Allahabad High Court
Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 9 July, 2025
Author: Rajeev Misra
Bench: Rajeev Misra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:111609
Reserved on: 03.07.2025
Delivered on: 09.07.2025
Court No. - 80
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 2337 of 2023
Revisionist :- Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others
Counsel for Revisionist :- Deepak Singh Yadav,Rajiv Lochan Shukla,Vijay Bahadur Prajapati
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Radheshyam Yadav
Connected with
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 3886 of 2023
Revisionist :- Dharmendra Goyal
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
Counsel for Revisionist :- Rajiv Lochan Shukla,Tushar Pandey
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
1. Criminal Revision No. 2337 of 2023 (Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) has been filed for the following relief;-
"It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow this criminal revision and set aside the impugned order dated 1.2.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions/Special Judge, POCO (Second), Gautam Budh Nagar in Session Trial No.559 of 2018 (State of U.P. Vs. Dharmendra and others) arising out of Case Crime No.202 of 2018, Under Section 306, 354, 506 of I.P.C. and section 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Sector 24 at Police Station Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, whereby charge has been framed against the revisionist under section 354, 506, 306 of I.P.C. and 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and impugned order dated 16.8.2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act (First), Court No.16, Gautam Budh Nagar, whereby the application under section 227 of Cr.P.C. for discharge filed by the revisionist has been rejected in the abovementioned Session Trial No.559 of 2018.
It is further prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to stay the further proceedings of Session Trial No.559 of 2018 (State of U.P. Vs. Dharmendra and others) arising out of Case Crime No.202 of 2018, Under Section 306, 354, 506 of I.P.C. and section 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, at Police Station Sector 24 Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, otherwise the revisionist shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.
And/or pass such other and further order, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts & circumstances of the case."
2. Criminal Revision No. 3886 of 2023 (Dharmendra Goyal Vs. State of U.P. and Another) has been filed with the following prayer;-
"It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow this criminal revision and set aside the impugned order dated 26.6.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions/Special Judge (POCSO-II), Gautam Budh Nagar in Session Trial No.559 of 2018 (State of U.P. Vs. Dharmendra and others) arising out of Case Crime No.202 of 2018, Under Section 306, 506 of I.P.C., Police Station Sector 24 Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, whereby the application under section 227 of Cr.P.C. for discharge filed by the revisionist has been rejected.
It is further prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to discharge the applicant in Session Trial No.559 of 2018 (State of U.P. Vs. Dharmendra and others) arising out of Case Crime No.202 of 2018, Under Section 306, 506 of I.P.C., Police Station Sector 24 Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar, otherwise the revisionist shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.
And/or pass such other and further order, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts & circumstances of the case."
3. I have heard Mr. Rajiv Lochan Shukla, the learned counsel for revisionist in both the criminal revisions, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Radheshyam Yadav, the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2.
4. Perused the record.
5. Criminal Revision No. 2337 of 2023 (Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) was taken up on 29.02.2024 and this Court passed the following order;-
"1. Rejoinder affidavit filed by the learned counsel for revisionist in court today, is taken on record.
2. Heard Mr. Rajiv Lochan Shukla, the learned counsel for revisionist and the learned A.G.A. for State.
3. It transpires that co-accused Dharmendra Goyal has filed Criminal Revision No. 3886 of 2023 (Dharmendra Goyal Vs. State of U.P. and Another) in which an interim order dated 02.08.2023 has been passed. Copy of the order dated 02.08.2023 has been placed by the learned counsel for revisionist which is taken on record.
4. In view of above, connect Criminal Revision No. 3886 of 2023 (Dharmendra Goyal Vs. State of U.P. and Another) along with this criminal revision.
5. Accordingly, matter shall re-appear as fresh on 07.03.2024 along with connected matters.
6. When the matter is listed next, the details of all the criminal revisions shall be duly published in the cause list."
6. The matter was heard on different dates and this Court observed as follows in the order dated 14.05.2024;-
"1. Heard Mr.Rajiv Lochan Shukla, the learned counsel for revisionist and the learned A.G.A. representing opposite party-1.
2. After hearing the counsel for parties, record shows that the discharge claimed by revisionist in terms of Section 227 Cr.P.C. was refused by Court vide order dated 16.08.2022. This order passed by Court below was not challenged and by efflux of time was allowed to be confined. Subsequently, Court below framed charges against accused-revisionist vide framing of charge order dated 01.02.2023.
3. Present criminal revision has been filed challenging both the orders. One of the questions that has emerged for consideration before Court is that once the order passed by Court below rejecting the discharge application having been allowed to become final for want of further challenge can the revisionist challenge the order of framing of charge as it is consequential exercise or not and whether this Court while dealing with the veracity of framing of the charge order can go behind the framing of charge order and indirectly consider the correctness of the order passed on the discharge application.
