

(emphasis supplied)

10. In Sangeet [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] the Court also took note of the suggestions (offered at the Bar) noticed in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] to be relevant in a determination of the circumstances attending the crime (described as aggravating circumstances) as well as those which pertain to the criminal as distinguished from the crime (referred to as the mitigating circumstances). The attempt at evolution of a principle-based sentencing policy as distinguished from a Judge-centric one was noted to have suffered some amount of derailment/erosion. In fact, the several judgments noted and referred to in Sangeet [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] were found to have brought in a fair amount of uncertainty in application of the principles in awarding life imprisonment or death penalty, as may be, and the varying perspective or responses of the court based on the particular facts of a given case rather than evolving standardised jurisprudential principles applicable across the board.

11. The above position was again noticed in Shankar Kisanrao Khade [Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 402]. In the separate concurring opinion rendered by Brother Madan B. Lokur, J. there is an exhaustive consideration of the judgments rendered by this Court in the recent past (last 15 years) wherein death penalty has been converted to life imprisonment and also the cases wherein death penalty has been confirmed. On the basis of the views of this Court expressed in the exhaustive list of its judgments, reasons which were considered adequate by the Court to convert death penalty into life imprisonment as well as the reasons for confirming the death penalty had been set out in the concurring judgment at paras 106 and 122 of the Report in Shankar Kisanrao Khade [Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 402] which paragraphs may be extracted hereinbelow to notice the principles that have unfolded since Bachan Singh Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] : (SCC pp. 594-95 & 603-604)

106. A study of the above cases suggests that there are several reasons, cumulatively taken, for converting the death penalty to that of imprisonment for life. However, some of the factors that have had an influence in commutation include:

(1) the young age of the accused [Amit v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 8 SCC 93 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1959] aged 20 years, Rahul [Rahul v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 10 SCC 322 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1516] aged 24 years, Santosh Kumar Singh [Santosh Kumar Singh v. State, (2010) 9 SCC 747 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1469] aged 24 years, Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod (2) [Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod (2) v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 2 SCC 764 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 883] aged 28 years and Amit v. State of U.P. [(2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] aged 28 years];

(2) the possibility of reforming and rehabilitating the accused (in Santosh Kumar Singh [Santosh Kumar Singh v. State, (2010) 9 SCC 747 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1469] and Amit v. State of U.P. [(2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] the accused, incidentally, were young when they committed the crime);

(3) the accused had no prior criminal record (Nirmal Singh [Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 670 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 472], Raju [Raju v.State of Haryana, (2001) 9 SCC 50 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 408], Bantu [Bantu v. State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 615 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 777], Amit v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 8 SCC 93 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1959], Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal [Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 3 SCC 127 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 653], Rahul [Rahul v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 10 SCC 322 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1516] and Amit v. State of U.P. [(2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] );

(4) the accused was not likely to be a menace or threat or danger to society or the community (Nirmal Singh [Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 670 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 472], Mohd. Chaman [Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 2 SCC 28 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 278], Raju [Raju v. State of Haryana, (2001) 9 SCC 50 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 408], Bantu [Bantu v. State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 615 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 777], Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal [Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 3 SCC 127 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 653], Rahul [Rahul v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 10 SCC 322 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1516] and Amit v. State of U.P. [(2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590]);

(5) a few other reasons need to be mentioned such as the accused having been acquitted by one of the courts (State of T.N. v. Suresh [(1998) 2 SCC 372 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 751] ,State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [(2000) 1 SCC 471 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 263], Bharat Fakira Dhiwar [State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, (2002) 1 SCC 622 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 217], Mansingh [State of Maharashtra v. Mansingh, (2005) 3 SCC 131 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 657] and Santosh Kumar Singh [Santosh Kumar Singh v. State, (2010) 9 SCC 747 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1469] );

(6) the crime was not premeditated (Kumudi Lal [Kumudi Lal v. State of U.P., (1999) 4 SCC 108 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 491], Akhtar [Akhtar v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 60 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1058], Raju [Raju v. State of Haryana, (2001) 9 SCC 50 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 408] and Amrit Singh [Amrit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 79 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 397] );

(7) the case was one of circumstantial evidence (Mansingh [State of Maharashtra v. Mansingh, (2005) 3 SCC 131 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 657] and Bishnu Prasad Sinha [Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam, (2007) 11 SCC 467 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766] ).

