Allahabad High Court

Sayyed Abbas vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. ... on 25 September, 2023

Bench: Saurabh Lavania





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


A.F.R. 		    Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:61565
 
Reserved On 15.09.2023
 
Delivered On 25.09.2023
 

 
Court No. - 18
 

 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 88 of 2023
 

 
Petitioner :- Sayyed Abbas
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Revenue, Lko. And Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Rakesh Kumar Srivastava
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Ashish Verma,Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi
 

 
Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.

Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the State as also Sri Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the opposite party No.4.

By means of present petition, the petitioner has challenged the order 28.12.2022 passed by the opposite party No.2-Chief Revenue Officer, Sultanpur in Case No.2714 of 2022, Computerized Case No.D202204680002714 (State vs. Sayeed Abbas), which was instituted under Section 15-A of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952 (in short "U.P. Act No.10 of 1953"), whereby, the Grant/Patta dated 19.06.1982 related to Plot No.1178 M area 1 Biswa and 15 Biswansi, and Grant/Patta dated 02.09.1985 related to Plot No.1178 M area 5 Biswansi, situate at Village-Goravarik Pargana-Meeranpur, Tehsil-Sadar, District-Sultanpur, has been cancelled.

Before entering into the merits of the case, I feel it appropriate to indicate that on 18.08.2023 the final order was dictated in open Court. However, on account of some confusion, at the time of signing of final order, regarding disposal of application seeking amendment, the case was again ordered to be listed vide order dated 18.08.2023 and thereafter on 15.09.2023, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the judgment was reserved.

Undisputed facts of the case are to the effect that the petitioner was minor, at the time of Grant(s), in issue, dated 19.06.1982 and 02.09.1985, respectively, which have been cancelled by the impugned order dated 28.12.2022. In particular, the petitioner was aged about 12 years old, at the time of providing first Grant dated 19.06.1982 and at the time of Grant dated 02.09.1985, he was 15 years old.

The property/land, in issue, was provided by virtue of these Grant(s) under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, which was promulgated for specific purpose.

The part of property i.e. 1 Biswa obtained under the Act No.10 of 1953 was transferred through sale deed dated 17.07.2012 to Rehana Begum W/o Intzaar and on 05.02.2022 rest part of property i.e. 1 Biswa, was transferred to Ishratulla S/o Shahadatulla and Mohd. Khaleeq S/o Tahir Khan.

At this stage, this Court finds it appropriate to refer the judgment of this Court passed in the case of B.R. Nangia vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2011 SCC OnLine All 1013; wherein this Court, after considering the aims and objects as also the relevant provision of U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, observed that the grantee shall not be entitled to sublet or transfer the land and cannot use the land for the purpose other than it was granted. The relevant paras of the report are as under:-

"7. Before coming to the question of non-observance of principle of natural justice, the pure legal question with respect to application of section 131-B of Act, 1950 in respect to land governed by 1952 Act, I find it appropriate to deal with this issue first since it is a pure question of law and needs to be clarified by this Court.

8. Act, 1952 was enacted to facilitate donation of land in connection with the Bhoodan Yagna initiated by Acharya Vinoba Bhave and to provide for settling of such land on the landless persons. The statute was enacted realizing certain difficulties faced in respect to donation of land by the persons having agricultural land in view of certain provisions of Act, 1950 and to overcome such difficulties. The statement of objects and reasons published with Act, 1952 in U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 21.11.1952 reads as under:

"In the last cold weather Acharya Vinoba Bhave started the Bhoodan Yagna movement with a view to obtain land so that it could be distributed among the landless persons of the State. The response of the people of the State was very encouraging. The Zamindars as well as the tenants donated their land to Acharyaji. There were, however, certain legal difficulties. The donations made by the zamindars were defective according to the provisions of section 28 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The tenants did not possess any right to transfer their lands by gift. The Bill is intended to remove these and certain other legal difficulties and to ensure the achievements of the object of this movement. Both in regard to the donations of land to the Bhoodan Yagna and its distribution to the landless persons".

9. The Act contemplates establishment and incorporation of a Committee, namely, Bhoodan Yagna Committee under State of U.P. (hereinafter referred to as "Bhoodan Committee") having perpetual succession, a body corporate, vested with the capacity to sue and being sued in its corporate names acquiring, holding, administering and transferring property, both movable and immovable and entering into contracts. The constitution of Bhoodan Committee and other details are contained in sections 4, 5 and 6 of 1952 Act. The duties of the Committee are contained in section 7, which reads as under:

"7. Duties of the Committee.--(1) It shall be the duty of the Committee to administer all lands vested in it for the benefit of the Bhoodan Yagna.

(2) The Committee shall for the purpose of Bhoodan Yagna perform such other functions and possess such other powers as may be necessary in respect of such land."

10. The land which is donated and is governed by Act, 1952 after such donation is completely vest in "Bhoodan Committee" by virtue of sections 11(4) and 13(3)(a) of Act, 1952. When Bhoodan Committee or Collector, as the case may be, grant land to landless persons, rights conferred upon such person are provided in sections 14 and 15 of 1952 Act which read as under:

"14. Grant of land to landless persons.--(1) The Committee or such other authority or person as the Committee with the approval of the State Government, specify either generally or in respect of any area, may, in the manner prescribed, grant lands which have vested in it to the landless agricultural labourers and the grantee of the land shall:

(i) where the land is situate in any state which has vested in State Government under and in accordance with section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, acquire in such land the right and the liabilities of a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights and the grantee of the land shall;

(ii) where it is situate in any other area, acquire therein such rights and liabilities and subject to such conditions, restrictions and limitations as may be prescribed and shall have effect, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.

(2) Where the Committee or other authority or person as aforesaid fails to grant any land in accordance with sub-section (1) within a period of three years from the date of vesting of such land in the Committee or from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1975, whichever is later, the Collector may himself grant such land to the landless agricultural labourers in the manner prescribed, and thereupon the grantee shall acquire the rights and liabilities mentioned in sub-section (1) as if the grant were made by the Committee himself.

(3) Omitted

(4) In making grant of land under this section, the committee or other authority or persona as aforesaid or the Collector, as the case may be, shall observe the following principles:

(a) At least fifty per cent of the land available for grant shall be granted to persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and persons belonging to the Kol, Pathari, Khairwar, Baiga, Dharikar, Panika and Gond Tribes and such other tribes as the State Government on the recommendations of the Committee may notify in this behalf;

(b) The land situate in one village shall, as far as possible, be granted to persons residing in that very village.

Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, the expression "landless agricultures labourer" means a person whose main source of livelihood is agriculture labour or cultivation and who at the relevant time either holds no land or holds lands not exceeding 0.40468564 hectares (one acre) in Uttar Pradesh as a bhumidhar, asami or Government lessee.

15. Grants to be made in accordance with Bhoodan Yagna Scheme.--All grants shall be made as far as may be in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna.