4. Let, the learned A.G.A. address the Court on the said issue.
5. Matter shall come up as fresh on 17.05.2024 at 02:00 P.M."
7. In view of above and after hearing the counsel for the parties, the order was reserved only in respect of the aforementioned preliminary questions, which cropped up for consideration by this Court at the admission stage.
8. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned A.G.A. to the effect that revisionist had filed a discharge application dated 26.04.2019 in terms of Section 227 Cr.P.C. seeking his discharge in concerned Special Sessions Trial. Aforementioned discharge application filed by accused came to the rejected by Court below, vide order dated 16.08.2022. The order dated 16.08.2022 was allowed to become final for want of challenge. As there was no stay operating in the proceedings pending against accused/revisionists before Court below, therefore, as a logical consequence, Court below, vide order dated 01.02.2023 framed charges against revisionist in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 228 Cr.P.C. It is at this stage that revisionist has approached this Court by filing aforementioned criminal revision challenging the orders dated 16.08.2022 and 01.02.2023.
9. Learned A.G.A. has then referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others 1979 (2) SCC 179 and has referred to paragraphs 27 and 28. For ready reference, the same are reproduced herein below;-
"27. From the scheme of the provisions noticed above it is clear that in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, "discharge" or "acquittal" of accused are distinct concepts applicable to different stages of the proceedings in Court. The legal effect and incidents of "discharge" and "acquittal" are also different. An order of discharge in a warrant case instituted on complaint, can be made only after the process has been issued and before the charge is framed. Section 253(1) shows that as a general rule there can be no order of discharge unless the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses has been taken and the Magistrate considers for reasons to be recorded, in the light of the evidence, that no case has been made out. Sub-section (2) which authorises the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless, is an exception to that rule. A discharge without considering the evidence taken is illegal. If a prima facie case is made out the Magistrate must proceed under Section 254 and frame charge against the accused. Section 254 shows that a charge can be framed if after taking evidence or at any previous stage, the Magistrate, thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable as a warrant case.
28. Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no power under Section 227 or any other provision of the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the proceedings to the stage of Section 253 and discharge the accused. The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of the charge if the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the manner provided in Sections 254 to 258 to a logical end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant case, instituted either on complaint or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can either acquit or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under Section 349 and 562 of the Code of 1898 (which correspond to Sections 325 and 360 of the Code of 1973)."
9. In the light of aforementioned observations, the learned A.G.A. contended that in view of aforementioned observations made by the Apex Court, the challenge to the order dated 16.08.2022 passed by Court below rejecting the discharge application filed by revisionists is now misconceived as once the charges have been framed, the question of discharge becomes academic. Therefore, the present criminal revision to that extent has been rendered infructuous. It was also contended by the learned A.G.A. that since there is nothing on record to show that the grounds prayed for discharge were different than the grounds raised in challenge to the framing of charge order, therefore, no effective adjudication can be made by this Court regarding the veracity of the framing of charge order. As such, the present criminal revision is liable to be dismissed.
10. When confronted with above, the learned counsel for applicant contended that there is no prohibition in the Code i.e. Cr.P.C., which prohibits an accused from challenging the order passed by the Court rejecting his discharge application along with the framing of charge order. Since the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wide and equitable, therefore, this Court has ample jurisdiction to consider the veracity of the orders passed by Court below rejecting the discharge application filed by an accused as well as the framing of charge order passed against an accused simultaneously as the litmus paper test will be where there is such material on record so as to proceed against an accused.
11. The Court has delved into the records and finds that subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani (Supra), a similar issue cropped up for consideration before Apex Court in Satish Mehra Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2012) 13 SCC 614, wherein the Court has observed that the veracity of the proceedings can be examined more appropriately by the Court after the charges have been framed against an accused. Though this judgment is a Two Judges bench judgment, but the Court has referred to two earlier Three Judges Bench judgment, which are similar to the controversy involved in the matter headed by Two Judges Bench. Observations made by the Court in paragraphs 13, 14 and 19 of the report are relevant for the controversy in hand and accordingly, the same are reproduced herein below:-
"13. Though a criminal complaint lodged before the court under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure or an FIR lodged in the police station under Chapter XII of the Code has to be brought to its logical conclusion in accordance with the procedure prescribed, power has been conferred under Section 482 of the Code to interdict such a proceeding in the event the institution/continuance of the criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of court. An early discussion of the law in this regard can be found in the decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239] wherein the parameters of exercise of the inherent power vested by Section 561-A of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, 1973) had been laid down in the following terms: (AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice;
(ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding e.g. want of sanction;
(iii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and
(iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
14. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence, there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to be interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognised to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extraordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfy the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually come on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in their entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused.
