Allahabad High Court

Cantonment Board Meerut Thru. ... vs Anuj Singh And Others on 17 July, 2023

Bench: Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Om Prakash Shukla





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:46143-DB
 
A.F.R.
 
Reserved
 
Court No. - 1
 

 
Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 337 of 2023
 
Appellant :- Cantonment Board Meerut Thru. Chief Executive Officer And Another
 
Respondent :- Anuj Singh And Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Sanjeev Singh,Ajay Kumar Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Gaurav Mehrotra,A.S.G.I.,Anant Khanna,Chinmay Mishra,Lalta Prasad Misra
 

 
Hon'ble Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya,J.

Hon'ble Om Prakash Shukla,J.

(1) Heard Sri Satish Chandra Mishra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Sanjeev Singh, Sri Ajai Kumar Singh and Ms. Shataxi Shukla, Advocates for the appellants, Dr. L. P. Misra, Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, Sri Rohit Agarwal, Sri Chinmay Mishra and Sri Anant Khanna for the respondent No.1 and Sri Nishant Shukla, learned Counsel representing respondent No.2 and 3 and perused the records available before us on this Special Appeal.

(2) Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, this intra-Court appeal questions the judgment and order dated 27.04.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby Writ-A No. 14919 of 2021 filed by the respondent No.1/petitioner has been allowed and the order of punishment of dismissal from service dated 14.08.2019 and the resolution of the Cantonment Board dated 14.08.2019 as also the order passed by the appellate authority rejecting the appeal against the punishment order, dated 01.06.2021 have been quashed. Learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has also directed the appellants-Cantonment Board, Meerut to re-instate the respondent No.1/petitioner in service alongwith all consequential benefits on the post on which he was working prior to his dismissal.

(3) Learned Senior Advocate representing the appellants-respondents has vehemently argued that the order under appeal passed by the learned Single Judge dated 27.04.2023 is not sustainable for the reason that the learned Single Judge has apparently exercised his jurisdiction beyond the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of an order of dismissal from service passed after conclusion of full-fledged departmental inquiry. It has further been argued on behalf of the appellants-respondents that the learned Single Judge has acted as an appellate authority over the decision taken by the disciplinary authority inasmuch as that the learned Single Judge has substituted his own findings to the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority by appreciating the evidence afresh which is not permissible so far as judicial review of matters relating to disciplinary proceedings is concerned.

(4) It has also been argued that in absence of any finding returned by the learned Single Judge regarding any flaw in the procedure followed during the course of conducting the inquiry, punishment order could not have been set aside. He has thus argued that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No.1/petitioner were conducted in terms of the provisions contained in the Rules regulating the disciplinary proceedings and since no irregularity or infringement of any legal provisions have been pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the order under appeal is not sustainable.

(5) Sri Mishra has also contended that once the evidence available on record has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and the findings returned by the disciplinary authority in respect of 'misconduct' are supported by the evidence available on record, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of dismissal from service cannot be justified. It has also been contended by the learned Senior Advocate representing the appellants-petitioners that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are not supported by evidence available on record and thus the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained specially for the reason that different acts complained of against the respondent No.1/petitioner clearly amounted to misconduct in terms of the provisions of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. In this view, the submission is that the order under appeal is not sustainable and accordingly the appeal deserves to be allowed.

(6) Per contra, Dr. L.P. Misra assisted by other learned counsel representing respondent No.1/petitioner has argued that the learned Single Judge was conscious of the legal position that judicial review cannot be a substitute of an appellate jurisdiction and has thus proceeded to consider the submissions of the parties and has arrived at a conclusion that it was a case where findings recorded by the disciplinary authority as also by the Inquiry Officer suffered from the vice of perversity. He has also argued that it is well settled principle of law as enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Union of India (UOI) vs. P. Gunasekaran [2015 (2) SCC 610] that interference by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary proceedings is permissible in case there is some perversity in the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. In support of his submission, Dr. Misra has relied upon various judgments which are (i) Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others [(1983) 2 SCC 442], (ii) S.R.Tewari v. Union of India and another [(2013) 6 SCC 602], (iii) Union of India and others vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami [(2011) 13 SCC 553], (iv) Charanjit Lamba vs. Commanding Officer, Army Southern Command and others [(2010) 11 SCC 314]. (v) B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others [(1995) 6 SCC 749], (vi) Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India and others [(1987) 4 SCC 611] and (vii) Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others [(2009) 2 SCC 570].

(7) Certain other judgments have also been relied by the learned counsel representing respondent No.1/petitioner to buttress the submission that it is well within the scope of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for this Court to interfere even in the findings of fact in the matters of departmental proceedings recorded by the disciplinary authority if the findings are based on no evidence or they are based on misreading of evidence or they are perverse. These judgments have also been cited to emphasize that doctrine of proportionality can be a ground for challenging a punishment order before this Court while scrutinizing such an order passed in departmental proceedings.

