Ashok Kumar And Others vs Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 1541 ALL

Allahabad High Court

Ashok Kumar And Others vs Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal ... on 3 July, 2025

Author: Shekhar Kumar Yadav

Bench: Shekhar Kumar Yadav

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:105331
 
A.F.R.
 
Reserved on:- 26.05.2025
 
Pronounced on:- 03.07.2025
 
Court No. - 36
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 45 of 2007
 
Appellant :- Ashok Kumar And Others
 
Respondent :- Bhartiya Jeevan Beema Nigam Mandal Karyalaya And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Divakar Rai Sharma,Arvind Srivastava
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Manish Goyal,Siddharth Singhal
 

 
CONNECTED WITH
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 70 of 2007
 
Appellant :- Bhartiya Jeevan Bima Nigam
 
Respondent :- Sri Chandra Shekhar And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- ,Divakar Rai Sharma,Siddharth Singhal
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Arvind Srivastava,D.R. Sharma
 
&
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 71 of 2007
 
Appellant :- Bhartiya Jeevan Bima Nigam
 
Respondent :- Sri Devendra Singh And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- ,Siddharth Singhal
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Arvind Srivastava,Divakar Rai Sharma
 

 
Hon'ble Shekhar Kumar Yadav,J.
 

Background of the Appeals

1. First Appeal No. 45 of 2007 has been filed by the appellants--Defendants No. 6, 7, and 8--while First Appeal No. 71 of 2007 has been preferred by the appellant-Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). Both appeals challenge the judgment and decree dated November 21, 2006, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 11, Aligarh, in Suit No. 1210 of 2004. By this judgment, the trial court partly decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff-LIC, declaring the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, executed in favor of Defendants No. 6 to 8, void and ineffective to the extent of 550 square yards.

2. First Appeal No. 70 of 2007 was filed by the plaintiff-appellant LIC under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated November 21, 2006, passed in Original Suit No. 1211 of 2004, in which LIC sought a decree declaring the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, void with respect to Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 15, each having an area of 450 square yards, carved out of Khasra No. 37 & 38. The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment insofar as it dismissed its claim for permanent injunction and prays that the suit be decreed in its entirety with costs. Separately, Defendants No. 1 to 5 (including heirs) have filed Cross-Objection No. 128636 of 2007, challenging the trial court's findings on Issues No. 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8.

3. Since all the aforementioned appeals pertain to the same subject matter, they are being decided together by this common judgment.

4. The plaintiff-LIC instituted Original Suit No. 1210 of 2004 seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, executed by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. in favor of Defendants No. 6 to 8, was void to the extent it pertained to 550 square yards of land, allegedly forming part of Khasra Nos. 33 and 34, Mauja Daulatabad, Aligarh. A decree of permanent injunction was also sought to restrain defendants-respondents from interfering with the said land. The trial court, by its judgment dated November 21, 2006, partly decreed the suit by declaring the impugned sale deed dated September 23, 2000, void to the extent of 550 square yards but declined to grant the relief of permanent injunction. Aggrieved, Defendants No. 6 to 8 filed First Appeal No. 45 of 2007, while LIC filed First Appeal No. 71 of 2007 against the denial of the injunction.

5. Mr. Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, assisted by Mr. Vineet Vikram, Advocate; Mr. Divakar Rai Sharma, learned counsel appearing in the cross-objection; and Mr. Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Divya Chaurasia, learned counsel for the appellant (LIC), were heard, and the record was perused.

6. The record discloses that the dispute pertains to 550 square yards of land forming part of the larger Khasra Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38, situated within Kailash Nagar Colony, Aligarh. The plaintiff-LIC claimed that the said portion was previously transferred to its predecessor, Swadeshi Insurance Company, through a sale deed dated July 23, 1954, executed by Lal Singh & Sons, who had acquired it under a sale deed dated August 3, 1949, from Bharat Stores Ltd. In contrast, Defendants No. 6 to 8 contended that they purchased the same land through a registered sale deed dated September 23, 2000, from Bharat Stores Ltd., acting through its attorney Sanjeev Kumar Maheshwari. The trial court held that since Bharat Stores had already divested itself of title to the said land in 1949, it had no authority to resell it in 2000, rendering the later sale deed null and void to the extent of 550 square yards. Defendants No. 6 to 8, however, contended valid title and possession over the land, submitting that there was a misappreciation of evidence, title by adverse possession, and an erroneous application of limitation law by the trial court.

7. In First Appeal No. 70 of 2007, LIC averred that Defendant No. 6 developed Kailash Nagar Colony over Khasra Nos. 33 to 38 by carving out 181 residential plots. Of these, Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 15, each measuring 450 square yards (total 1800 square yards), were sold to Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd. via a sale deed dated December 5, 1953. After the enactment of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd. merged with LIC, and the said plots vested in the plaintiff. LIC alleged that the defendants had attempted to interfere with its possession and challenged the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, as illegal, void, and ineffective.

8. Both suits filed by the plaintiff-LIC revolve around the title and possession of plots within Kailash Nagar Colony, allegedly developed by Bharat Stores Ltd. LIC's claim is based on sale deeds in favor of its predecessor, Swadeshi Bima Company. The defendants denied these claims.

Arguments of the Parties [Defendants' Arguments (Appeal No. 45 of 2007 & Cross Objection No. 128636 of 2007)]

9. In Appeal No. 45 of 2007, learned counsel for Defendants No. 6 to 8/appellants assailed the judgment on several grounds. They argued that neither LIC nor its predecessor, Swadeshi Bima Company, nor the predecessor of Defendant No. 1, Sri Lal Singh and Sons Harmonium Maker, took actual possession of the said land since July 23, 1954 (the date of the sale deed in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd. by Sri Lal Singh), nor from August 3, 1949 (the date of execution of the sale deed by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd., Agra, in favor of Sri Lal Singh and Sons Harmonium Maker). They also contended that title was not asserted for more than five decades, making Suit No. 1210 of 2004, instituted by the plaintiff for declaration of the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, in favor of Defendants No. 6, 7 & 8 by Defendant No. 9 as void, not only barred by time but also not maintainable in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

10. It was argued that LIC failed to produce any conclusive evidence showing either legal or physical possession. Furthermore, the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, was executed through a registered power of attorney and is presumed valid. It was also submitted that the defendants have made constructions and are in settled possession, which was overlooked by the trial court.

11. It was further submitted that the suit was barred by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950, as Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 were agricultural plots. The plaintiff's name was not recorded in the revenue records, nor was the plaintiff in possession of Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38. Therefore, the suit was barred by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950, as it amounted to a declaration of title of the plaintiff, whose name was not recorded over these Khasra plots.

12. It was argued that the trial court proceeded with manifest illegality in holding that, on account of the execution of the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, by Sri Lal Singh in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company, it was not necessary for a declaration of title, as revenue entries were irrelevant and pertained to fiscal entries. This view, they submitted, is contrary to the law settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the record.