19. The view expressed by this Court in Century Spg. case [(1972) 3 SCC 282 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 495 : AIR 1972 SC 545] and in L. Muniswamy case [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 : AIR 1977 SC 1489] to the effect that the framing of a charge against an accused substantially affects the person's liberty would require a reiteration at this stage. The apparent and close proximity between the framing of a charge in a criminal proceeding and the paramount rights of a person arrayed as an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution can be ignored only with peril. Any examination of the validity of a criminal charge framed against an accused cannot overlook the fundamental requirement laid down in the decisions rendered in Century Spg. [(1972) 3 SCC 282 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 495 : AIR 1972 SC 545] and Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 : AIR 1977 SC 1489] . It is from the aforesaid perspective that we must proceed in the matter bearing in mind the cardinal principles of law that have developed over the years as fundamental to any examination of the issue as to whether the charges framed are justified or not."
12. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Vs. Raj Kumar Arora and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 819 has observed that once the charges have been framed, the accused cannot be discharged either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 227 Cr.P.C. or Section 216 Cr.P.C. Paragraph 154 of the report is relevant for the controversy in hand. Accordingly, the same is extracted herein under:-
"154. We are in agreement with the view that once charges have been framed by the Trial Court in exercise of the powers under Section 228 CrPC, the accused cannot thereafter be discharged, be it through an exercise of the powers under Sections 227 or 216 CrPC. It is reiterated that the language of Section 216 CrPC provides only for the addition and alteration of charge(s) and not for the deletion or discharge of an accused. If the Legislature had intended to empower the Trial Court with the power to delete a charge at that stage, the same would have been expressly and unambiguously stated. Therefore, at such a stage of the trial, the accused must necessarily either be convicted or acquitted of the charges that were so framed against him. No shortcuts must be allowed."
13. It is thus apparent that there is no congruence of the opinion on the point in question i.e. whether after the framing of charge, the question of discharge became academic.
14. However, the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Satish Mehra (Supra), has referred to few earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, which also need to be noted;-
(i). A Three Judges Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. And Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 3 SCC 282, while dealing with the issue regarding discharge of an accused after the framing of charge order was passed referred to the provisions contained in Section 251A Cr.P.C. (Old Cr.P.C.), the facts of the case and the law on the subject in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the report and came to the conclusion that the Court can discharge an accused even after the charges have been framed, if the same are found to be groundless. It shall be useful to refer to paragraphs 16 and 17 of the report, which are relevant for the issue in hand. Accordingly, the same are reproduced herein below;-
"16. We may first dispose of the argument on the meaning and scope of Section 251-A, Criminal P.C. This section reads:
(1) When, in any case instituted on a Police report, the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, such Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in Section 173 have been furnished to the accused, and if be finds that the accused has not been furnished with such documents or any of them, he shall cause them to be so furnished.
(2) If, upon consideration of all the documents referred to in Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge him.
(3) If, upon such documents being considered: such examination, if any, being made and the prosecution and the accused being given an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try, and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
(4) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused and lie shall be asked whether he is guilty or claims to be tried.
(5) If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon.
(6) If the accused refuses to plead, or does not plead, or claims to be tried, the magistrate shall fix a date for the examination of witnesses.
(7) On the date so fixed the Magistrate shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution:
Provided that the Magistrate may permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined, or recall any witness for further cross-examination.
(8) The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon' his defence and produce his evidence: and if the accused puts in any written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record.
(9) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination or the production of any documents or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. Such ground shall be recorded by him in writing:
Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness after the charge is framed, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of justice.
(10) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application under Sub-section (9), require that his reasonable expenses incurred in attending for the purpose of the trial be deposited in Court.
(11) If in any case under this section in which a charge has been framed, the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty he shall record an order of acquittal.
(12) Where in any case under this section, the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 349 or Section 562, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon (him) according to law.
(13) In a case where a previous conviction is charged under the provisions of Section 221, Sub-section (7), and the accused does not admit that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the charge, the Magistrate may, after he has convicted the said accused under Sub-section (5) or Sub-section (12), take evidence in respect of the alleged previous conviction, and shall record a finding thereon.
Though at the bar of this Court as also in the High Court considerable arguments and discussion centered round this point, in our opinion, the construction and meaning of this section so far as relevant for our purpose does not present any difficulty. Under Sub-section (2), if upon consideration of all the documents referred to in Section 173, Criminal P.C. and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he must discharge the accused. This sub-section has to be read along with Sub-section (3), according to which, if after considering the documents and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XXI of the Code with in the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish adequately, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Reading the two sub-sections together it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that (he accused has committed an oftence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saving that there is no ground for framing the charges. This necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the Magistrate is entitled and indeed has a duty to consider the entire material referred to in Sub-section (2). On the view that we have taken, we do not consider it necessary to refer to the various decided cases cited at the bar of this Court or discussed in the judgment of the High Court.