(8) The submission on behalf of learned counsel for respondent No.1/petitioner thus is that the learned Single Judge has given a categorical finding in respect of the charges levelled against the respondent No.1/petitioner which is based on the correct appreciation of evidence available on record and thus the order of punishment of dismissal from service has also been quashed by the learned Single Judge. In this view, the submission on behalf of the respondent No.1/petitioner is that no interference in this special appeal ought to be made and that the special appeal is liable to be dismissed.

(9) We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel representing the respective parties.

(10) For appropriate adjudication of the issue involved in this appeal, we find it apt to notice certain facts. Respondent No.1/petitioner, at the relevant point of time, was posted on the post of Cantonment Executive Engineer and was Head of the Engineering Section. It is the case of the appellants-respondents that respondent No.1/petitioner having served for 24 long years in the Engineering Section of the Cantonment Board, Meerut was well aware of the facts and circumstances of Meerut Cantonment, however, the omissions attributable to him had resulted in unauthorized construction and encroachment to the extent that the geographical picture of Meerut Cantonment was altered. In respect of certain charges, a charge sheet was issued to the respondent No.1/petitioner on 20.12.2013 which contained seven articles of charges alongwith statement of imputation of misconduct in support of each article of charge. Respondent No.1/petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 27.01.2014. He, however, remained in jail in pursuance of a criminal case lodged vide F.I.R., dated 09.07.2016 under Sections 147, 302/34 I.P.C. Since he was in jail, an order of deemed suspension was passed against him on 27.07.2016 and the said suspension order continued till 11.01.2018 when it was revoked.

(11) Respondent No.1/petitioner submitted a detailed written statement of defence to the charge sheet on 30.06.2017. He also submitted written brief dated 18.08.2018 before the Inquiry Officer in respect of each article of charge. The Inquiry Officer after conducting inquiry submitted the Inquiry Report on 13.03.2019 finding the respondent No.1/petitioner guilty of misconduct in respect of charge Nos.1 to 5. Charge No.6 was found to be partially proved, whereas charge No.7 was not found proved. The Inquiry Report was served upon the respondent No.1/petitioner who submitted his explanation/comments/written submission to the Inquiry Report on 17.06.2019.

(12) In terms of the provisions of the Cantonments Act, 2006 and the relevant Rules, Cantonment Board being the disciplinary authority considered the Inquiry Report and the reply/representation made by the respondent No.1/petitioner to the Inquiry Report and unanimously resolved that the respondent No.1/petitioner be dismissed from service. Against the said decision of the dismissal from service, an appeal was preferred before the appellate authority under the relevant provisions of the Rules, however, the appellate authority found that the first charge was not proved against the respondent No.1/petitioner, whereas charge Nos.2 to 5 were found proved by the appellate authority as well. The appellate authority also concurred with the disciplinary authority in respect of charge No.6 where he found respondent No.1/petitioner to be partially guilty. The appellate authority thus reduced the major penalty of dismissal from service to the punishment of compulsory retirement as per Rule 11(2)(vi) of the Cantonment Fund Servants Rules, 1937.

(13) The said decision of the Cantonment Board as also the order of appellate authority were challenged by the respondent No.1/petitioner by filing Writ-A No. 14919 of 2021 which has been allowed by the judgment and order which is under appeal before us.

(14) In the aforesaid background facts, if we consider the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, what we find is that after noticing the facts, the contents of charge sheet and the documents relied upon in support of the charges, learned Single Judge has also noticed the arguments made by the respective parties and has further noticed and observed the principle relating to scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings. Learned Single Judge has thus observed that the judicial review in such matters is concerned with the decision- making process and to see whether the same is perverse, illegal or it fails to satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

(15) However, having observed the aforesaid principles governing the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in disciplinary matters, learned Single Judge has thereafter analyzed the inquiry report in respect of each charge and has also considered the proceedings before the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority as also the Appellate Authority.

(16) The inquiry report is on record as also the order of punishment of dismissal from service. The Inquiry Officer has considered in detail the evidence available on record in respect of each charge and the reply submitted by the respondent No.1/petitioner and has arrived at the conclusions mentioned therein. The disciplinary authority has also considered the entire matter and has given its findings based on the documents and evidence available on record. Similarly, the appellate authority has also proceeded to consider the entire evidence available on record in respect of each charge and thus has arrived at the conclusion different than the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority in respect of some of the charges. The appellate authority has, in its final conclusion, reduced the punishment of dismissal into the punishment of compulsory retirement.