13. A significant argument was that the suit was filed by an incompetent authority. Sri Suresh Kumar, who filed and signed the suit on behalf of the LIC, allegedly had no authority to present the suit, and the Zonal Manager had no authority to delegate any such power. It was further submitted that the signatures of the power of attorney, alleged to be the Zonal Manager, were not proved by any witnesses. Sri Suresh Kumar admitted that LIC had three Directors, namely, D.K. Mehrotra, George Mathew, and A.K. Das Gupta, and none of them had executed any power of attorney, nor had anyone seen any document authorizing the Zonal Manager to execute a power of attorney on behalf of LIC authorizing Sri Suresh Kumar to sign the plaint.

14. It was also argued that no issue was framed challenging the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, and in the absence of such an issue, no decision could have been made by the Trial Court about its validity.

15. Lastly, the appellants-defendants No. 6 to 8 contended that M/s Bharat Stores is admitted by the plaintiff to be the owner of Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 located at Mauja Daulatabad, District Aligarh. The plaintiff stated that M/s Bharat Stores carved out 181 plots over these Khasra plots for Kailash Nagar Colony, but no colony was ever constructed, nor was Plot No. 1, having an area of 550 square yards, allegedly sold to Lal Singh and Sons, the predecessor of Defendant No. 1, ever given effect to, nor was its location identifiable over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38. The sale deed dated August 3, 1949, executed by M/s Bharat Stores in favor of the predecessor of Defendant No. 1, is not on record despite being the basis of the suit. Hence, Plot No. 1 located over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 is not identifiable, and since the plot is not identifiable, no decree can be granted for unidentified plots, making the suit not maintainable.

LIC's Arguments

16. Learned senior counsel appearing for the LIC submitted that the non-framing of the issue regarding the validity of the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, is irrelevant as no prejudice was caused to Defendants No. 6 to 8. It was further submitted that in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, once the fact of transfer of possession is mentioned in the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, it cannot be contradicted by oral evidence. Since the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, is the source of LIC's title, there was no need for a separate declaration of title by LIC. Counsel for LIC submitted that once the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, was executed, the plaintiff became the co-owner of Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38, and the plaintiff has annexed a plaint map along with the plaint which clearly shows the plot numbers and their location; therefore, there is sufficient identification of the plots.

Defendants' Rebuttal to LIC's Arguments

17. In rebuttal, learned counsel for Defendants No. 6 to 8 argued that out of 181 plots allegedly carved out over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38, the location of Plot No. 1, area 550 sq. yards, was not identifiable after superimposing the map annexed with the plaint over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38. The map annexed with the plaint does not provide any identification of Plot No. 1 over these Khasra plots.

18. Secondly, it was submitted that no evidence was led to prove the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, which was the source of title for executing the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, nor was the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, brought on record. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence, severe prejudice is caused when the trial court decides the validity of the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, without any issue being framed. This act of the Trial Court is contrary to the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC.

19. With respect to the submission regarding Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was argued that Section 92 is not attracted to the plaintiff's case. The statement in the sale deed that the predecessor of the plaintiff was given possession of the plot is not a "term of the contract" but merely a "fact mentioned in the sale deed as a recital." Oral evidence can, therefore, be given to prove the contrary, which the defendant has done, proving that possession was never given to the plaintiff's predecessor.

20. It was further argued that the subsequent conduct of Defendant No. 9 and the predecessor of the plaintiff, by never giving effect to the sale deed executed by Defendant No. 9 in favor of the plaintiff's predecessor, clearly demonstrates that there was no intention to sell the property to the plaintiff's predecessor, and oral evidence can be given to demonstrate these facts. Furthermore, Proviso (1) and (6) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, clearly give the defendants the right to prove additional facts mentioned in the sale deed by means of oral evidence, which has been done by the defendant. The parties to the sale deed are not the same as Defendant No. 9 has not sold the property to the plaintiff; therefore, the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act are not applicable to the facts of the case.

21. It was also submitted that the appellant-plaintiff relied upon the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for discarding the oral evidence given in favor of the defendant, proving that the sale deed allegedly executed in favor of the predecessor of the plaintiff was never given effect to. It is submitted that the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, applies only to the terms of the document and not to the facts mentioned in the documents. The rule is therefore not infringed by the introduction of parole evidence contradicting or explaining the instruments in some of its recitals of facts. There is nothing in this section to exclude evidence which is not a term of the contract but a recital in the contract itself. A document may contain a fact itself, and this recital may be traversed by giving oral evidence. It was further submitted that the subsequent conduct of the parties signing the documents and the surrounding circumstances are also relevant for determining the intention of the parties, and oral evidence can be given to prove the recitals in the documents.

22. The plaintiff's submission that courts can adjudicate the validity of the sale deeds despite no issue being framed with respect to the challenge of the sale deed executed in 2000 in favor of the defendant is a misconceived submission.

23. It was further submitted that since no issue was framed for adjudicating the validity of the sale deed executed in 2000 in favor of the defendant, no evidence was laid by the defendant to prove the sale deed executed in 2000. Consequently, the sale deed could not have been declared void by the learned trial court. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs D. Raghukul Pershad (Dead) By Lrs and others, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 584.

Arguments in Appeal No. 71 of 2007 (LIC vs. Defendants No. 6-8)

24. In Appeal No. 71 of 2007, learned Senior Counsel appearing for LIC reiterated the submission raised in Appeal No. 45 of 2007.

25. In rebuttal, learned counsel for Defendants No. 6 to 8 reiterated the submission made in Appeal No. 45 of 2007.

Arguments in Appeal No. 70 of 2007 (LIC vs. Defendants No. 1-5)

26. In Appeal No. 70 of 2007, the counsel for the LIC submitted that in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, once the fact of transfer of possession is mentioned in the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, it cannot be contradicted by oral evidence. Therefore, the trial court erred in relying upon oral evidence in holding that the plaintiff was not in possession. It was further submitted that since the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, is the source of LIC's title, there was no need for a declaration of title by LIC. Counsel for LIC submitted that once the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, was executed, the plaintiff became the co-owner of Plot No. 37 & 38, and the plaintiff has annexed a plaint map along with the plaint which clearly shows the plot numbers and their location; therefore, there is sufficient identification of the plots.

27. In rebuttal, learned counsel for Defendants No. 1 to 5 submitted that Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972, is not attracted to the plaintiff's case because the statement in the sale deed that the predecessor of the plaintiff was given possession of the plot is not a "term of the contract" but only a "fact mentioned in the sale deed as a recital." Oral evidence can be given to prove the contrary, which has been provided by the defendant, proving that possession was never given to the predecessor of the plaintiff. It is further argued that the subsequent conduct of Defendant No. 6 and the predecessor of the plaintiff, namely, Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd., in never giving effect to the sale deed executed by Defendant No. 6 in favor of the predecessor of the plaintiff, clearly demonstrates that there was no intention to sell the property to the predecessor of the plaintiff, and oral evidence could be given to demonstrate these facts. Further submission is that Proviso (1) and (6) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, clearly give the defendants the right to prove additional facts mentioned in the sale deed by means of oral evidence, which has been done by the defendant. The parties to the sale deed are not the same as Defendant No. 6 has not sold the property to the plaintiff; therefore, the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act are not applicable to the facts of the case.

