The Supreme Court set aside the summoning order issued in a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that a complaint filed beyond the statutory period of thirty days cannot be entertained in the absence of a formal application for condonation of delay. The Court observed that condonation cannot be presumed and must be based on reasons specifically placed on record.
The matter arose from a complaint filed five days after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed under Section 142 of the NI Act. The Trial Court, while issuing summons, recorded that the complaint was within limitation. The High Court later upheld this order, observing that courts had inherent power to condone such delay even without a formal application.
Challenging these findings, the appellants argued before the Apex Court that the Trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by presuming timeliness despite clear evidence of delay. Counsel emphasized that although Section 142 permits condonation, such power can only be exercised upon a proper application disclosing sufficient cause.
On the other hand, counsel for the respondent contended that the delay of five days was trivial and within the discretionary powers of the Court to condone. It was submitted that an affidavit for condonation had been prepared but was inadvertently not filed with the complaint, and an application for condonation remained pending before the Trial Court.
The Apex Court, however, disagreed. It observed that the Trial Court erred in proceeding on the assumption that the complaint was filed within limitation, ignoring the admitted fact of delay. The Bench underscored that “condonation of delay cannot be automatic or presumed; the Court must first recognize the existence of delay, then evaluate the sufficiency of reasons provided, and only thereafter exercise discretion.”
The Court further noted that the High Court’s view, that an application for condonation was not a statutory requirement under Section 142(b), was legally unsustainable. Stressing the mandatory nature of statutory timelines, the Bench held that deviation is permissible only when delay is formally acknowledged and justified through a proper application.
Accordingly, the Top Court quashed the summoning order as well as the complaint itself, allowing the appeal. The Court clarified that any civil proceedings for recovery of the cheque amount initiated by the complainant would not be prejudiced by this decision.
Case Title: H. S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd & Ors. vs. M/S MSN Woodtech
Case No.: SLP(Crl.) No. 2002/2025
Coram: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice K. Vinod Chandran
Advocate for Petitioner: Adv. Yugansh Mittal (AOR), Pawan K. Mittal
Advocate for Respondent: Adv. Sudhir Tewatia, Lal Singh Thakur, Syed Mehdi Imam (AOR), Tabrez Ahmad, Shahid Ali Khan
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