11. A grant made under Act, 1952 can be cancelled in certain contingencies as provided in section 15-A, which reads as under:

15-A. Cancellation of certain grants.--(1) The Collector may of his own motion and shall on the report of the Committee or on the application of any person aggrieved by the grant of any land made under section 14, whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1975, inquire into such grant, and if he is satisfied that the grant was irregular or was obtained by the grantee by misrepresentation or fraud, he may:

(i) cancel the grant, and on such cancellation, notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or in any other law for the time being in force, the rights, title and interest of the grantee or any person claiming through him in such land shall cease, and the land shall revert to the Committee; and

(ii) direct delivery of possession of such land to the Committee after ejectment of every person holding or retaining possession thereof, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary.

(2) Notice of every proceeding under sub-section (1) shall be given to the committee, and any representation made by the Committee in relation thereto shall be taken into consideration by the Collector.

(3) No order shall be passed under sub-section (1) except after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee or any person known to the Collector to be claiming under him.

(4) The order of the Collector passed under sub-section (1) shall be final and conclusive.

12. Act, 1950, in essence, has not been made applicable to Act, 1952 in its entirety to the land governed by Act, 1950. Therefore, all the provisions of Act, 1950 cannot be applied to the grant of land governed by Act, 1952 ipso facto.

13. Further, section 17 of Act, 1952 confers power upon the State Government to make Rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Sub-section 2 (k) says specifically that Rules may provide for the matters relating to the land in pursuance of section 14.

14. In purported exercise of power under section 17 of Act, 1952, U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1953") has been framed.

15. Rule 3 provides that after grant of land by the Bhoodan Committee to a grantee, the grantee as also the land which is subject of the grant shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be governed by the prevailing law relating to land-tenure.

16. This makes it clear that Act, 1950 would apply to the land governed by Act, 1952 but subject to Act, 1952. Rule 14 (2) provides two aspects, firstly in respect to the land to which Act, 1950 does not apply. It says that the grantee shall acquire such rights and liabilities as the Bhoodan Committee may confer under the law. In general, for all grantees it says that the grantee shall be subject to the following conditions, restrictions and limitations:

(i) the grantee shall pay the rent to the Committee in such instalments and on such dates as the Committee may specify;

(ii) the grantee shall not be entitled to sublet or transfer the land; and

(iii) the grantee shall not be entitled to use the land for any purpose other than for which it was granted.

17. Therefore, it is very much clear under the Rules also that grantee shall not be entitled to sublet or transfer the land and cannot use it for the purpose other than it was granted.

18. In the circumstances, in absence of anything to show that Act, 1950 had overriding effect over the Act, 1952, it cannot be said that land once granted by means of grant by Committee would be governed by the provisions of Act, 1950 in all respect including section 131-B ignoring the provisions of Act, 1952."

It is also not in dispute that after allotment of land, in issue, the application dated 15.12.1983 for cancellation of Patta was preferred by one Ganga Deen S/o Ram Udit impleading the present petitioner as also Bhoodan Samiti, Sultanpur and this application was registered as Case No.238 under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 and was dismissed for want of prosecution vide order dated 11.03.1993 passed by the Opposite party No.2. The order dated 11.03.1993 on reproduction reads as under:-

"dqN le; esa vUrj ls dbZ ckj iqdkj djkus ds ckn Hkh izkFkhZ dh vksj ls dksbZ mifLFkr ugha gqvkA vr% Li"V gksrk gS fd izkFkhZ vius }kjk fn;k x;k iV~Vk fujLrhdj.k izkFkZuk i= esa cy ugha nsuk pkgrk gSA ,slh n'kk esa bl dk;Zokgh dks tkjh j[kus dk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha gS] rn~uqlkj izkFkZuk i= fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA bl dk;kZy; esa dfFkr iV~Vs ds xq.k&nks"k gsrq nk;j vU; fdlh okn esa ;g vkns'k js'ktqMhdsVk dk izHkko ugha j[ksxkA vkns'k dh izfr lEcaf/kr ijxukf/kdkjh dks bl vk'k; ls izsf"kr dh tk; fd og bl ckr dk ijh{k.k djk ysa fd foi{kh dks gq, dfFkr iV~Vs dh dk;Zokgh esa ;fn izFke n`"V;k dksbZ vfu;ferrk gS rks iV~Vs ds fujLrhdj.k gsrq Lofoosd ls dk;Zokgh djus gsrq vk[;k izsf"kr djsaA"

A perusal of the order dated 11.03.1993, quoted above, shows that the opposite party No.2 directed the official subordinate to him to send a copy of the order dated 11.03.1993 to S.D.M., Sadar, Sultanpur, for the purposes of submitting a report for cancellation of Grant, in issue, if upon enquiry it appears that the same was not granted in accordance with the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953. It appears from the record that the direction in the order dated 11.03.1993 was not carried out.

Thereafter, one Mohd. Khaleeq Khan (opposite party No.4) preferred an application on 11.08.2022 (Annexure No.10 to the petition) before Opposite party No.2 for the purposes of compliance of the order dated 11.03.1993, as appears from the application itself. Relevant part of the same is extracted herein as under:-

"izkFkZuk i= ckor vuqikyu djk;s tkus vkns'k fnukad 11-3-93 okn la0238 /kkjk 15d Hkwnku lfefr ,sDV U;k;ky; lh0vkj0vks0 egksn; lqyrkuiqj ekStk xksjkokfjd ijxuk ehjkuiqj rglhy lnj ftyk lqyrkuiqj

xaxknhu cuke lbZn vCckl"

From the application preferred by the opposite party No.4 dated 11.08.2022 it further reflects that the opposite party No.4 sought a prayer for cancellation of Patta. The prayer sought in the application is as under:-

"अतः श्रीमान जी से निवेदन है कि गाटा सं० 1178 रकबा 2 बिस्वा से कथित पट्टा वहक सईद अब्बास ना० 12 वर्ष सुत असगर अब्बास साकिन गोरावारिक परगना मीरानपुर तहसील सदर जिला सुल्तानपुर खारिज किया जावे और आराजी पूर्ववत् ग्राम सभा के खाते में अंकित करने की कृपा करें।"

On coming to know from the aforesaid application of opposite party No.4 that Grant(s) dated 19.06.1982 and 02.09.1985, respectively, were provided to a minor (petitioner) under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, the opposite party No.2-Chief Revenue Officer, Sultanpur, called a detailed report and in response to the same, the inquiry report dated 22.08.2022 was submitted before the opposite party No.2 and based upon the same, the opposite party No.2 in exercise of power vested under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, instituted a case for cancellation of Grant(s)/Patta(s).

The case instituted under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, was registered as Case No.2714 of 2022, Computerized Case No.D202204680002714 (State vs. Sayeed Abbas) and in this case the petitioner put in appearance and filed the objection, which has been annexed as Annexure No.11 to the present petition.