Defendants' Cross-Objection Arguments (Appeal No. 70 of 2007)

28. In the cross-objection filed by Defendants No. 1 to 5 in Appeal No. 70 of 2007, learned counsel for Defendants No. 1 to 5 assailed the judgment on the grounds that neither LIC nor its predecessor, Swadeshi Bima Company, ever took actual possession of the said land since December 5, 1953 (the date of the sale deed in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd.), nor asserted title for more than five decades. Hence, Suit No. 1211 of 2004, instituted by the plaintiff for a declaration of the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, with respect to the title of Defendants No. 1 to 5 as void, was not only barred by time in view of Section 27 of the Limitation Act and Article 65 of the Limitation Act (and the admission of the plaintiff that M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. had sold the property to the defendants and also handed over its possession to Defendants No. 1 to 5) but was also not maintainable in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and also not identifiable.

29. It was argued that LIC failed to produce any conclusive evidence showing either legal or physical possession. Further, the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, was executed through a registered power of attorney and is presumed valid. It was also submitted that the defendants have made constructions and are in settled possession, which was overlooked by the trial court. It is further submitted that the suit was barred by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950, as Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38 were agricultural plots. The plaintiff's name was not recorded in the revenue record, nor was the plaintiff in possession of Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38. Therefore, the suit was barred by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950, as it amounted to a declaration of title of the plaintiff whose name was not recorded over Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38.

30. It was submitted that the trial court proceeded with manifest illegality in holding that on account of the execution of the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, by Defendant No. 6 in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company, it was not necessary for a declaration of title as the revenue entries were irrelevant and pertained to fiscal entries. This view of the trial court is contrary to the law settled by the Apex Court and the record.

31. It was further submitted that the suit was filed by an incompetent authority as Sri Suresh Kumar, who filed and signed the suit on behalf of the LIC, had no authority to present the suit on behalf of the LIC, and the Zonal Manager had no authority to delegate any power. It was further submitted that the signature of the power of attorney, alleged to be the Zonal Manager, was not proved by any witnesses. Sri Suresh Kumar admitted that LIC had three directors, namely, D.K. Mehrotra, George Mathew, and A.K. Das Gupta, and none of them had executed any power of attorney, nor has anyone seen any document which authorized the Zonal Manager to execute a power of attorney on behalf of LIC authorizing Sri Suresh Kumar to sign the plaint on behalf of LIC.

32. It was further submitted by the appellant-defendants No. 6 to 8 that M/s Bharat Stores is admitted to be the owner of Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38 located at Mauja Daulatabad, District Aligarh, by the plaintiff. The plaintiff stated that M/s Bharat Stores carved out 181 plots over these Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38 for the purpose of making Kailash Nagar Colony, but no colony was ever constructed, nor were Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15, each having an area of 450 sq. yards, allegedly sold to Swadeshi Bima Company, ever given effect to, nor was their location identifiable over Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38. Hence, Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15 located over Khasra Plot Nos. 37 & 38 are not identifiable, and since the plots are not identifiable, no decree can be granted for unidentified plots, making the suit not maintainable. It was further submitted that Defendants No. 1 to 5 were in possession over Khasra Plot No. 37 & 38, and in view of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, they have title over it.

33. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the LIC submitted that since the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, is the source of LIC's title, there was no need for a declaration of title by LIC. It was submitted by counsel for the LIC that once the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, was executed, the plaintiff became the co-owner of Plot No. 37 & 38, and the plaintiff has annexed a plaint map along with the plaint which clearly shows the plot number and its location; therefore, there is sufficient identification of the plots.

Issues Framed by the Trial Court

34. In Suit No. 1210 of 2004, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:

(I) Whether the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the disputed property? If yes, what is its effect?

(II) Whether the sale deed dated 24.01.2004 is void and ineffective, as alleged in the plaint?

(III) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 27 of the Limitation Act?

(IV) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Sections 34, 38, and 41 of the Specific Relief Act?

(V) Whether the suit has been undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient?

(VI) Whether this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit, as stated in the written statement? If yes, what is its effect?

(VII) Relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to.

(VIII) Whether the person who signed and verified the plaint has the authority to file the suit? If not, what is its effect?

35. In Suit No. 1211 of 2004, the trial court framed the following issues:

(I) Whether the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the disputed property? If yes, what is its effect?

(II) Whether the sale deed dated 23.09.2000 is liable to be cancelled on the grounds stated in the plaint? If yes, what is its effect?

(III) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 27 of the Limitation Act?

(IV) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Sections 34, 38, and 41 of the Specific Relief Act?

(V) Whether the suit has been undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient?

(VI) Whether this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit?

(VII) Relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to.

(VIII) Whether the person who signed the plaint has the authority to file the suit? If not, what is its effect?

Analysis of Possession and Identification (Issues No. 1)

36. Issue No. 1: Whether the plaintiff-LIC has title and possession over Plot No. 1, area 550 sq. yards over Khasra Plot No. 33 & 38, and Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15, area 450 sq. yards each, over Khasra Plot No. 33, 37 & 38, in Suit No. 1210 of 2004 & 1211 of 2004. Since issue no. 1 in both the suits is common hence it is being dealt with jointly.

37. Defendants No. 9 in Suit No. 1210 of 2004 who is also Defendant No. 6 in Suit No. 1211 of 2004, in its written statements, admitted that it was the owner of Khasra No. 34 to 38 and that a sale deed dated September 23, 2000, was executed in favor of Defendants No. 6, 7 & 8 of Suit No. 1210 of 2004, and Defendants No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Suit No. 1211 of 2004. It categorically denied that any colony was developed over Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, & 38, nor were any Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14, & 15 carved out over these plots. It denied the existence of any developed colony with roads or parks on the ground, asserting that the colony was merely on paper. It contended that the plots mentioned in the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, and sale deed dated December 5, 1953, were unidentifiable due to lack of plotting and demarcation on site, and that Swadeshi Bima Nigam or LIC or the predecessor of Defendant No. 1 in Suit No. 1210 of 2004 never obtained possession. It also stated that any rights LIC might have had were extinguished by Section 27 of the Limitation Act. The maintainability of the suit was also challenged on various grounds, including lack of proper authorization to file the suit, and being barred by Sections 34, 38, and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.