In one case, commutation was ordered since there was apparently no exceptional feature warranting a death penalty (Kumudi Lal[Kumudi Lalv.State of U.P., (1999) 4 SCC 108 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 491] ) and in another case because the trial court had awarded life sentence but the High Court enhanced it to death (Haresh Mohandas Rajput[Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 12 SCC 56 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 359]).

***

122. The principal reasons for confirming the death penalty in the above cases include:

(1) the cruel, diabolic, brutal, depraved and gruesome nature of the crime (Jumman Khan [Jumman Khan v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 752 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 283], Dhananjoy Chatterjee [Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 358], Laxman Naik [Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 656], Kamta Tiwari [Kamta Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 250 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1298], Nirmal Singh [Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 670 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 472], Jai Kumar [Jai Kumar v. State of M.P., (1999) 5 SCC 1 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 638], Satish [State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 642], Bantu [Bantu v. State of U.P., (2008) 11 SCC 113 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 353], Ankush Maruti Shinde [Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 308], B.A. Umesh [B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 801], Mohd. Mannan [Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik [Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 30]);

(2) the crime results in public abhorrence, shocks the judicial conscience or the conscience of society or the community (Dhananjoy Chatterjee [Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 358], Jai Kumar [Jai Kumar v. State of M.P., (1999) 5 SCC 1 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 638], Ankush Maruti Shinde [Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 308] and Mohd. Mannan [Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 626]);

(3) the reform or rehabilitation of the convict is not likely or that he would be a menace to society (Jai Kumar [Jai Kumar v. State of M.P., (1999) 5 SCC 1 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 638], B.A. Umesh [B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 801] and Mohd. Mannan [Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 626]);

(4) the victims were defenceless (Dhananjoy Chatterjee [Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 358], Laxman Naik [Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 656], Kamta Tiwari [Kamta Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 250 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1298], Ankush Maruti Shinde [Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 308], Mohd. Mannan [Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik [Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 30]);

(5) the crime was either unprovoked or that it was premeditated (Dhananjoy Chatterjee [Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 358], Laxman Naik [Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 656], Kamta Tiwari [Kamta Tiwari v. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 250 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1298], Nirmal Singh [Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 670 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 472], Jai Kumar [Jai Kumar v. State of M.P., (1999) 5 SCC 1 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 638], Ankush Maruti Shinde [Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 308], B.A. Umesh [B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 801] and Mohd. Mannan [Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] ) and in three cases the antecedents or the prior history of the convict was taken into consideration (Shivu [Shivu v. High Court of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 713 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 686], B.A. Umesh [B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 801] and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik [Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 30]).

However, in para 123 of the Report the cases where the reasons for taking either of the views i.e. commutation or confirmation as above have been deviated from have been noticed. Consequently, the progressive march had been stultified and the sentencing exercise continues to stagnate as a highly individualised and Judge-centric issue.

12. Are we to understand that the quest and search for a sound jurisprudential basis for imposing a particular sentence on an offender is destined to remain elusive and the sentencing parameters in this country are bound to remain Judge-centric? The issue though predominantly dealt with in the context of cases involving the death penalty has tremendous significance to the Criminal Jurisprudence of the country inasmuch as in addition to the numerous offences under various special laws in force, hundreds of offences are enumerated in the Penal Code, punishment for which could extend from a single day to 10 years or even for life, a situation made possible by the use of the seemingly same expressions in different provisions of the Penal Code as noticed in the opening part of this order.

13. As noticed, the net value of the huge number of in-depth exercises performed since Jagmohan Singh [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169] has been effectively and systematically culled out in Sangeet [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] and Shankar Kisanrao Khade [Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 402]. The identified principles could provide a sound objective basis for sentencing thereby minimising individualised and Judge-centric perspectives. Such principles bear a fair amount of affinity to the principles applied in foreign jurisdictions, a rsum of which is available in the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar [(2008) 7 SCC 550 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 183]. The difference is not in the identity of the principles : it lies in the realm of application thereof to individual situations. While in India application of the principles is left to the Judge hearing the case, in certain foreign jurisdictions such principles are formulated under the authority of the statute and are applied on principles of categorisation of offences which approach, however, has been found by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singhv.State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] to be inappropriate to our system. The principles being clearly evolved and securely entrenched, perhaps, the answer lies in consistency in approach.

14. To revert to the main stream of the case, we see no reason as to why the principles of sentencing evolved by this Court over the years though largely in the context of the death penalty will not be applicable to all lesser sentences so long as the sentencing Judge is vested with the discretion to award a lesser or a higher sentence resembling the swing of the pendulum from the minimum to the maximum. In fact, we are reminded of the age-old infallible logic that what is good to one situation would hold to be equally good to another like situation. Besides, para 163 (italicised portion) of Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580], reproduced earlier (see at SCC p. 385d-f, above), bears testimony to the above fact.

