Unknown vs Satya Kumar Rao
2025 Latest Caselaw 4742 UK

Uttarakhand High Court

Unknown vs Satya Kumar Rao on 9 October, 2025

                                                       2025:UHC:8922



                                              Reserved on 25.09.2025
                                              Delivered on 09.10.2025
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
             AT NAINITAL
          Appeal from Order No. 142 of 2025
                        With
     Delay Condonation Application (IA 2 of 2025)
           (under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963)


Kalyani Sandugu                    ...........Appellant/defendant
                               Versus
Satya Kumar Rao                       ........Respondent/plaintiff
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Presence:-
Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. Neeraj Garg, learned counsel for the respondent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Hon'ble Mr. Alok Mahra, J.

The appeal from order has been preferred against the order dated 28.02.2023 passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Rishikesh, District Dehradun in Original Suit No. 68 of 2021, whereby the temporary injunction application filed by respondent/plaintiff has been allowed.

2. There is a delay of 708 days' in filing the present appeal from order. A delay condonation application (IA No. 2 of 2025) has been filed by the appellant/defendant to condone the delay of 708 days in filing the appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that that the appellant has been suffering from severe motor paralysis and respiratory ailments and was hospitalized for a prolonged period, rendering her physically and mentally incapable of participating in the

2025:UHC:8922 proceedings of the original suit. He would further submit that the appellant is a single mother with a minor child and has no other family members to assist her in contesting the suit. Consequently, she could not execute a power of attorney to any person for pursuing the appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that the appellant was not provided proper legal advice to file the present appeal in a timely manner; that, the delay in filing the appeal was neither deliberate nor intentional, and the same should be condoned to advance justice.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff vehemently opposed the delay condonation application, submitting that the appellant/defendant has taken a false and frivolous ground to seek condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 28.02.2023 passed in O.S. No. 68 of 2021. It was contended that the appellant/defendant is attempting to misuse the process of the Court to further an ulterior motive, thereby causing unnecessary hindrance in the proceedings of the suit. The appellant/defendant has not approached the Court with clean hands and has raised a frivolous plea for condonation of delay.

6. Learned counsel further submitted that O.S. No. 68 of 2021 had been proceeded with ex-parte against the appellant/defendant vide order dated 22.03.2023 by the learned trial court. Subsequently, the appellant/defendant filed an application seeking recall of the said order, to which the respondent/plaintiff filed detailed objections, including additional objections. The learned trial court, by its order dated 30.05.2023,

2025:UHC:8922 rejected the recall application, observing that while the appellant/defendant was shown to be appearing before the Court on a wheelchair, photographs indicated her attendance at a function in the Ashram a few days prior. The Court further noted that although the appellant/defendant had put in appearance through counsel, she subsequently filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint, which was dismissed vide order dated 01.11.2022. The trial court, in the same order, observed that the grounds raised by the appellant/defendant in seeking recall of the ex-parte order did not appear bona fide and that it seemed the appellant/defendant was interested in unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings of the suit.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would further submit that subsequent to the order dated 30.05.2023, the appellant/defendant preferred Revision No. 99 of 2023 before this Court, which was disposed of by the Coordinate Bench vide order dated 10.09.2024. By the said order, the orders dated 22.03.2023 and 30.05.2023 were set aside subject to payment of costs of ₹25,000/-. The appellant/defendant was granted an opportunity to file her written statement within three weeks, with a clear stipulation that no further opportunity would be granted. Despite this, the appellant/defendant filed her written statement in O.S. No. 68 of 2021 and thereafter sought to amend the same. It was submitted that the appellant/defendant, being fully aware of the proceedings, including the dismissal of her application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. and the disposal of the temporary injunction application vide order dated 28.02.2023, is attempting to revisit settled matters without sufficient cause.

2025:UHC:8922

8. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff emphasized that the appellant/defendant did not, at the time of filing the recall application (Paper No. 49C), seek to recall the order dated 28.02.2023 disposing of the temporary injunction application, nor did she challenged the said order before this Court despite full knowledge thereof. The learned trial court, in its order dated 30.05.2023 (para 7), specifically referred to the disposal of the temporary injunction application on 28.02.2023. Copies of this order were also annexed by the respondent/plaintiff while filing objections against the stay application in CLR No. 99 of 2023. At no point, from filing of the recall application till the present appeal, did the appellant/defendant attempted to assail the order dated 28.02.2023 through appropriate proceedings.