38. LIC's claim rested on the assertion that Plot No. 1, measuring 550 square yards, had been transferred in 1949 to Lal Singh & Sons and later auctioned to Swadeshi Bima Company in 1954. However, no sale deed dated August 3, 1949, was brought on record. Furthermore, material evidence of ownership and possession remained unsubstantiated. Crucially, P.W.-1, Suresh Kumar, a witness for the plaintiff, admitted that no demarcation or survey had ever been conducted over the property in dispute. He deposed under cross-examination as under:

"LIC does not maintain any record identifying Plot No. 1 on Khasra Nos. 33, 34, 37, 38. I have not seen any document showing that Plot No. 1 was demarcated or occupied by LIC. I do not know on which exact part of the Khasra numbers Plot No. 1 is situated."

39. Similarly, P.W.-2, Rakesh Kumar, deposed:

"I have no personal knowledge of previous possession. No site verification has been done by LIC. The property on site is not demarcated."

40. The trial court observed that no plotting or development had been done over Khasra Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38, and that the alleged plots never came into existence. The court remarked:

"This property is not demarcated on site. The location of Plot No. 1, as they state, also does not reveal that Plot No. 1 exists on site. Since they have failed to prove the on-site situation according to the lengths and widths of the boundaries shown in the map."

41. The admissions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, when read in conjunction with the trial court's observations, strongly support the defendants' plea that the property was unidentifiable on the ground. The plaintiff's own witnesses conceded the absence of plot numbers, development, or any possession.

42. The trial court failed to consider that since the plaintiff had not proved the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, nor the identity of the land purportedly covered by it. In the absence of cogent evidence identifying the land covered by the 1949 and 2000 sale deeds as the same, the findings of the court below declaring the sale deed dated 23.09.2000 as void are perverse. A decree for injunction concerning an unidentifiable subject matter is unexecutable and contrary to settled legal principles. In Rishikesh v. Harikesh and Others, 2019 (1) ADJ 678, this Court held that a decree cannot be granted for property that is not clearly identifiable. It was observed that where there exists a discrepancy between the description of the property in the plaint and that in the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff, rendering the identity of the property uncertain, the plaintiff cannot be said to have established their title or possession. The Court further emphasized that in the absence of clear demarcation or reliable evidence establishing the boundaries or location of the disputed property, the claim is liable to fail. The judgment reinforces the well-settled principle that no relief can be granted in respect of vague or unidentifiable immovable property.

43. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Pawan Kumar Dutt and another Vs. Shakuntala Devi and others, (2010) 5 SCC 601, and Nahar Singh vs. Harnak Singh (1996) 6 SCC 699, held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance if the property is not identifiable. The relevant paragraph from Pawan Kumar Dutt is extracted below:

"10.3. In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in [(2010) 15 SCC 601] (supra) it has been held as follows:- 7. It is clear from the suit agreement that no boundaries of the suit property which was sold are specified in the agreement. It is not clear from what point the area is to be measured. It is also not clear that these 4 bighas 2 biswas is a portion of the land situated in the middle of the total land or in one portion or at the extreme end or at a particular place, in other words, there is no clear identity of the property agreed to be sold. The Courts are not expected to pass a decree which is not capable of enforcement in the courts of law. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellants is to be accepted and if a decree is to be granted for specific performance, without identification of the suit property, it will not be possible to enforce such a decree. In a judgment reported in (1996) 6 SCC 699 (supra), it has been held that, if the property itself cannot be identified, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted."

44. The Trial court correctly emphasized that the critical requirement for relief was the establishment of identifiable and exclusive possession. The oral testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 revealed that LIC had neither conducted any survey nor could identify the exact plots. The discrepancy in maps (Papers 34G and 70G) further cast doubt on the demarcation, location, and identification.

45. In the absence of specific identification and proof of exclusive possession, mere co-ownership does not entitle the plaintiff to an injunction or a declaration voiding a sale deed executed by another co-owner, especially when the plaintiff's own possession is not clearly established and his title and claim over the plot in dispute is barred by time. The burden of proving specific identity and possession of the disputed plots lay on the plaintiff, which was not discharged.

46. The trial court correctly concluded that there was no proof of exclusive possession. The principle that the possession of one co-owner is the possession of all is settled; however, a co-owner seeking an injunction must demonstrate unlawful interference or ouster. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, has clarified that such relief cannot be granted in the absence of proof of specific title and possession.

47. So far as the title of the plaintiff over Plot No. 33 & 34 and Plot No. 37 & 38 is concerned, after considering the trial court judgment and the respective arguments made by learned counsel for the parties, this court finds that its findings on this issue are perverse and based upon misreading of evidence and misconception of the provisions of law. The sale deed dated August 3, 1949, which allegedly gave title to Sri Lal Singh and Sons, who purportedly sold Plot No. 1 located over Plot No. 33 & 34 to Swadeshi Bima Company, the predecessor of LIC, was not on record nor was it proved nor given effect to. Similarly, the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, allegedly executed by Defendant No. 6 of Suit No. 1211 of 2004 in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company Ltd., was not proved nor was it ever given effect to. This was categorically reiterated by Defendant No. 6 in his written statement in paragraph No. 8, stating that the alleged sale deed dated December 5, 1953, was never made effective at the spot. The relevant paragraph is quoted below:

"alleged sale deed dated 5.12.1953 was never made effective at the spot, because though Bharat Stores Ltd Agra had purchased land in village Daulatabad, Aligarh to make a colony and map of the proposed colony was prepared but in fact, Bharat Stores Ltd, Agra could not make plotting, parks and roads there because of the reasons best known to the then Directors..."

48. Similar averments were also made by Defendant No. 9 in Suit No. 1210 of 2004. The relevant paragraph is quoted below:

"But as such proposed colony could never be made at spot, the purchasers, if any could not get actual possession at the spot also for want to demarcations of plots at sit. As such purchasers, if any, did not take any action to get charged out these plots at site and to take possession over their allegedly purchased plots for long lapse of time, so their rights and remedy, if any stood lost in view of Section 27 of Limitation Act."

