Uttarakhand High Court
Prempal Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand on 26 September, 2025
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
Reserved on: 22.09.2025
Delivered on: 26.09.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. RAVINDRA MAITHANI
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. ALOK MAHRA
Special Appeal No. 150 of 2019
22nd September, 2025
Prempal Singh .........Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand
And Others .......Respondents
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Mr. C.D. Bahuguna, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Chandra Shekhar
Dalakoti, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. G.S. Negi, learned Addl. C.S.C. for the State.
Mr. I.D. Paliwal, learned Standing Counsel for the State of U.P.
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Coram: Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
Hon'ble Alok Mahra, J.
Per: Alok Mahra, J.
The present Special Appeal has been filed by the
appellant for setting aside the judgment and order dated
12.12.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
(S/S) No. 2438 of 2018, Prem Pal Singh Vs. State with further
prayer to allow the Writ Petition and grant all consequential
benefits of service including retiral and pensionary benefits.
2. Brief facts of the case are as hereunder:-
That the petitioner was appointed as Constable in
Civil Police of the State (Uttar Pradesh) in the year 1977;
that respondent no. 4 passed an order dated
10.12.1997, whereby, the petitioner was placed under
suspension. The grounds, on which the petitioner was
put under suspension, was that when petitioner along
with other Policemen, was taking under-trial prisoners
from Sub-Jail, Haldwani for producing them before the
Court of Kashipur, petitioner gave sufficient opportunity
to one of the prisoners namely Manoj @ Ghantoori so
that he may telephonically threaten the Former M.L.A. of
Kashipur Rajeev Agarwal. Besides this, he provided
liquor to prisoners Jaswinder Singh @ Jassa and
Shamim.
That only eleven days after the order of
suspension, respondent no. 4 passed an order dated
21.12.1997, whereby, the services of the petitioner were
dismissed by invoking the provisions of Rule 8(2) Proviso
(b) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks
(Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1991 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Rules of 1991').
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
4. The main ground canvassed by the petitioner in
the Writ Petition was that the dismissal order has been
passed by respondent no. 4 without following the principles of
natural justice and without holding any departmental inquiry,
as contemplated under Rule 14 and 16 of the Rules of 1991.
After reorganization of the State of U.P., the Writ Petition was
transferred to this Hon'ble Court and by the impugned
judgment and order dated 12.12.2018, the Writ Petition was
dismissed. The learned Single Judge has held that
Disciplinary Authority has recorded reasons for not holding
regular inquiry and has found no error in the order.
5. Mr. C.D. Bahuguna, learned Senior Counsel has
submitted that Rule 4(1)(a) of the Rules of 1991 defines major
penalty namely (i) dismissal from service; (ii) Removal from
service; (iii) Reduction in rank including reduction to a lower-
scale or to a lower stage in a time scale.
6. Rule 5 of the Rules of 1991 lays down the
procedure for award of punishment, which is quoted as
hereunder:-
"5. Procedure for award of punishment.- (1) The cases in
which major punishments enumerated in clause (a) of sub-
rule (1) of Rule 4 may be awarded, shall be dealt with in
accordance with the procedure laid down in sub-rule (1) of
Rule 14.
(2) The cases in which minor punishments enumerated in
clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 may be awarded, shall be
dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down in
sub-rule (2) of Rule 14.
(3) The cases in which minor penalties mentioned in sub-
rules (2) and (3) of Rule 4 may be awarded shall be dealt
with in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule
15."
7. Rule 14 of the Rules of 1991 lays down the
procedure for conducting departmental proceedings, which is
quoted as hereunder:-
"14. Procedure for conducting departmental
proceedings.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in
these Rules, the departmental proceedings in the cases
referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 against the police officers
may be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Appendix-I.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)
punishments in cases referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5
may be imposed after informing the police officer in writing
of the action proposed to be taken against him and of the
imputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be
taken and giving him a reasonable opportunity of making
such representation as he may wish to make against the
proposal.
(3) The charged police officer shall not be represented by
Counsel in any proceedings instituted under these Rules."
8. On this basis, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
has submitted that since the appellant was dismissed from
service, therefore, respondent no. 4 was bound to follow the
procedure, as prescribed under Rule 14(1) and (2). Learned
Senior Counsel has submitted that it is an admitted case of
the appellant that even no chargesheet was issued. Learned
Senior Counsel has further argued that even if the allegations
leveled against the appellant in the impugned dismissal order
are taken on the face value that he is avoiding the
departmental inquiry by absenting himself, then also,
provisions of Rule 16 would have been invoked, which
provides for proceedings in absentia.