In the case before opposite party No.2, one Rehana Begum also put in appearance and indicated the fact that her name was recorded on the basis of sale deed executed by the petitioner. The objection of Rehana Begum also indicates that in the Khatauni related to Fasli Year 1391-1396, the land was recorded in the name of Bhoodan Yagna Samiti.

A perusal of Annexure No.11 to the present petition reflects that the objection was also filed by Sayeed Abbas, Ishrat Ulla and Khalid in relation to application of Mohd. Khaleeq Khan based upon which the case was instituted by the opposite party No.2 in exercise of power under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 and a perusal of para 16 of this objection reflects that based upon the deed(s) executed in favour of petitioner, the pleas in defense were taken. Further, in relation to the report dated 22.08.2022 joint objection was filed, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure No.14 to the present petition.

Petitioner and other named persons took specific plea that Gift Deed was executed and not the Patta, as such, the proceedings are unsustainable in the eye of law.

The plea of limitation was also taken, as appears from Annexure No.15, wherein, it has specifically been stated that after about 40 years the case for cancellation of Patta under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 has been instituted and as such is highly time barred and liable to be dropped as the limitation prescribed for cancellation of Gift Deed is four years.

In the aforesaid background of the case, present petition has been filed impeaching the order dated 28.12.2022 passed by the opposite party No.2.

The submissions of Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the order impugned dated 28.12.2022 can be summarized as under:-

(i) The power vested in Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 can only be exercised by the Collector of the district and in the instant case, this power has been exercised by the Chief Revenue Officer, District-Sultanpur, as such, the order impugned is nullity being passed by an incompetent authority.

(ii) Under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No. 10 of 1953, the Collector may on his own motion and shall on the report of the Committee or on the application of any person aggrieved by the grant of any land made under Section 14 of the U.P. Act No. 10 of 1953 first is to inquire into such grant and if he is satisfied that the grant was irregular or was obtained by the grantee by mis-representation or fraud, then, only he may cancel the grant. Whereas in the instant case, the proceedings were initiated on the application of one Mohd. Khaleeq Khan (opposite party No.4), who was not at all aggrieved person, as such, the proceedings ought not to have been initiated nor could be decided against the petitioner as has been done by the impugned order dated 28.12.2022.

(iii) The Collector can exercise power under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No. 10 of 1953 but for the same, the report of Committee, as referred in Section 3 read with Section 4 of the U.P. Act No. 10 of 1953, is required. For suo-moto exercise of power, the report is must as expression "and" has been used between two expressions namely "Collector may of his own motion" and "shall on the report of Committee". In this case, there is no report of the Committee, as such, the power exercised by the Authority concerned is unjustified. Further, the satisfaction in terms of Section 15-A the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 in the order has also not been recorded, which is mandatory, as per the language of the said provision.

(iv) In the instant case, the Collector has not inquired into the Grant(s)/Gift Deed(s), in issue. It is the opposite party No.2-Chief Revenue Officer, Sultanpur, who got the report from the revenue official subordinate to it and proceeded in the matter and subsequently passed the order impugned, as such, the procedure as prescribed under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No. 10 of 1953 has not been followed. Thus, also the order impugned is liable to be interfered with by this Court.

(v) It is settled principle of law that mode and manner prescribed has to be followed else the order would be vitiated. Reference has been made to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I And Another; reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151.

(vi) No irregularity was committed while providing the Grant(s) as the Committee was constituted for the same purpose and the Committee took decision and in terms of decision of the Committee, the land was provided through the Grant(s)/Gift Deed(s). As such also the cancellation of Grant(s), at this belated stage i.e. after about 40 years, is unsustainable in the eye of law.

(vii) The learned counsel for the petitioner based upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others; reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 also stated that suo-moto power could be exercised within a period of three years.

(viii) In the entire order, the opposite party No.2 has not dealt with the plea of limitation specifically raised in the objection preferred by the petitioner in its true spirit.

(ix) The notice of every proceedings, as per Sub-section 2 Section 15-A, should be given to the Committee and in the instant case, neither the Committee was impleaded as party nor any notice was issued to it. Thus, this mandatory provision was also not followed and accordingly, in this view of the matter alone, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.

(x) There is no legal bar in giving the Gift Deed to a minor. Reference has been made to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of K. Balakrishnan vs. K. Kamalam And Others along with K. Kamalam vs. K. Balakrishnan And Others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 581.

(xi) The observation in the order impugned has been made only with regard to condonation of delay, however, for the purposes of cancelling the Grant(s)/Gift Deed(s) the opposite party No.2 has not recorded any reason, though as per settled view of the Hon'ble Apex Court the same is required. According to law settled, even the Administrative authorities should record its reasons for coming to conclusion and a perusal of the order impugned would show that the observations/facts have been indicated in the order just to give the benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. As such also the order impugned is liable to be interfered with.

Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the State and Sri Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the opposite party No.4 (whistle blower) opposed the present petition. They stated that (i) under U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 the land can only be provided to 'landless agricultural labourers', the expression inserted vide U.P. Act No.10 of 1975 in the principal Act No.10 of 1953 and the petitioner, who was minor at relevant time, was not covered under this expression and as such, the Grants(s), in issue, were void-ab-initio and being so the impugned order does not suffer from any violation of law. Thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed with costs.

Considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

In regard to submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 28.12.2022 passed by the opposite party No.2-Chief Revenue Officer, Sultanpur is non-est being passed by incompetent authority, this Court finds it appropriate to refer some provisions of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953.

"2.(3)(f) words and expressions not defined in this Act shall have the meaning assigned to them--

(i) in areas referred to in sub-clause (1) of clause (c), in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950;

(ii) in areas referred to in sub-clause (ii) of the said clause in the U.P. Tenancy Act; 1939;

(iii) in other areas, in the law relating to land tenure applicable to the land.

3. Establishment and incorporation of the Bhoodan Yagya Committee.--There shall be established a Bhoodan Yagna Committee for Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter called the Committee) having perpetual succession which shall be a body corporate vested with the capacity of suing and being sued in its corporate names acquiring, holding, administering and transferring property, both movable and immovable and of entering into contracts.

4. Constitution committee.--(1) The Committee shall consist of the following members; namely--

(a) the Chairman to be nominated by the [State Government;]4

(b) four or more but not exceeding nine members to be nominated by the [State Government.]4

(2) [xxxxxx]5

(3) The nomination [xxxxxx]6 of the Chairman and of the members shall be notified in the Gazette in the manner prescribed.

(4) The Chairman and members of the committee shall hold office for four years from the date of the notification under sub-section (3) and shall be eligible for re-appointment or re-nomination.

5. Dissolution of the committee.--(1) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that--

(a) the Committee has failed without reasonable cause or excuse to discharge duties or to perform functions imposed or assigned by or under this Act;

(b) circumstances have so arisen that the Committee is rendered unable or may be rendered unable to discharge duties or to perform functions imposed or assigned by or under this Act; or

It may by notification in the official Gazette

(i) dissolve the committee for the period to be specified;

(ii) direct the reconstitution of the committee in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of this act; and

(iii) declare that the duties, powers and functions of the committee under this Act shall for the period for which it has been dissolved be discharged, exercised and performed by such person or authority and subject to such restrictions as may be specified therein.