49. The witnesses produced by the plaintiff have categorically stated that details of LIC's properties were maintained in a property register and several other documents, but none of these documents have been produced by the LIC to show whether Plot No. 1, 12, 13, 14 & 15, allegedly located over Khasra No. 33, 34, 37 & 38, are recorded in these registers. The relevant part (translated from Hindi) is quoted below:

"Suresh Kumar admitted in his statement that LIC maintains property registers and files regarding all its properties, and he had seen this register on May 24, 2004. That property register could have been the most important evidence in this regard. The non-production before the court of whether the property transferred by Lal Singh & Sons to Swadeshi Bima Company in the form of a plot is recorded in LIC's records indicates that LIC never acquired this property nor ever took possession of it. (Suit No. 1210 of 2004)

Regarding the learned counsel for the defendant's argument that the LIC's property register, which records all its properties, as admitted by PW-1 Suresh Kumar in his statement (Paper No. 53C), was not produced before the court. He admits in his statement that he has seen this register of LIC's properties and that details of all LIC's properties are recorded in that register. This witness clarified that he had seen this register on May 24, 2004. He admits that he did not verify Khasra No. 33, 34, 37, 38 on site, but he wants to verify his plot. The non-production of that property register in court will not adversely affect the plaintiff's rights, because the document by which the plaintiff acquired rights in this property has been filed in original form as Paper 33-Ka. In the above situation, after Swadeshi Bima Company, LIC will be considered the full owner of this property. (Suit No. 1211 of 2004)"

50. The trial court, while deciding Suit No. 1211 of 2004 and Suit No. 1210 of 2004, has given contradictory findings. While deciding Suit No. 1211 of 2004, the trial court illegally ignored the effect of non-production of the property register, despite the categorical admission by the plaintiff's own witnesses that all LIC's properties are recorded in the property register. This register was deliberately not brought on record to show that Plot No. 1, 12, 13, 14 & 15 are entered in it. Instead of drawing an adverse inference from the non-production of this crucial evidence, the court held that its non-production would have no effect in Suit No. 1211 of 2004, while in Suit No. 1210 of 2004, it held that its non-production clearly demonstrated that LIC had no title over it. Thus, the findings given by the trial court suffer from perversity and non-application of mind, besides being contradictory. In the absence of the sale deed, which is the source of the plaintiff's title, and in the absence of the contents of the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, having not been proved, nor the sale deed ever having been given effect to (which is evident from the conduct of the parties to the sale deeds dated August 3, 1949, and December 5, 1953), the trial court has made an error apparent on the face of the record by ignoring to consider these aspects in declaring the plaintiff as having title over Plot No. 33, 34, 37 & 38 and blindly relying upon the sale dated dated 5.12.1953 paper no. 33 ka which has not been proved in consonance with Section 90 and 90-A of the Indian Evidence Act.

51. In addition, learned counsel for the Defendants-Respondents submitted that Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act establishes that possession follows title. They argued that since the Plaintiff-LIC never had actual possession, title effectively rests with the Defendants. They maintained that Bharat Stores Ltd. retained possession until the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, after which the Defendants (Nos. 6-8) took possession, and their names were duly mutated in the revenue records. The LIC-Plaintiff, however, contended that possession passed to it by operation of law following the merger.

52. This Court acknowledges the significant role that possession plays as evidence of title. The oral evidence strongly favors the Defendants. P.W.-1 (Suresh Kumar) admitted that Bharat Stores Ltd. initially held possession, and thereafter, the appellants (Defendants Nos. 6-8) came into possession. He also conceded that the names of Lal Singh, Swadeshi Bima Company, or LIC were never recorded in the revenue records, while the Khasra-Khatauni reflects the property in the names of Chandra Shekhar, Narendra Kumar Maheshwari, and previously Bharat Stores Ltd. Further, P.W.-2 (Rakesh Kumar Saxena) confirmed that Defendants Nos. 6-8 purchased the property from Bharat Stores Ltd. on September 23, 2000, and are in possession as owners. The trial court's own findings--that "this entire property is in the possession of the Defendants Nos. 6 to 8" and that "no doubt remains that this entire property is in their possession"--corroborate these admissions. Taken together with the revenue records, the evidence establishes that the Plaintiff was never in actual possession, while the Defendants are in actual physical possession of the property.

53. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that, in view of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, no oral evidence should be considered for proving the plaintiff's possession over the disputed plot once the sale deeds dated December 5, 1953, and July 23, 1954, acknowledge that possession has been transferred to Swadeshi Bima Company. The counsel for Defendants No. 6 to 8 and 1 to 5 submitted that no such arguments were pressed before the trial court and, therefore, cannot be considered. Furthermore, Section 92 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to the facts of this case as neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were parties to the sale deeds dated December 5, 1953, and July 23, 1954, nor is the fact of possession recorded in the aforesaid sale deeds, is a term of the sale deed. Besides this, the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, is not brought on record nor has it been proved.

54. It is well settled that when no arguments are pressed before the trial court, it is not open for the appellate court to consider those arguments and consider the judgment passed by the trial court on grounds that were never pressed before it. Furthermore, the recording of the fact of possession in the sale deeds dated December 5, 1953, and July 23, 1954, is not a term of the document on the basis of which the parties to the sale deed had agreed to transfer the title; therefore, oral evidence can be given.

55. The provision of Section 92 is not at all attracted to the present case set up by the plaintiff because the statement given in the sale deed that the predecessor of the plaintiff was given possession of the plot is not a "term of the contract" but only a "fact mentioned in the sale deed as a recital." Oral evidence can be given to prove the contrary, which has been provided by the defendant, proving that possession was never given to the predecessor of the plaintiff. The subsequent conduct of M/s Bharat Stores Ltd and the predecessor of the plaintiff, in never giving effect to the sale deed executed by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. in favor of the predecessor of the plaintiff, clearly demonstrates that there was no intention to sell the property to the predecessor of the plaintiff, and oral evidence could be given to demonstrate these facts. Proviso (1) and (b) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, clearly give the defendants the right to prove additional facts mentioned in the sale deed by means of oral evidence, which has been done by the defendant. The parties to the sale deed are not the same as Defendant No. 9 has not sold the property to the plaintiff; therefore, the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act are not applicable to the facts of the case. The appellant-plaintiff has relied upon the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for discarding the oral evidence given in favor of the defendant, proving that the sale deed allegedly executed in favor of the predecessor of the plaintiff was never given effect to. The provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, applies only to the terms of the document and not to the facts mentioned in the documents. The rule is therefore not infringed by the introduction of parole evidence contradicting or explaining the instruments in some of its recitals of facts. There is nothing in this section to exclude evidence which is not a term of the contract but a recital in the contract itself. A document may contain the fact itself, and this recital may be traversed by giving oral evidence. The subsequent conduct of the parties signing the documents and the surrounding circumstances are also relevant for determining the intention of the parties, and oral evidence can be given to prove the recitals in the documents. Proviso (1) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, clearly provides that any fact may be proved which invalidates any document on the ground that the document suffers from a mistake of law. Furthermore, Proviso (6) of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts. It should be noted that the existence of facts of the contract is quite distinct from the proof of the terms of the contract. In any document where there is a statement of fact other than the terms of the contract, oral evidence can be placed to prove or disprove the fact. In the sale deed which is the subject matter of the case, the fact of transfer of possession mentioned in the sale deed is not a term of the contract/document. The trial court has rightly, after appreciating evidence, found that the plaintiff was unable to prove its possession over Plot No. 1 and Plot Nos. 12, 13, 14 & 15 over Khasra Plot No. 33, 34, 37 & 38, or that the sale deeds dated August 3, 1949, July 23, 1954, and December 5, 1953, were ever given effect to.