9. Rule 16 of the Rules of 1991 is quoted as hereunder:-
"16. Proceedings in absentia.-(1) Departmental
proceedings against delinquent police officers may be taken
in absentia by the authorities competent to take
departmental proceedings if, the police officer, against whom
departmental proceedings are pending or against whom it is
proposed to start such proceedings or to whom it is
impossible for the inquiry officer to contact, deliberately
absents himself from the place of his posting or from the
proceedings when in progress."
10. Learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that
since no chargesheet was issued, therefore, the allegations
leveled against the appellant in the impugned order that he
was hand in gloves with some of the prisoners, was not a
reasonable and practicable ground not to hold regular
disciplinary proceedings against him. In support of his
contention, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the
Constitutional Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court
passed in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs.
Tulsi Ram Patel and Others, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398,
wherein, he has made a reference to paragraph 130 of the
judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow:-
"130. The condition precedent for the application of clause
(b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is
not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated
by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that
the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not
"impracticable". According to the Oxford English
Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable of being put into
practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or
done; feasible". Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia as
meaning "possible to practice or perform : capable of being
put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible". Further,
the words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably
practicable". Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable
manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was
practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the
context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It
is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required
by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the
inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man
taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not
possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some
instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It
would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry
where the government servant, particularly through or
together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or
intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence against
him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or
where the government servant by himself or together with or
through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the
officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his
family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to
be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general
indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is
immaterial whether the concerned government servant is or
is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this
connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and
terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable
practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment
to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is
generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is
because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this
that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the
disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary
authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary
inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or
merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because
the Department's case against the government servant is
weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the
disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon
the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned
and in such a case the court will strike down the order
dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing
penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India [(1984)
2 SCC 578 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 290 : (1984) 3 SCR 302] is an
instance in point. In that case, the appellant was working as
a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial
Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior
Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the appellant calling
upon him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve
charges of gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted
his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the
appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing
and that another chance was being given to him to offer his
explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant
submitted his further explanation but on the very next day
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an
order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be
retained in service. This Court struck down the order
holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the
conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial
Superintendent who was the disciplinary authority and that
if an inquiry were to be held, the principal witness for the
Department would have been the Deputy Chief Commercial
Superintendent himself, resulting in the same person being
the main accuser, the chief witness and also the judge of the
matter."
11. It is further submitted by learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant that interim order was granted to the
appellant against his dismissal and he continued his service
till his superannuation i.e. 31.01.2018.
12. Per contra, respondents have submitted that
Disciplinary Authority recorded reasons for invoking the
provisions of Rule 8(2) of the Rules of 1991 and have further
submitted that the judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge is reasoned and speaking order and need no
interference.
13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
14. It is an admitted case that no regular departmental
proceedings were initiated against the appellant, as
prescribed under the Rules. Only on the basis of his past
service record and on the basis of the fact finding inquiry, his
services have been dismissed by invoking the provisions of
Rule 8(2) of the Rules of 1991. The reasons recorded by the
respondent no. 4 for not holding regular inquiry and invoking
the provisions of Rule 8(2) of the Rules of 1991 was that the
appellant in order to avoid the departmental inquiry had
absented himself and delay in departmental proceedings
would lower the morale of the Police force.
15. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the
considered opinion that this could not be a reason to dispense
with the procedure to hold regular inquiry as Rule 16 provides
holding of departmental inquiry in absentia of the delinquent
officer.
16. The reasons recorded in the impugned order are
not such on the basis of which it can be said that holding of
inquiry was not reasonably practicable inasmuch as the
petitioner was suspended on 10.12.1997 and dismissal order
was passed on 21.12.1997 i.e. within a period of 11 days,
therefore, the reason that petitioner has absented himself in
order to delay the departmental proceedings cannot be
sustained for the simple reason that the departmental
proceedings were not even initiated before passing the
dismissal order and even the chargesheet was not issued to
the appellant. Further Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of
India postulates for extending reasonable opportunity to a
civil servant before subjecting him to dismissal or removal
from service or in the event of reduction in rank.
17. In view of the forgoing observation, this Court is of
the view that the order impugned is contrary to the provisions
of Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules of 1991 as well as Article 311(2)(b)
of the Constitution of India and the same is not sustainable in
the eye of law.
18. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the
impugned order dated 12.12.2018 passed by learned Single
Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 2438 of 2018 is hereby set-
aside. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned
dismissal order dated 21.12.1997 is hereby quashed.
19. Since, petitioner had already superannuated on
31.01.2018 and he has served till his superannuation in
pursuance of the interim order, therefore, this Court thinks
that it would not be reasonable and fair to the appellant that
the department be directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against him as per the provisions of the Rules of 1991, i.e.
after more than almost eight years of his attaining the age of
superannuation.
20. With the above observation, the present Special
Appeal is allowed.
(Ravindra Maithani, J.)
(Alok Mahra, J.)
Dated: 26.09.2025
Ujjwal