(2) The State Government may make such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to be necessary for this purpose.

14. Grant of land to landless persons.--[(1)]10 The committee or such other authority or person as the Committee with the approval of the State Government, specify either generally or in respect of any area, may, in the manner prescribed, grant lands which have vested in it to the [landless agricultural labourers]11, and the grantee of the land shall--

(i) where the land is situate in any state which has vested in the State Government under and in accordance with section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, acquire in such land he rights and the liabilities of a [Bhumidar with non-transferable rights,]12 and

(ii) where it is situate in any other area, acquire therein such rights and liabilities and subject to such conditions, restrictions and limitations as may be prescribed and they shall have effect, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.

[(2) Where the committee or other authority or person as aforesaid fails to grant any land in accordance with sub-section (1) within a period of three years from the date of vesting of such land in the committee or from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodah Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1975, whichever is later, the Collector may himself grant such land to the landless agricultural labourers in the manner prescribed, and thereupon the grantee shall acquire the rights and liabilities mentioned in sub-section (1) as if the grant were made by the committee itself.

(3) [xxxxxx]13

(4) In making grant of land under this section, the committee or, other authority or person as aforesaid or the Collector, as the case may be, shall observe the following principles:--

(b) The land situate in one village shall, as far as possible, be granted to persons residing in that very village.

Explanation--For the purposes of this section; the expression "land-less agricultural labourer" means a person whose main source of liveli-hood is agricultural labour or cultivation and who at the relevant time either holds no land or holds; land not exceeding 0.40468564 hectares (one acre) in Uttar Pradesh as a bhumidhar, [xxxxxx]14 asami or Government lessee.]15

15-A. [Cancellation of certain grant.--(1) The Collector may of his own motion and shall on the report of the committee or on the application of any person aggrieved by the grant of any land made under section 14, whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1975, inquire into such grant, and if he is satisfied that the grant was irregular or was obtained by the grantee by misrepresentation or fraud, he may--

(ii) direct delivery of possession of such land to the committee after ejectment of every person holding or retaining possession thereof, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary.

(2) Notice of every proceeding under sub-section (1) shall be given to the committee, and any representation made by the committee in relation thereto shall be taken into consideration by the Collector.

(3) No order shall be passed under sub-section (1) except after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee or any person known to the Collector to be claiming under him.

(4) The order of the Collector passed under sub-section (1) shall be final and conclusive.]16"

In the light of relevant provisions i.e. Section 2(3)(f)(i) and Section 2(3)(f)(ii) as also the fact that the expression 'Collector' has not been defined in the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, this Court is of the view that Sub-section 4 of Section 3 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 (in short "Act of 1950") and Section 14 read with Section 14-A and 15 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (in short "Act of 1901") are relevant and after considering these provisions the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Brahm Singh vs. Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad & Others; reported in 2008 SCC OnLine All 490; observed that the Additional Collector can discharge the duties of Collector and thereafter this Court in the judgment passed in the case of Seetla vs. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 2019 SCC OnLine All 4784 also observed that the Additional Collector can discharge the function of Collector. The relevant portion of judgment of Full Bench of this Court is as under:-

"It is the above provision under which the Additional Collector is appointed by the State Government. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 14A in the present form were enacted by U.P. Act No. 21 of 1962. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 14A, the Additional Collector exercises all such powers and discharges such duties of Collector in such cases or class of cases as the Collector concerned directs. Sub-section (4) of Section 14A further provides that the Additional Collector while exercising power and discharging duties under Sub-section (3) under this Act, i.e 1901 Act and under any other law for the time being applicable to the Collector, acts as a Collector of the district. In other words, the Additional Collector exercises powers and discharges duties under Sub-section (3) of Section 14A as Collector of the district. Therefore, by legal fiction the order passed and the jurisdiction exercised by the Additional Collector by virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 14A would be deemed to be that of a Collector of the district because of Sub-section (4) of Section 14A of 1901 Act. Thus, the Additional Collector when acts and discharges duties and functions or exercises such powers of a Collector either under 1901 Act or under any other Act for the time being in force, that would be deemed to have been exercised by him as Collector of the district under that Act. Thus, the Additional Collector has all the powers of a Collector under Sub-section (4) of Section 14A when he exercises power under Sub-section (3) of Section 14A."

At this stage, it would be appropriate to consider the submissions of Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, which are to the effect that the judgment of Full Bench of this Court is not liable to be taken note of in view of the fact that the judgment of Single Judge affirmed by Full Bench was set aside by the Hon'ble Apex Court prior to the judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court.

This Court finds that there is no force in the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner for the reason that the Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering the aims and objects of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, interfered in the order of this Court dated 09.09.1988 and affirmed the order of Additional Collector dated 01.01.1976, whereby the Grant under the Act provided to respondent was cancelled. The relevant portion of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, U.P. vs. Braj Kishore and Others; reported in (1988) 4 SCC 274 reads as under:-

"3. Before the High Court two questions were raised. First was about the jurisdiction of the Additional Collector as under the Act the duties were cast on the Collector to enquire into these matters and therefore on that ground it was contended before the High Court that Additional Collector has no jurisdiction. The other ground which was raised before the High Court was that the view taken by the Additional Collector is not in accordance with law. So far as the first ground is concerned, even the High Court held against the respondents and before us learned Counsel for parties conceded that to that part of the High Court judgment there is no challenge and this now is not in dispute that the Additional Collector has jurisdiction to enquire into the matter and therefore on that ground it is not necessary for us to dilate any more.

4. We are therefore mainly concerned with as to whether the settlement made by the Bhoodan Yagna Samiti in favour of the respondents was in accordance with law or which was not in accordance with law and therefore Additional Collector was right in setting aside those allotments.

5. As regards the second question, the facts in this case are not in dispute. The respondents are businessmen residing in Kanpur. It is not disputed that they have their trade in Kanpur and have properties also and are income tax-payers. It is also not in dispute that they are not agriculturists and they had at the time of allotment nothing to do with agriculture. Apart from it their source of livelihood was not agriculture at all but trade and business. It is also not in dispute that they did not fall into any of the categories of persons depending on agriculture who did not have land in their name. On this ground, it was contended before the Additional Collector that in fact the allotment was obtained by the respondents by misrepresenting that they are landless persons and on the basis of this the allotments were made which could not be justified.