56. Issue No. 2: Whether the sale deed dated January 24, 2004, is void and ineffective, as alleged in the plaint?

57. In Suit No. 1210 of 2004, it is evident that no issue was framed challenging the validity of the Sale deed dated September 23, 2000, with respect to Plot No. 33 & 34, over which Plot No. 1 has allegedly been carved out.

58. The trial court, while deciding Suit No. 1210 of 2004, declared the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, as void without any issue being framed to declare it as such and challenging it. No evidence was led to prove the title of the plaintiff over Plot No. 33 & 34 as the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, which was the basic sale deed through which title was conferred upon the predecessor of the plaintiff, was neither brought on record nor proved.

59. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs D. Raghukul Pershad (Dead) By Lrs and others, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 584, in paragraph 6, held as under:

"We have considered the submissions of Mr. P.S. Narsimha and we find that although plea was raised by the appellants in their written statement that the execution of the lease deed in the present case, as well as payment of rent pursuant to the lease deed were under mistake of fact, no issue as such was framed by the trial court on whether the lease deed was executed by mistake of fact. This issue is an issue of fact and it is at the stage of trail that this issue will have to be raised and framed by the trial court so that parties could lead evidence on the issue. In this case, as this issue has not been framed, parties have to adduced evidence and no finding as such has been recorded by the trial court on this issue. Hence, we are not in a position to consider the argument of Mr. P.S. Narsimha that the lease deed was executed and the rent was paid by mistake of fact."

60. It is amply clear that since no issue has been framed for adjudicating the validity of the sale deed executed in the year 2000 in favor of the defendant, the sale deed could not have been declared as void by the learned trial court. Thus, without framing an issue, the trial court acted with manifest illegality in declaring the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, with respect to Plot No. 33 & 34, as void.

61. After reviewing the trial court's judgment and the discussion therein, this Court finds that its findings on this issue appear contradictory. Although the court acknowledged that no plotting existed on the ground and that the Plaintiff failed to prove the specific demarcation of Plot Nos. 1, 13, 14 & 15 over Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37 & 38, it nevertheless proceeded to declare the Defendants' sale deed partially void based on an assumed overlap. Given the absence of identifiable plots and the Plaintiff's failure to establish clear prior possession of a demarcated area, the basis for partially invalidating the Defendants' sale deed becomes questionable. The evidence from P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 regarding the non-demarcation of plots directly undermines the premise of an overlapping area.

62. The sale deed dated September 23, 2000, was executed by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd., the recorded owner of Khasra Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38. The appellants were bona fide purchasers for value, and the land sold was contiguous, undivided, and in the physical possession of the vendors. The claim that Bharat Stores Ltd. had previously transferred Plot No. 1 in 1949 remains unsupported by any document; no possession was ever transferred, nor was any mutation effected in favor of the Plaintiff or its predecessor.

63. The record discloses that the witnesses DW-2 Rakesh and DW-1 Prempal categorically admitted that Defendants-appellants Nos. 6, 7, and 8 were in possession of the disputed plot and that no separate plotting was ever undertaken over Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38. They stated:

"The entire land of Bharat Stores Ltd. is in single possession; no plotting was ever done. The defendants (Nos. 6 to 8) are in full possession of the entire land."

64. Despite recording this categorical finding, the trial court erroneously invalidated the 2000 sale deed on the mere assumption that it overlapped with the 1949 transaction--a deed that was neither proved nor placed on record nor given effect to by the parties of the deed. In the circumstances, the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, is valid and was executed by a competent party with respect to unencumbered property.

65. Learned counsel for the Defendants-Respondents further contended that the trial court's presumption of the validity of the sale deed dated August 3, 1949, under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act was a misinterpretation of law. It was argued that since the original sale deed was not presented, the presumption under Section 90 should not apply to an unproven document, which was the basis of the suit.

66. The Court agrees with the Defendants-Respondents.

67. The application of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act requires strict adherence to its provisions. P.W.-1 admitted that the crucial "property register," which could have confirmed the transfer to LIC's records, was not presented in court. Furthermore, the original sale deed dated August 3, 1949--the basis of the suit--was not on record. The Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify its non-production or to lay a foundation for secondary evidence. The Supreme Court has clarified that the presumption under Section 90 applies to original documents, not to copies, and that it should come from proper custody unless specific conditions are met, which were never proved by the plaintiff to exist Accordingly, the trial court's reliance on this presumption was erroneous, and its misinterpretation of Section 90 constitutes manifest illegality.

68. Regarding issue no. 2 in suit no. 1211 of 2004, the trial court proceeded with manifest illegality in declaring the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, void with respect to plot nos. 12, 13, 14 & 15 over khasra plot nos. 37 & 38. This declaration was made without any material to prove the contents of the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, and despite overwhelming evidence demonstrating that the latter deed was never given effect to and there being no evidence that it was produced from valid custody following the provisions of Section 90 and 90A of the Indian Evidence Act.

69. Issue no. 3: Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 27 of the Limitation Act? This issue is common to both suits. The trial court, while deciding Suit nos. 1210 & 1211, failed to address the specific contention raised by the defendants that the suit challenging the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, is barred by limitation under Section 27 of the Limitation Act and Article 65 of the Limitation Act. This constitutes a manifest illegality.

70. Section 27 of the Limitation Act states: "Section 27 - Extinguishment of right to property -- At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished."

71. This section clearly indicates that if a person fails to file a lawsuit for possession of property within the prescribed limitation period, their right to that property is extinguished. In essence, if legal action to reclaim property is not taken within the statutory time limit, ownership rights are permanently lost. The right initially obtained by Swadeshi Insurance Company stands extinguished by the operation of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, as neither Swadeshi Insurance Company nor, subsequently, the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) ever obtained actual possession of the property by filing suit for specific relief nor did any suit for declaration of title was filed by the plaintiff for more than 50 years. Section 27 emphasizes that for any immovable property, if no steps are taken to secure possession or assert ownership within the statutory period of twelve years, the original owner's entire rights in that property are extinguished.

72. A perusal of the evidence on record, particularly the statements of witnesses produced by the plaintiff and defendants, and the pleadings recorded by the trial court, makes it amply clear that the plaintiff or its predecessor were never in possession of the property, nor were their names recorded in the revenue records. In view of Section 27 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act, their right to sue for a declaration of title over plot nos. 33, 34, 37 & 38 stands extinguished after 50 years from 5.12.1953 and 3.08.1949. Furthermore, the limitation period for challenging the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, is three years, and the suit was filed beyond this period. On this ground alone, the suits were barred by limitation.

73. Issue no. 4: Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Sections 34, 38, and 41 of the Specific Relief Act? This issue is also common to both suits. In both cases, the trial court correctly held that the suits were barred under the provisions of Sections 34, 38 & 41 of the Specific Relief Act.