9. Learned counsel further submitted that the delay condonation application does not provide any plausible explanation for the inordinate delay of 708 days in filing the instant appeal. The appellant/defendant has been fully aware of the order dated 28.02.2023 throughout, having participated in subsequent proceedings, filed revision, and relied upon her illness as a ground in those proceedings. Such grounds have now been deliberately and mala fide raised to seek condonation of delay in the present appeal. The delay condonation application is therefore misconceived, constitutes a blatant abuse of the process of law, and is wholly without merit. It was urged that such frivolous applications, filed without sufficient cause, deserve to be discouraged, preferably by imposing exemplary costs on the appellant/defendant.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the

2025:UHC:8922 respondent and submitted that the delay in filing the present appeal was caused due to the lack of knowledge and illness of the appellant and absence of proper legal advice. He further submitted that the delay should not be refused on technical grounds and ought to be condoned in view of the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application. He emphasized that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in several judgments, has consistently held that delay condonation applications must be entertained with a liberal approach to ensure substantial justice.

11. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments:

(i) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Another Vs. Ms. Katiji & Others (1987) 2 SCC 107 - The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that delay should be condoned liberally, provided there is no gross negligence or mala fides. The term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction to advance justice.

(ii) Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & Others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others (1974) 1 SCC 317 - It was held that when delay has caused a substantial change in the position of other persons, such as vested rights or intervening interests, these should not be lightly disturbed unless there is a strong explanation. The principle is that rights accrued to others due to delay should not be disturbed without a reasonable explanation.

(iii) Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal

2025:UHC:8922 Representatives & Others Vs. Union of India & Another (2023) 10 SCC 531 - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order condoning the delay and emphasized that condonation is a discretionary power, which must be exercised judicially.

(iv) Rafiq & Another Vs. Munshilal & Another (1981) 2 SCC 788 - The Court reiterated the liberal approach in condoning delays, emphasizing the need to advance justice.

(v) Kumar Sahu Vs. Bhubananda Sahu (2025 Supreme Online SC 597) - While courts must exercise caution in condoning delays, especially long ones, the judgment stresses balancing the scales of justice, particularly for litigants who are socio-economically disadvantaged and reliant on their counsel.

(vi)   Dhiraj   Singh      (Dead)    through    Legal
Representatives        &    Others   Vs.    State    of
Haryana & Others (2014) 14 SCC 127 - In a

land acquisition context, the Court held that the approach to condoning delay must be "pragmatic and not pedantic," and that rigid or hyper-technical interpretations of time limits should not defeat substantial rights.

(vii) Imrat Lal & Others Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Others (2014) 14 SCC 133 -

Reiterated that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be interpreted liberally to advance substantial justice rather than through a pedantic or technical lens.

(viii) State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Ahmed Jaan

2025:UHC:8922 (2008) 14 SCC 582 - The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be construed liberally to facilitate justice, emphasizing a practical and justice-oriented approach over strict technicality.

(ix) Steel Authority of India Limited & Another Vs. State of West Bengal & Others (2008) 14 SCC 589 - Affirmed that procedural delays do not necessarily invalidate governmental actions, provided they are otherwise competent and lawful.

(x) Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 SCC Online SC 600) - The High Court's decision to condone delay was upheld by the Supreme Court, reinforcing the principle that delays may be excused when sufficient cause is shown and justice demands it.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff relied on several judgments to emphasize that delays in filing appeals must be supported by sufficient cause and that repeated or frivolous requests for condonation of delay constitute an abuse of judicial process. He relied upon Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Another (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1093, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Madras High Court's order that had condoned a delay of 1,116 days. The Court held that once grounds for condonation of delay have been judicially examined and rejected, they cannot be re-agitated in subsequent proceedings, and reiterating identical grounds amounts to an abuse of the judicial process.

2025:UHC:8922

13. Learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff further relied upon Baasawaraj & Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013 (14) SCC 81), where the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, reinforcing that delays in legal proceedings must be justified by sufficient cause and that the law of limitation must be strictly adhered to.

14. He also relied upon the judgment In Ajay Dabra Vs. Pyare Ram and Others (2023 SCC OnLine SC 92), the Court held that courts should not condone delays unless there exists a reasonable and satisfactory explanation. Similarly, in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) through Legal Representatives & Others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (2024 SCC OnLine SC 513), the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of a condonation application, emphasizing that the discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised judiciously, and that mere negligence or unexplained delay cannot constitute sufficient cause. The Court also clarified that while considering condonation, the merits of the case are irrelevant; the focus must solely be on whether sufficient cause for the delay is shown.