6. Before the High Court it was contended that Section 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act which provides for allotment of land only talks of landless persons. Section 14 as it stood in the year 1968 enabled the Samiti to settle the land vested in it with landless persons. Section neither specifies that such landless persons should also be agricultural labourers nor it provided that they have to be residents of a place in which the concerned lands were located. It was also not provided that the persons must be such whose source of livelihood is agriculture. The High Court on the basis of its earlier decision felt that Section 14 as it stood in 1968 did not provide any one of these qualifying clauses and therefore the respondents who admittedly had no land in that village and the district, they were covered by the definition of landless persons, in spite of the fact that they may be traders and paying income tax, may have properties in the city of Kanpur, still the learned Judges of the High Court felt that they well within the ambit of the definition of landless persons as it stood in 1968 and therefore settlement made in their favour was justified. High Court relied on Section 14 as it stood in 1968. It reads:

"14. Grant of land to landless persons.--The Committee or such other authority or person, as the Committee may, with the approval of the State Government, specify either generally or in respect of any area, may, in the manner prescribed, grant lands which have vested in it to the landless persons, and the grantee of the land shall--

(i) where the land is situate in any estate which has vested in the State Government under and in accordance with Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, acquire in such land the rights and the liabilities of a sirdar, and

(ii) where it is situate in any other area, acquire therein such rights and liabilities and subject to such conditions, restrictions and limitations as may be prescribed and the same shall have effect, any law to the contrary notwithstanding."

It is not disputed that these allotments were made in accordance with Section 14 but had not been approved by the Government and it was even before that the Additional Collector took notice of the complaint and issued notice to the respondents and on the basis of his enquiry he cancelled the allotments made in their favour by the order in 1976 which has been quashed by the High Court.

7. It was contended by learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner (Bhoodan Yagna Samiti) that although Section 14 quoted above does not clearly indicate what the law meant by landless persons but in view of the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna the movement which Acharya Vinoba Bhave and later Jaya Prakash Narain carried out and the purpose of the movement clearly indicated that when in Section 14 allotment was contemplated in favour of landless persons it only meant those landless persons whose main source of livelihood was agriculture and who were agriculturists residing in the village where the land is situated and who had no land in their name at that time. It never meant that all those rich persons who are residing in the cities and have properties in their possession but who are technically landless persons as they did not have any agricultural land in their name in the tehsil or the village where the land was situated or acquired by the Bhoodan Samiti that it could be allotted in their favour. This was not the purpose or the philosophy of Bhoodan Yagna and therefore it was contended that such a view which has been taken by the learned Judges of the High Court is contrary to law and the interpretation put by the High Court on the language of Section 14 could not be justified. It was contended that landless person has to be interpreted in the background of the law which was enacted and the movement and the philosophy behind the movement which was the basis of the enactment of this law and it is only in that background that these words " landless persons" could be properly interpreted.

8. It was also contended that if there was any doubt left, Section 15 makes the things still clearer. Section 15 reads:

"Grants to be made in accordance with Bhoodan Yagna Scheme.--All grants shall be made as far as may be in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna."

Section 15 provides that all grants shall be made so far as may be in accordance with the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna, and it could not be disputed that Bhoodan Yagna scheme only contemplated allotment of lands in favour of those landless agricultural labourers who were residing in the villages concerned and whose source of livelihood was agriculture and who were landless and in that context only the landless person could be understood as contemplated under Section 14. It appears that in 1975 by an amendment in place of "landless persons" in Section 14 "landless agricultural labourers" was substituted and the objects and reasons when this Amendment Bill was moved, clearly go to show that it was because of such errors committed that it became necessary to make this amendment. The Objects and Reasons of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna (Amendment) Act, 1975 reads:

"Prefatory Note.--Statement of Objects and Reasons.--The Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952 provides for distribution of Bhoodan land to the landless persons by the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Samiti. It has come to the notice of Government that in certain cases persons other than landless persons have also received by fraud the land donated under the said Act. It has also come to the notice of Government that in many cases, for various reasons, the land vested in the Committee is not actually distributed. It has, therefore, been considered necessary to empower the Collector to cancel the grants received by misrepresentation or fraud, and further, where the Committee does not grant the land within a period of three years, to authorise him to distribute the land according to the provisions of the Act."

By this Amendment Act in Section 14 in place of landless person "landless agricultural labourers" was substituted, and this clearly shows that it became necessary only because such errors were committed in understanding the meaning of words "landless persons".

9. The rule of interpretation which had been generally accepted in later part of 19th century and the first half of 20th century was that the word should be given its plain ordinary dictionary meaning and it is clear that learned Judges of the High Court in the impugned Judgment interpreted the words "landless persons" on that basis and in so doing they followed their earlier judgment. But if the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna which has to be looked into because of Section 15 has been looked into or the purpose of the movement of Bhoodan Yagna which was started by late Acharya Vinoba Bhave and followed by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain was understood, this interpretation would not have been possible.

10. In India we have yet another problem. The movement and the problems which are debated at all levels is not in the language in which ultimately the law to meet those situations was enacted. The Bhoodan Yagna movement used generally a term "Bhoomihin Kissan" and it is this term which gained momentum and virtually was understood to mean those agricultural labourers whose main source of livelihood is agriculture but who have no lands of their own or who have no lands (agricultural) recorded in their names in the revenue record and it is this problem of "Bhoomihin Kissan" that this movement went on to settle and this Act was enacted to remedy that problem but our draftsman while drafting the law borrowed the phrase "landless person" in place of "Bhoomihin Kissan" and this unfortunately led to the present interpretation put by the High Court in the impugned judgment as the High Court followed the rule of interpretation which in my opinion has become obsolete.

11. At the time when Acharya Vinoba Bhave started his movement of Bhoodan Yagna our rural society had a peculiar diversity. There were some who owned or had leasehold rights in vast tracks of agricultural lands whereas on the other hand there were those who were working on agriculture as labourers in the fields and depending on what little they got from their masters. Sometimes they were even bound down to their masters and therefore had to lead miserable life. It was this problem in rural India which attracted the attention of Acharya Vinoba Bhave followed by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain and they secured large donations of land from big land holders and the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna movement was to distribute this land to those "Bhoomihin Kissan" who were living on agriculture but had no land of their own and it was to make this effective and statutory that this law was enacted and in this context it is clear that if one had noticed even the slogan of Acharya Vinoba Bhave's movement or its basis and the purpose it would have clearly indicated the problem which was to be remedied by this enactment and if this was looked into for the purpose of interpretation of the term "landless persons" no court could have come to the conclusion which has been arrived at in the impugned judgment.

12. In this country we have a heritage of rich literature, it is interesting to note that literature of interpretation also is very well known. The principles of interpretation have been enunciated in various shlokas which have been known for hundreds of years. One such shloka (verse) which describes these principles with great precision is:

Upkramop Sunharo Abhyaso Uppurwatta Falam

Arthwadoppatti Ch Lingam Tatparya Nirnaye

13. This in short means that when you have to draw the conclusion from a writing you have to read it from beginning till end. As without doing it, it is difficult to understand the purpose, if there is any repetition or emphasis its meaning must be understood. If there is any curiosity or a curious problem tackled it should be noticed and the result thereof must be understood. If there is any new innovation (uppurwatta) or something new it should be taken note of. Then one must notice the result of such innovation. Then it is necessary to find what the author intends to convey and in what context.