74. Counsel for the plaintiff has been unable to dislodge the findings given by the court below.

75. The findings given by the trial court are correct as the plaintiff has been unable to demonstrate that there arose any cause of action of filing the suit. Trial Court in both the suits recorded a categorical findings of fact after appreciating evidences that no cause of action arose for filing the suit.

76. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has not been able to demonstrate any perversity in the findings recorded by the Trial Court.

77. In addition to this suits are also barred by Sections 34, 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act on the following grounds.

78. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Vasantha (Dead) through L.R. v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) through L.Rs., 2024 INSC 109, reiterated the settled legal position that a suit for mere declaration without seeking consequential relief, such as possession, is not maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It was further held that where the right to sue had clearly accrued long before the institution of the suit, and the plaintiff failed to take timely action, such a suit is barred by limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court emphasized that mere inaction over a long period disentitles a party from declaratory relief, particularly where rival claims are evident and the delay remains unexplained.

79. Similarly, in Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust Virudhunagar Vs Chandran and others, (2017) 3 SCC 702, the Supreme Court held that a suit for mere declaration of title without seeking the consequential relief of possession is not maintainable when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. The Court emphasized that under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a person out of possession must necessarily pray for recovery of possession along with a declaration. It also noted that the plaintiff failed to prove title and did not properly describe the property in dispute, rendering the claim unsustainable. The relevant portion of the judgment, paragraphs 32 to 35, is quoted below:

"32. One of the submissions made before the courts below, on behalf of the defendant, was that the suit for mere declaration when the plaintiff was not in possession of the property, was not maintainable and hit by Section 34 of The Specific Reliefs Act, 1963, the plaintiff having not sought for recovery of possession. 33. Trial court, after considering the aforesaid submissions, recorded its conclusions in para 14 which is to the following effect: "From the facts of above cited suit, plaintiff in this suit has prayed for the relief of declaration without seeking the relief of recovery of possession and under these circumstances, it is clearly seen that the plaintiff is not entitled to get such relief. Therefore, it is held that the suit is not maintainable legally."

34. Section 34 of the Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 provides as follows: "Section 34:- Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.-Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:

Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. ..... ..... ...."

35. In the present case, the plaintiff having been found not to be in possession and having only sought for declaratory reliefs, the suit was clearly not maintainable and has rightly been dismissed by the trial court."

80. Similar views have been taken in the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in M. K. Rappai and Others Vs John and Others, 1969 (2) SCC 590 (para-10); Ram Saran and Another Vs Smt Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60 (para-4); Meharchand Das s Lal Babu Siddique and others, (2007) 14 SCC 253 (para-12); and Union of India Vs Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148.

81. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a catena of decisions, has consistently held that in suits for injunction, the plaintiff must prove settled possession of the property. If possession is disputed or not clearly established, a suit for a bare injunction may not be maintainable; the plaintiff might then be required to seek declaratory relief and/or relief for possession. In Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) By Lrs & Ors., 2008 (4) SCC 594, the principles regarding when a suit for a bare injunction is maintainable--and when a suit for declaration of title and/or possession is necessary--were clearly laid down. The Supreme Court elucidated that when a defendant raises a substantial dispute over the plaintiff's title, a mere suit for injunction is inadequate, and the plaintiff must seek a declaration of title and possession.

82. In Meharchand Das Vs Lal Babu Siddique and others, (2007) 14 SCC 253, the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed that a suit for a mere declaration of title is not maintainable if the plaintiff is not in possession of the property and does not seek consequential relief. Relying on the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and prior precedents such as Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129, the Court held that "if the plaintiff is not in possession, a suit for mere declaration would not be maintainable." It further held that even a suit for permanent injunction is untenable without the plaintiff's possession.

83. In Anathula Sudhakar (supra) reiterated that if the plaintiff has failed to prove possession over the plots in question, they cannot seek relief of injunction simpliciter without claiming the relief of possession. Furthermore, if the plaintiff's title is under cloud and dispute, and the plaintiff is not in possession nor has been able to establish possession, a suit without the relief of possession is not maintainable.

84. Learned counsel for the Defendants-Respondents also challenged the maintainability of the suit by contending that LIC/Plaintiff sought a decree of permanent injunction and a declaration that certain sale deeds were void without seeking the consequential relief of possession. This, they argued, renders the suit barred by Sections 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

85. The record clearly shows that no prayer was made for possession of the plots derived from Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38. Consequently, no declaration of title can be granted because, under Sections 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a claim must be supported by both title and possession, or proof of interference with possession. The Plaintiff failed to establish either element. Even the trial court noted that the Defendants (Nos. 6 to 8) were in exclusive physical possession: "प्रश्नागत संपत्ति पर प्रतिवादी 6 र 8 मौके पर काबिज हैं ---------------और अलग से कोई प्लाटिंग नहीं हुई है।" (The defendants 6 to 8 are in possession of the property in question on the spot ---------------and no separate plotting has been done.)

86. This Court concurs with the Defendants-Respondents' arguments. The Plaintiff's suit essentially seeks to establish title to the property; however, without a prayer for possession, the suit is incomplete. Supreme Court precedents clearly establish that when the plaintiff is not in possession, a suit for a mere declaration of title without also seeking possession is not maintainable. The admissions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 regarding LIC's lack of actual possession further reinforce this point. The Hon'ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that if the plaintiff is out of possession and merely seeks to restrain the defendant from interfering with an alleged possession (when the defendant is in possession), the plaintiff must first seek recovery of possession. Thus, a bare injunction suit in these circumstances is generally not maintainable. [Ref: Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) By Lrs & Ors., 2008 (4) SCC 594].

87. Issue no. 5: Whether the suit was undervalued and the court fee paid was insufficient? In both suits, the trial court correctly held that this issue was not pressed by any of the parties, and therefore, the court fees had been properly paid. The issue was rightly decided against the defendants.

88. Issue no. 6: Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the suit, as stated in the written statement? If yes, what is the effect? In both suits, the trial court framed this issue regarding its jurisdiction. However, the trial court incorrectly held, under a misconception of law, that the suit was not barred by Section 331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (UPZA & LR) Act.

89. It is noted that the suit was indeed barred by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act, 1950, because Khasra Plot Nos. 33, 34, 37, and 38 are agricultural plots. Since the Plaintiff's name did not appear in the revenue records, and neither the plaintiff nor their predecessor (from whom the property was allegedly purchased) was in possession of the property, the suit effectively amounted to a declaration of title over land for which the Plaintiff had no recorded right. Thus, it was barred by Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act.

90. The trial court further proceeded with manifest illegality by holding that, given the execution of the sale deed dated July 23, 1954, by Shri Lal Singh in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company, and the execution of the sale deed dated December 5, 1953, by defendant no. 6 of suit no. 1211 of 2004 in favor of Swadeshi Bima Company, a declaration of title was unnecessary, and revenue entries were irrelevant as they pertained solely to fiscal matters. Consequently, it held that the suit was not barred by Section 331 of the Act--a finding that directly contradicts statutory requirements and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

91. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Shri Ram and another Vs Ist Addl. District Judge and others, (2001) 3 SCC 24, held in paragraph no. 7: "The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the revenue court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession."