17. Coming now to the facts of this case, in our view, the question principally depends on the scope and effect of the notification dated September 22, 1949, the circular dated November 2, 1964 and the Deviation Order dated June 25, 1965. If, on this material, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it can appropriately consider the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused. The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it, has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."
(ii). The aforesaid observations were approved by an another Three Judges Bench judgment in State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699, wherein the following approval was accorded by the Bench in paragraph 10 of the report. Accordingly, paragraph 10 of the report is reproduced herein under;-
"10. On the other hand, the decisions cited. by learned counsel for the respondents in Vadilal Panchaly. D.D. Gha- digaonkar(1) and Cen-tarS, Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra(2) show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of flaming charges the court cannot apply. its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judi- cially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prose- cution that the accused be. asked to face a trial. In Vadilal Panchal's case. (supra) section 203 of the old Code was under consideration, which provided that the Magistrate could dismiss a complaint if after considering certain matters mentioned in the section there was in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding with the case.. To art extent section 227 of the new Code contains an analogous power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. It was held by this Court, while considering the true scope of s. 203 of the old Code that the Magistrate. was not bound to accept the result of an enquiry or investigation and that he must apply his judicial mind to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These decisions show that for' the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which. it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted, is such on the: basis of which a conviction can-be said reasonably to be possible."
(iii). A Two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu Vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy and Others, (2011) 12 SCC 437, was considering the question as to what are the grounds on which, the High Court can quash the proceedings, the Bench referred to the earlier judgment in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy (Supra) in paragraph 10 of the report. It, thereafter, referred to various other judgments of the Supreme Court on the point and then anallyzed the facts of the case. The Court ultimately expressed itself in paragraphs 31 and 32. Accordingly, paragraphs 31 and 32 of the report are reproduced herein below;-
"31. We have already pointed out various principles and circumstances under which the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in detail in Bhajan Lal (supra). The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 are very wide and at the same time the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
32. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all the probabilities in order to determine whether conviction would be sustainable and on such premise arriving at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. In a proceeding instituted on a complaint, exercise of inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case in which complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. There is no need to analyse each and every aspect meticulously before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. The statement of witnesses made on oath to be verified in full and materials put forth in the chargesheet ought to be taken note of as a whole before arriving any conclusion. It is the material concluded during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused persons."
15. In view of above noted authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is apparent that this Court is not denuded of it's jurisdiction to examine the veracity of the framing of charge order, even after the discharge prayed by the accused/revisionist has been negated by Court below. In view of above, the preliminary objection raised by the learned A.G.A. is rejected.
16. Having heard the learned counsel for revisionst, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1, Mr. Radheshyam Yadav, the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2 in Criminal Revision No. 2337 of 2023 (Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) and upon perusal of records, this Court finds that matter requires consideration.
17. It may also be noted that there are three accused in the trial pending before Court below;-
(i). Rajesh Sahgal, the present revisionist.
(ii). Dharmendra Goyal. The discharge application filed by this accused was rejected by Court below, vide order dated 16.08.2022. He, accordingly, approached this Court by filing Criminal Revision No. 3589 of 2022 (Dharmendra Goyal Vs. State of U.P. and Another). The same was allowed by this Court, vide order dated 20.03.2023. The same reads as under:-
"1. The present criminal revision has been preferred against the order dated 16.08.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act (1st), Court No.16 Gautam Buddha Nagar in Special Trial No. 559 of 2018 (State vs. Dharmendra and others), Crime No. 202 of 2018, under Sections 306, 354, 506 IPC and Section 7/8 of POCSO Act, P.S. Sector-24 Noida, District Gautam Buddha Nagar, whereby the application of revisionist-accused for discharge has been rejected.
2. Heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned counsel for the informant and learned A.G.A. for the State.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the impugned order is against facts and law and thus, liable to be set aside. There is absolutely no evidence to indicate that the revisionist has abetted or instigated the deceased to commit suicide and thus, no case under Section 306 IPC is made out against the revisionist. The revisionist was working as Principal of the Alckon Public School, Mayur Vihar Phase-3, Delhi and the allegation regarding misbehaviour with deceased girl, were levelled against co-accused Rajiv Sahgal and Niraj Anand, who were working as teacher in the said school. The mere allegation against the revisionist is that when the informant made a complaint against the said teachers to the revisionist, he has threatened him to cut off the name of deceased from the school. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that the ingredients of offence under Section 306 IPC are not made out against the revisionist. The trial Court did not consider the grounds taken in the discharge application and that the said application was rejected in an arbitrary manner and thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance upon the case of Geo Varghese vs. State of Rajashtan & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1164 of 2021) decided by the Supreme Court on 05.10.2021.
4. Learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for the first informant have opposed the revision and argued that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order. The trial Court has considered the entire facts and rejected the discharge application of revisionist by a reasoned order. It was submitted that the criminal revision filed by co-accused Niraj Anand against the rejection of her discharge application, has already been dismissed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 06.01.2023, passed in Criminal Revision No. 3443 of 2022. It was submitted that the allegations made in the first information report and material collected during investigation, discloses a prima facie case against the revisionist. At this stage matter cannot be examined meticulously and only it is to be seen whether a prima facie case is made out or not. It was submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order.
5. I have considered rival submissions and perused record.
6. In case of Geo Varghese vs. State of Rajashtan & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1164 of 2021), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"What is required to constitute an alleged abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC is there must be an allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the commission of offence of suicide and mere allegations of harassment of the deceased by another person would not be sufficient in itself, unless, there are allegations of such actions on the part of the accused which compelled the commission of suicide. Further, if the person committing suicide is hypersensitive and the allegations attributed to the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly situated person to take the extreme step of committing suicide, it would be unsafe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. Thus, what is required is an examination of every case on its own facts and circumstances and keeping in consideration the surrounding circumstances as well, which may have bearing on the alleged action of the accused and the psyche of the deceased."
In paragraph nos. 27, 28 and 30 of the aforesaid judgment it was held as under:
"27. It is a solemn duty of a teacher to instil discipline in the students. It is not uncommon that teachers reprimand a student for not being attentive or not being upto the mark in studies or for bunking classes or not attending the school. The disciplinary measures adopted by a teacher or other authorities of a school, reprimanding a student for his indiscipline, in our considered opinion, would not tantamount to provoking a student to commit suicide, unless there are repeated specific allegations of harassment and insult deliberately without any justifiable cause or reason. A simple act of reprimand of a student for his behaviour or indiscipline by a teacher, who is under moral obligations to inculcate the good qualities of a human being in a student would definitely not amount to instigation or intentionally aid to the commission of a suicide by a student.
28. ''Spare the rod and spoil the child' an old saying may have lost its relevance in present days and Corporal punishment to the child is not recognised by law but that does not mean that a teacher or school authorities have to shut their eyes to any indiscipline act of a student. It is not only a moral duty of a teacher but one of the legally assigned duty under Section 24 (e) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 to hold regular meetings with the parents and guardians and apprise them about the regularity in attendance, ability to learn, progress made in learning and any other act or relevant information about the child.
30. If, a student is simply reprimanded by a teacher for an act of indiscipline and bringing the continued act of indiscipline to the notice of Principal of the institution who conveyed to the parents of the student for the purposes of school discipline and correcting a child, any student who is very emotional or sentimental commits suicide, can the said teacher be held liable for the same and charged and tried for the offence of abetment of suicide under section 306 IPC."
7. It It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge or considering discharge application, the court is not to analyse reliability of the material on record. The evidentiary value and its credibility has to be considered at the stage of trial. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. At the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the material brought on record by prosecution is true and such material and documents have to be considered with a view to find out whether the facts emerging from such material when taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the offence.
8. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 39], considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, it was held that at the stage of framing of charge it is not obligatory for the Judge to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion, at the initial stage of framing of charge, is sufficient to frame the charge and in that event it is not open to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
9. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors [(1980) 1 SCR 323], the Apex Court held that the Magistrate at the stage of framing charges had to see whether the facts alleged and sought to be proved by the prosecution prima facie disclose the commission of offence on general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer.
10. In State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi and Others [(2000) 8 SCC 239], the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that at the stage of framing of charge the trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons.
11. In State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj and Others [(1997) 4 SCC 393] it was held that at Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
12. It is apparent from the above discussed decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court that at the stage of charge there can only be limited evaluation of materials and documents on record. At the stage of charge or consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the material brought on record by prosecution is true and such material and documents have to be considered with a view to find out whether the facts emerging from such material when taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the offence.
13. In the instant matter, perusal of record shows that the opposite party No.2/informant has lodged first information report of this case against the revisionist and co-accused Rajiv Sahgal and Niraj Anand, alleging that his daughter was student of class 9th in Alckon Public School, Mayur Vihar Phase-3, Delhi and she used to remain upset and that later on she told him that her two teachers, namely, Rajiv Sahgal and Niraj Anand were harassing her and they used to touch her inappropriately. The informant met the Principal (revisionist herein) and made a complaint against the said teachers but the revisionist threatened to remove the name of his daughter from the school. It was alleged that after that the said two teachers increased the harassment of the daughter of informant and they have failed her in their respective subjects. The informant again met the Principal but he has again threatened him. It was further alleged on that very day the informant saw that the alleged two teachers were laughing at him. It was alleged that on 20.03.2018 the daughter of informant told him on phone that she has prepared her course well but the said teachers would again fail her and that when the informant reached at his home, he found that his daughter has committed suicide.