14. This principle of interpretation was not enunciated only for interpretation of law but it was enunciated for interpreting any piece of literature and it meant that when you have to give meaning to anything in writing then you must understand the real meaning. You can only understand the real meaning by understanding the reference, context, the circumstances in which it was stated and the problems or the situations which were intended to be met by what was said and it is only when you take into consideration all this background, circumstances and the problems which have to be tackled that you could really understand the real meaning of the words. This exactly is the principle which deserves to be considered.

15. When we are dealing with the phrase "landless persons" these words are from English language and therefore I am reminded of what Lord Denning said about it. Lord Denning in "The Discipline of Law" at p. 12 observed as under:

"Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this, or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament ..."

16. And it is clear that when one has to look to the intention of the legislature, one has to look to the circumstances under which the law was enacted. The preamble of the law, the mischief which was intended to be remedied by the enactment of the statute and in this context, Lord Denning, in the same book at p. 10, observed as under:

"At one time the Judges used to limit themselves to the bare reading of the statute itself -- to go simply by the words, giving them their grammatical meaning, and that was all. That view was prevalent in the 19th century and still has some supporters today. But it is wrong in principle. The meaning for which we should seek is the meaning of the statute as it appears to those who have to obey it -- and to those who have to advise them what to do about it; in short, to lawyers like yourselves. Now the statute does not come to such folk as if they were eccentrics cut off from all that is happening around them. The statute comes to them as men of affairs -- who have their own feeling for the meaning of the words and know the reason why the Act was passed -- just as if it had been fully set out in a preamble. So it has been held very rightly that you can inquire into the mischief which gave rise to the statute -- to see what was the evil which it was sought to remedy."

It is now well-settled that in order to interpret a law one must understand the background and the purpose for which the law was enacted. And in this context as indicated earlier if one has bothered to understand the common phrase used in the Bhoodan Movement as "Bhoomihin Kissan" which has been translated into English to mean "landless persons" there would have been no difficulty but apart from it even as contended by learned Counsel that it was clearly indicated by Section 15 that the allotments could only be made in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna. In order to understand the scheme of Bhoodan and the movement of Shri Vinoba Bhave, it would be worthwhile to quote from "Vinoba And His Mission" by Suresh Ram printed with an introduction by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain and foreword by Dr S. Radhakrishnan. In this work, statement of annual Sarvodaya Conference at Sevapuri has been quoted as under:

"The fundamental principle of the Bhoodan Yagna movement is that all children of the soil have an equal right over the Mother Earth, in the same way as those born of a mother have over her. It is, therefore, essential that the entire land of the country should be equitably redistributed anew, providing roughly at least five acres of dry land or one acre of wet land to every family. The Sarvodaya Samaj, by appealing to the good sense of the people, should prepare their minds for this equitable distribution and acquire within the next two years at least 25 lakhs of acres of land from about five lakhs of our villages on the rough basis of five acres per village. This land will be distributed to those landless labourers who are versed in agriculture, want to take to it, and have no other means of subsistence." (Underlining for emphasis by us)

This would clearly indicate the purpose of the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna and it is clear that Section 15 provided that all allotments in accordance with Section 14 could only be done under the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna."

Thus, from the aforesaid, it is apparent that the Additional Collector can discharge the duties of Collector.

Further, subsequently the issue came before this Court with regard to exercising of power of Collector by Chief Revenue Officer and this Court, after considering the Government Order dated 07.03.1996 No.1805/II-(2) 1996, observed in the case of Bahraich Deen vs. Board of Revenue and Ors. reported in 2008 SCC OnLine All 2079 that the power of Collector can be exercised by the Chief Revenue Officer. The relevant portion of the same on reproduction reads as under:-

"7. In this regard reference may be made to a Government Order dated 7.3.1996 No. 1805/II-(2) 1996 communicated by Kalika Prasad, Secretary Government of Uttar Pradesh to different authorities including Commissioners and D.M. The first para of the said Communication/Government Order translated in English reads as under:

"On the above subject, I have been directed to say that Governor was pleased to grant permission for change of designation of those P.C.S. Officers who were appointed on the post of Chief Revenue Officer in a District to Chief Revenue Officer-Additional District Magistrate (land revenue)."

8. From the above it is quite clear that Chief Revenue Officer have been redesignated as C.R.O.-A.D.M. (Land Revenue). This clearly amounts to conferring the power upon them to hear the cases under Land Revenue Act. In fact by virtue of the aforesaid G.O. it is evident that the main duty of Chief Revenue Officer is to hear the cases under Land Revenue Act.

9. In a recent Full Bench authority in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40986 of 2001 Brahm Singh v. Board of Revenue decided on 29.4.2008 it has been held that all Additional Collectors are entitled to exercise the power of Collector under section 14-A (4) of U.P. Land Revenue Act.

10. Accordingly, I do not find any force in the contention of learned Counsel for the applicant in recall/modification application that Chief Revenue Officer is not Additional Collector and can not exercise the powers of Collector in respect of matters under section 28, Land Revenue Act."

Now coming to expression 'Collector' mentioned in the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953. Considering the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that expression 'Collector' under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 is liable to be read in the light of the observations made in the judgments, referred above. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that Chief Revenue Officer can pass the order under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 and being so the order passed by the opposite party No.2 dated 28.12.2022 is not liable to be interfered with on the ground that it was passed by the incompetent authority.

In view of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, next issue/question arises before this Court is as to whether the procedure, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner based upon Section 15-A including with regard to submitting a report of Committee, which, as per learned counsel for the petitioner, was required for taking suo-moto action by the Collector and also with regard to obligation of Collector to inquire into the Grant(s), in issue, granted under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, if not followed, then, in that eventuality, the order is liable to be interfered with by this Court or not.

On the aforesaid issue/aspect of the case, this Court is of the view that the inquiry or report, as the case may be, is required only to ascertain a fact to institute a proceeding or case and to apprise the concerned based upon the inquiry report so as to enable him to submit his/her reply in the proceeding/case against the concerned under relevant statutory provision, which, in this case was instituted in exercise of power under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953.

The fact that the petitioner was minor at the time of providing the land by virtue of Grant(s) dated 19.06.1982 and 02.09.1985, respectively, is not in dispute rather it is admitted and the case under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 was instituted based upon admitted fact that at the time of providing Grant(s), in issue, the petitioner was minor. As such, taking note of admitted facts of the case, this Court is of the view that if any report was not submitted by the Committee or inquiry was not made by the Collector to satisfy himself that the proceedings should be initiated against the petitioner, then the same would not be fatal for carrying out the proceedings under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953.

Moreover, in the instant case, after due consideration of the report of revenue official dated 22.08.2022, the opposite party No.2 instituted the case for cancellation of Grant(s), in issue.

