'Harshness alone cannot justify reading down of statutory language', SC declines to alter clear Regulations, Read Judgment

In interpreting the provisions of the UGC regulations, the Supreme Court observed "harshness alone cannot justify" the reading down of statutory language, and stressed that judicial intervention should not alter clear and unambiguous provisions unless they are proven to be unconstitutional or lead to absurdity.

In this case the Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of Regulation 10(f)(iii) of the UGC Regulations, 2018, concerning the recognition of teaching experience for the shortlisting of Assistant Professor candidates. The Court critically examined the High Court's approach to 'reading down' the regulation, emphasizing that such interpretations should not be made in the absence of clear legislative ambiguity.

Respondent 1 applied for the position of Assistant Professor at Allahabad University after working as a contractual and guest faculty at various institutions between 2004 and 2021. Despite meeting the required qualifications, she was not shortlisted for the interview as her prior teaching experience was not recognized by the university under UGC regulations. The university argued her experience as a guest lecturer and contractual faculty did not qualify under Regulation 10(f)(iii), which restricts recognition of certain services.

Respondent 1 filed multiple petitions challenging this decision. The High Court ruled that Regulation 10(f)(iii) did not apply to the shortlisting process for Assistant Professors and clarified that all prior teaching experience should be counted, regardless of the nature of the appointment or salary. However, the court decided that past selections would not be reopened, and future shortlisting would follow this interpretation.

The petitioners, representing Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College, argued that the High Court wrongly replaced their established methodology for shortlisting candidates. They claimed that Regulation 10 should apply for awarding marks under clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, as the post of Assistant Professor is explicitly mentioned. They also contended that even if Regulation 10 was not directly applicable, they were still entitled to adopt their methodology, as long as it was not arbitrary or discriminatory.

Additionally, the petitioners argued that the Division Bench should have clarified the meaning of 'post-doctoral experience' with the UGC instead of assuming an anomaly. They referred to a Constitution Bench decision in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, which upheld that recruitment procedures can be flexible, as long as they are transparent, non-discriminatory, and rationally related to the recruitment objective.

Contentions of the Respondent:

Respondent 1 argued that the Division Bench correctly interpreted Regulation 10(f)(iii) to avoid it being deemed arbitrary. They claimed the regulation violates Article 14 by unfairly distinguishing between contractual and regular Assistant Professors based on salary, without a clear link to quality education. This exclusion of qualified candidates with teaching experience undermines the goal of quality education.

Respondent 1 further contended that the Assistant Professor position, being entry-level, does not require prior experience. Although she lost the chance to participate in the process, the impugned order should still apply to ongoing recruitment. She challenged Regulation 10(f)(iii) as discriminatory, as salary does not correlate with teaching experience.

The Court examined whether the High Court was correct in reading down Regulation 10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations. The High Court had limited its application to posts requiring prior service, such as Associate Professor or Professor, arguing that counting past teaching services for the Assistant Professor post was unnecessary and did not serve a tangible purpose. The Court noted that the Division Bench had based its conclusion on assumptions, including the treatment of post-doctoral experience, without addressing the issue formally or seeking clarification.

The Court referred to the principles of statutory interpretation, quoting Hon'ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., who emphasized that "words are but mere vehicles of thought," and that "interpretation must depend on the text and the context." The Court cited the case of Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen, stressing that "a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is," without altering the language. Furthermore, in Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, the Court reaffirmed that courts cannot "rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation" unless the provision is ambiguous or leads to absurdity.

The Court discussed the limited application of "reading down," which can only be used to save a statute from unconstitutionality, as seen in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress: "the doctrine of reading down... can be applied in limited situations." It was also pointed out in Subramanian Swamy v. Raju that "reading down the provisions of a statute cannot be resorted to when the meaning thereof is plain and unambiguous." The Court concluded that "harshness alone cannot justify" the reading down of statutory language, as emphasized in Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu.

The Court addressed two key issues. First, it noted that the Selection Board may set higher criteria for shortlisting candidates, as upheld in M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar: "It is not open to the recruiting authorities to dilute in any manner the norms and standards prescribed by the statutory provisions... but it is always open to them to prescribe enhanced norms." Secondly, the Court underscored that appropriate pleadings are essential in a writ petition, citing Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor: "It is too well settled that the petitioner who approaches the court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction... must fully aver and establish his rights."

On the issue of statutory provisions, the Court reaffirmed that compliance with statutory provisions is mandatory, except in cases of constitutional challenges. It criticized the Division Bench's approach of "reading down" Regulation 10(f)(iii) without demonstrating it was ultra vires and emphasized that judicial overreach occurred when the Court altered the regulation without proper basis. It rejected the Division Bench’s interpretation, stating that teaching experience should remain a criterion for shortlisting candidates, and concluded that the Division Bench’s decision was erroneous.

The Court found the impugned order unsustainable in law and set it aside. Consequently, the writ petition of Respondent 1 was dismissed, and the special appeal filed by Respondent 1 challenging the dismissal of her earlier writ petition was also dismissed, affirming the order of the Single Judge. Additionally, the review petition filed by Respondent 1 was dismissed. The writ petition filed by Brahma Deo was likewise dismissed, and all the appeals were allowed without an order for costs.

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