14. Thus, it is apparent from perusal of record that only allegation against the revisionist is that when the informant has met him and made complaint against the conduct of alleged two teachers, namely, Rajeev Sahgal and Niraj Anand, the revisionist/Principal has threatened to cut off (remove) the name of his daughter from the school. There is no such allegation that the revisionist/accused did any physical overt act against the deceased girl. The allegations of touching the victim girl inappropriately were against the said two teachers. There is also no such allegation that in that connection the deceased girl has ever met the revisionist. It appears that the trial Court did not consider the matter in correct perspective and the discharge application of revisionist was rejected by merely observing that after collecting sufficient evidence, the Investigating Officer has filed charge-sheet against the accused/revisionist. It appears that neither the grounds taken in discharge application were considered by the trial Court nor it was considered whether the ingredients of offence under Section 306 IPC are satisfied so as to make out a prima facie case under Section 306 IPC against the revisionist. It is apparent from above stated facts that case of applicant is on different from from that of said co-accused Rajiv Sahgal and Niraj Anand. It is correct that at the stage of charge or considering the application of discharge, only it is to be seen whether a prima facie case is made out or not and that roving inquiry is not required to be made but nevertheless the Court is required to evaluate entire material and documents on record with a limited view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose existence of all ingredients constituting the alleged offence and that for this limited purpose, the Court may sift the evidence, as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all the prosecution version as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. Thus, it is apparent that the trial Court did not consider the matter in correct perspective and in accordance with law and thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
15. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order dated 16.08.2022 is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Court concerned to reconsider and decide the discharge application of revisionist afresh in accordance with law.
16. The revision is allowed in above terms."
Subsequent to above order, the discharge application filed by aforementioned accused was again rejected by Court below, vide order dated 26.06.2023. Against aforesaid order, aforementioned accused has again approached this Court by means of Criminal Revision No. 3886 of 2023 (Dharmendra Goyal Vs. State of U.P. and Another), wherein an interim order dated 02.08.2023 was passed by this Court. For ready reference, the same is reproduced herein under:-
"1. Heard Shri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. After hearing the learned counsel for the revisionist, notice is issued to the opposite party no.2, enabling him to file a response to the present revision, returnable at an early date. Learned A.G.A. may also file a response to the present revision if so desired.
2. The revisionist- Dharmendra Goyal has preferred the instant revision for setting aside the impugned order dated 26.6.2023, by which the learned trial court has dismissed the discharge application consequent upon the filing of charge-sheet against revisionist- Dharmendra Goyal and co-accused Rajeev Sehgal and Neeraj Anand.
3. The brief facts of the case are that on the written complaint of Raghav Shah- the complainant and the father of victim 'X'- stating that her daughter, a student of Class-IX, has committed suicide after having scolded, mis- appropriately touched and bullied by her teachers/co-accused, namely, Rajiv Sehgal and Neeraj Anand. The allegation of snubbing and instigation for committing suicide was also alleged against the revisionist- the Principal of the school. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, an F.I.R. bearing No.0202 under sections 306, 506, 354 I.P.C. read with section 7/8 POCSO Act was registered at P.S. Noida, Sector-24, District Gautam Budh Nagar, against the revisionist.
4. After completing the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against the revisionist and co-accused, Rajiv Sehgal and Neeraj Anand, under sections 306, 506, 354 I.P.C. read with section 7/8 POCSO Act. Aggrieved by the charge sheet, the revisionist preferred discharge application before the trial court and by order dated 16.8.2022, the learned trial court rejected the application for discharge.
5. After that, aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 16.8.2022, the revisionist preferred a Criminal Revision No.3589 of 2022 before this Court, and this Court by order dated 20.3.2023 has set aside the order dated 16.8.2022 passed by the trial court. The High Court was of the view that the learned trial court neither dealt with the grounds mentioned in the discharge application nor took into consideration the ingredients of section 306 I.P.C. while dealing with the discharge application, and with such findings, remitted the matter to the Court concerned to reconsider and decide the discharge application of the revisionist afresh in accordance with the law.
6. After receipt of the order dated 20.3.2023 passed by this Court in Criminal Revision No.3589 of 2022, the learned trial court again dismissed the discharge application vide the impugned order dated 26.6.2023. This is how this Court has seized the matter.
7. Mr. Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned counsel for the revisionist, invited the attention of the Court to the contents of F.I.R.; statement of the mother and brother of the victim recorded by police under section 161 Cr.P.C.; order dated 20.3.2023 passed by this Court in Criminal Revision No.3589 of 2022; order dated 15.5.2023 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No.(s)18429/2023 on the petition filed by co-accused Neeraj Anand. The submission of Mr. Shukla could be summarised as follows, besides other grounds made in the petition:
(i) The learned trial court mechanically passed the impugned order without application of mind and appreciation of material collected by police during the investigation. On perusal of the F.I.R., it reflects nowhere that the revisionist has, in any manner, threatened or intimidated the victim or caused any harm to her reputation or property. It is also not a case of the prosecution that the Principal has intentionally instigated or consciously made any attempt to lead the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option.
(ii) The learned trial court failed to consider the contents made in Parcha-2 of the C.D. and the back side of Parcha no.731735.
(iii) The learned trial court has also failed to consider the contents of C.D. No.5, wherein CBSE had constituted a Board for re-evaluation of the answer sheet of the victim in which she had been allegedly shown to be failed.
(iv) The learned trial court has also erred in appreciating the statement of the mother and brother of the victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
(v) The police is not the mouthpiece of the prosecution; its job is to extract the truth out of the material collected during the investigation and place it before the Court in the form of a charge-sheet or closure report/final report for taking cognizance, which is not done in the instant case.
(vi) The learned trial court has erred in not appreciating the prima-facie observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded in order dated 15.5.2023 passed in the petition filed by co-accused Neeraj Anand; its a matter of record that Ms. Neeraj Anand is a lady teacher, whereas on perusal of the contents of the F.I.R., it could prima-facie inferred that the complainant has addressed her as a male teacher, meaning thereby the complainant has never visited the school on the date and time as mentioned in the F.I.R. and never saw or interacted with them in the school or any of the teachers.
(vii) The learned trial court has also erred in not appreciating the ingredients of section 306 I.P.C. He further submits that on perusal of the entire charge sheet, not an iota of evidence surfaced during the investigation to satisfy the requirement of ingredients of section 306 I.P.C.
8. On perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the learned trial court has candidly relied upon the selective portion of the complainant's statement. The relevant portion is extracted herein below:-
मैं स्कूल से प्रधानाचार्य से मिलकर वापस अपने घर आया तो मेरी बेटी मानसिक रूप से बहुत दुखी थी और वह कहने लगी कि मैं कितनी पढ़ाई कर लूॅं लेकिन दोनों अध्यापक व प्रिंसिपल उसे फेल कर देंगे। मेरी बेटी के साथ हुआ यौन शोषण और परीक्षा में फेल होने दोनो कारणों से बहुत परेषान थी। मेरी पुत्री को इन दोनों कारणों से बचने का कोई रास्ता न पाकर दिनांक 20.03.2013 को आत्महत्या कर ली थी। मेरी बेटी ने उपरोक्त लोगों के उत्पीड़न से परेषान होकर आत्महत्या की है।
9. On perusal of the F.I.R., statement of the mother and brother of the victim, the contents of C.D. No.5, and documents annexed with the revision/petition, this Court prima-facie is of the view that;
(i). The complainant was unaware of the gender of the co-accused Ms. Neeraj Anand, at the time of registration of the F.I.R.
(ii). There are substantive improvements in the complainant's statement in supplementary statements.
(iii). On perusal of the statement of Master Aryan Raghav Sah and Smt. Deep Mala Nutan, wife of Shri Raghav Sah, its prima-facie revealed that the ingredients of section 306 I.P.C. are not made out from the contents of the F.I.R.
(iv) It is also reflected from the records, placed by the counsel for the revisionist, that the CBSE constituted a Board for re-evaluation of the answer-sheet of the victim, and it transpired that the marks have been given fairly. The evaluation was found to be correct. Reliance may be placed on page 270 of the revision/petition.
10. On perusal of the order dated 5.5.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the petition of co-accused Neeraj Anand, it transpires that Hon'ble Supreme Court has stayed the further proceedings against petitioner Ms. Neeraj Anand in Special Trial No.559 of 2018 arising out of Crime No.202 of 2018 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Gautam Budh Nagar.
11. In view of the observation hereabove, it's a case for a stay of the impugned order dated 26.6.2023.
12. The effect and operation of the impugned order dated 26.6.2023 passed by the trial court shall remain stayed during the pendency of the present criminal revision.
13. List this case on 10.10.2023.
14. The deliberation made herein above are purely tentative in nature and shall not tantamount to weighing of the strength of evidence collected by police during the investigation. The deliberations are solely for the purpose of adjudication of interim prayer for stay of proceedings qua the revisionist, and shall have no bearing on the final outcome of the revision/petition."
Aforementioned Criminal Revision is still pending.