(17) Learned Single Judge has recorded a finding that the disciplinary authority in this case has drawn conclusions only on the basis of the submission of the Inquiry Officer and that there is no application of mind in respect of the defence taken by the respondent No.1/petitioner. This conclusion, however, in our considered opinion goes against the record inasmuch as that the disciplinary authority has clearly discussed the material available on record of the inquiry proceedings including the inquiry report and the reply submitted by the respondent No.1/petitioner. We also noticed that the learned Single Judge has also recorded a finding in respect of the order passed by the appellate authority that while dealing with second to fifth charge, the appellate authority concluded that any kind of minor deviation from the duty of supervision is to be viewed seriously and further that the appellate authority has further held that ineffective execution of duties by the subordinate/technical staff does not exculpate the respondent No.1/petitioner for non-performance of his duties. In the judgment under appeal passed by the learned Single Judge it has been observed that the appellate authority concluded its finding on the basis of dictionary meaning of the word 'supervisor' or 'to supervise' and that he has nowhere held that the respondent No.1/petitioner was in any way actively involved either in illegal constructions or illegal cultivation of crops. Learned Single Judge has opined that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are erroneous inasmuch as the dictionary meaning of the word 'supervise' or 'to supervise' can be taken aid of only when the supervisory role and the supervisory duties are not specified, whereas in the present case nature of duties was clearly specified and elaborated where such no role for illegal construction is assigned to the respondent No.1/petitioner and the role of reporting was rather specifically assigned to the Junior Engineer Sri K.A. Gupta, Sri Piyush Gautam and Sri Vinod Gupta as also to Sri Roshan Zamir, Draftsman. Learned Single Judge has thus found that the order passed by the appellate authority is erroneous and perverse.

(18) For any finding recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority in disciplinary proceedings to be termed as perverse or erroneous, in our opinion, this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot take upon itself the role of an appellate authority over the decision made by the disciplinary authority or even the appellate authority. Perversity, as is well known, in findings of fact, arises only in case any finding returned by any authority or Court or Tribunal is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or acceptance of inadmissible evidence or ignorance of any evidence having bearing on the matter in issue. In respect of disciplinary proceedings, as is well established, the strict rule of evidence does not have any application. Accordingly, for this reason alone this Court while exercising the power of judicial review or judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has to be extra cautious in the sense that the Court may not enter into the finding of facts.

(19) In the same breath, we also observe that in the matter of disciplinary inquiry against an employee if the disciplinary/appellate authority arrives at a conclusion which is based on the material available on record and if the view taken by the authority concerned is a plausible view, interference in such findings by this Court in exercise of its power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be minimal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and others vs. N. Gangaraj [MANU/SC/0187/2020]. In the said judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court has reviewed the entire law relating to scope of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary proceedings and has clearly held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Referring to another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (supra), it has been observed that under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court will not re-appreciate the evidence neither will it interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry if it has been conducted in accordance with law and the applicable rules. Hon'ble Supreme Court further goes on to observe that the High Court will not go even into the adequacy of evidence or its reliability. Further observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court are that the High Court will not interfere if there is some legal evidence on which findings can be based. It has also been observed that the principle of proportionality of punishment can be taken recourse to only if the punishment inflicted upon the employee shocks the conscience of the Court. Paragraphs 6 to 13 of the judgment in the case of N. Gangaraj (supra) are extracted here-in-below:-

"6. The disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the evidence led before the IO to return a finding that the charges levelled against the respondent stand proved.

7. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.

8. In State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao MANU/SC/0222/1963:AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under :

"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."

9. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0118/1996 : (1995) 6 SCC 749, again, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under :

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [MANU/SC/0271/1963 : (1964) 4 SCR 718], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. MANU/SC/0603/1999 : (2000) 1 SCC 416, this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under :

"16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."

11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya MANU/SC/0411/2011 : (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under :

"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India MANU/SC/0118/1996 : (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham MANU/SC/0834/1997 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana MANU/SC/0399/1999 : (1999) 5 SCC 762, High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil MANU/SC/0603/1999 : (2001) (sic 2000) 1 SCC 416)

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12. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him."

13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran MANU/SC/1068/2014 : (2015) 2 SCC 610, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings :

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

13. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari MANU/SC/0006/2017 : (2017) 2 SCC 308, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct."

(20) When we thus analyze the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in this case in the light of the aforesaid legal principles, what we find is that there is no finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted in accordance with any rule or law. Learned Single Judge has also not found any flaw or illegality or irregularity in the procedure followed during the course of disciplinary proceedings against respondent No.1/petitioner. Findings as regards non-observance of principles of natural justice have also not been returned by the learned Single Judge.

(21) To the contrary, there is nothing on record which can even remotely point out that there has been any procedural lapse or any irregularity or illegality or infringement or violation of any rule while the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in this case against respondent No.1/petitioner. In absence of any such lapse emerging from the record, in our considered opinion, learned Single Judge ought not to have entered into the findings recorded by the disciplinary and appellate authorities to the extent of substituting its own findings. While we say so, we do not mean to state that in no such matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is permissible, however, the scope is very limited so far as the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority are concerned. As alrady observed above, in the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has already held that the adequacy of evidence or even reliability of evidence will not be permissible for this Court to go into in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority are based on some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(22) For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find ourselves in agreement with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge which is under appeal before us.