In continuation, it would be appropriate to observe here that before proceeding against the petitioner appropriate care was taken by the opposite party No.2 as upon an application dated 11.08.2022 preferred by the private opposite party No.4-Mohd. Khaleeq Khan seeking compliance of Order dated 11.03.1993 passed in Case No. 238 under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, a report was called upon and in response to the same revenue official submitted the report dated 22.08.2022 indicating relevant facts including that the Grant(s) were provided to the petitioner at the time when he was minor and considering the same as also the spirit of the Act and the scheme, the opposite party No.2 instituted the case for cancellation of Grant(s) and provided opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to place his case and in terms of opportunity provided, the petitioner preferred his objection, however, in the objection the fact that at the time of providing Grant(s), in issue, the petitioner was minor was not disputed. In this view of the matter, this Court is finds that after due satisfaction the case was instituted for cancellation of Grant(s) executed in the year 1982 and 1985, respectively, in favour of petitioner.

Thus, taking note of aforesaid particularly the report dated 22.08.2022, basis of initiation of proceedings, this Court is of the view that the requirement of making inquiry provided under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 was carried out.

In regard to the issue that as to whether the impugned order dated 28.12.2022 passed by the opposite party No.2 in absence of Committee as a party and also without a report of Committee is non-est or not, this Court considered (i) the Notification dated 15.02.1978, which is on record and was issued by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 5 of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 and as per same the Committee under the Act constituted vide Notification No.9(XV)-Bando-76-100 was dissolved; (ii) the fact that the petitioner was provided Grant(s) in the year 1982 and 1985 and (iii) the Government Order dated 28.10.1993, placed by the learned counsel for the State during course of hearing of this petition, and a conjoint reading of the same reflects that at the time of institution of case, in issue, against the petitioner for cancellation of Grant(s), in issue, the Committee was not in existence and to prove contrary no document has been placed on record except one Government Order Dated 07.10.1978, which was issued for distribution of land under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953. The relevant portion of Government Order Dated 07.10.1978 reads as under:-

"विषयः- उ०प्र० भू-दान यज्ञ अधिनियम, १९५२ की धारा- १४ के अन्तर्गत भू-दान में प्राप्ति भूमि के वितरण करने के लिए भूमि वितरकों की नियुक्ति।

महोदय,

उपर्युक्त विषयक आपके पत्रांक ८०५/१४२/७८-७९, दिनांक २१ सितम्बर, १९७८ के सन्दर्भ में मुझे यह कहने का निदेश हुआ है कि उ०प्र० भूदान यज्ञ समिति द्वारा, निम्नलिखित व्यक्तियों की, उनके नाम के सम्मुख अंकित क्षेत्र विशेष के लिये, भूदान समिति में निहित भूमि का, भूमिहीन व्यक्तियों का नियत विधि से वितरण करने हेतु ११ सितम्बर, १९७८ से की गई नियुक्ति, जो समिति के कार्यकाल के अन्त तक अथवा अन्यथा आदेश होने पर उसके पूर्व तक, प्रभावी रहेगी, पर शासन का अनुमोदन प्रदान किया जाता है"

The Government Order dated 28.10.1993 indicates as under:-

"उपर्युक्त विषय में मुझे यह कहने का निदेश हुआ है कि प्रायः देखा गया है कि जिला भूदान यज्ञ समिति के पैड पर विभिन्न पदों के नाम से पूर्व में कार्यरत व्यक्ति अपने नाम से शासन को पत्र लिखाते रहते हैं, जब कि उल्लेखनीय है कि भूदान यज्ञ समितियों का पुनर्गठन वर्ष १९९० के पश्चात नहीं किया गया है और पुनर्गठन न करने का निर्णय शासन स्तर पर लिया गया है। अतः जिले में अब कोई भू-दान यज्ञ समितियां अस्तित्व में नहीं हैं। इस तथ्य से जिले की पूर्व में कार्य करने वाली (अब समाप्त) समितियों को वास्तविक तथ्यों से अवगत करवा दिया जाय कि वे जिला भूदान यज्ञ समिति के पैड का प्रयोग न करें।"

Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that at the time of initiating the proceedings under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 the Bhoodan Yagna Committee, described under Section 3 and 4 of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, was not in existence, as such, the same could not have been impleaded as a party to the proceedings and in this view of the matter even no report can also be submitted by the Committee for the purposes of initiating the proceedings under Section 15-A.

For the aforesaid reason, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 28.12.2022 passed by opposite party No.2 is not liable to be interfered with on account of non-impleadment of Committee as a party to the proceedings as also on the ground that for the purposes of initiating the proceedings under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 no report was submitted by the Committee.

Next issue which is required to be taken note of by this Court is as to whether the Grant under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 can be provided to a minor or not. In order to decide the same, this Court finds it appropriate to refer the aims and object of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953.

"Aim and object for enacting the Act 1952 are as under:--

"In the last cold weather Acharya Vinoba Bhave started the Bhoodan Yagna movement with a view to obtain land so that it could be distributed among the landless person of the State. The response of the people of the State very encouraging. The Zamindars as well as the tenants donated their land to Acharyaji. There were, however, certain legal difficulties. The donations made by the Zimindars were defective according to the provisions of Section 28 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The tenants did not possess any right to transfer their land by gift. The Bill is intended to remove these and certain other legal difficulties and to ensure the achievement of the object of this movement. Both in regard to the donations of land to the Bhoodan Yagna and its distribution to the landless person."

Thus, the intention of the legislature in framing the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952 is to grant land to landless person who are bedded to the soil or who have attachment with the soil in any form and who have knowledge about the sou. Philosophy that the land must go to the tiller has been implemented in so many countries and reasonably in India to implement preamble of the Constitution i.e. to achieve social justice and to secure distributive justice under Article 38 of the Constitution of India."

From the aforesaid, it can be deduced that taking note of fundamental principle of 'Bhoodan Yagan Movement' the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 was enacted with the intention "to grant land to landless person who are bedded to the soil or who have attachment with the soil in any form and who have knowledge about the soil".

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment passed in the case of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti, U.P. (Supra), considered the expression 'landless person' as also expressions 'landless agricultural labourers' which was substituted in place of 'landless person' vide U.P. Act No.10 of 1975 and also the purpose of enactment, which was enacted to provide land to 'Bhoomihin Kissan' and thereafter upheld the order of Additional Collector cancelling the Grant(s) provided to the private respondents before the Hon'ble Apex Court.

Taking note of aforesaid as also Section 14 (1) of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 wherein the expression 'landless agricultural labourers' was inserted vide U.P. Act No.10 of 1975, this Court is of the firm view that under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 the land was to be provided or could have been provided to 'landless agricultural labourers/Bhoomihin Kissan'.