(iii). Neeraj Anand. The discharge application filed by this accused was rejected by Court below, vide order dated 16.08.2022. Against above order, aforementioned accused approached this Court by means of Criminal Revision No. 3443 of 2022 (Ms. Neeraj Anand Vs. State of U.P. and Another). Aforementioned Criminal Revision was dismissed by this Court, vide order dated 06.01.2023. The order dated 06.01.2023 reads as under;-
"Heard Ms. Shama Begum, learned counsel for the revisionist, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and perused the record.
This revision has been filed by the revisionist for setting aside the order dated 16.08.2022 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act (First), Court No.16, Gautam Budh Nagar in discharge application under Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure in Special Trial No.559 of 2018 arising out of Case Crime No.202 of 2018, under Sections 306, 354, 506 IPC and Section 7/8 POCSO Act, Police Station Sector 24 Noida, Disrict Gautam Budh Nagar.
Learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the revisionist is innocent and has been falsely implicated. The revisionist has never committed any offence as alleged in the FIR. The complainant never visited a while in the school to attend the parents meeting and the victim who was mostly involved in other activities since last year. The study of the victim was also not satisfactory and when the result was declared, she was found fail, therefore, she has herself committed suicide. No alleged offence is made out against the revisionist but the investigating officer has submitted charge sheet against the revisionist and other co-accused persons on 6.10.2018 and the learned sessions judge has taken cognisance. Feeling aggrieved, the revisionist has filed discharge application on 26.4.2019 under Section 227 Cr.P.C., which was rejected vide order dated 16.08.2022 passed by Additional Sessions Judge without considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as evidence of witnesses.
On the other hand, learned A.G.A. and leaned counsel for opposite party no.2 supporting the impugned order, vehemently opposed and have submitted that while passing the impugned order, the court below has considered all aspects of the case. Nothing remain left to be considered.
After having heard the learned counsel for the parties present and perused the impugned order as well as the material brought on record, I am of the view that the impugned order is based upon relevant considerations and supported by cogent reasons. The impugned order does not suffer from any, illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional error and is based upon relevant considerations and supported by cogent reasons, hence, requires no interference by this Court. The revision devoid of merits and the same is hereby dismissed.
The revision is, accordingly, dismissed."
Feeling aggrieved by the above order dated 06.01.2023, aforementioned accused approached the Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 6560 of 2023 (Neeraj Anand Vs. The State of U.P.) and the Apex Court passed the following interim order;-
"Delay condoned.
Heard Mr. Pijush K. Roy, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The counsel would point out that the petitioner is a lady teacher in the school where the concerned student, because of failure in the examination, has committed suicide at her own residence on 21.03.2018. Yet the teachers and the Principal are roped in on the complaint of the deceased student's father.
It is pointed out that the Court should have favourably considered the discharge application of the petitioner as was done in the case of the Principal of the School on 20.03.2023 (Annexure P/9), by the High Court.
Issue notice, returnable in six weeks.
In the meantime, there shall be stay of further proceedings against the petitioner in Special Trial No. 559 of 2018 arising out of Crime No. 202 of 2018 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Gautam Budh Nagar."
Ultimately, aforementioned interim order was extended until further orders, vide order dated 23.02.2024, which reads as under;-
"Leave granted.
The interim order will continue during the pendency of the proceedings."
18. Since the matter is already engaging the attention of this Court in the case of co-accused Dharmendra Goel and that of the Supreme Court in case of another co-accused Neeraj Anand, justice demands that both the applications be heard together inasmuch as, the question of discharge of the accused in the concerned Sessions Trial is common. Furthermore, the material relied upon by the prosecution in support of the charge sheet/police report, submitted by the Investigating Officer in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is also substantially similar, therefore, it is not judicious to segregate the case of present revisionists and decide the same in ignorance of above. It is thus held that the present criminal revision filed by accused Rajeev @ Rajesh Sehgal requires consideration by this Court.
19. Notice on behalf of State-opposite party-1 has been accepted by the learned A.G.A. Mr. R.S. Yadav, Advocate has put in appearance on behalf of first informant-opposite party-2. All the opposite parties may file their respective counter affidavits within 4 weeks. Revisionists will have two weeks thereafter to file his rejoinder affidavits.
20. List these criminal revisions for admission before the appropriate Bench on 20.08.2025.
21. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also the facts and reasons recorded in the order dated 02.08.2023 passed by this Court in the case of co-accused Dharmendra Goel, as an interim measure, it is hereby provided that the effect and operation of the framing of charge order dated 01.02.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions/Special Judge, POCO (Second), Gautam Budh Nagar in Session Trial No.559 of 2018 (State of U.P. Vs. Dharmendra and others) arising out of Case Crime No.202 of 2018, Under Section 306, 354, 506 of I.P.C. and sections 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Sector 24 at Police Station Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar shall remain stayed during the pendency of present criminal revision.
22. The matter shall not be treated as tied up or part heard to this Bench.
Order Date :- 09.07.2025
Vinay