15. Would the above principles apply to sentencing of an accused found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B inasmuch as the said offence is held to be proved against the accused on the basis of a legal presumption? This is the next question that has to be dealt with. So long there is credible evidence of cruelty occasioned by demand(s) for dowry, any unnatural death of a woman within seven years of her marriage makes the husband or a relative of the husband of such woman liable for the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B though there may not be any direct involvement of the husband or such relative with the death in question. In a situation where commission of an offence is held to be proved by means of a legal presumption the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine the presence of aggravating circumstances (Crime Test) may not be readily forthcoming unlike a case where there is evidence of overt criminal acts establishing the direct involvement of the accused with the crime to enable the court to come to specific conclusions with regard to the barbarous or depraved nature of the crime committed. The necessity to combat the menace of demand for dowry or to prevent atrocities on women and like social evils as well as the necessity to maintain the purity of social conscience cannot be determinative of the quantum of sentence inasmuch as the said parameters would be common to all offences under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The above, therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of acceptable jurisprudential principles to act as a rational basis for awarding varying degrees of punishment on a case-to-case basis. The search for principles to satisfy the Crime Test in an offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code must, therefore, lie elsewhere. Perhaps, the time spent between marriage and the death of the woman; the attitude and conduct of the accused towards the victim before her death; the extent to which the demand for dowry was persisted with and the manner and circumstances of commission of the cruelty would be a surer basis for determination of the Crime Test. Coupled with the above, the fact whether the accused was also charged with the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code and the basis of his acquittal of the said charge would be another very relevant circumstance. As against this the extenuating/mitigating circumstances which would determine the criminal test must be allowed to have a full play. The aforesaid two sets of circumstances being mutually irreconcilable cannot be arranged in the form of a balance sheet as observed in Sangeet [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] but it is the cumulative effect of the two sets of different circumstances that has to be kept in mind while rendering the sentencing decision. This, according to us, would be the correct approach while dealing with the question of sentence so far as the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code is concerned.

16. Applying the above parameters to the facts of the present case it transpires that the death of the wife of the appellant-accused occurred within two years of marriage. There was, of course, a demand for dowry and there is evidence of cruelty or harassment. The autopsy report of the deceased showed external marks of injuries but the cause of death of the deceased was stated to be due to asphyxia resulting from strangulation. In view of the aforesaid finding of Dr L.T. Ramani (PW 16) who had conducted the post-mortem, the learned trial Judge thought it proper to acquit the accused of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code on the benefit of doubt as there was no evidence that the accused was, in any way, involved with the strangulation of the deceased. The proved facts on the basis of which offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code was held to be established, while acquitting the appellant-accused of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, do not disclose any extraordinary, perverse or diabolic act on the part of the appellant-accused to take an extreme view of the matter. Coupled with the above, at the time of commission of the offence, the appellant-accused was about 21 years old and as on date he is about 42 years. The appellant-accused also has a son who was an infant at the time of the occurrence. He has no previous record of crime. On a cumulative application of the principles that would be relevant to adjudge the crime and the criminal test, we are of the view that the present is not a case where the maximum punishment of life imprisonment ought to have been awarded to the appellant-accused. At the same time, from the order of the learned trial court, it is clear that some of the injuries on the deceased, though obviously not the fatal injuries, are attributable to the appellant-accused. In fact, the finding of the learned trial court is that Injury 1 (laceration 1″ ″ skin-deep on the side of forehead near hair margin) and Injury 2 (laceration 1″ 1″ scalp-deep over the frontal area) on the deceased had been caused by the appellant-accused with a pestle. The said part of the order of the learned trial court has not been challenged in the appeal before the High Court. Taking into account the said fact, we are of the view that in the present case the minimum sentence prescribed i.e. seven years would also not meet the ends of justice. Rather we are of the view that a sentence of ten years' RI would be appropriate.

17. Consequently, we modify the impugned order dated 4-4-2011 [Ram Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), Criminal Appeal No. 347 of 1997, order dated 4-4-2011 (Del)] passed by the High Court of Delhi and impose the punishment of ten years' RI on the appellant-accused for the commission of the offence under Section 304-B of the Penal Code. The sentence of fine is maintained. The appellant-accused who is presently in custody shall serve out the remaining part of the sentence in terms of the present order.

18. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.

34. The facts of the present case resemble to that of the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (Supra) inasmuch as marriage of the deceased with the accused/appellant Chandra Pal @ Rachit was solemnized on 11.10.2010 and incident in the matter was of 12.3.2011. The post mortem examination report of the deceased Smt. Jyoti showed one ligature mark and two contusions on her body and cause of death was opined as due to asphyxia due to ante mortem strangulation. The trial court convicted the accused/appellant under Section 304-B I.P.C. and thus held that alternative charge under Section 302 I.P.C. is thus redundant and proceeded to convict him. The accused/appellant was aged about 20 years at the time of alleged incident and thus proceeded to convict him for life imprisonment. In the present matter there is another circumstance arising out that the appellant is in jail since 13.3.2011 and thus has served out about 14 years of imprisonment till date.

35. The second limb of the matter is with regards to the accused appellant Smt. Atarkali. Although she has been named in the first information report and has been assigned the role alongwith three other co-accused of demanding dowry but the same is a general role with omnibus allegations. There is no overt act assigned to her. Two co-accused namely Bablu (jeth) and Smt. Sharda (jethani) with identical allegations have been exonerated in the investigation which has attained finality. The entire evidence against her also does not assign any overt act to her. She has been assigned with general and omnibus allegations in the matter.

36. Time and again, the Apex Court has considered and held that there is exaggeration of versions in matrimonial disputes and family members of the husband are involved and made accused in matters and are assigned general and omnibus allegations. For reference, the view as taken in different cases by the Apex Court are as under:-

A. Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar : (2022) 6 SCC 599

Issue involved

10. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions made by the appellants and respondents, in our considered opinion, the foremost issue which requires determination in the instant case is whether allegations made against the appellant in-laws are in the nature of general omnibus allegations and therefore liable to be quashed?

11. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of Section 498-AIPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her inlaws, by facilitating rapid State intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage, now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as Section 498-AIPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives.

12. This Court in its judgment in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P. [Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P., (2018) 10 SCC 472 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 301], has observed : (SCC pp. 478-79, para 14)

14. Section 498-A was inserted in the statute with the laudable object of punishing cruelty at the hands of husband or his relatives against a wife particularly when such cruelty had potential to result in suicide or murder of a woman as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 46 of 1983. The expression cruelty in Section 498-A covers conduct which may drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury (mental or physical) or danger to life or harassment with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand. [Explanation to Section 498-A.] It is a matter of serious concern that large number of cases continue to be filed under Section 498-A alleging harassment of married women. We have already referred to some of the statistics from the Crime Records Bureau. This Court had earlier noticed the fact that most of such complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues. Many of such complaints are not bona fide. At the time of filing of the complaint, implications and consequences are not visualised. At times such complaints lead to uncalled for harassment not only to the accused but also to the complainant. Uncalled for arrest may ruin the chances of settlement.

13. Previously, in the landmark judgment of this Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 449], it was also observed : (SCC p. 276, para 4)

4. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-AIPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-AIPC is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In quite a number of cases, bedridden grandfathers and grandmothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested.

14. Further in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 473], it has also been observed : (SCC pp. 676-77, paras 32-36)

32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under Section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment is also a matter of serious concern.

33. The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fibre of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under Section 498-A as a basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure that social fibre, peace and tranquillity of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases.

34. Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not properly visualised by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations.

35. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a Herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection.

36. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of an amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.

15. In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. [Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC 741 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 212 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 120] it was observed : (SCC p. 749, para 21)

21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that : (SCC p. 698, para 12)

12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their young days in chasing their cases in different courts.

The view taken by the Judges in this matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.

16. Recently, in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana [K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 605], it was also observed that : (SCC p. 454, para 6)

6. The courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.

17. The abovementioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498-A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long-term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this Court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

B. Payal Sharma v. State of Punjab and another : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3473

9. In the decision in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand: (2010) 7 SCC 667, this Court observed that it is a matter of common knowledge that in matrimonial disputes exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints and the tendency of over implication is also reflected in a large number of cases. The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate acquittal in the trial may also not be able to wipe out the deep scars of sufferings of ignominy, it was further held therein. We have no hesitation to hold that the said observation of this Court is in fact, sounding of a caution, against non-discharge of the duty to see whether implication of a person who is not a close relative of the family of the husband is over implication or whether allegation against any such person is an exaggerated version, in matrimonial disputes of this nature. In this context, it is to be noted that the term relative has not been defined in the statute and, therefore, it must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Hence, normally, it can be taken to include, father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or granddaughter of any individual or the spouse of any person. To put it shortly, it includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption. In paragraph 35 of Preeti Gupta's case (supra) it was furthermore held thus:

The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by husband's close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.