In the instant case, admittedly, the land was provided to a minor by virtue of Grant(s) dated 19.06.1982 and 02.09.1985, respectively, in terms of Section 16 of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953. To the view of this Court, in the light of aims and objects of the enactment, a 'minor' can not be placed within the expression ''landless agricultural labourers/Bhoomihin Kissan/Tiller' and a minor can also not be considered as a person bedded to the soil or having attachment with the soil or having knowledge about the soil, as it is natural presumption that the 'minor' would be in the guardianship of parents and in case the parents are not alive then in the guardianship of any other elderly person of the family and it can not be presumed that a 'minor' would do agricultural work independently. Thus, the Grant(s) dated 19.06.1982 and 02.09.1985, respectively, were not made in the spirit of Bhoodan Yagan Movement as also in the light of the provision of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, according to which, the Grant shall be made in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan Yagan Samiti. Thus, the Grant(s), in issue, to the view of this Court, itself were in violation of law and being so, were Void Ab Initio.

So far as the issue of limitation, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is concerned, this Court took note of the fact that the Grant(s)/Patta(s) were granted on 19.06.1982 and 02.09.1985, respectively and one Ganga Deen S/o Ram Udit instituted a case under section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 for cancellation of Patta on 15.12.1983 with regard to Grant dated 19.06.1982, as such, the proceedings initially were instituted within reasonable time i.e. 3 years.

Further, as observed above, initially the proceedings for cancellation of Patta was instituted within reasonable time which was registered as Case No.238 and this case was dismissed for want of prosecution on 11.03.1993 with the direction that a copy of this order be sent to S.D.M. concerned to inquire into the matter and if required, then, the report be submitted for the purposes of instituting the proceedings of cancellation of Patta.

From the material available on record, it appears that no action was taken in terms of the order of opposite party No.2-Chief Revenue Officer, Sultanpur dated 11.03.1993 by the authority subordinate to him and on coming to know about the order dated 11.03.1993, the opposite party No.4 preferred an application dated 11.08.2022 before opposite party No.2 for making compliance of the order dated 11.03.1993, though, in the application he prayed for cancellation of patta. However, on this application the inquiry was ordered and in response to the same the report dated 22.08.2022 was submitted and immediately thereafter an action was taken on the said report by instituting a case under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953.

At the cost of repetition, it needs to be mentioned that the application for making compliance of order dated 11.03.1993 was preferred on 11.08.2022 in the Office of Chief Revenue Officer, who, on the same directed the official to submit a report in this regard and thereafter a report was submitted on 22.08.2022. Thus, the fact regarding Grant(s) under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 related to petitioner came into the knowledge of Chief Revenue Officer, Sultanpur on 11.08.2022 and thereafter, upon receiving the report dated 22.08.2022 the case was instituted under Section 15-A of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 in the year 2022 itself i.e. Case No. 2714/2022.

The reasonable time for instituting the case starts running from the date of cause of action accrued or when the right to apply accrues and in this regard, reference can be made to Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 and in this case, the case under Section 15 of the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 was instituted in the year 2022 by the opposite party No.2 on the basis of report dated 22.08.2022 i.e. within three years from the date of knowledge of facts pertaining to providing Grant(s) to a minor (petitioner). Thus, to the view of this Court, the action was taken well within reasonable time against the petitioner.

In regard to submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the judgment passed in the case of K. Balakrishnan (Supra) and Section 122, 123, 126 and 127 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short "Act of 1882"), which are to the effect that the Grant(s) under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 are akin to gift and gift can be granted to a minor are concerned, this Court is of the view that the same have force as the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 is a special law and Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is general law and there is maxim "Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant" and the law in this regard is also settled that special law would prevail over general law, more particularly, when the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 was framed with specific aims and objects, according to which, the Grant under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1957 can be provided to 'landless agricultural labourers/Bhoomihin Kissan/Tiller'.

Moreover, a copy of Deed (Annexure No.4 to the petition) does not indicate that who had accepted the Gift/Grant on behalf of petitioner, who, admittedly was minor at relevant time.

It is established law that the transfer of Gift cannot be deemed complete till not accepted by the donee and in the instant case, the donee (petitioner) was minor at relevant point of time and as such, in the deed the fact that the guardian accepted the Gift on behalf of donee ought to have been mentioned and it is apparent from the copy of the deed (Annexure No.4 to the petition) that at relevant time the father of the petitioner was alive, however, on the same there is no indication of acceptance of gift on behalf of donee (petitioner, who was minor at relevant time).

Thus, also for the reasons aforesaid, the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner based upon the provisions of the Act of 1882, to the view of this Court, have no force.

A bare perusal of the impugned order dated 28.12.2022 reflects that the opposite party No.2 considered entire aspects of the case including the fact that the Grant(s) were provided to a minor and thereafter provided the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and also interfered in the Grant(s), in issue and thereafter directed the revenue official to enter the name of Bhoodan Samiti in the revenue records related to Gata No.1178 M area 0-1-15 and Gata No.1178 M area 0-0-5 situated at Village-Goravarik Pargana-Meeranpur, Tehsil-Sadar, District-Sultanpur. The order dated 28.12.2022 passed by the opposite party No.2 is reasoned and speaking order and this Court has already held in preceding portion of this judgment that the proceedings were instituted well within the limitation prescribed i.e. three years for exercising suo-moto power, as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment passed in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy (Supra). Thus, this Court finds no illegality in the order impugned dated 28.12.2022.

At this stage, it would not be out of place to indicate that this Court has already observed that under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953 the Grant(s), in issue, to the minor (petitioner) were void-ab-initio and as such, interference in the impugned order dated 28.12.2022 for any reason would perpetuate the illegality and would revive the illegal Grant(s).

Settled proposition is that this Court will not perpetuate illegality and no person can be allowed to enjoy benefit of an illegal order, by taking recourse to Institution of Justice under Article 226 of Constitution.

In Employees' State Insurance Corporation and others v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association and others, MANU/SC/3424/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 2767, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that relief in a writ of certiorari can be denied inter alia when it would be opposed to public policy or in a case where quashing of an illegal order would revive another illegal order.

In Ramnik Lal N. Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0279/1997 : AIR 1997 SC 1236, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that 'The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interest of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point.'

In Amrendra Singh v. State of U.P. and others, MANU/UP/1480/2007 : 2008(1) ADJ 397 (DB), this Court has declined to interfere in intra Court appeal with an order of Single Judge even though legally it was not sustainable since substantial justice had been done therein and setting aside order may have resulted in revival of another pernicious order.

In addition to above, it is to be indicated that as per the judgment passed in the case of B.R. Nangia (Supra), the Grantee under the U.P. Act No.10 of 1953, cannot sublet or transfer the land and also can not use for the purpose other than it was granted and admittedly, in the instant case, the petitioner (Grantee) has already transferred the land provided to him under the U.P. Act No. 10 of 1953. Thus, also the petitioner is not entitled to any protection by this Court.

For the reasons aforesaid, the petition has no force. It is accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 25.09.2023

Vinay/-