15. He also referred to Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another (2010 (5) SCC 459), wherein the Supreme Court underscored that courts should adopt a strict approach when considering condonation of substantial and unexplained delays. Likewise, in Popat Bahiru Goverdhane & Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Another (2013 (10) SCC 765), the Court emphasized adherence to statutory limitation periods, particularly under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and clarified that the limitation period for

2025:UHC:8922 applications under Section 28A is fixed and cannot be extended based on a claimant's knowledge of the award. Further, in Salil Dutta Vs. T.M. and M.C. Private Limited (1993 (2) SCC 185), the Supreme Court held that a litigant cannot solely rely on their advocate and must take personal responsibility for pursuing their case. In State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Satish Chand Shivhare and Brother(s) (2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151), the Court observed that a liberal approach to condonation does not permit condonation based on flimsy grounds, and upheld the High Court's rejection of the appeal due to delay.

16. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by Legal Representatives Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Others (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969), the Supreme Court held that administrative negligence by the State is not sufficient to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court set aside the High Court's condonation order and directed expeditious execution of the decree. The relevant paragraph no.258 and 259 are extracted hereunder:

"258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical

2025:UHC:8922 considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants."

17. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

18. The Court has carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for both parties, the materials on record, including the delay condonation application (IA 2 of 2025), the affidavits filed by the appellant.

19. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that the delay of 708 days in filing the present appeal was due to the appellant's serious medical conditions, including severe motor paralysis and respiratory problems, which required prolonged hospitalization. It was further stated that, being a single mother with a minor child and no other family support, the appellant was unable to participate effectively in the proceedings or authorize anyone to act on her behalf. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate and urged the Court to adopt a liberal

2025:UHC:8922 approach under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the interest of substantial justice.

20. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff opposed the delay condonation application arguing that the appellant had deliberately delayed the proceedings and sought to misuse the judicial process. The respondent referred to earlier proceedings, including the ex-parte order dated 22.03.2023 in O.S. No. 68 of 2021, the appellant's unsuccessful application for recall of that order (rejected on 30.05.2023), the prior revision (Revision No. 99 of 2023) disposed of on 10.09.2023, and the appellant's subsequent filing and attempted amendment of the written statement despite Court directions. The respondent contended that the appellant/defendant was fully aware of the temporary injunction order dated 28.02.2023 but deliberately decide not to challenge it earlier and the explanation offered for the delay was neither credible nor bona fide and amounted to an abuse of the judicial process.

21. The Court has scrutinized the judgments cited by both parties. The appellant relied on authorities advocating a liberal approach to condonation to advance substantial justice, while the respondent referred to precedents emphasizing that repeated, long, or unexplained delays, particularly after earlier opportunities cannot be condoned. Cases such as Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran and Others (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1093 and Shivamma (Dead) by Legal Representatives v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1969 stress the importance of examining the bona fides of the explanation, noting that prolonged delays without satisfactory reasons may

2025:UHC:8922 amount to abuse of process.

22. On careful perusal of the record, it appears that the appellant was aware of the impugned order dated 28.02.2023 and participated in subsequent proceedings. Despite her medical ailments, she engaged counsel and pursued other remedies, indicating that the delay in filing the appeal was not entirely unavoidable. The appellant made no genuine attempt to challenge the temporary injunction order within a reasonable time, and the explanation for the 708 day delay lacks credibility.

23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that only if the reasons are genuine and acceptable, then alone, delay are to be condoned and not otherwise. The delay cannot be condoned in a routine affair. A person, who is not vigilant enough, is not entitled for the relief after a prolonged period. It is well considered principle of law that while condoning the delay, the Courts have to consider the genuinity of the reasons furnished by the person seeking condonation of delay.

24. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the extensive case law on the point of condonation of delay, has culled out the principles which need to be followed while condoning the delay. The said principles evolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court read as under:

21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-

pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to

2025:UHC:8922 legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

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xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

25. In Brijesh Kumar and others vs State of Haryana and others, (2014) 11 SCC 351, Hon'ble Apex Court relying upon the previous judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) has laid down the various principles in paragraph 10 of said judgment, which reads as under:

"10. The Courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However, the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone."

26. In view of the above, this Court is of the view that the appellant has failed to establish cogent and sufficient reasons to condone such an inordinate delay, therefore, delay in filing the present appeal cannot be condoned.

27. For the reasons recorded above, delay condonation application is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal from order also stands dismissed, as being time barred.

28. The trial court is directed to decide Original Suit No. 68 of 2021 expeditiously, preferably within a period of one year from the date of this order, after affording opportunity of hearing to both parties in accordance with law.

(ALOK MAHRA, J.) 09.10.2025 Mamta

MAM

TA 4f3e584af1449e430ef900bf09 a6d67ebbd642671329b, postalCode=263001, st=Uttarakhand, serialNumber=5de1751a4f1d9

RANI cabfd54852c9e68911ca8b66d d26690a191648ab5d8dd004ef 0, cn=MAMTA RANI Date: 2025.10.09 12:01:40 +05'30'