10. In such circumstances, normally against a person who is not falling under any of the aforesaid categories when allegations are raised, in the light of the observations made in Preeti Gupta's case (supra), the Court concerned owes an irrecusable duty to see whether such implication is over implication and/or whether the allegations against such a person is an exaggerated version. We have already taken note of the fact that except the observation made in paragraph 7 there is no consideration at all of the contentions of accused No. 5 in the impugned order.

11. In the decision in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. : (2012) 10 SCC 741, this Court held that mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the tendency of over implication viz., to draw the entire members of the household in the domestic quarrel resulting in matrimonial dispute, especially when it happens soon after the wedding. In the decision in Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar : (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court quashed proceedings in so far as family members of the husband on the ground that the allegations against them are general and ominous in nature. In matters like the one at hand when relatives not residing in the same house where the alleged victim resides, the courts shall not stop consideration by merely looking into the question where the accused is a person falling within the ambit of the expression relative for the purpose of Section 498-A, IPC, but should also consider whether it is a case of over implication or exaggerated version solely to implicate such person(s) to pressurise the main accused. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein after considering the statutory provisions and the earlier decisions, this Court referred to various categories of cases where the inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could be exercised by High Court to prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. One among such categories is where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused.

C. Dara Lakshmi Narayana and others v. State of Telangana and another : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682

11. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (Bhajan Lal), this Court formulated the parameters under which the powers under Section 482 of the CrPC could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all the parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out as under:

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

x x x

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

12. In the instant case, the allegations in the FIR are under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.

13. Section 498A of the IPC deals with offences committed by the husband or relatives of the husband subjecting cruelty towards the wife. The said provision reads as under:

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation. For the purpose of this section, cruelty means-

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

14. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act talk about the penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.

3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.

(1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more.

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,

(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf:

Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act;

(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf:

Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act:

Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.

4. Penalty for demanding dowry. If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.

15. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines cruelty for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.

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25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No. 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

XXXXXXX

28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them. 29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows:

12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their young days in chasing their cases in different courts.

31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband's close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection

37. The Apex Court in the case of Geddam Jhansi vs. The State of Telangana : Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 decided on 07.02.2025 : 2025 INSC 160 has held that criminal charges of cruelty, dowry demand and domestic violence without specific allegations and credible materials may have disastrous consequences for families. It was further held that when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious and should allow invocation of criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences. It has been held as under:

31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the penal code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, preservation of family relationship has always been emphasised upon. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious, and should allow invocation of criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.

32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.

33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since, violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.

34. For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner to hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turns, otherwise an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegation of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.

35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who are accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

36. Our observations, however, should not be generalised to mean that relatives cannot be brought under the purview of the aforesaid penal provisions when they have actively participated in inflicting cruelty on the daughter-in-law/victim. What needs to be assessed is whether such allegations are genuine with specific criminal role assigned to such members of the family or whether it is merely a spill over and side-effect of a matrimonial discord and allegations made by an emotionally disturbed person. Each and every case of domestic violence will thus depend on the peculiar facts obtaining in each case.

38. Taking into account of the said facts, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years under Section 304-B I.P.C. would meet out the ends of justice and would be appropriate in the present matter. The sentence thus awarded by the trial court under Section 304-B I.P.C. of life imprisonment is reduced to the period of 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The sentence of fine is maintained along with the sentence as awarded on other counts. The sentence shall run concurrently. The appeal in so far as the accused/appellant- Chandra Pal @ Rachit is concerned, stands partly allowed to the extent as indicated above. He be released from jail forthwith if served out the sentence and not needed in any other case.

39. In so far as the appeal with regards to appellant Smt. Atarkali is concerned, the same is allowed. Conviction and sentence in her regard is set aside. She is on bail. Her bail bonds and sureties stand discharged.

40. The trial court records be sent back along with the communication of this judgment. Office to communicate this judgment to the District and Sessions Judge concerned forthwith for compliance and necessary action.

(Samit Gopal, J.)       (Rajiv Gupta, J.)
 

 
November 10, 2025
 
(Naresh Kumar, M. ARIF, A.S. Rathore,)