92. Furthermore, in Kamla Prasad and others Vs Kishna Kant Pathak and others (2007) 4 SCC, it was held in paragraph no. 15: "In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant rightly relied upon a decision of this Court in Shri Ram & another Vs Ist Addl. Distt. Judge & Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 24. In Shri Ram, A, the original owner of the land sold it to B by a registered sale deed and also delivered possession and the name of the purchaser was entered into Revenue Records after mutation. According to the plaintiff, sale deed was forged and was liable to be cancelled. In the light of the above fact, this Court held that it was only a Civil Court which could entertain, try and decide such suit. The Court, after considering relevant case law on the point, held that where a recorded tenure holder having a title and in possession of property files a suit in Civil Court for cancellation of sale deed obtained by fraud or impersonation could not be directed to institute such suit for declaration in Revenue Court, the reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land."

93. The land in dispute is agricultural, and the Plaintiff/LIC is not recorded in the revenue records. Thus, the suit, which effectively seeks a declaration of title over agricultural land against recorded tenure-holders, is barred under Section 331 of the UPZA & LR Act. The trial court's erroneous conclusion that revenue entries were irrelevant is legally flawed; accordingly, the suit is barred under Section 331 of the Act.

94. Issue no. 8: Is the person who signed and verified the suit authorized to institute it? If not, what is the effect? This issue concerns the competency of the person who filed the suit. In both cases, the trial court erroneously held that the suit had been filed by a competent person.

95. The suit was not filed by a competent authority, as the individual who instituted it was not authorized to do so. It was contended that under Order 29 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), only a Secretary, Director, or Principal Officer of a Corporation may sign and verify pleadings. The Manager (Legal) who filed the suit acted in violation of the CPC. The LIC-Plaintiff's submission that the Manager was competent is legally incorrect.

96. Upon examining the record, this Court finds that P.W.-1 (Suresh Kumar), the Manager (Legal) who filed the suit, explicitly admitted during cross-examination that the Chairman or Directors of LIC had not given him the power to institute the suit. He further stated that he was unaware of any document authorizing the Zonal Manager (who allegedly delegated power to him) to execute such a power of attorney. Although the plaint was signed and verified by Shri Suresh Kumar, purportedly under the authority of the Zonal Manager, no valid power of attorney was produced. Suresh Kumar himself stated: "I have not seen any power of attorney executed by the Zonal Manager. I do not know whether he was authorized by LIC to delegate such power."

97. The statutory scheme under the LIC Act permits only the Secretary, Director, or Chairman to institute legal proceedings. In the absence of any resolution or delegation authorizing the filing of the suit by the Manager (Legal), the suit was instituted by an unauthorized person and is therefore not maintainable in law. This admission by the Plaintiff's own witness is fatal to the suit. Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC clearly specifies who is authorized to represent a corporation in legal proceedings, and the Manager (Legal) does not fall within those prescribed categories without proper authorization.

98. Separately, Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 preferred Cross Objection No. 128636 of 2007, challenging the trial court's findings on Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 in First Appeal No. 70 of 2007.

Issue 1: The Defendants argued that the trial court's finding that the Plaintiff had proved its title was based on unsound evidence, citing the Plaintiff's failure to mutate their name in the revenue records for over fifty years, along with admissions by P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 that LIC's name was never recorded.

Issue 2: The Defendants contended that once it was established that plots were not carved out, the basis for declaring any part of the sale deed void was lost.

Issue 3: They asserted that the trial court wrongly decided the matter of possession in favor of the Plaintiff, given the clear admissions by P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 that the Defendants were in actual physical possession.

Issue 6: The Defendants argued that the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction and in asserting that the civil court had jurisdiction. They maintained that since the land is agricultural and the Defendants' names appear in the revenue records, the suit for declaration of title should have been filed in the Revenue Court under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, thereby barring the civil court's jurisdiction under Section 331.

Issue 8: The Defendants reiterated that the trial court wrongly found the Manager (Legal) to be competent to institute the suit, given P.W.-1's admissions concerning the lack of proper authorization.

99. The Plaintiff argued that these cross-objections are not maintainable.

100. This Court has meticulously examined the evidence related to these issues. The Defendants' arguments in their cross-objection are well-founded and strongly supported by the oral evidence. The admissions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 regarding the Plaintiff's lack of actual possession, the absence of revenue entries in the Plaintiff's favor, and the non-demarcation of the plots directly contradict the trial court's findings on both title and possession. Moreover, the clear admissions regarding the Manager's lack of authority to institute the suit render the entire proceeding not maintainable. The trial court's errors on these points significantly impacted its overall judgment and contributed to this Court's decision to set aside the original decree.

101. In view of the aforesaid findings, and the overwhelming evidence--including the admissions of the Plaintiff's own witnesses (P.W.-1 and P.W.-2) and supported by the cited Supreme Court judgments--this Court finds substantial merit in the Defendants-Respondents' arguments as articulated in their cross-objection. The Plaintiff-Appellant's suit is fundamentally flawed due to the non-identifiability of the property, the absence of a prayer for possession, the improper institution of the suit, and the trial court's erroneous findings on key factual and legal issues.

102. Accordingly, this Court finds that the learned trial court failed to appreciate material facts and wrongly invalidated a sale deed without clear proof of LIC's physical possession or proper title demarcation. The trial court erred by granting a declaration in favor of LIC without proof of title, possession, or defined property boundaries. It also erred by presuming an unproduced document and ignoring relevant legal bars. Although the refusal to grant an injunction was legally sound, the partial decree of declaration is unsustainable.

103. In light of all the foregoing, this Court is of the considered opinion that the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside so far as it declares the sale deed as void and suit to be maintainable. Accordingly, First Appeal No. 45 of 2007 is allowed. The judgment and decree dated November 21, 2006, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 11, Aligarh, in Suit Nos. 1210/2004 and 1211/2004, are hereby set aside to that extent. It is held that the sale deed dated September 23, 2000, executed by M/s Bharat Stores Ltd. in favor of Defendants Nos. 6, 7, and 8, is valid and binding. The claim by LIC to 550 square yards of land over plot no. 33 & 34 and 1800 Sq Yards of land over plot no 37 & 38 are dismissed as unproven. Accordingly, First Appeals No. 70 & 71 of 2007 are dismissed. Cross-Objection No. 128636 of 2007, filed by defendants-Respondents in First Appeal No. 70 of 2007, is likewise disposed of in view of the findings stated above. No order as to costs is passed, and all pending applications, if any, are hereby disposed of.

Order Date :- 03.07.2025

RKS/

(Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav)